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Abstract 
The emergence of Islamist terrorism in the UK has its genesis within an environment 
socially constructed by the organization of fundamentalist Muslims. Since 1989, 
Islamic preachers arriving in London from the Middle East have religiously mobilized 
hundreds of British Muslims drawing them into an extremist milieu termed the 
“Islamic Fundamentalist Movement” by the author. Followers are encouraged to 
adopt extreme political narratives and pursue activities designed to re-establish an 
Islamic Caliphate. Contrary to the prevailing discourse, Islamic fundamentalist 
Muslims are far from constituting a homogenous set of individuals. Based on age, 
overseas connections, experience of conflict and religiosity, they each fulfill specific 
tasks. These include but are not limited to recruitment, preaching, fundraising, 
facilitating and combative jihad. Through socialisation and participation in this 
movement, a minority of adherents have crossed the line and developed a mindset in 
which terrorism has become normalised. For this subgroup of extreme 
fundamentalists, suicide bombing against fellow citizens is considered a legitimate 
means in which to defend co-religionists, challenge western interference in Muslim 
lands and support the recently established Islamic State that now spans Northern Iraq 
and Syria. This doctoral study draws heavily upon recently obtained court transcripts, 
interviews with counter terrorism officers, politicians, journalists and counter 
radicalisation workers in order to provide a unique insight to the environment from 
which the individuals responsible for major UK terrorism conspiracies witnessed 
since 2003 have emerged.  
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Introduction 
This doctoral thesis presents the results of a three-year study into the relatively 
modern phenomenon in which British Muslims have pursued domestic terrorism. 
Before 2001, this specific community were rarely amongst the set of persons 
implicated, charged and convicted of terrorism offences in the UK. The cause of Irish 
Nationalism dominated the legal landscape. Since 2001 however, British born and 
raised second-generation Muslim men have featured in almost every large-scale 
counter terrorism investigation carried out by the security agencies. Between 2003 
and 2013, prosecutors convicted approximately sixty individuals born and or at least 
partially raised in the UK of major terrorism offences. In each of the roughly ten plots 
or conspiracies, evidence presented in court firmly established a clear intention by the 
defendants to detonate improvised explosives devices amongst the civilian population. 
At the height of the terrorist threat in 2005, the Security Service (commonly referred 
to as MI5) stated it was monitoring as many as thirty terrorist-related plots designed to 
kill UK citizens and damage the economy.1  
In June 2012, the director of MI5 Jonathan Evans suggested the Arab Spring 
had facilitated a second coming for Islamic fundamentalists. British would-be 
jihadists, he suggested, are now heading to the Middle East in pursuit of training, 
because ‘parts of the Arab world have again become a permissive environment for Al-
Qaeda’. 2  Counter terrorism officers believe that British Muslims today waging 
combative jihad in Syria have the potential to network with experienced facilitators 
and pursue terrorism in the UK.3 As recently as January 2013, the Prime Minister 
David Cameron framed the current terrorist threat in terms of growing “Al-Qaeda 
                                                
1 E. Manningham-Butler, ‘The International Terrorist Threat to the UK’, Speech given 
at Queen Mary's College, November 9, 2006, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-
us/who-we-are/staff-and-management/director-general/speeches-by-the-director-
general/the-international-terrorist-threat-to-the-uk.html, (accessed 16th February 2015) 
2 J. Evans, quoted by N. Hopkins, ‘MI5 warns al-Qaida regaining UK toehold after 
Arab spring’, Guardian Online, 25th June 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jun/25/mi5-uk-terrorism-threat-warning, 
(accessed 16th February 2015) 
3 Private email between the author and a counter terrorism officer from SO15, New 
Scotland Yard (31st October 2013) 
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franchises”.4 Critically, this research project has sought to develop our understanding 
of why men born and raised in a modern, secular, democratic society readily 
volunteer to pursue jihad overseas and why a minority commit acts of terrorism, 
typically sacrificing their own lives in the process. 
Drawing overwhelmingly on primary research including interviews with 
former UK home secretaries, this dissertation adds an original narrative to the 
discourse surrounding “Islamic Terrorism”. In particular, acts of religious and 
seemingly politically orientated violence carried out in the UK by British Muslims, 
which began around 2003 and continues to this day. Elite interviews conducted with 
government ministers, anti-terrorism police, counter radicalisation workers and 
journalists suggest this contemporary threat to national security is a logical, 
inescapable consequence of an environment socially constructed by the organisation 
and mobilisation of fundamentalist Muslims that began in London circa 1995. The 
European Commission’s expert group on violent radicalisation agree on the 
importance of an environment made of up like-minded individuals as an enabler for 
terrorism. Reporting in 2008, the group stated clearly: 
All diverse political radicalisation waves that resulted in terrorism have 
thrived in an enabling environment characterised by a widely shared sense of 
injustice among concerned segments of the population. Sentiments of 
injustice, exclusion and humiliation have always been powerful forces in 
politics and prime movers for change. 5  
Proponents of social network theories contend that radicalisation is transmitted and 
intensified through collective affiliations. Drawing on biographical evidence, CIA 
analyst Mark Sageman argues that violent radicalisation of Muslim youth takes place 
though bonds of friendship, kinship, discipleship and other common social networks.6 
In a sample of 100 “militant-jihadists”, Sageman found that only 13 attributed their 
                                                
4 D. Cameron, Speech to the World Economic Forum, Thursday 24 January 2013, 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/prime-minister-david-camerons-speech-to-the-
world-economic-forum-in-davos/, (accessed 16th January 2015) 
5 European Commission, ‘Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism’, 
Commission's Expert Group on European Violent Radicalisation, 2008, 
http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20080500_cscp_report_vries.pdf 
(accessed 15th September 2014) 
6 M. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First 
Century, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008, p.115 
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affiliation with “jihad” solely to their religious beliefs and without the intervention of 
friends. It is becoming increasingly clear that an “enabling environment” is necessary 
for the emergence of terrorism. Unlike their counter parts in Palestine and now 
increasingly across Iraq and Syria, British Muslims who commit acts of terrorism 
have no experience of occupation. Factors that might have encouraged a young 
Palestinian to volunteer as a suicide bomber for Hamas are unlikely to have played a 
role in motivating the 2005 London bombers.  
Absent of the sense of injustice typically experienced in Palestine and 
commonly associated with daily humiliation and oppression, Muslims in Europe have 
relied heavily on social networks, political ideology and the significant influence of 
extremist preachers in order to develop the mindset necessary to volunteer as suicide 
bombers. Disseminated by immigrant preachers fleeing persecution during the 1990s, 
the ideology responsible for the London bombings spread quickly across Muslim 
communities in the UK. Popular amongst students and those on the fringes of society, 
extreme religious and political narratives helped foster a mindset in which terrorism 
became a legitimate response to a perceived western war on Islam. Following an 
exhaustive review of the current literature and available evidence, this dissertation 
argues: 
Acts of terrorism carried out by British Muslims since the turn of the twenty 
first century have been the inevitable consequence of an environment socially 
constructed by the organisation of religiously mobilised Islamic 
fundamentalists in the UK. Termed the “Islamic Fundamentalist Movement” 
by the author, followers have been encouraged to adopt extreme political 
narratives and pursue activities designed to re-establish an Islamic Caliphate 
(Empire). Through socialisation and participation in this movement, a 
minority of adherents have crossed the line and developed a mindset in which 
terrorism has become normalised. For a subgroup of fundamentalist British 
Muslims, suicide bombing against fellow citizens is considered a legitimate 
means in which to defend co-religionists, challenge western interference in 
Muslim lands and support the recently established Islamic State that now 
spans Northern Iraq and Syria.  
In order to expand the above thesis, the following dissertation consists of five 
substantive chapters. Individually and collectively, this new literature widely 
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examines the environment socially constructed through the organisation of Islamic 
fundamentalist Muslims, specifically the role it plays as an incubator of extremism 
leading to terrorism. Chapter 1 lays important foundations by introducing core tenets 
of the Islamic faith. Critically and without apology, it asks whether violence 
sanctioned in the Quran may serve as the basis upon which terrorism has become 
normalised amongst a minority of British Muslims. Building on a basic introduction 
to domestic terrorism in the UK presented towards the end of the first chapter, the 
second chapter then formally charts the origins and contemporary re-emergence of 
Islamic fundamentalism as an agent of political and social mobilisation. Embryonic in 
1930’s Egypt as part of the struggle against western colonialism, political narratives 
rooted in a strict interpretation of Islam led to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism 
around the world. Heavily suppressed in the Middle East, preachers fleeing 
prosecution transplanted this part religious part political ideology to the UK towards 
the late 1990s.  
Drawing upon a significant archive of literature published by extremist 
preachers towards the end of the century, chapter three deconstructs the core tenets of 
fundamentalist ideology. More than simply a rejection of western foreign policy, the 
individuals responsible for the London bombings were educated to believe strongly in 
the superiority of Sharia law, the obligation of Jihad as well as the need to completely 
eradicate the state of Israel. By understanding this polycot of extremist beliefs, it 
becomes clear why ending “western interference” in the Middle East is insufficient to 
satisfy the demands of terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda. Following on from this critical 
examination of ideology, chapter four offers a detailed study of the activities carried 
by fundamentalists Muslims in the UK and overseas designed to help re-establish the 
Islamic Caliphate. During the development of this thesis, British Muslims undertaking 
the most important activity, namely “Jihad”, have contributed to the successful rise of 
The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS) today renamed simply “The Islamic 
State” (IS). While enjoying almost no international recognition and indeed widely 
rejected by the majority of the worlds Muslims, the Islamic State governs territory 
greater than the United Kingdom and provides welfare services including everything 
from waste disposal to education. Acts of terrorism carried out against western 
nations today, for example Sydney 2014 and Paris 2015 are no longer about 
establishing the Caliphate. The objective now is to show solidarity with the 
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mujahedeen and help deter Arab and Western aggression designed to destabilise the 
new regime.  
Using ten unique case studies, the penultimate chapter of this dissertation 
seeks to demonstrate a direct link between Islamic fundamentalism and acts of 
terrorism witnessed in the UK since 2003. Within each case, evidence suggests the 
environment socially constructed by the organisation of fundamentalist Muslims has 
been a necessary condition for the emergence of domestic terrorism in the UK. For 
example, all four of the July 7th 2005 suicide bombers internalised extreme political 
narratives promoted by fundamentalist preachers and all four of them undertook 
activities designed to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate, in particular sending finance 
and equipment to the Taliban as well as volunteering for Jihad in Afghanistan. In the 
final chapter, which sets out conclusions and policy recommendations, the author 
critically reflects on the British government’s response to the organisation, politics 
and activities of fundamentalist Muslims in the UK. Specifically, attention turns to 
how policy makers have firstly recognised the threat posed and secondly, sought to 
disrupt the milieu from which a significant number of individuals convicted of 
terrorism offences have emerged. The second half of the concluding chapter then 
presents a series of recommendations designed to assist in the development of counter 
terrorism strategy. Objectively, the author has sought a balance between civil liberties 
and the clear need to combat further acts of terrorism carried out by fundamentalist 
Muslims in the UK. Moving forward now, the remaining sections of this introductory 
chapter present in detail each of the five substantive chapters that constitute the 
doctoral thesis.  
Islam, Fundamentalism, Moderation and Terrorism 
At the centre of this doctoral study is the Islamic faith, a religion followed by over a 
billion adherents worldwide. Even the most liberal writer on terrorism cannot 
legitimately ignore the importance of religion and the prospect of “divine rewards” 
offered to Muslims who volunteer for suicide bombing. Consequently, chapter one 
begins by examining the relationship between Islam and Terrorism questioning the 
legitimacy afforded to those who engage in political violence out of a broad 
interpretation of the Quran. To discourage potential revolution, Western governments 
have widely encouraged the dichotomisation of moderate and fundamentalist Muslims 
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in order to isolate and de-legitimize the latter. Divide and conquer therefore appears to 
be the government’s strategy for challenging and disrupting Islamic fundamentalism. 
While critics applaud moderate Muslims for rejecting violence and supporting 
democracy, concurrently the government clamps down and seeks to marginalise 
fundamentalists who pursue Jihad and promote anti-western political narratives.  
In concluding this first chapter, the author makes an argument for mainstream 
adoption of the term Islamic fundamentalist extremist terrorism as a label to describe 
acts of political violence carried out by British Muslims since 2003. Within this 
dissertation, the author refers to men born and raised in the UK who volunteer to 
undertake terrorist operations as extreme fundamentalists. This well considered label 
more adequately captures the religious nature of what others refer to simply as 
“Islamist terrorism”. Importantly, it narrows the focus of liability for terrorism away 
from the majority of Muslims who reject violence, to the minority of Islamic 
fundamentalists willing to commit terrorism against fellow citizens. Furthermore, by 
prefixing the word “extreme”, the term also communicates that while there may be a 
wide pool of fundamentalists in the UK (those who subscribe to universal adoption of 
sharia), only a small number agree with terrorism in which to achieve it. 
Rise of the Islamic Fundamentalist Movement 
Since the mid-1990s, Islamic fundamentalists in the UK have organised into a de-
facto socio-political movement. Strict obedience to the core principles of Islam 
provided and continues to provide the basis for their organisation, socialisation and 
mobilisation as a political force. Islamic fundamentalism certainly did not originate in 
the UK. This second chapter traces the origins for this devout interpretation of Islam 
that has mobilised generations, back to the years following the collapse of the Islamic 
Empire in 1924. Before WWII and the relative peace enjoyed through the 
establishment of the United Nations, western colonialists sought to dominate and 
plunder the Middle East of its natural resources. Fighting back, Islamic 
fundamentalists competed with Arab nationalists in establishing political opposition 
and attracting public support for the pursuit of independence. One particular group 
established in the 1930’s, “The Muslim brotherhood”, proved particularly popular, 
much to the alarm of the authoritarian Egyptian government.  
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Influential writings by Egyptian scholar Sayyed Qutb, especially his seminal 
book “Milestones”, provided the underlying political ideology of the brotherhood and 
even today, this book continues to strongly influence and direct the activities of 
fundamentalist Muslims convicted of the most serious terrorism offences. Fearing the 
growing popularity of Islamists, autocratic rulers encouraged by the west, led a harsh 
clampdown on preachers and scholars who advocated the re-establishment of an 
Islamic State and a world governed according to Shariah (God’s law). Executed by 
the Egyptian state, Qutb became a martyr for the cause, an inspiration to generations 
of fundamentalists seeking to realise his religious and political ambitions. Perhaps the 
most noted student of Qutb is arguably the Egyptian scholar Ayman Al-Zawahiri. 
Avoiding execution, Dr Zawahiri dedicated his life to the fundamentalist cause and 
eventually became leader of international terrorist group Al-Qaeda after the 2011 
killing of Osama Bin Laden.  
Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Islamic 
fundamentalism regained momentum. Buoyed up by their perceived victory over a 
superpower, veteran Afghan mujahedeen formed new international groups aligned by 
a set of common interests and objectives. Although focused on liberating their 
respective homelands, these Islamic fundamentalists groups shared an overarching 
goal of re-establishing an Islamic Caliphate. Comparable with the period of Sayyed 
Qutb, Middle Eastern dictators supported financially and militarily by the West were 
again able to supress this modern revolution. Faced with overwhelmingly persecution 
for their political and religious beliefs, outspoken Muslim clerics fled to Europe. 
Protected by the very liberal democracy and respect for human rights they openly 
rejected and sought to replace, men like Abu Qatada soon began establishing grass 
roots support for revolutionary groups in Pakistan, Yemen, Afghanistan and in 
particular Algeria. Although partially divided by specific religious doctrine, newly 
arrived fundamentalists in London promoted a generic anti-western political ideology. 
Regardless of what school of Islamic law they subscribed to, each of these preachers 
encouraged followers to adopt extreme political narratives and pursue activities 
designed to support the global fundamentalist struggle. From this organisation of 
Islamic fundamentalist Muslims that began in the mid-1990s, domestic extremist 
terrorism in the UK would later emerge.  
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Politics Associated with Islamic Fundamentalism 
In order to gain an insight into the mindset of British Muslims who pursue terrorism, 
an appreciation is required of the underling political ideology guiding their activities. 
Drawing on a detailed archive of literature published by two fundamentalist groups 
towards the late 1990s, this third chapter details five core tenets constituted by twenty 
unique political narratives. Fundamentalist Muslims who adhere to, promulgate and 
act upon this ideology are aggressively anti-western. Almost universally, they contend 
that there is a global conspiracy driven by the US, UK and Israel to supress the rise of 
Islam and prevent the organisation of fundamentalist Muslims. Discussing the 
motivation behind domestic terrorism in the UK, writers consistently point to British 
Foreign Policy. Suicide Bombing is deemed reactionary, a response to Western 
interference in Middle Eastern countries, support for Israel and the general oppression 
of Muslim worldwide. Key events like the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the battle of Fallujah 
and human rights abuses in Abu Ghraib aggravate religious tensions and cause 
widespread anger amongst even moderate Muslims. However, this reductionist 
approach fails to adequately capture the importance of environment as an agent of 
radicalisation. While the events in Iraq certainly angered the majority of British 
Muslims, only extreme fundamentalists held the necessary mindset to pursue 
terrorism.  
Preachers consistently reminded followers of Allah’s command to live in an 
Islamic state governed by Shariah. Consequently, achieving this objective was and 
continues to be the primary goal of British fundamentalist Muslims. Until the fall of 
the Taliban in 2001, a number of British Muslims moved to Afghanistan to live and 
raise families under Shariah. Recent evidence of how well fundamentalists adopted 
this political goal? appears clear in respect of the Syrian civil war that began in 2010. 
Estimates suggest as many as five hundred British Muslims have joined the insurgent 
group ISIS since 2012 helping to establish a Caliphate ruled according to Shariah.7 In 
addition to political narratives hailing the importance of God’s law, preachers also 
                                                
7 T. Whitehead, ‘Syria a game changer for UK terror threat, warns Home Office 
intelligence chief’, The Telegraph Online, 3rd July 2013, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/10157825/Syria-a-game-
changer-for-UK-terror-threat-warns-Home-Office-intelligence-chief.html, (accessed 
1st March 2015) 
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taught followers about the history of Western aggression against Muslims and how 
Jews are the greatest enemy of Islam. Extremist preachers convinced fellow Muslims 
it is their duty to pursue Jihad in order to fight back against oppression and liberate 
historical Muslim lands, in particular, Palestine. The most controversial tenet of the 
fundamentalist political ideology concerns the legitimacy of terrorism and suicide 
bombing. The final section of Chapter 3 therefore looks at how fundamentalists seek 
to legitimize violence against civilians as part of their fight back against the west.  
Activities carried out in pursuit of a caliphate 
Directed by an extreme political ideology, fundamentalists in the UK undertake a 
series of tasks designed to help re-establish an Islamic Caliphate. This fourth chapter 
examines the process in detail looking in particular at how immersion and intensive 
participation contributes towards developing the mindset necessary to volunteer for 
suicide terrorism. Beginning with recruitment of new followers, the first section 
charts the various locations where preachers have encouraged moderate Muslims to 
adopt fundamentalism. Due to an increase in counter terrorism initiatives, recruitment 
has become far less overt in recent years. Suspicious of moderate Muslims whom they 
believe to have co-operated with Police, recruiters have moved away from the mosque 
instead utilising more closed environments including the Internet, gym, private homes 
and sports groups. At events like demonstrations and public lectures, fundamentalists 
invite Muslims showing an interest in extremist politics to join social circles where 
recruitment now predominantly takes place.  
When British Muslims become involved in the Islamic fundamentalist 
movement, more experienced members indoctrinate them with its political ideology. 
Observers commonly refer to this activity as “radicalisation”. The distinctive 
importance of political ideology for drawing individuals into Islamic fundamentalism 
is recognised by the European Commission’s expert group on violent radicalisation: 
Ideology appears to be a constant feature in the radicalisation process related 
to various forms of terrorism. Indoctrination constitutes a relevant factor in the 
radicalisation of a small but significant minority of persons dissatisfied with 
the socio-political context in which they live. This, in turn, contributes to 
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consolidating violent ideas and attitudes and eventually generates a sub-
culture of violence. 8 
A 2007 report conducted by the New York Police department (NYPD) concludes that 
terrorism is the ultimate consequence of the radicalisation process. Senior NYPD 
analyst and author of a best selling book on Al-Qaeda, Mitch Silber, explains: 
In the example of the homegrown threat, local residents or citizens gradually 
adopt an extremist religious/political ideology hostile to the West, which 
legitimizes terrorism as a tool to affect societal change. This ideology is fed 
and nurtured with a variety of extremist influences. Internalizing this extreme 
belief system as one’s own is radicalization.9 
Surprisingly, it is moderate preachers, not extremists, who lay the foundations needed 
to enable radicalisation amongst British Muslims. At the weekly Islamic service 
(Friday prayers), Imams constantly remind the gathered audience of moderate and 
fundamentalist Muslims about the suffering experienced on a daily basis by their co-
religionists around the world. Rightly, moderate Imams call for the followers to 
provide aid and prayer rather than violent Jihad. These political sermons do not 
encourage Muslims to become fundamentalists, however, inevitably they lead the 
audience to reflect on what they are doing to help end the suffering of fellow 
Muslims.  
Inevitably, a minority turn to fundamentalist groups who preach that Jihad is 
the only legitimate means in which to fight back against western aggression. This 
more focused type of radicalisation involves extremist preachers convincing new 
recruits they have a religious obligation to obey Sharia and thus defend co-
religionists. The third type of preaching concerns targeted radicalisation. In this 
scenario, senior fundamentalist Muslims in the UK strongly encourage fellow 
Muslims to sacrifice their lives as suicide bombers in the fight against western 
occupation and oppression and more recently in defence of the Islamic State. 
Supporting fundamentalist Muslims who wish to pursue Jihad, men with 
previous combat experience have commonly served as facilitators. Two important 
                                                
8 European Commission ‘Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism’ 
9 M. Silber and A. Bhatt, ‘Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat’, 
NYPD, 2007, http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_Report-
Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf (accessed 15th September 2014) 
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theatres of conflict are significant in this respect. Firstly, and in particular for the UK, 
facilitators who have fought in Kashmir provide introductions to second-generation 
family members. In terrorist discourse, writers often refer to this practice as having an 
“uncle in Kashmir”. Even before Islamic fundamentalism took hold in the UK, British 
Muslims were joining Kashmiri insurgent groups like Pakistani backed Lashkar-e-
Taiba in order to wage Jihad. Secondly, British Muslims who fought the Soviets 
alongside the mujahedeen during the 1980s have also served as important facilitators. 
Active in the Islamic fundamentalist movement for decades, these men use well-
established connections to their former comrades in order to enable typically young 
British Muslims the opportunity to undertake military training in Afghanistan.  
Facilitation is an important activity recognised and targeted extensively by 
counter terrorism officers since 2005. Policy makers believe that without networks 
connecting Muslim communities in the UK to Pakistan, potential terrorists cannot 
gain access to training necessary to build explosive devices for suicide bombing. The 
rise of “self-starters” combined with the growing availability of Internet based 
explosives training renders this strategy increasingly ineffectual. For example, in 2008 
British Muslim convert Nicky Reilly, attempted a suicide mission utilising a 
homemade explosive device without having received any training. In practical terms, 
facilitation can range from financing a covert trip to Pakistan, to providing the 
introduction necessary for a British Muslim to undertake military training with an 
overseas insurgent group.  
The majority of British Muslims who train for Jihad consider it a religious 
obligation. Whether or not they actually engage in combat, fundamentalist Muslims 
believe in the need to be prepared. Consequently, only a minority of those who train 
for Jihad actually travel on to locations such as Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan and 
more recently Syria. The majority simply return home to the UK and get on with their 
lives. In the final section of Chapter 4, attention turns to the important activity of 
financing and equipping foreign mujahedeen striving to establish the caliphate. 
Evidence suggests that British Muslims convicted of major terrorism offences have 
previously raised funds and sent equipment to Afghanistan. Participation in this 
activity helped build the necessary connections that would later enable a minority to 
gain explosives training, authorisation and operational support to pursue violent 
terrorist acts. 
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Terrorism born from Islamic Fundamentalism 
Chapters two to four examine in depth the inner workings of the UK Islamic 
fundamentalist movement. Individually and collectively, these chapters present a 
detailed study of how fundamentalists organised in the late 1990s by promoting 
extreme political narratives and engaging in activities designed to re-establish the 
Islamic Caliphate. In chapter five, the focus shifts directly towards the product of this 
environment, namely the pursuit of terrorism by British Muslims. Primarily this fifth 
chapter seeks to understand the motivation behind fundamentalists who cross the line 
and become terrorists, how they operate and lastly what distinguishes them from the 
majority of fundamentalists satisfied with mere political activism. The chapter begins 
by presenting ten case studies in which individuals convicted of serious terrorism 
offences have engaged in fundamentalist politics and activities. Through involvement 
in the Islamic fundamentalist movement, members were sensitive to how the west 
would react to 9/11.  
In December 2001, the “shoe bomber”, Richard Reid, failed in his attempt to 
detonate explosives hidden inside his trainers while aboard a flight from Paris to 
Miami. In the immediate years before their recruitment by Al-Qaeda, both Reid and 
his fellow conspirator Sajid Badat attended sermons given by radical cleric Abu 
Hamza Al-Masri at Finsbury Park Mosque. Like many of their peers, Al-Masri 
encouraged both men to believe that America was at war with Islam and that 
Washington had used 9/11 as an excuse to eradicate the Taliban, the only regime 
governing according to God’s law. Committed fundamentalists, Reid and Badat 
supported by UK facilitators pursued jihad against US forces in Afghanistan. 
However, according to Badat, during basic military training in 2001, operatives from 
Al-Qaeda convinced both him and Reid they could best serve the global 
fundamentalist cause by undertaking a suicide mission against the US. Described as a 
“top down” approach to recruiting suicide bombers, this form of radicalisation 
continued in the UK until at least the liquid bomb plot at High Wycombe foiled by 
counter terrorism officers in August 2006.  
Significantly degraded and debilitated by the War on Terror, the importance 
of Al-Qaeda in relation to terrorism carried out by British Muslims declined post 
2007. The strongest explanation for this decline is the overwhelming success of 
American drone strikes in North Waziristan. Targeted assassination of key facilitators 
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in Pakistan and increased disruption of UK facilitators caused fundamentalist 
Muslims to pursue terrorism almost entirely alone. The only support available to 
British Muslims since 2007 has been and continues to be that offered by fellow 
members of the Islamic fundamentalist movement. Following our examination of 
roughly sixty extreme fundamentalist terrorists involved in ten major terrorist 
conspiracies at the start of chapter five, an attempt is made to profile these individuals 
and in doing so challenge the common orthodoxy that suggests they are void of any 
humanity. Contrary to popular opinion, men who sacrifice their lives for what they 
believe in are rarely aggressive in their everyday life and unlikely to be suffering from 
mental illness. Interviews conducted by the researcher with counter radicalisation 
workers paint a picture of strongly empathic individuals with a history of engaging in 
positive action to support their community. This is certainly true of Mohammed 
Sidique Khan, ringleader of the July 7th London bombers. In addition to serving as a 
community leader and primary school teaching assistant, Khan was active in a group 
known to assist in the rehabilitation of drug users.  
Since it first emerged in the late 1990’s, hundreds of British Muslims have 
engaged with the Islamic fundamentalist movement. Only a small minority have later 
pursued terrorism. In section three of chapter five, the researcher seeks to understand 
what motivates a fundamentalist to cross the line and volunteer to become a terrorist. 
Critically, the author asks to what extent is British foreign policy a primary factor and 
secondly can it be argued that many of those who pursue terrorism are at least 
initially, reluctant volunteers coerced into participating by more committed members 
of the cell? It is plausible that British Muslims who embraced Islamic fundamentalism 
with good intentions inadvertently engaged in conspiracies for which they were less 
than enthusiastic. The penultimate section of the fifth and final chapter examines in 
detail the operational cycle of domestic terrorist plots in the UK. In particular, focus 
turns importantly to the role played by the Islamic fundamentalist movement as a 
facilitator, organiser and general source of support to British Muslims pursuing 
terrorism. 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
In concluding this comprehensive dissertation, attention turns to the British 
government and how policy makers have responded to Islamic fundamentalism as an 
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agent of radicalisation. Findings suggest that recognition of the relationship between 
fundamentalism and terrorism did not occur in Whitehall until shortly after the 
London bombings in 2005.10 Consecutive British governments have long failed to 
appreciate how the mindset necessary to pursue terrorism takes several years to 
incubate and requires an environment conducive to violence. In light of the killing of 
soldier Lee Rigby in May 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron set up a task force in 
order to find new ways in which to disrupt the Islamic fundamentalist movement. In 
considering the government response, this dissertation examines legislation designed 
to limit activities conducted by members of the fundamentalist movement, policy 
initiatives aimed at countering radicalisation within the Muslim community as well as 
practical steps taken by front line services including attempts to shut down the 
facilitation networks. In completing the dissertation, this author presents a series of 
policy recommendations, which seek to build upon the existing counter terrorism 
framework in order to challenge the role of Islamic fundamentalism as an incubator of 
extremist terrorism. In particular, ministers are strongly encouraged to re-introduce 
and expand upon the use of control orders. Firstly as a means in which disrupt the 
organisation of fundamentalist Muslims and secondly to coerce those on the periphery 
of counter terrorism investigations, to undertake government approved de-
radicalisation programmes. Only by having their extremist ideology challenged by 
more learned Islamic scholars, will individuals at risk of pursuing terrorism, 
reconsider the legitimacy of such actions. 
                                                
10 J. Klausen, ‘British Counter-Terrorism After 7/7: Adapting Community Policing to 
the Fight Against Domestic Terrorism’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 
35, no. 1, 2009, pp. 403-420 
Page 23 of 370 
Literature Review 
This chapter outlines the competing theories that seek to explain why British Muslims 
commit acts of violent terrorism, typically killing themselves and innocent civilians in 
the process. When scholars first began studying the phenomenon in the 1980s, they 
posited a remarkable range of motivations. Researchers argued that volunteers gained 
motivation from either religious fanaticism, a desire for revenge against occupation, 
competition with other groups, brainwashing or some form of irrational behaviour 
linked to mental deficiency. Israeli Professor Ariel Marari holds a wide experience of 
studying Palestinian suicide bombers. Drawing on his considerable knowledge, 
Marari readily acknowledges that, ‘in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the 
conclusion that suicide bombers are just ordinary, normal people seems tentatively 
reasonable’.1 The inference from this conclusion is that any suggestion the July 7th 
2005 London bombers were in any way suffering from mental illness, holds little 
weight. On the contrary, Mohammed Sidique Khan (MSK) was arguably a normal, 
hardworking father who served his family and his community well. A seemingly 
empathetic figure, his decision to carry out terrorism is therefore inherently difficult 
to explain. 
There is no public evidence to suggest any of the British Muslims who 
engaged in terrorism were suffering from any form of brainwashing. Consistent with 
his fellow conspirators, Mohammed Sidique Khan believed he was a soldier of God 
fighting against an aggressive neo-colonialist western empire at war with Islam. On 
the surface these men appear to have been motivated entirely by their political beliefs. 
British Muslims who commit acts of terrorism defy any kind of sociological profiling. 
According to a report by the British Security Service (MI5), ‘several hundred 
individuals known to be involved in, or closely associated with, violent extremist 
activity do not fit a single demographic profile, they are a diverse collection of 
                                                
1 A. Merari et al, ‘Personality Characteristics of Self Martyrs/Suicide Bombers and 
Organizers of Suicide Attacks’, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 22, no. 1, 
2010, pp. 87–101; A. Merari et al, ‘Making Palestinian Martyrdom 
Operations/Suicide Attacks: Interviews with Would-Be Perpetrators and Organizers’, 
Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 22, no. 1, 2010, pp. 102–119; A. Merari, 
Driven to Death, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010 
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individuals who do not follow a typical pathway to violent extremism’. 2  This 
assessment from MI5 implies that British Muslims who pursue terrorism represent a 
wide spectrum of individuals from within society. However, this dissertation argues 
that only a specific subset are involved, specifically those who have engaged to 
varying degrees with Islamic fundamentalism.  
Moreover, researchers can better understand violent terrorism when observed 
in relation to a conflict zone than it is in countries enjoying relative peace and 
security. Muslims who execute journalists, bomb aid convoys and drive explosive 
laden trucks into crowds of women and children have typically already experienced 
death and destruction first hand. The British Muslim known as ‘Jihadi John’ had spent 
at least six months fighting on behalf of the Islamic State (IS) before executing three 
western hostages. Violence often has to become normalised amongst terrorists before 
they are willing to undertake it themselves. Certainly, in almost every major UK 
terrorist plot from 2003 to 2014, at least one member of the cell (typically the leader) 
fought on the front line with a foreign insurgent group: Afghanistan, Somalia and 
Kashmir being the most common destinations. Fighting is both practical and 
ideological. Jihadists learn not only how to kill the enemy, but also how to 
dehumanise them. In turn, this allows a minority to commit terrorism against civilians 
whom they no longer perceive as fellow citizens but rather as enemies of Islam. 
However, this presents us with an intriguing puzzle. Palestinians are born and 
raised under occupation. Reflecting on the mindset of someone living amongst the 
rubble of a bombed out neighbourhood, who throws stones and petrol bombs at 
passing military convoys and regular attends funerals of friends and family, one can 
appreciate a desire to retaliate. British Muslims who have conspired to commit 
terrorism have no direct experience of the trauma encountered by individuals living in 
either Gaza or the West Bank. Reflecting on the roughly sixty fundamentalists who 
have engaged in major terrorist plots, all enjoyed the benefits of growing up in a 
modern, secular, generally tolerant, multicultural society. University education and 
professional employment being common factors amongst them; certainly, this is true 
of cell leaders. If British Muslims who pursue terrorism have little in common with 
                                                
2 A. Travis, ‘MI5 report challenges views on terrorism in Britain Exclusive: 
Sophisticated analysis says there is no single pathway to violent extremism’, The 
Guardian Online, 21st August 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/aug/20/ 
uksecurity.terrorism1, (accessed 18th Sep 2014) 
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their foreign counterparts, how can we account for their seemingly irrational 
behaviour? In particular, why did London suicide bomber Mohammed Sidique Khan 
abandon his responsibilities as a father and husband in order to kill innocent civilians 
taking his own life in the process?  
Defining Terrorism 
Legislation introduced as part of the 1999 UK/Northern Ireland Good Friday 
Agreement, formally defined terrorism as, ‘the threat or actual use of an action 
designed to influence government for the purpose of advancing a political, religious 
or ideological cause’.3 Since the objective of any insurgency is to effect regime 
change, the historical dichotomy between terrorists and freedom fighters collapsed 
under the weight of this new legislation. Since 2000, UK citizens can no longer 
without risk of prosecution, support any kind of political violence either at home or 
overseas. A range of non-violent acts including fund-raising, training and exhorting 
fellow radicals to act now constitute terrorist offences. Troubling contradictions 
between anti-terrorism laws and UK foreign policy became acutely obvious when the 
Arab Spring instigated regime change across the Middle East. Notwithstanding the 
British government’s desire to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, upon 
returning to the UK, British Muslims suspected of fighting on behalf of Syrian rebels 
routinely face arrest and prosecution.4 Politicians have expressed concerns that once 
back in the UK, these trained jihadists might cross the line and commit acts of 
terrorism.5 
Accordingly, a detailed consideration of the academic discourse surrounding 
suicide terrorism is required. In particular, the extent to which mainstream theories 
assist us in accounting for the contemporary British experience. Broadly speaking, the 
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current literature leaves something to be desired. In a 2007 review essay, Martha 
Crenshaw, a professor at Stanford University and the doyen of terrorism studies, 
outlined a set of competing theories drawn from thirteen books published on the 
subject since 2002. 6  Highly critical of the absence of a consistent ontology, 
epistemology and methodology, Crenshaw notes the imprecise nature of the concept, 
the absence of established facts and the failure to sufficiently distinguish between 
suicide and non-suicide terrorism. Incompatibility between datasets, ambiguous 
definitions and references to cases that conveniently fit the author’s stated 
classification, largely suggest the field is in its infancy. Crenshaw persuasively argues 
that the inclusion or exclusion of specific events can strongly bias the findings of a 
given study, thus influencing the overall validity and reliability of any conclusions. 
For example, the Japanese Kamikaze fit the profile of suicide bombers, but they were 
soldiers not terrorists. Throughout the first Persian Gulf War 1980 to 1988, waves of 
Iranian children (Basij) clothed in white shrouds traumatised Iraqi soldiers by running 
blindly across minefields. Again, the Iranian state directed these ‘volunteers’ during 
wartime and therefore they do not attract the terrorist label. Intensely problematic, a 
universal theory of suicide terrorism is difficult to achieve due to the irreconcilability 
of the widely varying contexts, objectives, legitimacy and motivations associated with 
competing actors.  
By replacing the word terrorism with the word mission, an approach taken by 
Diego Gambetta, it is certainly possible to combine heterogenetic groups more 
reliably and to escape the labyrinthine debate around the word ‘terrorism’. 7 Liberated 
from the linguistic straightjacket imposed by the subjectivity of the word ‘terrorism’, 
authors are gifted a much broader dataset in which to pursue quantitative analysis 
based upon an investigation of suicide missions. Researchers may ignore the nature of 
the conflict, the legitimacy of volunteers as well as the overall strategic objectives. 
Instead, focusing specifically on why individuals agree to sacrifice their lives in 
pursuit of a specific political or military outcome. On the surface, this approach 
appears somewhat attractive. However, such a broad definition brings in such a wide 
range of variables that it makes it almost impossible to draw definitive conclusions. 
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For example, how does one differentiate between the motivations of terrorist groups, 
and countries that employ terrorism within an existential conflict? By contrast, 
Professor Robert Pape and Dr Mia Bloom refer explicitly to suicide terrorism.8 The 
only incidents considered by these two authors are those in which the perpetrator has 
been designated a terrorist by the US government. One may immediately appreciate 
the inherent flaw within this approach; it relies on an individual or government’s 
subjective definition of who warrants the terrorist label. Let us suggest hypothetically 
that one researcher is Jewish and another Arab. In collecting data, the former gathers 
data from the Jerusalem Post while the later relies on articles in the Palestinian 
Chronicle. The two authors would have two irreconcilable datasets and therefore any 
conclusions drawn from their studies would be entirely subjective. Indeed, one could 
encounter this problem simply by taking two conflicting definitions of terrorism 
offered by different departments within the US government. 
Consistent with Gambetta, Anne Oliver and Paul Steinberg who have studied 
the culture of support behind Palestinian group Hamas, avoid the word terrorism 
entirely. Instead, they refer to murder-suicides.9 Although this term may be welcome 
in Israel by hawkish politicians and senior commanders of the Israeli Defence Force, 
Hamas themselves would almost certainly reject it. Palestinians who volunteer for a 
martyrdom mission do not perceive themselves as committing suicide and certainly 
not murder. Every sacred explosion (colloquial term) carried out against their 
technologically superior enemy is a military operation no different to an Israeli 
targeted assassination. Although Oliver and Steinberg’s definition may not be the 
most appropriate, their avoidance of the word terrorism deserves respect. Arguably, it 
should not matter whether a group is classified as terrorist or insurgent; the process of 
arming and deploying a human bomb remains the same. However, this does not 
suggest we should conflate a mixture of state and non-state actors. Only that it is 
acceptable to combine non-state actors regardless of whether they are labelled as 
terrorists or insurgents by the west. For example, the Turkish PKK, Hamas, the IRA 
                                                
8 R. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, New York, 
Random House, 2005; M. Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 2005 
9 A. Oliver and P. Steinberg, The Road to Martyrs’ Square: A journey into the world 
of the Suicide Bomber, New York, Oxford University Press, 2005 
Page 28 of 370 
and the Tamil Tigers could all be homogenised in a single dataset regardless of 
international disagreement over their designation.  
If word play were not enough to make the study of suicide terrorism 
sufficiently complex, semantic disputes over the probability of death (certain or just 
highly likely), classification of target (civilian or military), and weapon used 
(explosive vest or small arms), further complicate comparative analysis and make 
irreconcilable the competing theories and policy recommendations.10 In pursuing a 
general explanation for suicide terrorism, authors typically combine volunteers and 
groups as homogenous units. This is necessary to allow quantitative analysis and is 
the preferred methodological approach for serious academics in the United States. 
Pape and Bloom both attempt to present a single holistic theory by adopting this 
approach. In contrast, Gambetta and Ricolfi, two European academics with greater 
emphasis on qualitative research methods, reject the possibility of a single explanation 
for the complex universe of suicide terrorism.11  
The structure of Crenshaw’s observations suggests that research into suicide 
terrorism can be appropriately divided into a three-tier framework. Firstly, at the 
personal or individual level, analysis focuses on what motivates an individual to 
sacrifice their life in order to end the lives of others. Leading authors on the 
psychology of suicide bombers include Ariel Merari and Marc Sageman. The former 
makes the case that ‘volunteers’ find it hard to say no to an authority figure, thereby 
making them susceptible to recruitment.12 Meanwhile a study of 400 members of Al-
Qaeda by Sageman found an absence of any antisocial behaviour, mental illness, early 
social trauma or behavioural disorders such as rage, paranoia and narcissism amongst 
potential volunteers.13 Secondly, at the organisational level, authors ask why some but 
not all terrorist groups direct suicide terrorism and what they expect to achieve from 
doing so. The principal authors at this level include Robert Pape and Mia Bloom, who 
focus on foreign occupation and competition between rival terrorist groups 
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respectively.14 Finally, at the social level, interest concerns the degree to which 
particular societies support and engender suicide bombing despite the certainty of 
harsh retaliatory action. Few authors focus specifically on social support and therefore 
literature typically consists of short chapters in books centred on individuals or 
organisational groups.15 
Some respected theories of suicide terrorism typically explain the 
phenomenon by referring to the interplay between the individual, group and the host 
community.16 For example, a society under occupation may construct a mythology of 
self-sacrifice to expel a foreign invader. Seeking to garner support and recognition 
amongst the community, resistance groups capitalise on this socially constructed ‘cult 
of martyrdom’ by offering the means to fulfil personal ambitions of self-sacrifice. 
This holistic description can be recognised in conservative areas of Palestine, 
including Nablus and Jenin, where a significant number of martyrs originated during 
the second intifada.17  In the old town area of the city of Nablus, posters of martyrs 
adorn every wall and the people speak openly of their pride for those who have 
carried out suicide missions against the Israelis. Within the context of terrorism 
carried out by British Muslims; although there is no local host community, suicide 
bombers claim to be acting on behalf of the global Muslim community (Umma).  
Even the most cursory examination of available literature suggests a clear 
dichotomy between old and new terrorism. Modern terrorism refers to campaigns 
waged since the early 1980’s by specific groups in defined locations for explicit 
purposes. Examples include the PPK in Turkey, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in 
Palestine, and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. In contrast, postmodern terrorism is 
detached from a specific community, a recognised terrorist organisation and a set of 
achievable political objectives. From the British perspective, this new wave began in 
2003 with the plot codenamed by Police as Operation Crevice. Available evidence 
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suggests 21st century terrorists are mostly inexperienced and typically have little more 
than an ideological alignment with international groups like Al-Qaeda. Commonly 
they are self-funded, trained in northern regions of Pakistan and motivated by 
perceived Western aggression against co-religionists. Despite the amateurish, self-
start up nature of post-modern terrorists, they have arguably achieved significant 
operations in London, Edinburgh, Madrid and most recently Stockholm. While 
modern theories might with a gymnastic like stretch, explain the post-modern wave 
(for example religion), empirical evidence suggests that this involves painful 
contortion and arguments that are far from elegant. What academia and policy makers 
need is a clear separation between the modern and the post-modern, the rational and 
the seemingly irrational. This chapter seek to focus on this challenge and proceeds by 
examining five mainstream theories that seek to explain what motivated the four 
British Fundamentalist Muslims responsible for the July 7th 2005 London Suicide 
Bombings.  
Explanations for Suicide Terrorism 
The remainder of this chapter systematically examines five mainstream theories that 
seek to account for the phenomenon of suicide terrorism. For each theory, we 
consider how well it fits as an explanation for the British experience of suicide 
terrorism that began in 2003. The first theory considers the concept of top down 
radicalisation, attempts by experienced terrorists to convince fundamentalist Muslims 
in the UK to volunteer for suicide bombing.  
Manipulation by radicalising agents 
Research fellow Kris Christmann suggests that ‘radicalising agents and extremist 
messages’ influence vulnerable young British Muslims towards terrorism.18 In other 
words, British Muslim men from Leeds, Luton, Birmingham, and London who 
engaged in acts of terrorism over the last ten years were radicalised by extremists. 
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Consequently, this dissertation is primarily concerned with the social environment in 
which British Muslims inhabit before volunteering to pursue terrorism.  In particular, 
we are interested in how they are encouraged to adopt a fundamentalist interpretation 
of Islam. Those who chose this path internalise extreme political narratives and 
engage in activities that may eventually lead them towards terrorism. Drawing upon a 
2009 study of major UK terror plots, Bromund and Roach connect at least 61 of the 
87 cell members to Al-Qaeda thereby highlighting the importance of top down 
radicalisation.19 In response, since 2005, the British government has engaged in a 
hearts and minds campaign to turn the Muslim community away from 
fundamentalism towards moderation. Acting in parallel, a long-term counter-terrorism 
programme managed by the Office of Security and Counter-terrorism in the Home 
Office known as PREVENT, aims to protect vulnerable Muslims from the threat 
posed by radicalising agents.  
The PREVENT strand of the UK’s overarching counter-terrorism strategy 
known as CONTEST has been widely criticised, some might even say subjected to a 
degree of derision. Speaking to the BBC in 2014, a senior figure in the Muslim 
Council of Great Britain denounced the programme, claiming that it was having a 
‘negative impact’.20 Harun Khan has said that PREVENT had ‘entirely failed’ the 
Muslim community and served only to push Muslims towards radical groups thereby 
achieving the exact opposite of what it was designed to do. In an earlier rebuttal of 
this ‘protective’ style approach, anthropologist Scott Atran argues ‘there are no Al-
Qaeda cells in Europe and no radicalising agents brain washing young Muslim men 
into pursuing acts of terrorism’.21 Muslims in the West are self-radicalising and seek 
out finance and training rather than have it pushed on them by foreign groups. 22 
Political sociologist and former CIA operative Marc Sageman, also believes the 
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greatest danger comes not from Al-Qaeda, but from Westernised Muslims undergoing 
the process of radicalisation far from the tribal regions of Pakistan.23 
Research fellow at the RAND Corporation, Aiden Kirby, argues social 
dynamics infused with radical Islamic ideology and rhetoric largely drive the self-
starter phenomenon.24 The evidence reviewed by this doctoral study seem to confirm 
the findings of Kirby, strongly postulating that social networks play a necessary role 
in uniting potential terrorists. However, Kirby incorrectly claims the London bombers 
were an autonomous clique whose operation occurred in the absence of any organised 
network or formal entry into the Jihad. Firstly, this proposition fails to capture the 
known connection between UK terror cells originating from the organisation of 
Islamic fundamentalists since the late 1990s. Secondly, in almost every major UK 
terrorist plot, at least one or more cell members pursued jihad overseas before 
volunteering to commit terrorism. Rejecting Kirby’s findings, this study has instead 
determined an affiliate of Al-Qaeda initially recruited the London bombers. 
Subsequently they received explosives training by an operative before returning to the 
UK with orders to carry out a suicide mission ‘on behalf of the brothers’.25 By arguing 
the London bombers operated autonomously, Kirby ignores the necessary role played 
by fellow members of the Islamic fundamentalist movement in both the UK and 
overseas. Danish researchers Crone and Harrow also reject Kirby’s explanation and 
highlight the importance of radicalizing agents. In a 2011 quantitative study of 
Islamist terrorism in the West, both scholars conclude that although most UK 
terrorists plots are internally driven, they are not however entirely autonomous.26 
Limitations in the research conducted by Kirby may be accounted for by the 
absence of two important primary sources from his study. Firstly, he does not refer to 
court transcripts relating to three men who are accused of supporting the London 
bombers. In testimony given by defendant Wahid Ali, he openly - and at great cost to 
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his defence - confessed to attending a 2004 training camp with Mohammed Sidique 
Khan in Pakistan. Ali told the court that when Khan returned early January 2005, he 
had agreed to ‘do something for the brothers back in the UK’.27 Secondly, diaries 
written by Al-Qaeda associate Rashid Rauf and recovered in Germany in 2009, 
discuss in detail how Al-Qaeda operative Abu Ubaida Al-Masri trained the London 
bombers. In the diary, Rauf also discusses the failed July 21st 2005 cell and how they 
failed to maintain contact with handlers back in Pakistan. Reviewing this primary 
material, we cannot accept Kirby’s conclusions that the London bombers were in any 
way autonomous.  
Significantly, Kirby offers tacit acknowledgement of the importance that 
environment plays as an incubator of terrorism. He notes the well-established and 
well-documented culture of Islamic radicalism present in the United Kingdom as 
early as the mid-1990s. This study has established that Islamic fundamentalism first 
began attracting followers in 1995 when Palestinian preacher Omar Bakri Mohammed 
established the now outlawed Salafi jihadist group known as Al-Muhajiroon (ALM). 
Working in parallel to draw British Muslims into fundamentalism, Jordanian cleric 
Abu Qatada also gave regular sermons in which he encouraged followers to pursue 
Jihad in Afghanistan. As momentum gathered due to the British government’s failure 
to offer any kind of challenge, Bakri and Qatada were later joined by Egyptian self-
labelled Muslim cleric Abu Hamza Al-Masri. Together, these men rapidly 
disseminated Islamic fundamentalism across Muslims communities in the UK.  
Widely published scholar Farhad Khosrokhaver has extensively interviewed 
men convicted of being involved in Al-Qaeda. This important research has discovered 
that suicide bombers relate to the concept of martyrdom in fundamentalist Islam. For 
many, a devout interpretation of their faith offers a profound way of channelling anger 
and rejection of western nations that many believe are guilty of oppressing Muslims 
worldwide. Fundamentalists who have organised themselves into a socio-political 
movement since the late 1990s, strongly promote narratives in which the west is 
accused of being at war with Islam. Followers reject western ideas of democracy and 
human rights and are constantly reminded of their obligation to protect co-religionists 
by means of jihad.  
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After the events of July 7th 2005, the British government introduced a new 
counter terrorism strategy known as CONTEST. An examination of Muslims 
communities in late 2005 raised concerns about their isolation from the rest of society 
amid public fears of radicalization and the fostering of terrorism within this 
environment. These uncertainties were compounded by a number of domestically 
generated acts of extremism, notably the High Wycombe plot to detonate liquid 
explosives aboard passenger aircraft in 2006. The stipulated rationale of government 
policy is to stop members of the Muslim community in Great Britain from becoming 
radicalized to such an extent that they either commit or at least support acts of 
terrorism. In a word, de-radicalisation has become the focus of policy. The post 2007 
paradigm shift in counter terrorism strategy, presents tangible evidence that 
government recognized the importance of challenging the wider environment from 
which Islamic terrorism has emerged. Yet in 2014, Maajid Nawaz, leader of an anti-
extremism think tank claimed that despite government rhetoric, there was still no 
satisfactory strategy to challenge non-violent extremism and the environment from 
which potential future terrorists continue to operate unchallenged. 28 
Religion 
British Muslims who conspired to commit terrorism between 2003 and 2014 adhered 
to a fundamentalist interpretation of their faith. More generally, author and 
philosopher Sam Harris argues ‘the mainstream doctrine of Islam contains this notion 
of jihad to kill infidels. Anyone who does not accept this claim has either not read the 
Koran or is simply lying’.29 Rejecting competing explanations for suicide terrorism, 
Harris argues the world is full of poor, uneducated, exploited, and oppressed peoples 
who do not commit the acts of terrorism that have according to him, become 
commonplace amongst Muslims.30 Such a broad generalisation fails to take into 
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account the substantial campaign of suicide bombing carried out by oppressed secular 
Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka. Until their defeat in 2009, the Tigers consistently deployed 
operatives on suicide missions against both military and civilian targets. Rejecting any 
suggestion that Islam has been unfairly ‘hijacked’ by terrorists, Harris vehemently 
attacks the entire Muslim faith. Provocatively, he claims, ‘it is not merely that we are 
at war with an otherwise peaceful religion that has been hijacked by extremists, we 
are at war with precisely the vision of life that is prescribed to all Muslims in the 
Quran’. 31  Mainstream British politicians do not support this proposition. They 
consistently point out that the majority of the Muslim community in the UK neither 
engage nor support any interpretation of Islam that advocates violence in any form, let 
alone against innocent civilians.  
The author of a number of important books on the subject of reason versus 
religion, Harris contends that Islamic doctrine sufficiently accounts for the 2005 
London bombings. For Harris, much of the Muslim world has rationalised suicide 
attacks, which they refer to as ‘sacred explosions’.32 Within this normalised ‘cult of 
martyrdom’, volunteers believe that upon detonation, they ascend to paradise where 
space has been reserved for them and their family. Like Harris, Nasra Hassan also 
focuses on religion, paradise, and divine rewards sought after by volunteers for 
suicide terrorism. Hassan agrees with Harris that volunteers intercede on behalf of 
their loved ones so they too can be saved from hell.33 British Muslims who pursue 
terrorism believe that rewards in the heavenly afterlife are plentiful and far greater 
than any tangible benefit offered on earth. Addressing the British public in a 
martyrdom video recorded before the July 7th London bombings, Mohammed Sidique 
Khan strongly implies that he is motivated by the prospect of entering paradise which 
is far more important than anything on earth. Specifically he says, ‘our driving 
motivation doesn't come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer’.34 
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In terms of educational attainment, British Muslim terrorists range from the 
complete illiterate all the way up to degree level.35 In Pakistani culture, marriage and 
a stable family are highly regarded with low levels of divorce. Consequently, few 
British Muslims who pursue terrorism can claim to have been negatively influenced 
by a troubled upbringing or family breakdown. The majority were either middle class 
or better. Harris subsequently asks ‘how many engineers or doctors need to fly planes 
into buildings for us to appreciate that it is not poverty or lack of education that 
motivates suicide bombers?’36 For Harris, religion, specifically Islam and adoption of 
fundamentalist political ideology lay at the heart of suicide terrorism pursued by 
British Muslims.  
French Sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar offers the concept of ‘martyropath’ 
whereby, ‘the goal is no longer to realize an ideal, but to take leave of life by 
destroying the enemy in an apocalyptic vision that will put an end to life’.37 
According to Khosrokhavar, suicide bombers are entirely of the Islamic faith because 
unlike other religions, Islam ‘does not avoid the question of legitimate violence, it 
resorts to violence when justice requires it to do so’.38 Harris reinforces this idea by 
suggesting that although one could potentially develop a doctrine of martyrdom from 
Buddhism; it is incredibly difficult compared to Islam, where it is much more 
straightforward.39 In seeking to isolate Islam as an inherently violent religion and 
therefore present it as a single holistic explanation for suicide terrorism, Harris 
compares Muslim terrorists to Chinese and Israeli political prisoners. Dissidents and 
political opponents that have spent years in Chinese prisons suffering the most brutal 
torture leave prison and make statements like, ‘my greatest fear when I was in prison 
was that I would lose my sense of compassion for my torturers’.40 In contrast, Harris 
argues that due to what Muslims believe according to Islam, one will never find a 
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Muslim terrorist coming out of prison who will speak in similar terms to the 
Tibetans.41 
The absence of suicide terrorism amongst followers of other religions may 
stem from the absence of justification by their leaders. If the Pope in his weekly 
address told the world’s Catholics they were obliged to pursue martyrdom against 
anyone burning Churches in Nigeria, then at least a minority would carry out his 
instructions. Catholics in Africa are willing to die from Aids because Pope Benedict 
the XVI objects to contraception. If eulogised by the Catholic Church, would they not 
be equally enthusiastic to commit suicide in pursuit of religious martyrdom? Yusuf 
Qaradawi, the world’s most influential Muslim spokesman and writer, and Sheikh 
Tantawi who heads the world’s most prestigious centre of Islamic learning at Egypt’s 
Al Azhar Univeristy, both support and justify the use of suicide missions against 
Israeli civilians. Whether or not religion alone explains suicide terrorism, it is 
impossible to ignore the consistent claims by volunteers that they act on behalf of co-
religionists. In the absence of Islam, there would be no global Muslim Umma and 
therefore no virtual kinship to inspire individuals thousands of miles from a conflict 
zone to give their lives altruistically. British Muslims who pursue terrorism constantly 
refer to the humiliation suffered by co-religionists. Whether or not they feel 
compelled to act by religious doctrine, one cannot discount the power of religion as a 
mobilising agent, drawing young British Muslims into an environment from which 
acts of terrorism may ultimately emerge.  
However, Crenshaw points out that other than Israeli and Shay, all other 
authors she has reviewed reject the idea that religion alone is a necessary or sufficient 
cause for suicide terrorism.42 Pointing to Lebanon, Crenshaw notes that suicide 
attacks were not the exclusive province of the Islamic group Hezbollah and that 
secular political parties were equally engaged. Although religion alone may not be 
sufficient to encourage suicide terrorism, several authors agree that it has a role to 
play. In respect of 1980’s Lebanon, Reuter has observed, ‘Religion, patriotism, and 
the willingness to sacrifice oneself can easily blend together when the challenge is to 
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resist a foreign occupier of a different faith’.43 Pape contends that it is not religious 
doctrine per se, but religious difference between the occupier and the occupied that 
enables suicide terrorism. ‘The taproot of suicide terrorism is nationalism, but it is 
inflamed by religious difference’.44 Hopgood disputes the role of religion in the case 
of Sri Lanka, arguing that religion is not a feature, which can explain the emergence 
of suicide missions amongst the Tamil Tigers.45 Although the Tamils are a Hindu 
minority in a predominantly Buddhist country, it is difficult to accept the Tamils 
feared religious persecution given the passive and non-confrontational nature of 
Buddhism. Bloom agrees with Hopgood, suggesting that religion played little part in 
the motivation by the Tamil Tigers to adopt suicide terrorism beyond the role of 
Hinduism as an ethnic marker.46  
At the 2006 Beyond Belief Conference, anthropologist Dr Scott Atran 
challenged two empirical claims by Harris in an attempt to discredit his universal 
theory of religion. Firstly, he highlights (as many others have) that volunteers for the 
Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka were not driven by religion, but were more likely to have 
been suffering from personal loss. 47 Secondly, against claims that Islam has a 
monopoly on suicide terrorism, Atran correctly points to the secular insurgent group, 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).48 Between 2001 and 2004 
during the second intifada, at least six individuals from PFLP successfully carried out 
suicide missions in Israel killing thirteen civilians. Leonard Weinberg offers further 
evidence discounting Harris in his book chapter ‘Suicide Terrorism for Secular 
Causes’.49 According to Weinberg, two types of Viet Cong units were involved in 
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carrying out acts of suicide terrorism. The most widespread and notorious were 
‘suicide cells’ or ‘suicide teams’, created at the beginning of November 1967 in 
connection with the General Offensive and General Uprising.50 Although the Viet 
Cong were recognised as insurgents, not terrorists, thereby highlighting the earlier 
critique by Crenshaw, they still fit the profile of individuals willing to sacrifice their 
life in order to take the lives of their enemy.  
British Muslim terrorists are rarely uneducated and poor and there is no 
evidence any were suffering from mental illness when they volunteered to pursue 
terrorism. This leaves few reasons to account for their seemingly irrational decision. 
Religion provides an effective set of narratives, symbols, ideas and obligations that 
recruiters can use to convince young men to volunteer for a suicide mission. 
Consequently, in the absence of other theories, in the case of British Muslims, religion 
as an instrument of radicalisation offers a strong explanation. Muslims who pursue 
terrorism in the UK commonly originate from the most religiously conservative areas. 
For example, East London and the Sparkbrook area of Birmingham have been 
accused of being ‘hotbeds of radicalisation’.51  The absence of convicted terrorists 
over the age of thirty-five, suggests only the young are willing to accept the political 
ideology pushed on them by fundamentalist preachers.  
Occupation 
Robert Pape, currently at the University of Chicago and founder of the Chicago 
Project on Suicide and Terrorism, argues his theory of occupation adequately 
explains the entire universe of suicide terrorism.52 Drawing on a comprehensive 
dataset comprised of over three hundred attacks between 1980 and 2003; Pape argues 
the tactic is used successfully to compel modern democracies to withdraw military 
forces from territory considered by terrorists to be their own.53  In contrast to 
authoritarian regimes that require little popular support, democracies are especially 
vulnerable to the devastation and fear that suicide terrorism generates. Examples 
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outlined by Pape include the bombing of the US Marine barracks in 1983, attacks 
against the Israeli Defence Force by Hezbollah in South Lebanon, and attacks against 
Israeli civilians by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza and the West Bank. 
In each case, Pape contends that suicide terrorism is used to force the opponent to end 
their occupation or at the very least cede concessions during protracted negotiations.54  
Pape’s theory does not command universal agreement. Critics identify a number of 
important flaws with his underlying assumptions and conclusions. Authors Pedahzur 
and Perliger point out that more than one-third of suicide attacks from 1982 to June 
2005 were carried out against undemocratic regimes.55 In their study of five countries 
in which terrorist groups conducted over 80% of the total suicide attacks carried out 
worldwide, the majority were directed against weak democracies. 
In the case of suicide terrorism carried out in Palestine, which provides 30% of 
Pape’s dataset, questions have been raised over the extent to which the tactic can be 
said to have been successful. Jon Elster argues that Pape’s claim, ‘suicide attacks 
between 1994-1995 forced Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories ahead of 
schedule’ rests exclusively on ambiguous statements by then Prime Minister Rabin 
and self-serving statements by Hamas.56 Brym and Araj claim that anything conceded 
by Israel was by no means sufficient to offset the destructive impact of retaliation, 
which included arbitrary arrests, internment, house searches and crippling 
checkpoints.57 Mia Bloom notes that public opinion polls indicate that according to 
every available indicator, economic, social, health, etc, Palestinians are worse off now 
than they were before the al-Aqsa intifada.58 Any observer familiar with daily life in 
the West Bank would find it impossible to accept that Palestinians achieved anything 
tangible from suicide terrorism. The satisfaction and restitution of honour that might 
have been drawn from limited acts of retaliation was and continues to be significantly 
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offset by the punishing counter-insurgency strategy in place today throughout the 
occupied territories. 
Despite semantic questions on democracy and what constitutes a successful 
campaign of suicide terrorism, there is reason to accept the core premise of Pape’s 
theory. It also conveniently accounts for the important Sri Lanka case. It is enough for 
the proponents of suicide terrorism to perceive the tactic works, however limited, for 
it to constitute sufficient motivation. Success, for example, may involve nothing more 
than uniting the population. If resistance groups felt they gained absolutely nothing 
from suicide terrorism then it is difficult to understand why they would continue 
(assuming they act rationally). What does strongly undermine Pape’s theory of 
occupation however, is that Palestinians continue to live under occupation today albeit 
it to a lesser extent, and yet there has been no active suicide terrorism for at least five 
years. Although the West Bank barrier has made it difficult to carry out such a 
mission, there remain plenty of less secure targets not covered by the barrier. The 
Palestinians are no better off after the second intifada and the occupation continues; 
despite this, suicide bombing has ceased. The only difference post-intifada is that 
since Hamas took over Gaza, they are no longer in competition with Fatah. 
Administration of Palestine has been divided between the two groups and this has 
removed the need for them to compete over limited popular support and finance. 
At the social level, Pape argues that occupied populations support suicide 
terrorism because the alternative - a successful conquest by a foreign invader - would 
be too damaging.59 In the case of the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers, Pape suggests that 
community support for suicide terrorism was driven by a ‘fear of religious 
persecution’ and that ‘the most prominent factor driving Tamil support for individual 
self sacrifice came from a fear of Buddhist extremism’.60 The absence of any 
empirical data on ‘Buddhist Extremism’ beyond acts of self-immolation by Buddhist 
Monks greatly weakens Pape’s suggestion. In the case of Palestine, the occupation 
theory for explaining social support is more obvious given the genuine belief amongst 
Palestinians that Zionism presents an existential threat. In Iraq however, the swift 
timetabling of elections and consequent introduction of a democratic parliament 
suggests the population (if they ever did support suicide terrorism) were not 
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convinced the Americans wanted to stay any longer than they had to. Although as 
Pape has argued, suicide terrorism began in 2003 against the Western occupiers, it 
quickly became associated more with sectarian violence designed to destabilise the 
new government.  
At the individual level, it is difficult to disaggregate personal motivations 
given their stratification from personal trauma to the pursuit of supposed heavenly 
rewards in the afterlife. If occupation alone is sufficient to motivate a volunteer, then 
how can we account for the relative absence of volunteers over thirty? Why are those 
who have spent a lifetime under occupation not at the head of the queue? One can 
hardly argue that physical fitness and good health is necessary to trigger an explosive 
device. Whether or not a group offers material support would not limit an individual 
living under occupation from driving a vehicle into enemy citizens. The absence of 
suicide terrorism in countries indirectly occupied by American forces - namely 
Yemen, Bahrain and Kuwait, strongly discounts occupation as a personal level 
motivation. While occupation provides a strong explanation for the formation of 
resistance groups and their decision to adopt suicide terrorism, Pape’s theory of 
occupation fails to adequately explain both social and individual level support. 
In the wake of 9/11, the theory of occupation has been further weakened. This 
has been due to a number of suicide bombings in regimes that are less than 
democratic and who are not engaged in any kind of occupation. Pape has sought to 
salvage his theory by arguing that suicide bombings carried out in Saudi Arabia, 
Morocco, and Indonesia were proxy bombings aimed at the United States and were 
therefore coercive against a democracy. Pedahzur rejects this claim, arguing, ‘for the 
most part, suicide actions performed under the flag of the jihad and attributed to Al-
Qaeda were, in effect, local initiatives stemming from Islamic organizational interests 
operating within the borders of a given country and whose aspirations principally 
amounted to a chance of rule in that same country’.61 In respect of British Muslims 
pursuing suicide terrorism, it is argued that the invasion and occupation of 
Afghanistan and Iraq provided the necessary motivation. However, domestic 
terrorism carried out by British Muslims did not occur until 2003, two years after 
coalition forces first arrived in Afghanistan. Furthermore, two former Labour Home 
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Secretaries strenuously reject any suggestion that the invasion of Iraq acted as a 
catalyst for the London bombings.62 
Strategic outbidding 
Occupation, while important, is insufficient as a universal explanation for suicide 
terrorism. While Bloom agrees with Pape that volunteers seek autonomy or 
independence, she argues instead that it is the desire to enhance an organisations 
prestige that helps mobilize support, publicity and finance.63 Described by Bloom as 
‘strategic outbidding’, her theory is based on a study of how group’s have deployed 
suicide bombers in Palestine, Sri Lanka and Turkey between 1994 and 2004. During 
the second intifada, which began in September 2000, Hamas sought to outbid the 
governing Fatah organisation by orchestrating an orgy of indiscriminate violence 
against the Israelis. These acts resonated strongly with the Palestinians who were 
suffering greatly from a heavy-handed counter insurgency campaign conducted by the 
occupying Israeli Defence Force. According to Bloom, support for the bombings and 
the radical Islamic groups increased after every suicide mission concomitant with 
declining support for Fatah.64 Crenshaw cites Scott Atran, Dipak Gupta and Kusum 
Mundra as all tending to support Bloom by suggesting that the effectiveness of 
suicide terrorism depends on its ability to mobilize constituents in order to dominate 
the competition in a local power struggle.65  
In support of her theory of competitive political mobilisation, Bloom points to 
the branding of martyrdom videos and the competing claims of responsibility that 
typically follow a successful mission. Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad issued 
competing claims of responsibility for the infamously devastating ninth of August 
2001 attack on the Sbarro pizzeria. Again, in May 2002, Hamas and the PFLP issued 
competing claims for the suicide attack on the Netanya market.66 No fewer than four 
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different groups tried to claim credit for the bus bombing of 17 July 2002, which 
killed five people and injured forty.67 Bloom notes that attacks are much more closely 
related to periods when Arafat is weaker and rival organizations compete to fill the 
power vacuum.68 Imad Faluji and Darb Ashwak have argued that Palestinians were 
disillusioned with both Arafat and the Palestinian Authority in general. Given the 
deadlocked peace process, it was a perfect moment for radical groups to increase their 
share of the political market by engaging in violence.69 In further support of the 
strategic outbidding theory, Kydd and Walter identify extremist violence as being 
strategic with the aim being to influence not only the enemy, but also rival groups and 
the local population.70 
Bloom has focused her study on the second intifada; a time of significant 
unrest, a time when Palestinians were engaged in an existential crisis. She notes that 
of the 225 suicide attacks that occurred between 1993 and 2004, none were aimed 
towards blocking the peace process but rather at internal political rivalry.71 Before the 
second intifada, both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) had a long history of 
engaging in Suicide Terrorism. The first suicide bombing in Palestine occurred in 
1989 near Kiryat Yearim. An operative from PIJ detonated a device aboard Bus 405, 
killing 16 passengers. Four years later in 1993, Hamas became the second Palestinian 
resistance group to carry out a suicide mission. Over the next 12 months, Hamas and 
PIJ worked together on three further missions resulting in the death of 16 Israeli 
citizens. It would be another eight years before the ruling Fatah party would instruct 
its militant wing Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade to follow suit. If suicide terrorism is about 
outbidding rivals, then why did Fatah wait over ten years before joining the fray? 
Support for political opponents fluctuated long before the second intifada and 
therefore if suicide terrorism resonated so strongly with the population, one expects 
that Fatah would have engaged far sooner than they did.  
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Far from seeking to compete with one another, Palestinian insurgents have 
often united against the harsh counter insurgency campaign waged by Israel. Between 
2005 and 2006, Hamas carried out only one operation, compared to five by Al-Aqsa 
and seven by PIJ. If suicide terrorism is about outbidding, why did Hamas as the 
number two political party, not engage more significantly? Pape and Victor Ricolfi 
have both discounted the outbidding theory, pointing out that Palestinian insurgent 
groups have often worked together on joint missions.72 Terrorist groups may compete 
with each other at a time when public support for suicide terrorism is at its highest. 
Those willing to engage in the most vicious, most visually compelling acts of violence 
satisfy demands for retaliation after the latest round of targeted assassinations or 
‘strategic incursions’. As a reward, that group is likely to enjoy greater support 
domestically and internationally. As a punishment, the group is certain to come under 
greater scrutiny by the enemy, suffer from an increased number of assassinations and 
face political sanctions across the board. The terrorist group, which refers to itself as 
the Islamic State (IS), enjoyed a significant increase in support both financially and in 
terms of recruitment after it began publishing videos on the Internet showing its 
overwhelming capacity to carry out what observers have described as crimes against 
humanity.  
Jon Elster argues that game-theoretic rational choice theories like Bloom’s are 
doomed to fail for two fundamental reasons. Firstly, organisers may not be that 
rational (especially in wartime when cognitive bias is high) and secondly, game 
theory has little to say about the equilibrium outcome of strategic interaction between 
more than two actors.73 In November 1998, 75 per cent of Palestinians ceased to 
support suicide operations altogether. By 1999, over 70 per cent of Palestinians had 
faith in the peace process, and support for suicide bombings fell to 20 per cent. 
Support for Hamas at this time was at its lowest point ever (below 12 per cent). 
Throughout this period, when it appeared that the peace process would succeed and 
the majority of Palestinians preferred peace to continued violence, suicide terrorism 
continued. This suggests groups will engage in the tactic regardless of public opinion. 
Public support appears to act independently. It is more likely explained by the level of 
brutality directed against the population by the enemy. Martha Crenshaw argues that 
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Bloom’s analysis of Sri Lanka, one of her three major case studies, is contradictory. 
By her own admission, when the LTTE began its suicide attacks in 1987, the other 
Tamil militant groups had largely been destroyed.74 For a theory of outbidding to 
hold, the LTTE would have to have engaged in suicide terrorism between 1983 and 
1987 when the group faced its most ardent opposition. Pape argues that it was not 
until 1990 that the LTTE first began suicide terrorism, well after the elimination of its 
rivals.75 
Outbidding theory is to an extent persuasive in the case of modern suicide 
terrorism, in particular the case of Palestine. However, it is significantly weak with 
respect to post-modern terrorism of the type witnessed across Europe since 2003. Far 
from seeking to compete with Al-Qaeda, groups like Islamic Jihad in the Arab 
Peninsula, previously led by the American Anwar Al-Awlaki, have sought to present 
themselves as followers of Bin Laden rather than competitors. Yoram Schweitzer 
argues that the ultimate goal of Al-Qaeda is to pressure the West into changing its 
policies toward the Muslim world, and to that end they deliberately promote suicide 
terrorism in the hope that others will imitate there modus operandi.76 In the case of 
Europe, young jihadists have little, if any, genuine relationship with any particular 
group. According to Scott Atran, these ‘bunch of guys’ seek out Al-Qaeda in the hope 
of obtaining training and guidance in the pursuit of martyrdom.77 More importantly, it 
is simply not the case that so called ‘home-grown’ terrorists have engaged in any kind 
of strategic outbidding against co-jihadists either at home or overseas. Rather co-
operation is the norm with conspirators doing whatever they can to assist fellow 
terrorists. Islamic terrorist cells in the UK are known to have co-operated and trained 
together in Pakistan.  
From a British perspective, the outbidding theory holds little weight since 
British Muslims who volunteer for terrorism do not belong to any recognised group. 
Cells form ad hoc in order to carry out a one off mission and they do not compete 
with anyone in order to do this. However, outbidding theory may be developed to 
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provide an explanation at the individual level of analysis. Islamic fundamentalists, in 
particular reverts are known to pursue a greater level of religiosity amongst their peer 
group. Often seeking to atone for past mistakes, new Muslims and those who have 
embraced their home religion more devoutly are at the forefront of the Islamic 
Fundamentalist Movement. For example, middle class Richard Dart who converted to 
Islam under the direction of preacher Anjem Choudary was arrested in July 2012 
accused of plotting to bomb the funeral parade of soldiers returning from 
Afghanistan.78 Men like Dart gather privately in homes to discuss the latest addition 
of the Al-Qaeda Inspire magazine while slowly encouraging one another to hold more 
extreme views about the West. Indeed it is through this process of outbidding 
whereby members of the group seek to be the most revolutionary, that agreements to 
carry out terrorism first emerge. While some members will fall away, the core 
element made up of the most committed will further seek to outbid one another as the 
plot takes shape and the ambitions became increasingly extreme. 
Trauma 
In the early 1990s, psychologist Charles Snyder derived what he referred to as ‘Hope 
Theory’. According to his research, hope consists of agency and pathways. When a 
person has hope, they possess the will, determination and a set of strategies to achieve 
their goals. Those who lack hope, tend to adopt mastery goals. They choose easy tasks 
that do not challenge them or offer any opportunity for growth. It is believed people 
with mastery goals act helpless and feel a lack of control over their environment 
because they do not believe they have the capacity to obtain the future they want. In 
short, they have no hope. Due to the reality of occupation, Palestinians commonly feel 
that they are not in control of their own lives. Consequently, they have no hope and 
this means they choose easy tasks, one of which includes volunteering for suicide 
bombing. If life cannot mean anything on earth, sacrificing it for religious beliefs at 
least restores in them a degree of hope. Young Palestinian men and recently women 
who volunteer for suicide bombing operations in Israel, are commonly raised to 
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believe Jews (whom they are taught to dehumanize) stole their land. Post-traumatic 
stress disorder and visceral hatred all contribute to the explanation of why young men 
readily agree to detonate explosives strapped to their bodies while riding buses in 
down town Tel-Aviv. From a western perspective, Cottee suggests that terrorism in 
Europe is best understood as a collective response or solution to the strains 
encountered by young Muslims, imposed on them by the circumstances in which they 
find themselves.79 
Hopelessness, frustration, humiliation, persecution, grief, anger and injustice 
can significantly traumatise those living in a widely marginalised society. Former 
chair of the Armed Forces Muslim association, Afzal Amin has said, ‘young Muslims 
in inner city Britain have been left disenfranchised by politics and let down by imams 
and other community leaders’.80 Recognising the role of radicalising agents, Amin 
reflects on how British Muslims ‘turn to this gang of brigands cloaked with a false 
version of Islam’. Drawing parallels between British Muslims and the white working 
class, Amin believes, ‘They have rebelled against everything that is familiar to them, 
but instead of Mohicans or facial piercings, they have opted for the YouTube glory of 
becoming an internationally wanted terrorist at war with the superpower that is the 
US.’ 81 Civil War in Syria that has raged since 2010 has been fought both on and 
offline with Social media providing a significant channel in which to recruit British 
Muslims. Videos showing the exploits of terrorist group ISIS have proved popular as 
well as specific recruitment propaganda that continues to flood sites like twitter and 
facebook. 
Although trauma might appear to be specific to individuals, resistance groups 
and society can equally suffer. A targeted assassination against the leader of a group 
or an incursion into a refugee camp can result in strong feelings of hatred, which 
subsequently lead to calls for retaliation. Brym and Araj both support this assertion 
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stating that the motivation for Palestinians was revenge and retaliation in response to 
specific Israeli actions.82 Weingast and Rui de-Figueiredo have also argued that 
violence is often retaliatory.83 This school of thought traces Palestinian suicide 
bombings to Israeli provocations, beginning with the Hebron Massacre by Baruch 
Goldstein. Other provocations include the opening of the tunnel under the al-Aqsa 
Mosque and the Israeli policy of ‘targeted assassinations’ of Palestinian militant 
leaders, for example Hamas's bomb maker, Yahiyeh Ayyash84, Izz Eddin al-Qassam 
Brigade leader Salah Shehada and his family and, in 2004 Hamas spiritual leader 
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. In the case of British Muslims who commit terrorism, there is 
no hierarchical structure to target and there is no evidence to suggest the Muslim 
community support the actions of individual terrorists. Although protests followed the 
imprisonment of preachers Abu Qatada and Abu Hamza Al-Masri and the increased 
surveillance of Muslims communities, it has never been suggested that any of the 
terrorist conspiracies that began in 2003 were the consequence of such action. Al-
Masri claimed during his trial in 2013 that he was the force preventing terrorism and 
that his incarceration meant he was no longer effective at restraining his fellow 
fundamentalists. 
Although such flash points can result in immediate retaliation by way of a 
suicide mission, a medium to long-term campaign relies on the construction and 
manipulation of trauma, which builds up over a period. Pedahzur believes that 
communities who have experienced a long and painful conflict with a powerful 
enemy eventually react to a strong sense of injustice.85 Palestinians readily ask how it 
can be fair that Israeli children can play on the beach, drink clean water, and attend 
the best schools when their children are forced to live in poverty. Mohammed Hafez 
suggests that Palestinians came to venerate martyrdom because of a ‘confluence of 
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perceived threats and a sense of victimization’.86 In Palestine, the degradation of 
everyday life becomes intolerable. Constant Israeli military presence, boredom, 
anxiety, and the impossibility of leading a normal life combine, ‘The explosive 
mixture of prison, exile, living on the run, the instability of life and the constant need 
to keep moving to avoid being arrested...give rise to an extremism that can even 
overcome fear’.87 The alternative to this traumatic humiliation is utopia. Oliver and 
Steinberg describe some intended bombers as being ecstatic about their fate.88 
Although the Muslim community in the UK do not support acts of terrorism, counter 
terrorism police have found it difficult to develop trust and co-operation. Isolation 
appears driven by two factors. Firstly, media reports will often talk of Muslim 
communities being ‘hotbeds of radicalisation’ thereby causing them to become more 
defensive, especially since far-right groups often seek to capitalise on articles in the 
Daily Mail. Secondly, critics have accused the government’s counter-terrorism 
strategy known as PREVENT of constructing the Muslim community as a threat to 
national security.  
Contrary to what might appear seemingly obvious, it is generally accepted that 
volunteers for suicide terrorism are rarely, if ever, suicidal. The very term ‘suicide 
terrorism’ is therefore somewhat misleading. Nasra Hasan argues that many 
Palestinian bombers have suffered humiliation and persecution at the hands of Israeli 
forces. However, she insists that they are not suffering from any mental illness or 
personality disorders.89 Studies of Palestinian volunteers consistently reinforce claims 
by militant groups that anyone seeking death as a means of personal escape are 
refused support. In a study of fourteen regional commanders of Palestinian militant 
groups, most said they would not take mentally unstable candidates, suicidal people 
who want to die for personal reasons, and criminals.90 Only those who love life but 
are willing to die courageously for the cause of their people are mobilized in the 
pursuit of martyrdom. Gambetta, Pedahzur, Pape, and others refer to altruism, which 
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can often be a reaction to trauma. British Muslims who volunteer for terrorism often 
talk about seeing the deaths of co-religionists and feeling significantly traumatised. 
This fits with the suggestion these men are emphatic and have a great deal of love, 
which causes them to feel the pain and suffering of others more than an average 
person would. Mohammad Sidique Khan was clear when he said, ‘until we feel 
security, you will be our targets and until you stop the bombing, gassing, 
imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight’. The word 
‘gassing’ is interesting because the west adheres to the Geneva Convention of the use 
of chemical weapons. Khan may therefore have been trying to draw parallels between 
the gassing of the Jews and the treatment of modern day Muslims. He is arguing that 
western oppression of Muslims is as much a tragedy as the holocaust and that 
consequently he felt obliged to act.  
A person acting altruistically may be struggling to cope with the guilt of not 
having suffered the same humiliation and subjugation as their co-religionists. 
Khosrokhavar suggests ‘immersion in the western world has defiled them because 
they have been unfairly spared the same fate as others’.91 Sacrifice for the cause can 
therefore be both personally redemptive and a mark of honour, a way of becoming a 
hero and part of an exalted elite. The July 7th 2005 bombers were all from relatively 
privileged families and were fortunate to have escaped the kind of suffering 
experienced on a daily basis in Palestine, Chechnya and Middle Eastern. The same is 
true for many of the 9/11 bombers who were educated to degree level. The poverty 
witnessed in the slums of Egypt is alleged to have strongly influenced 9/11 ringleader 
Mohammed Atta. His desire to strike back at those who funded the rule of President 
Mubarak through military aid masked as ‘humanitarian intervention’ was therefore a 
natural response to the trauma by proxy he felt from his observations of the Egyptian 
people.  
Trauma is arguably the most powerful explanation for why otherwise perfectly 
sane, rational young men and women volunteer for suicide terrorism. Even in the 
absence of religion and a foreign occupier, individuals suffering from consistent 
trauma and driven by a sense of injustice would likely fight back by whatever means 
necessary. Few would be surprised if a father grieving the death of his child decided 
to take violent revenge against those responsible, even if he was killed in the process. 
                                                
91 Khosrokhavar Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Martyrs p.152 
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Although trauma may explain why a population suffering checkpoints, incursions and 
house searches might support the tactic of suicide bombing, it is less convincing in the 
case of terrorist groups. Notwithstanding the immediate trauma and desire to retaliate, 
that one can find after a targeted assassination, knee jerk acts of suicide terrorism 
account for only a handful of missions carried out by groups who employ the tactic 
strategically. Consequently, trauma fails as a single explanatory theory of suicide 
terrorism. In almost every theatre where terrorists adopt suicide bombing, the 
population as a whole has suffered at the hands of either a foreign or a domestic 
aggressor. Chechnya is a powerful case study in this respect. The Russian army has 
carried out systematic human rights abuses as part of the most aggressive, violent and 
abhorrent counter insurgency campaign ever undertaken by an alleged ‘democracy’. 
Consequently, the conclusion that trauma holds explanatory weight across the entire 
universe of suicide terrorism gains significant merit. However, within the context of 
British Muslims who volunteer for terrorism, direct trauma is notably weak. The 
London bombers experienced none; they never suffered any kind of brutality at the 
hands of the state, nothing that would construct a sense of injustice and drive them to 
carry out an act of revenge. It may however be argued that British Muslims observing 
the death of co-religionists in Iraq and Afghanistan suffer from trauma by proxy. In 
September 2000, an Israeli sniper shot dead Palestinian father and son, Jamal and 
Muhammad al-Durrah. Muhammad appears on film crying shortly before a burst of 
gunfire ends his life. This incident is commonly discussed by British fundamentalist 
Muslims standing trial for terrorism offences thereby suggesting it directly influenced 
their mindset. It almost certainly added weight to the political narrative promoted by 
the Islamic fundamentalist movement in which Jews represent the greatest enemy of 
Islam. Three years after the al-Durrah incident, two British fundamentalist Muslims 
travelled to Gaza and volunteered as suicide bombers targeting a restaurant in Tel 
Aviv. 
This literature review has explored the various mainstream theories that seek 
to account for what motivates individuals to pursue terrorism. In particular, this 
chapter has focused on explanations for the specific act of suicide terrorism. 
Reviewing each theory, the author has considered its applicability to the British 
experience of suicide terrorism that began in 2003. While religion and trauma offer 
powerful narratives that have strongly influenced British fundamentalists to pursue 
terrorism, there is a clear failure within the literature to explore the social environment 
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responsible for incubating a mindset necessary for suicide terrorism. In order for 
British Muslims to experience trauma by proxy, they required political narratives in 
which co-religionists appeared to be suffering at the hands of an aggressive neo-
colonialist foreign occupier. The following substantive chapters of this dissertation 
presents the results of a three-year study into the social environment that has 
mobilised British fundamentalists and pushed a minority to cross the line in pursuit of 
terrorism 
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Methodology 
This critically reflective chapter formally outlines the social science approach taken in 
the thesis in investigating of the primary subject. Objectively, the aim is to elucidate 
the chosen methodology and explain why this approach was the most appropriate way 
of attacking the questions identified at the outset. Section 1, “Research Design”, 
discusses the epistemological and ontological limitations inherent in the study of 
human behaviour and personal decision-making. In particular, we confront a classic 
“black box problem” around motivation that has dogged terrorism researchers from 
more than forty years.1 In the absence of mind reading technology, how do we know 
for certain what a person was thinking before taking his or her own life in a suicide-
bombing mission? Section 2 of this chapter presents the central research question 
(CRQ) posited by the researcher after a great deal of theorizing and an exhaustive 
review of the available literature and discourse surrounding the thesis. To 
operationalize the CRQ at the chapter level, the researcher developed a set of sub 
questions allowing the investigation to be broken down into manageable sections. 
Section 4 details the research methods employed by the author to gather and 
subsequently analyse primary data, specifically transcripts from semi-structured elite 
interviews, archives of literature published by fundamentalist groups and lastly a 
series of detailed case studies. The final two sections of this chapter are important. 
Firstly, the author discusses the ethical considerations that have arisen throughout the 
study. Secondly, in concluding this explanatory chapter, the researcher outlines how 
this dissertation makes an important and original contribution to the existing literature 
concerning the study of domestic terrorism carried out in the UK by British Muslims. 
Research Design 
The primary objective of this thesis is to postulate an original analysis to explain why 
British Muslims readily volunteer as suicide terrorists. Since researchers are unable to 
interview those who are successful, it is reasonable to argue that regardless of how 
structurally sound an investigation, we can never truly be certain of what a person was 
                                                
1 M. Crenshaw, 'The Causes of Terrorism', Comparative Politics, vol. 13, no. 4, 1981, 
pp. 379-399 
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thinking in the moments before detonation. Recognising this problem, Silke has 
suggested that terrorism is not a topic easily researched, or at least it does not give 
that impression on first inspection. 2  The 2005 London bombers independently 
sacrificed their own lives in order to murder fellow citizens. So great was the bond 
between them, and so great was their belief in what they were doing, that each carried 
out the mission not knowing whether the others had followed suit. Researchers 
seeking to understand the relationship between cell members face a significant 
challenge given how “closed off” the environment is in which they exist, particularly 
in the hours and minutes before they make their fateful choices. 
Suicide bombing is neither accidental, nor committed in a moment of 
madness. During the seven-month operational cycle between inception and execution, 
all four London bombers had time to reflect on their individual and collective 
motivation. At some point before the event, each member of the cell recorded a 
martyrdom video discussing his religious beliefs and personal reasons for carrying out 
the attack. Our understanding of what motivated the WWII Japanese Kamikaze 
derives from studying their private diaries. There was no reason to bias entries with 
any kind of political agenda since the writers never intended what they wrote to enter 
the public domain. Consequently, this source of evidence is valid and reliable and 
provides a sincere understanding of what the pilots were thinking in the run up to their 
suicide mission. In contrast, modern day terrorist groups typically use so-called 
martyrdom videos to serve as legitimizing propaganda and a tool of further 
recruitment. A third party may have scripted what the martyr says making it difficult 
to discern genuine motivations. Internet material and videos now constitute the 
primary mode of terrorist fundraising, training and recruitment, and so we should 
assume significant organisational input into such testimonies.3 Researchers must 
therefore be cautious when drawing any conclusions based solely upon such material. 
Recognising the ontological and epistemological limitations inherent with any 
examination of suicide bombing, this author has conducted an empirical study that 
                                                
2 A. Silke,‘The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism’, 
Terrorism and Political Violence, vol.13, no. 4, 2001, pp. 1-14 
3 A. George, ‘The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision- Making 
Behaviour: The ‘Operational Code’ Belief System’ in Lawrence S. Falkowski, (ed), 
1979, Psychological Models in International Politics, Boulder, Colorado, Westview 
Press, pp. 95–124 
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triangulates several primary sources of information. Although we cannot positively 
state with absolute certainty that volunteer A had been motivated by reasons XYZ, we 
can show evidence the majority of suicide bombers espoused similar politics and 
engaged in comparable activities in the years leading up to their attack. Although this 
does not necessarily demonstrate causality, we may reasonably conclude that if we 
expose an individual to religious fundamentalism and extremist politics, and then task 
them with fundraising for an overseas militant group, these two factors will contribute 
towards motivating and facilitating that individual towards following a path that may 
lead them into committing acts of terrorism. For example, since 2010, a growing 
number of British fundamentalist Muslims who regularly participated in 
demonstrations calling for the establishment of Sharia, have since travelled to Syria 
and fought on behalf of the insurgent group known as ISIS. In May 2014, leader of 
ISIS, Abu Al-Baghbadi, declared himself Caliph of the official Islamic Caliphate 
spanning northern Syria and Iraq, governed according to Sharia.4  
Remarkably, to date there has been little academic focus on the relatively non-
violent environment surrounding British Muslims who pursue acts of terrorism. Since 
2005, government policy has been to engage with Muslim communities, in particular 
those considered vulnerable to radicalisation by overseas extremists. Consequently, 
academics have paid significant attention to the impact of counter terrorism policies 
on individuals and the mainstream Muslim community. Unfortunately, this has meant 
little recognition or indeed investigation of the milieu of fundamentalist Muslims who 
operate almost entirely isolated from society. Notorious Muslim cleric Abu Hamza 
Al-Masri did not attend community meetings; his followers considered themselves 
Muslim first, second and third. To fundamentalists, Britain represents nothing more 
than a passport. Counter radicalisation strategy after 2005 was therefore irrelevant 
since Al-Masri, his followers and others like them, operated outside the mainstream 
Muslim community – specifically, outside the environment upon which counter 
radicalisation focused. After the murder of Soldier Lee Rigby in 2013, the importance 
and the need to dismantle or at least disrupt these dangerous and self-isolating 
elements, acting on the periphery of the Muslim community became abundantly clear. 
Increasingly, and particularly in the wake of this attack, the UK government has 
                                                
4 J. Berry, ‘Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing’, PS: Political Science 
and Politics, vol. 35, no. 4, 2002, pp. 679-682 
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shifted towards a much tougher stance in which the promotion of anti-western 
political narratives either by individuals or groups is no longer tolerated.  
Aiming to fill the void that exists within the study of environment as an 
incubator of terrorism, this research is unique and timely, especially given events in 
Syria post 2010. Since 2011 possibly earlier, British Muslims have travelled to the 
country in order to fight on behalf of the insurgent group known as ISIS. Several of 
these men stand accused of committing the most barbaric acts of terrorism including 
the execution of western hostages. Observers believe one particular individual known 
in the press, as “Jihadi John” and responsible for the beheading of at least five 
hostages, is an individual radicalised while growing up in East London. Theoretically, 
this researcher advances the proposition that acts of terrorism tend to be a structural 
by-product of the socio-political organisation of British fundamentalist Muslims since 
the late 1990s. Until 2003, no British Muslim had ever sought to murder fellow 
citizens as part of a terrorist campaign designed to influence government. Observers 
commonly identify western foreign policies, in particular support for Israel and 
interference as the underlying motivation for acts of terrorism carried out in the UK 
by British Muslims. Weakening this theory is evidence that despite rampant neo-
colonialism before the millennium including sanctions on Iraq that led to the 
starvation of women and children, British Muslims failed to mobilise and carry out 
acts of terrorism either in the UK or overseas.  
Sanctions on Iraq were no less brutal than the events witnessed at Abu Ghraib 
or the Battle of Fallujah and yet there were no terrorist attacks in the UK by British 
Muslims during the 1990s. Pointing the blame at foreign policy is reductionist and 
fails to recognise the importance of the environment from which individuals have 
been politicised and encouraged to give everything including their lives in order to 
achieve certain objectives. Towards the end of the 1990s the environment necessary 
for terrorism first emerged in London. Thereafter, a minority of British Muslims 
began adopting a fundamentalist religious and political ideology based on a rejection 
of western ideas and norms. Years later, this mobilisation would lead to isolation of 
Islamic fundamentalists in the UK and eventually conflict and rebellion against the 
British state and its citizens. 
Environment is important in respect of the long-term incubation of terrorism. 
In making the case to focus on environment above the individual and the terrorist cell, 
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let us reflect for a moment on the case of David Copeland also known as the “London 
Nail Bomber”. An established member of the far-right British National Party (BNP), 
Copeland told police he targeted ethnic minorities because he wanted to start a race 
war, one that would eventually lead to their repatriation. During active service as a 
steward in the BNP, Copeland learned how to construct improvised explosive devices. 
Although acting alone, parallels between his stated motivation and the politics of the 
BNP, suggest there is good reason to conclude his involvement with the party, helped 
incubate a mindset in which he rationalised acts of extreme violence. With respect to 
the roughly sixty British Muslims who have pursued suicide terrorism, almost all of 
them have strongly embraced Islamic fundamentalism. Like Copeland, London 
bomber Mohamed Sidique Khan was deeply influenced by the inherited politics that 
came from socialising with others who shared his beliefs, indicating a degree of 
“Groupthink”. The only difference between these two terrorists is that Copeland had 
no faith in the afterlife, he choose prison over the divine rewards pursued by Khan. 5 
A well-established theory within psychology argues that persons act 
differently in groups than alone. This is especially true when encouraged and 
supported by others or those in authority. In 1978, over nine hundred members of a 
“cult” known as the Peoples Temple Agricultural Project committed mass suicide on 
the orders of leader Jim Jones. Upon hearing the news, none of those persons who had 
previously left the environment felt compelled to follow suit. Jones and trusted 
fellows around him exclusively controlled the politics and the practices of members. 
Isolation and “groupthink” therefore clearly played a part in these disturbing events. 
Without the authoritative influence, extreme beliefs held by members were no longer 
tenable. It is not enough that a person believes something; they must be part of an 
environment in which others share the same beliefs in order that they might act upon 
them. Drawing parallels with Islamic fundamentalism, observers can better 
understand the pathways in and out of terrorism by focusing on the environment from 
which terrorism has emerged. Alone, British Muslims holding fundamentalist ideas 
present less of a threat to British national security than those who are organised.  
In an attempt to provide a significant new insight regarding the phenomenon 
of terrorism carried out by British Muslims, this researcher has undertaken primary 
                                                
5 I. Janis, ‘Groupthink’, Psychology Today, vol. 5, no. 6, 1971, pp. 43–46, 74–76; W. 
Park, ‘A review of research on Groupthink, Journal of Behavioural Decision Making, 
vol.3, no. 4, 1990, pp.229–245. 
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empirical research. Semi-structured interviews have been conducted with elite 
individuals known to have first-hand experience of investigating, researching and 
responding to acts of terrorism carried out in the UK.6 Supplementing this rich source 
of information, an archive of literature published by fundamentalist groups before the 
turn of the century has also been examined. Written before the introduction of 
terrorism laws preventing the dissemination of extremist literature, this archive 
provides a unique insight regarding the politics of those British Muslims who would 
later support and carry out acts of terrorism. Data collected and analysed over a 
twelve-month period has allowed this researcher to offer a unique narrative that 
contributes to the explanation of the post 2003 wave of domestic terrorism carried out 
by British Muslims predominantly born and raised in the UK. Due to a statistically 
small population size of convicted terrorists in the UK, it was quickly determined that 
methodologically, a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach would be the most 
appropriate means in which to address the central and sub-research questions detailed 
below on page 63. Scholars have widely argued that a qualitative methodology allows 
a far deeper insight while at the same time placing greater emphasis on the 
participant’s view of the world.7 It should be noted that when studying political 
violence carried out by small groups, White has argued researchers should triangulate 
both a quantitative and qualitative approach. 8  Although adopting this 
recommendation may be possible when examining terrorism from a global 
perspective, the data-set of convicted British terrorists is arguably too small to enable 
any kind of quantitative analysis.9  
Formally this thesis adopts an interpretivist methodology which is particularly 
suited to answering research questions that deal with a sensitive subject, one that is 
notoriously difficult to explore due to the closed world in which it exists. In this 
study, the socially constructed world of terrorism has been understood and explained 
through an examination of how it has been interpreted by its participants. Given the 
                                                
6 A. Bryman, Social Research Methods, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008 
7 Bryman Social Research Methods 
8 R. White, ‘Issues in the study of political violence: Understanding the motives of 
participants in small group political violence’, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 
12, no. 1, 2000, pp. 95-108 
9 J. Mahoney and G. Goertz, ‘A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and 
Qualitative Research’, Political Analysis, vol. 14, no. 1, 2006, p.246 
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nature of the research subject, it was clearly not possible to engage in any kind of 
formal observant participation. Historically, researchers and journalists have 
interviewed members of certain groups proscribed by the United Kingdom as terrorist 
organisation for example, Hezbollah and Hamas. However, British Muslims who 
participate in acts of terrorism do so on an ad-hoc basis. In contrast with the IRA, 
there are no on- going negotiations, British Muslims do not appear on camera wearing 
balaclavas and making demands. Cells form, plot their operation and then either 
succeed - in which they become martyrs - or else Police disrupt the operation and 
conspirators go to prison.10  
In order to understand motivation, the researcher sought to conduct interviews 
with individuals convicted of terrorism offences in the UK. Consequently, the 
researcher attempted to communicate with twenty-five inmates currently incarcerated 
in Prisons across the UK. Letters sent to convicted terrorists were returned 
undelivered. Notes attached explained why the Prison governor had declined to allow 
the prisoners to enter into any kind of correspondence. Despite lengthy appeals, it was 
ultimately not possible to gain direct input from those persons upon whom this 
researcher has sought to investigate. Such an outcome was perhaps to be expected 
and, on reflection, it must be acknowledged any answers given by a convicted 
terrorist may not have been reliable. Reports published by the Justice Department 
suggest radicalisation in prison is now an established reality. British fundamentalist 
Muslims inside HMP Belmarsh are known to recruit, convert if necessary and then 
aggressively radicalise fellow inmates. If these men were to have been interviewed by 
the researcher, it is entirely likely they would have given a well-rehearsed set of 
answers that did not necessary reflect their true motivation.11  
Consequently, in order to gain an insight into the views of persons convicted 
of terrorism, this thesis relies predominantly on public source information combined 
with a private archive of court transcripts. Specifically, the researcher makes use of 
transcripts obtained from covert audio surveillance, martyrdom videos and testimony 
                                                
10 P. Davies, ‘Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite 
Interview Data in the Study of the Intelligence and Security Services’, Politics, vol. 
21, no.1, 2001, pp.73-80 
11 J. Aberbach and B. Rockman, ‘Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews’, PS: 
Political Science and Politics, vol. 35, no. 4, 2002, pp. 673-676; K. Goldstein, 
‘Getting in the Door: Sampling and Completing Elite Interviews’, PS: Political 
Science and Politics, vol. 35, no. 4, 2002, pp. 669-72 
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given at trial by those convicted of terrorism. The court transcripts run to almost 30 
thousand pages and concern five major terrorism conspiracies pursued between 2003 
and 2006. The UK government proved unwilling to make this record available despite 
the fact that court proceedings are conducted openly. Ultimately, these records were 
obtained privately from the United States by a somewhat circuitous route. These 
records are not easily available to other academics, but this archive of transcripts 
contains a vast amount of information concerning radicalization, jihad, the practice of 
militant Islam and the overall operational cycle of terrorist cells in the UK formed by 
British Muslims since 2003. In order to supplement the court transcripts and archives 
with additional material presented during the criminal trials, the researcher made 
formal applications to the Ministry of Justice to interview prisoners directly, examine 
multimedia shown to juries and lastly to interview judges that have dealt with cases of 
terrorism. Despite extensive correspondence and appeals, requests for information and 
access to both the Ministry of Justice and the Crown Prosecution Service failed to 
grant approval. The appeal panel ruled it was not possible to easily distinguish 
between material the Judge had allowed in open court, and material he had deemed 
private and never to be reported in the public domain. The consequence of this finding 
is that there exists an entire archive of audio recordings, video recordings and other 
important trial exhibits that researchers do not have access to.  
As part of the data collection phase, the researcher attended the trial of three 
men accused of major terrorism offences. A cursory examination of extant literature 
suggests no other academic writing on the subject of British terrorism, has ever sat 
through a criminal trial in the UK. Instead, they have relied on media coverage, 
allowing the reporter to decide what evidence is important enough to be added to the 
discourse. Over a three-month period, observations were made of the evidence 
presented from both prosecution and defence. This invaluable experience provided a 
significant insight concerning how cells form, train, gain finance and ultimately plot 
acts of terrorism against the UK. Combined with the archive of court transcripts made 
exclusively available to the researcher by a private third party and interviews with two 
former home secretaries, this study can arguably claim to stand out amongst 
competing literature since the body of empirical material that has been surveyed is 
both unique and formidable. The Rt Honourable David Blunkett and Charles Clarke 
held the office of Home Secretary at a time when domestic acts of terrorism were 
being carried out by British Muslims. The researcher interviewed both of these 
Page 62 of 370 
individuals and each offered extensive accounts of what the government knew at the 
time of various terrorist attacks and how it sought to respond to this relatively new 
phenomenon.12  
During three months of attending terrorism trials, the researcher made 
connections with a number of leading journalists who regularly report on terrorism 
cases. Several agreed to an interview with the researcher thereby giving a longitudinal 
account of terrorism. Input provided by these journalists helped challenge the overall 
design of this doctoral thesis and drew attention to a number of important questions 
that remained un-answered in the literature.  In addition, the journalists identified 
shifting trends over the last ten years, in particular, the decline of overseas support in 
favour of self-starters aided domestically at least by fellow Islamic fundamentalists. 
Although groups like Al-Qaeda helped fund and direct terrorism against the UK in the 
years after 9/11, by 2006, the war on terror had significantly eroded the group’s 
capabilities. In November 2013, the trial of the man accused of killing an off-duty 
Soldier in Woolwich began. Again the researcher attended the trial and made 
extensive notes that helped shape the overall dissertation. This case in particular 
highlights the subjective nature of terrorism. Although widely condemned as a 
terrorist by the media and politicians, Michael Adebalajo made no attempt to harm 
civilian observers. After years spent promoting extreme politics and engaging in 
activities designed to help re-establish the Caliphate, Adebalajo truly believed he was 
a soldier of Allah, a man fighting another soldier. Intriguingly, on sentencing, the trial 
judge said the men were extremists but refrained from using the label “terrorist”. 
Central Dissertation Question 
Researchers looking at the overall Muslim community have mainly focused on the 
impact of counter terrorism policy. Fears have been raised over the role that counter 
radicalisation programmes may have played in constructing the Muslim community as 
a threat to national security. An exhaustive literature review has shown that little 
academic attention has so far been given to the environment upon which convicted 
                                                
12 O. Tansey, 'Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability 
Sampling’, PS: Political Science and Politics, vol. 40, no.1, 2007, pp 765-772 
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terrorists socialised before volunteering for suicide bombing. Consequently, the 
central research question that forms the basis of this dissertation asks: 
To what extent has the environment socially constructed through the 
organisation of Islamic fundamentalist Muslims, incubated and is thus directly 
responsible for the phenomenon of British Islamic Terrorism since the turn of 
the century? 
Chapters of the dissertation have thus been organised around explaining the rise and 
importance of the environment termed the Islamic fundamentalist movement by the 
researcher. It is argued throughout the dissertation that the organisation of Islamic 
fundamentalist Muslims, their extreme politics and the activities members engage in, 
has been responsible for incubating a mindset necessary for a minority of British 
Muslims to cross the line from mere Islamic fundamentalists to extreme 
fundamentalist terrorists. 
Sub Research Questions 
Seven sub-questions were identified and have helped to structure the thesis chapters:  
1. To what extent does the Islamic Faith bare responsibility for act of terrorism 
carried out by British Muslims? 
2. What are the origins of Islamic Fundamentalism and how did it become 
embedded in UK Muslim communities?  
3. To what extent can we define the political ideology of the Islamic 
Fundamentalist Movement and list activities that members engage in?  
4. What are the most important factors to explain why British Muslims make the 
decision to pursue suicide terrorism?  
5. How might we define a Standard Operational Cycle that charts the path of a 
terrorist plot from inception to execution?  
6. What assistance do British Muslims receive domestically and from overseas in 
pursuing an act of terrorism? 
7. To what extent has the British Government challenged the organisation, 
politics and activities of Islamic Fundamentalists in the UK in order to prevent 
the incubation of terrorism? 
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Research Methods 
Following a qualitative methodology, conversation/discourse analysis combined with 
in-depth elite, semi-structured interviews have been adopted to answer the CRQ. In 
terms of available research methods, elite interviews were considered the most 
suitable method for the study as they provided rich, detailed answers to the research 
questions while allowing the subjects flexibility in terms of challenging the 
assumptions of the researcher.13 Silke has argued there are a number of advantages of 
using interviews for gathering data; in particular, they are a flexible method especially 
in the semi-structured form that dominates terrorism interviews.14 By following this 
approach, researchers can probe for additional information when the conversation 
leads down an unexpected path not originally predicted at the start. Silke has said that 
interviews have a good response rate and can produce a great deal of extra 
information, ‘indeed, supplementary information gathered in interviews can be of 
great value in establishing the wider context’. 15 
Denscome has suggested there is a broad consensus across a number of social 
science disciplines that in order to gain an insight into what motivates a person, 
qualitative interviews are the most appropriate research method.16 The conversations 
analysed here include interviews between terrorist suspects and the police, cross-
examinations at trial between defendants and barristers, and covert audio probes used 
in court evidence. When we say audio probes, we are referring to the listening devices 
secretly placed in the homes of terror suspects by police and the security services. At 
trial, prosecutors refer to transcripts of the conversations picked up by the devices to 
show evidence of intent. For example, in the 2006 Liquid bomb plot, the ringleader 
Ahmed Ali Khan was secretly recorded discussing the prospect of bombing 
nightclubs and shopping malls. As a primary source of information, the use of covert 
audio probes is quite novel and raises some interesting methodological questions.  
Unlike in researcher led interviews and under cross-examination at trial, the subject is 
not on guard. Since the person is unaware of the listening device, the views they 
                                                
13 Bryman Social Research Methods 
14 Silke ‘The Devil You Know’ pp. 1-14 
15 Ibid. 
16  M. Denscombe, M, The Good Research Guide: For Small-scale Social Research. 
Buckingham, Open University Press, 2007 
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express are uncontaminated and offer an invaluable insight into what the person 
genuinely believes about a particular subject. Again in reference to the 2006 liquid 
bomb plot, we can reasonably conclude from evidence in the audio probe, that 
conspirators were indeed willing to kill innocent civilians. This could not be 
established from court transcripts since all of the defendants denied any involvement 
in terrorism. 
The researcher carried out elite interviews for this study with counter terrorism 
officers, retired police officers, investigative journalists as well as current and former 
government policy makers. Interviews began with two senior investigative journalists. 
Both individuals had at least ten years experience of reporting on major terrorism 
trials held in the UK. In their responses, the journalists were able to draw upon their 
vast experience of speaking to friends and family members of those accused of 
committing acts of terrorism in the UK. Amardeep Bassey gave a particularly rich 
account of what motivated British Muslims initially to become involved in Islamic 
fundamentalism and secondly to then cross the line and engage in terrorism. Duncan 
Gardham has sat through several terrorism trials reporting on the evidence gathered 
by Police and presented by the Crown Prosecution Service. Over a lengthy period, 
Gardham has gained a significant insight into the politics of those persons accused of 
terrorism and the activities they engaged in during the years before volunteering to 
become suicide bombers.  
One of the most important interviews conducted by the researcher involved a 
discussion with retired spy Omar Nasri. Author of Inside the Jihad, Nasri infiltrated 
Al-Qaeda by attending training camps in Afghanistan during the 1990s. In the UK, 
Nasri worked undercover at the infamous Finsbury Park Mosque providing the 
Security Service MI5 with invaluable intelligence on the activities of various 
fundamentalist preachers. Kindly consenting to a lengthy interview, over a period of 
two days in Germany, 3rd to the 4th of August 2013, Nasiri explained the motivation 
behind Islamic Terrorism and sought to instruct the researcher on the most important 
religious issues relevant to British Muslims who become so entrenched in their beliefs 
they become willing volunteers as suicide bombers.  In order to gain a perspective on 
how counter terrorism police have engaged in the fight against terrorism, the 
researcher conducted interviews with two former heads of the London MET, Counter 
Terrorism Unit known as SO15. Although detail was not given on individual cases, 
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both men provided an important account of how cells formed, underwent training, 
gained finance and obtained support for their operations.  
Providing a more strategic insight, former home secretaries Labour MP’s 
David Blunkett and Charles Clarke were both interviewed by the researcher. It is 
significant that Clarke had been home secretary at the time of the London Bombings 
in 2005. As the most senior individual charged with responding to the event, he was 
able to give an important account of what the government knew at the time and how it 
reacted in both the short and long term.  Given the seniority of these individuals, the 
time afforded by each of them was only 30 minutes. Therefore, the researcher had to 
be as direct as possible and keep the interviewee from going off on a tangent to 
discuss issues that were not relevant to the research questions.   
Seven general questions focused the semi-structured interviews with each 
question related to a specific theme within the dissertation. Given the different roles 
of participants, it was necessary to tailor questions slightly in order to fit with the 
potential insight offered by the interviewee. For example, when discussing the 
difference between jihadists and terrorists, politicians were asked the question from 
the perspective of government policy, while in the case of investigative journalists, 
focused turned to what they believed to be the self-perception of terrorists they had 
reported on. All of the interviews conducted by the researcher were recorded and 
transcribed. Extracts were then used as evidence in support of propositions that came 
out of the data analysis phase. Some interviews were far less structured and instead 
consisted of a free flowing discussion. For example in order for the researcher to gain 
an understanding of Islamic fundamentalism, Omar Nasiri spent several hours 
narrating the main arguments in respect of the proposition that Islam bears 
responsibility for terrorism.17  
In addition to elite interviews, the researcher also analysed an archive of 
literature published by Islamic fundamentalists towards the end of the 20th century. 
Due to counter terrorism laws, the websites of these groups are no longer in operation. 
Consequently, the researcher had to use a tool known as the Way Back Machine. This 
website has periodically archived large sections of the Internet since the late 1990s. 
                                                
17 D. Hammer and A. Wildavsky, ‘The Open-Ended, Semi-Structured Interview: An 
(Almost) Operational Guide’, Craftways: On the Organisation of Scholarly Work, 
New York, Transaction Publishers, 1989 
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Given a URL, the database will return an image that webpage as it was at a specific 
moment in time. This meant that the researcher was able to analyse the politics and 
activities carried out by Islamic fundamentalists before the government introduced 
legislation forcing their operation underground. The beliefs held by members of these 
groups and activities they engage in have changed little over time. Despite the 
introduction of the terrorism acts 2000 and 2006, Islamic fundamentalists in the UK 
continue to engage in and thus be convicted of terrorism offences. 
Qualitative research should be assessed on trustworthiness and authenticity 
rather than validity and reliability.18 The study aims to be maximally reflexive, that is 
to say the researcher has sought to examine discourse as objectively as possible. In 
order to evaluate this authenticity of the study, chapters have been reviewed by 
individuals working in counter terrorism as well as by persons who represent the 
interests of convicted terrorists. Interview data has been fully transcribed and copies 
sent to the interviewee for confirmation before extracts were then used during the 
write up of the dissertation. 
Sampling 
The researcher sought out the most knowledgeable persons in respect of the research 
subject. In total, ten out of thirty potential elite interviewees agreed to participate. As 
the interviews progressed it quickly became clear the respondents were consistently 
highlighting similar themes with their answers. By the end of the data collection 
phase, the researcher had clearly reached a saturation point in consideration of the 
answers provided. Key themes quickly emerged that were then subsequently used to 
determine the chapter headings.19 
                                                
18  E. Guba and Y. Lincoln, ‘Competing paradigms in qualitative research’, in 
Handbook of Qualitative Research, N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln, (eds), Sage, 
Thousand Oaks, 1994, pp. 105-117. 
19 See the discussion of sampling in L. Epstein and G. King, ‘The Rules of Inference’, 
The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 69, no.1, 2002, pp. 1-209 
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Procedure 
From a review of the available literature, the researcher identified individuals likely to 
provide a useful insight regarding the research questions. Those persons working in 
counter terrorism and those responsible for national security at the government level 
were considered the highest priority. Roughly, thirty individuals ranging from 
politicians to journalists were short listed and contacted either informally through the 
researchers social network or formally through letter/email. Two thirds of respondents 
politely declined, one third however representing a cross section of the domain 
experts agreed to be interviewed. Those individuals who agreed to be interviewed 
were met by the researcher at a suitable location and asked to sign a consent form. A 
record of the interviews was maintained and the process of analysis documented in 
detail. Transcripts of the interviews were produced and copies sent to the interviewee 
to confirm they accurately reflected the conversation.20 In order to gain interviews 
with Charles Clarke and David Blunkett, the researcher made contact with a local MP 
who then facilitated access. 
Data Analysis 
The same interviewer conducted all interviews in order to reduce any impairment to 
the validity and bias of the research.21 To ensure the collected data was accurate, 
interviews were fully transcribed from the Dictaphone and a copy sent to the 
interviewee for approval. Themes identified through thematic analysis of the 
transcripts allowed the researcher to construct chapters that would ultimately form the 
basis of the dissertation. Within each chapter, the researcher has used extracts from 
interviews in order to construct propositions and draw conclusions. With respect to 
the archive of fundamentalist literature, again the researcher sought to construct a set 
of themes relating to the politics and activities associated with those individuals 
responsible for publishing the material.  
                                                
20 N. Mays and C. Pope, ‘Rigour and qualitative research’, BMJ  : British Medical 
Journal, vol. 311, no. 6997, 1995, pp.109-112 
21 Bryman Social Research Methods 
Page 69 of 370 
Ethics 
Dilemmas in respect of ethics are inherent across the entire design, implementation 
and reporting of an ethnographic study. British Muslim communities are widely 
accused of acting as ‘breeding grounds for terrorism’. Immediately after the murder of 
a soldier in Woolwich in May 2013, a significant backlash occurred against places of 
Islamic worship. This researcher has therefore remained conscious of the potential 
impact research into Islamic fundamentalism may have on the Muslim community. 
While it is important to conduct research on terrorism, one must avoid unnecessary 
conflation of Islam and terrorism. The Muslim community consistently rejects 
persons convicted of terrorism offences who offer the mendacious claim to be acting 
under the banner of Islam. Complete transparency in respect of the central thesis and 
project aims were necessary when inviting persons to participate in this study. Where 
requested, the researcher has strictly observed anonymity of interviewees. Methods to 
maintain confidentiality and informed consent, and avoid harm and deception formed 
the basis of this study. Given the sensitive nature of the research subject, participants 
were clearly informed about the overall research thesis and the themes that formed 
chapters of the dissertation. Formally, the researcher ensured regularly consultation of 
both the ESRC guidelines and Warwick University Ethics Committee guidelines to 
ensure the research was being conducted to the highest possible standards. 
Furthermore, the researcher’s regular consultation with the PhD supervisor ensured no 
activity was undertaken that might in any way be considered unethical. Although the 
determined effort to correspond with convicted terrorists proved unsuccessful, the 
researcher spent a great deal of time considering the ethical issues surrounding such 
interaction.  
Contribution to Literature 
In seeking to explain why British Muslims are motivated to commit acts of terrorism, 
scholars have propositioned a variety of explanatory causes. One particularly well-
rehearsed theme after 9/11 has been to adopt a top-down approach to understanding 
Page 70 of 370 
the onset of radicalization as a form of “brainwashing”.22 Writers have argued that 
international terrorist groups have sent operatives to the UK with orders to form 
terrorist cells amongst the milieu of fundamentalist Muslims. Rejecting any 
suggestion that cells are randomly constructed from indoctrinated Muslims, other 
researchers suggest radicalization since 9/11 has been entirely bottom-up and point to 
the importance of lone wolfs and self-starters. Academics suggest the motivating 
factors behind these “homegrown terrorists” include the western occupation of 
Islamic countries, support for oppressive regimes23, identity issues24, poor political 
and socioeconomic integration 25  as well as individual psychological factors 26 . 
Notwithstanding these elements contribute to the process of radicalization; none 
comprehensively recognize the role of the social environment from which they 
emerge. In particular, how important the process of socialization amongst inhabitants 
is for encouraging a minority to cross the line and pursue terrorism.  
So far, the debate on the importance of the environment inhabited by terrorists 
has been largely impressionistic, constructed around anecdotal evidence. By contrast, 
this doctoral study adopts an in-depth qualitative approach that charts the route taken 
by British Muslims from initial involvement with Islamic fundamentalism (adopting 
extreme political narratives, pursuing illegal activities) to developing the mindset 
necessary to cross the line and volunteer for terrorism. This research project has been 
completed at a time when the threat to British national security has been raised to 
severe. Legislation enacted since 11th September 2001 is no longer considered 
sufficient to tackle the threat posed by the radicalization of British Muslims who are 
now travelling to Syria to fight alongside the Islamic State. In September 2014, calls 
were made for British Muslims who fight overseas to be stripped of their passports. 
                                                
22 M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, Boulder Colorado, Lynne Reinner, 2003; C. 
Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, New York, Columbia University Press, 2002; Q. 
Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, Bloomington Indiana, Indiana University Press, 2003 
23 R. Pape, Dying To Win, New York, Random House, 2005 
24A. Choudhury, The Universal Paradigm And The Islamic World-System. 
Hackensack NJ, World Scientific, 2007; O. Roy, Globalized Islam, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 2004 
25 F. Buijs and D. Froukje and A. Hamdy, Strijders Van Eigen Bodem, Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam University Press, 2006 
26 J. Victoroff, 'The Mind Of The Terrorist: A Review And Critique Of Psychological 
Approaches', Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 49, no. 1, 2005, pp. 3-42 
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To British fundamentalist Muslims, jihad is an obligatory activity placed above all 
others. In the majority of cases, it does not necessarily serve as a precursor to 
terrorism. Certainly it is not true that every British Muslim who has fought in Syria 
presents a terrorist threat to the UK. Therefore, before any new legislation can be 
introduced, it is paramount that policy makers fully understand the environment from 
which these volunteers are emerging. Government must ensure the right strategy is 
adopted, one that does not alienate young Muslims and cause more of them to 
immerse themselves in Islamic fundamentalism which may one day lead them to 
commit acts of terrorism.  
Page 72 of 370 
Chapter One  - Islam, Fundamentalism, 
Moderation and Terrorism 
The first chapter of this doctoral thesis introduces four relatively complex topics. 
Individually and collectively, these concepts provide the basis in which to understand 
the relatively modern phenomenon in which British Muslims have pursued acts of 
domestic terrorism in the UK. At the heart of this discussion lay the Islamic faith. 
Over one and a half billion people worldwide currently observe a religion that 
emerged in 7th century Saudi Arabia. 1  Without prejudice to the overwhelming 
majority of Muslims, no rigorously honest debate concerning “Islamist terrorism”, 
may legitimately neglect the importance of religion. It is generally accepted that 
Muslims who volunteer for suicide bombing find motivation to act based partially on 
the prospect of divine rewards.2 The first section of this chapter therefore goes right to 
the heart of the problem by asking the controversial question of whether Islamic 
doctrine instructs violence against civilians. 
To understand the 2005 London bombings, at least a basic comprehension of 
Islam is required. In fulfilment, the first section of this chapter introduces tenets 
central to the faith. Having considered the largely uncontested elements of Islam, the 
chapter then turns its attention to the socially constructed dichotomy dividing 
Muslims into fundamentalists and moderates. While the latter typically reject violence 
in its entirety, the former strongly reserve the right to defend co-religionists, their 
faith, and historical Muslim land from aggression and occupation. Fundamentalists 
argue they have a moral and divine responsibility to protect fellow Muslim, an 
obligation equitable to that observed by sovereign states and their domestic citizens.  
Since the mid 1990s, fundamentalists have organised themselves into a de-
facto socio-political movement. Strict obedience to the core principles of Islam 
provided the basis for mobilisation. The central thesis running throughout this 
                                                
1 Pew Research Centre, Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size 
and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population, Washington, 2009, pp. 8–9, 17–
19. 
2 D. MacEoin, ‘Suicide Bombing as Worship Dimensions of Jihad’, Middle East 
Quarterly Fall, 2009, pp. 15-24; Staff Reporter, ‘Suicide bombing: Desperate tactic’, 
BBC News Online, 13th July 2005, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22290927, 
(accessed 15th September 2014) 
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dissertation is that British Muslims responsible for acts of terrorism emerged as a 
direct consequence of this environment. Specifically, the Islamic fundamentalist 
movement (IFM) incubated the contemporary wave of post IRA terrorism that began 
in the UK around 2003. By immersing themselves in extreme political narratives and 
by carrying out activities aligned to re-establishing the Caliphate, a minority of 
fundamentalists developed the necessary mindset to pursue terrorism. Underlying the 
central thesis of the dissertation, this chapter argues for mainstream adoption of the 
term Islamic fundamentalist extremist terrorism. This term adequately captures the 
religious and extreme nature of domestic terrorist conspiracies carried out in the UK 
since 2003. Concomitantly, extreme fundamentalists denote those British Muslims 
who have transgressed from merely pursuing jihad, to actively constructing 
improvised explosive devices designed to kill themselves and fellow citizens. 
The relationship between Islam and terrorism 
Former agent of the British and French security services, Omar Nasiri, strongly 
contends that terrorism is an inescapable consequence of Islamic doctrine.3 Drawing 
upon his many years spent infiltrating Al-Qaeda, Nasiri argues the post 9/11 wave of 
terrorism witnessed in the UK originates from the fundamental principles of Islam. 
Supporting this proposition, Nasiri highlights several verse in the Quran, for example, 
‘I will cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieve. Therefore strike off their 
heads and strike off every fingertip of them’.4 A rigorously honest, intellectual 
consideration of Nasiri suggests he is neither disingenuous nor easily dismissed. To 
concur with him however, draws attention from Islamic apologists and invites 
accusations of Islamophobia. Historically, condemning any religion, Islam or 
otherwise, has been strictly taboo within academia, politics and mainstream media. 
Consequently, it has been difficult to establish any kind of popular narrative in which 
the blame for terrorism carried out by Muslims, is levelled squarely at the Islamic 
faith. Despite compelling evidence that suggests volunteers for suicide bombing 
invariably hold deeply religious beliefs and frequently claim to be acting in 
accordance with their faith, politicians invariably denounce terrorists as warped and 
                                                
3 Author interview with Omar Nasiri, Germany, 3rd/4th August 2013 
4 Quran (8:12); Nasiri Author Interview 
Page 74 of 370 
misguiding rather than as fundamentalist Muslims.  In challenging the orthodoxy, this 
chapter places Islam on trial. It asks whether violence against non-combatants is 
entirely the fault of what is found in the Quran and the Hadiths. While Allah may 
indeed be merciful, British Muslims who deliberately target unarmed civilians are 
certainly not.  
Suggesting that Islam promotes terrorist violence to a greater degree than 
other Abrahamic religions routinely attracts denunciations of Islamophobia. 
Consequently, politicians, scholars, and religious leaders are at pains to deflect blame 
away from Islam. Government ministers appear reluctant to speak out publically 
against the relationship between Islam and terrorism due to the fear of being 
denounced as either right-wing or Islamaphobic.5 In defending Islam and the Muslim 
community, western leaders routinely suggest violence targeting innocent civilians 
stems from a distorted interpretation of religious doctrine. They allege that terrorists 
selectively cite the Quran and Sunnah out of context.6 For example, responding to the 
attack on a Kenyan shopping mall in 2013 which led to the death of three British 
citizens, Prime Minister David Cameron told reporters, ‘These appalling terrorist 
attacks that take place, where the perpetrators claim they do it in the name of a 
religion, they do not’.7 The group behind the attacks, Al-Shababb, faced accusations 
of hijacking Islam in order to elicit sympathy and gain legitimacy and finance for their 
organisation. Some critics suggest suicide bombers are brainwashed into helping their 
sponsors achieve political objectives, aims that have little to do with the core 
principles of Islam. Point of fact however, many of the political goals of terrorist 
groups like Al-Shababb and Al-Qaeda are also religious goals, for example re-
establishing the Islamic Caliphate fits in both categories.   
While the British government may not publically blame Islamic doctrine for 
the London bombings, counter terrorism policy instigated after the event suggests 
                                                
5 G. Owen, ‘Tony Blair Says Murder of Lee Rigby Proves ‘there is a Problem within 
Islam’’, Daily Mail Online, 2nd June 2013, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2334451/Tony-Blair-says-murder-Lee-Rigby-PROVES-problem-Islam.html, 
(accessed 19th September 2014) 
6 Author Interview with Charles Clarke, London, 2nd October 2013 and David 
Blunkett, London, 9th October 2013 
7 Staff Reporter, ‘Three Britons among Kenya shopping mall attack dead’, BBC News 
Online, 23rd September 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24195825, (accessed 
29th September 2014) 
Page 75 of 370 
otherwise. Since 2005, there has been increasingly draconian counter-terrorism 
legislation and broad counter-radicalisation strategy that has targeted the Muslims 
community at large. Critics allege new politics have constructed the entire UK 
Muslim population as a threat to national security despite the relatively small number 
of potential terrorists amongst them.8 In 2011, police installed a network of closed 
circuit television cameras (CCTV) across predominantly Muslim areas of south 
Birmingham. 9 Although never turned on, blanket surveillance of locations considered 
hotspots of radicalisation, Theresa May has projected the concern that all Muslims 
hold the potential to cross the line and pursue acts of domestic terrorism. 
The Islamic faith is accustomed to detractors who seek to problematise its 
relationship with terrorism.10 Many respected observers in a variety of domains have 
asked whether Islamic doctrine, in particular, the right of self-defence, is compatible 
with the western concept of a nation state. In particular, whether or not it challenges 
the monopoly of violence held by the incumbent government. While historically the 
Christian church enjoyed significant influence over the European aristocracy, after the 
reformation, religious leaders ceded responsibility for defending the state to policy 
makers. Within Islam, there can be no separation between Church and State. Unable 
to ignore the growing pervasiveness of “Islamic terrorism” that culminated in the 
2005 London bombings, the British government has since sought to dichotomise 
Muslims into moderates and fundamentalists. Former US President George Bush laid 
                                                
8 D. Casciani, ‘Prevent extremism strategy stigmatising’, BBC News Online, 30th 
March 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8593862.stm, (accessed 29th September 
2014) 
9 Staff Reporter, ‘Birmingham project champion ‘spy’ cameras being removed’, BBC 
News Online, 9th M ay 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-
13331161, (accessed 29th September 2014) 
10 J. Rojas, ‘Britons afraid to challenge radical Islam, says former Obama adviser’, 
The Telegraph Online, 15th March 2013, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/9932108/Britons-afraid-to-challenge-
radical-Islam-says-former-Obama-adviser.html, (accessed 29th September 2014); G. 
Traufetter interviews H. Ali, ‘Everyone is afraid to criticise Islam’, trans. C Sultan, 
Spiegel Online International, 6th August 2006, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/spiegel-interview-with-ayaan-hirsi-ali-
everyone-is-afraid-to-criticize-islam-a-399263.html, (accessed 29th September 2014) 
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the foundations of this division in the aftermath of 9/11 when he warned Muslims 
around the world, ‘you are either with us or you are with the terrorists’.11  
Throughout ten years in office, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
consistently defended Islam. Responding to the increasingly violent threat posed by 
British Muslim terrorists, Blair denounced them as apostates with little understanding 
of the religion they claimed to represent. Consequently, the Labour government held 
the view that terrorists operated on the periphery, enjoying little support from the 
wider Muslim community. In turn, strongly disliked but tolerated, fundamentalists 
enjoyed relative freedom to operate on the condition there was to be ‘no blood on 
British soil’.12 Many so called “hate preachers” later prosecuted as terrorists, initially 
served as agents of the security services. Notorious Muslim cleric Abu Hamza Al-
Masri has claimed that between 1997 and 2003, he met with police and MI5 at least 
nine times. Whitehall officials have confirmed this to be true.13 
Since leaving office in 2007, Blair has increasingly levelled blame for Islamic 
terrorism on a much more broad level of support amongst the Muslim population. 
Shifting from his tolerant position while Prime Minister, Blair has argued for greater 
recognition of how Islamic fundamentalism helps foster an environment conducive to 
terrorism. Responding to the killing of soldier Lee Rigby, and in direct contrast with 
David Cameron, Blair claimed that, ‘at the extreme end of the spectrum are terrorists, 
but the world view goes deeper and wider than it is comfortable for us to admit. So by 
and large we don’t admit it’.14 In a 2013 interview with the BBC, Blair stated that 
                                                
11 G. Bush, ‘Address to a joint session of congress and the American people’, 20th 
September 2001, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html, (accessed 29th 
September 2014) 
12 Clarke Author Interview 
13 J. Slack & D. Bates, ‘How spies and police courted Abu Hamza: Twelve secret 
meetings revealed as sobbing hate cleric tells New York court how his hands were 
blown off in Pakistan’, Mail Online, 9th May 2014, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2623830/How-spies-police-courted-hate-
cleric-Meetings-revealed-Hamza-sobs-hands-blown-Pakistan-New-York-terror-
trial.html, (accessed 29th September 2014) 
14 Owen ‘Tony Blair Says Murder of Lee Rigby Proves there is a Problem within 
Islam’ 
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Islam is a “fundamentally extremist” religion. 15 A view he repeated while accepting 
the “scholar-statesman” award from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.16 
Adding to his initial comments, Blair suggested, ‘We are unable to defeat extremism 
without defeating the narrative that nurtures it, yet this is problematic because those 
who adhere to it stretch far broader into parts of mainstream thinking’.17 Given his 
knowledge and first hand experience of counter terrorism discourse, there can be little 
doubt these carefully chosen words were deliberately meant to indict mainstream 
Islam or at least core principles that are the basis of fundamentalism.  
Blair is not alone in raising challenging questions and reaching uncomfortable 
conclusions. Following the 2005 London bombings, Islam lost much of the insulation 
that had long protected it from outright criticism. Emancipated from the sphere of 
right-wing politics, directly criticising Islam became in vogue, both centre-right 
journalists, and academics were quick to problematise the faith’s core principles. 
Within this new critically pervasive narrative, Islam is inherently violent and thus 
directly to blame for terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, and London.18 Even 
before 2005, outspoken atheists have long thundered vociferously against Islam. They 
routinely highlight how those responsible for suicide bombings seek divine rewards 
promised to them in the Quran. Terrorists act not merely in the name of Islam, but 
                                                
15 Staff Reporter, ‘Tony Blair attacks Islam as fundamentally extremist religion’, 
Press TV, 6th September 2013, 
http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/09/06/322446/islam/, (accessed 29th September 
2014) 
16 T. Blair, Acceptance speech for 2010 Scholar-Statesman award presented by the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, New York, 6th October 2010, 
http://www.tonyblairoffice.org/speeches/entry/washington-institute-for-near-east-
policy-2010-scholar-statesman-award/, (accessed 29th September 2014) 
17 W. Marshall, ‘Blair: Fight Extremism Narrative’, Progressive Policy Institute 
Online, 10th August 2010, http://www.progressivepolicy.org/issues/blair-fight-
extremist-narrative/, (accessed 29th September 2014) 
18 A. Hlayhel, ‘Is Islam a Violent Religion?’, Muslim Matters Online, 21st February 
2010, http://muslimmatters.org/2010/02/21/is-islam-a-violent-religion/, (accessed 29th 
September 2014); Staff Reporter, ‘Is Islam inherently violent’, WND online, 2nd 
November 2006, http://www.wnd.com/2006/11/38666/, (accessed 29th September 
2014); G. Davis, ‘Religion of Peace? Islam’s war against the world’, author and 
filmmaker Gregory M. Davis rebuts the notion that Islam is a great faith in desperate 
need of a Reformation 
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rather more sinisterly, in accordance with its core principles.19 Publically overt in his 
hostility to Islam, American author, and outspoken atheist Sam Harris argues that, ‘By 
no stretch of the imagination can anyone argue the core principles of Islam promote 
non-violence’.20 In terms of their respective views on Islam, Harris, and Professor 
Richard Dawkins share a great deal of common ground. Their main objective is to 
wage all out war on religion. Today, individually, and collectively, Harris and 
Dawkins continue with their mission to convince the world that religion and in 
particular Islam, are not at all conducive to the good of humanity.  
Apologists for Islam have not remained silent in the face of growing hostility. 
Fighting back against militant atheists, they question their underlying interpretation of 
the Quran and the Hadiths. Compared to the Islamic terrorists they condemn, Harris 
and Dawkins are accused of selectively adopting versus in the Quran and Hadiths out 
of context in order to support generalised propositions. Muslim community leaders 
point out how men like Harris fail to appreciate how Islam is based on peace and that 
jihad in self-defence is strictly limited and does not permit Muslims to commit 
terrorism against civilians. Refuting those who accuse Islam of being at the heart of 
modern terrorism, British author and Islamic scholar Abdal-Hakim Murad argues that 
targeting civilians and the act of suicide bombing are foreign to every possible school 
of Sunni Islam.21 Murad believes that both terrorists and those who blame their 
actions on religion have simply misinterpreted Islamic scripture.  
At the time of the London bombings, former politician Charles Clarke served 
as home secretary. Eight years later, he rejects any suggestion that the fundamental 
principles of Islam are to blame for the events of 7th July 2005. In fact, Clarke 
suggests the reverse is true and like many of his peers, deflects blame away from 
Islam. In his opinion, ‘Muslims have been ready to integrate with host communities. 
More than any other faith, Islam moulds itself to the values of the society of where it 
                                                
19 Anonymous, Palwatch, http://palwatch.org/main.aspx?fi=565, (accessed 29th 
September 2014) 
20 S. Harris, ‘Lecture to the New York Society of Ethical Culture’, [online video], 
2006, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VOpXHtHPZmU, 03:50, (accessed 18th 
September 2014) 
21 ‘Islamic statements against terrorism’, Charles Kurzman Online, 15th March 2012, 
http://kurzman.unc.edu/islamic-statements-against-terrorism, (accessed 29th 
September 2014) 
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is’.22 Proponents of this non-violent narrative include the Chief Mufti of Saudi Arabia, 
a widely respected Muslim scholar, and established authority on Islamic 
jurisprudence. In a 2004 sermon given at the Hajj, Abdulaziz Bin Abdalah Al-
Ashaykh, told the vast audience of Muslims gathered from around the world, ‘Islam is 
a religion of peace, mercy and goodness which forbids violence in all its forms 
especially acts the undermine the security of the innocent’.23 As a moderate Muslim 
enjoying life in the west, Murad may simply have been towing the official line when 
he spoke out. In a similar vein, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia encourages clerics to 
issue Islamic rulings dictated to them by Washington. However, in the aftermath of 
9/11, even hard-line fundamentalist groups historically unsympathetic to the west 
were queuing up to condemn the perpetrators. Palestinian Hamas, Pakistani Jamaat-e-
Islami and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood all widely condemned the deliberate 
targeting of civilians.24 Hardly recognised as pacifists, the decision by these groups to 
denounce Al-Qaeda, suggests that until the 2003 invasion of Afghanistan at least, 
even fundamentalists had limits on those deemed fair game. 
An idea of Islam 
Islam is an entirely holistic faith tightly governing the life of adherents. In contrast 
with predating Abrahamic faiths, Islam recognised no direct intermediary between 
Man and God. There is no Christ, Buddha or Judea. Mohammed is the prophet, but he 
is not worshiped the same as Jesus Christ. The word Islam derives from two Arabic 
words, taslim (submission) and salam (peace). Those who follow Islam referred to 
themselves as Muslims. Theoretically, there is total peace amongst these persons who 
literally submit entirely to God. In practice, this has proved difficult to achieve with 
sectarian violence occurring throughout history and to the present day. Originating in 
                                                
22 Clarke Author Interview 
23 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Information Office, Public statements by senior 
Saudi officials condemning extremism and promoting moderation, ‘Saudi Arabia’s 
Top Cleric Urges Muslims to Reject Terrorism’, Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia 
Information Office, May 2004, p. 10, 
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7th century Saudi Arabia, Islam is a strictly monotheistic faith such that God is one, 
with absolutely no associates. Similar to Christians and the Bible, Muslims submit to 
a written text. Authentic only when printed in Arabic, the Holy Quran is the absolute, 
final revelation of God as revealed to the Prophet Mohammed by archangel Gabrielle 
between 610 CE and 632 CE. Unlike the Bible or the Torah however, early Muslim 
missionaries passed on the word of god through oral recitation, printed Quran’s did 
not exist. Today, the ability to recite the entire Quran is highly respected; those who 
can are recognised as Guardians, or Hafiz.  
Unity of God (Monotheism) 
Central to the Islamic faith is the declaration, ‘There is no god worthy of worship 
except God and Mohammad is His messenger’. Known as the Shahada (lā ʾilāha ʾillā 
l-Lāh, Muḥammadun rasūlu l-Lāh), the phrase must be spoken by reverts to Islam in 
front of three witnesses. This seemingly short and simple statement has in fact 
produced vast chronicles of literature agonising over its meaning and implications for 
centuries. The clearest, indisputable, overarching consequence stemming from the 
Shahada is an uncompromising acceptance of the proposition that God has no 
associates. Theoretically, this leads to the rejection of synthetic laws and concepts of 
secular or monarchical governance since there can be no overarching authority 
between man and God. A second consequence of the Shahada (reinforced by multiple 
versus of the Quran) is that Muslims are obliged to hold deeply entrenched hatred 
towards polytheists (those who worship more than one God). For example, it is a 
terrible sin and outright apostasy to suggest God can manifest as the Father, the Son, 
and the Holy Spirit – the so-called Holy Trinity within Christianity.   
The Quran commands Muslims to fight polytheists until they submit. Stating 
clearly, ‘when the sacred months have passed, slay the polytheists wherever you find 
them’.25 Within the context of International Relations, the “oneness of God” has led to 
a number of deep-rooted conflicts. War between Pakistan and India has gone on 
longer than it has between Palestinians and Israelis. This is due to the underlying 
animosity between monotheist Muslims and polytheist Hindus. All non-Muslims are 
required to pay alms to the Islamic State on a regular basis. Harris argues this shows 
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that while Allah is merciful and forgiving, it is only to the subjugated.26 He points to 
the Quran, ‘…nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the People 
of the Book, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves 
subdued’.27  
Five Pillars 
Those who believe and submit entirely to God must adhere to the Five Pillars of 
Islam. Contrary to misconceptions amongst non-believers, these pillars namely 
testimony, prayer, alms-giving, fasting and pilgrimage do not include waging war 
against non-Muslims, subjugating Jews/Christians or forcing anyone to convert to 
Islam. The Quran is explicitly clear about having no compulsion in religion. Muslims 
are encouraged to promote Islam peacefully (Dawa) and every new follower must 
have converted by his or her own free will. This right to choose Islam is significant 
and the main proposition made in the seminal publication known as Milestones. 
Studying transcripts from every major terrorism trial in the UK since 2000, reveal 
consistent references to Milestones. Writing in the 1960s, Egyptian scholar Syed Qutb 
Shaheed argued that Muslims have a divine duty to remove all obstacles preventing 
humanity from choosing Islam. In practice this inevitable leads to violent revolution 
against secular nationalists and western backed dictators.  
Sunni & Shia 
After the death of the Prophet Mohammed, Muslims divided into two distinct sects 
namely Sunni and Shia. While both generally agree on the central tenets of Islam, 
they disagreed over the rightful successor to Mohammed as leader of the Caliphate 
(Muslim Empire). Ultimately the Sunni majority triumphed and Caliph Abu Bakr, a 
close companion of the Prophet Mohammed, subsequently ruled over the Rashidun 
Caliphate from 632 CE until his death in 634 CE. It would be an understatement to 
suggest that Sunni and Shia are staunch rivals. Respected Sunni scholars 
(predominantly Wahabi) have judged Shia Muslims to be Kuffar (unbelievers) and 
therefore not actual Muslims. Unfortunately, rivalry is not limited to theocratic 
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disagreement. Sectarian violence between the two major dominations of Islam has 
resulted in the death of millions of Muslims on both sides. There is no greater 
example in modern times than the Iran-Iraq war that raged from 1980 to 1988. Over 
an eight-year period, as many as half a million soldiers died on the battlefield, killed 
by weapons cynically supplied to both sides by France, Britain and the United States. 
More recently, sectarian violence in Syria has led to accusations of crimes against 
humanity. In this revolutionary struggle, the Sunni majority assisted by foreign 
mujahedeen are engaged in a bitter fight to oust the Shia government of Bashar Al-
Assad. Speaking to BBC News in 2013, Iran’s Foreign Minister judged sectarian 
tension between Shia and Sunni Muslims to be the most serious threat to world 
security.28 If divisions between the two sects were resolved and this led to unification, 
the west would face a far greater threat to its national security. Historically, divide and 
conquer has long been the preferred choice for subjugating enemies of the state. 
Consequently, it serves the interests of major superpowers to fuel hostility between 
Sunni and Shia. 
God’s Law (Shariah) 
Sharia Law or more commonly just Sharia is the moral, religious, and legal code that 
conditions the behaviour of all Muslims. Although interpretation and the degree of 
implementation vary between cultures, all Muslims consider Sharia the infallible law 
of God. It constitutes a system of duties that are incumbent upon all Muslims by 
virtue of his or her religious beliefs. Sources informing Sharia are naturally the Quran, 
but also the Hadiths. The Hadiths detail the life of the Prophet Mohammed and 
provide the basis in which Islamic jurists make rulings on what is allowed (Halal) and 
not allowed (Haram). The degree to which a Muslim in the west observes Sharia 
depends upon a number of factors. In areas of London, Birmingham, Leeds, and 
Bradford, Muslim communities live almost entirely within Islamic enclaves oblivious 
to the outside world. In the late 1990’s, the somewhat derogatory term Londonistan 
described parts of East London that had become indistinguishable from districts of 
Pakistan.  
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Residents of Londonistan consider themselves Muslim first, British second. 
Nationality is merely a passport or letter from the home office.29 Friday prayers are 
largely absent of issues facing the local community such as unemployment, women’s 
rights, and integration. Instead, Imams focus on international politics, specifically 
events in Iraq, Afghanistan, and more recently Syria. Muslims within these 
communities are constantly reminded of how they are part of a greater collective, one 
that transcends state sovereignty, local laws and customs binding a billion Muslims 
around the world together as a single body. In stark contrast to fundamentalist living 
in Londonistan, thousands of largely second generation Muslims barely attend Friday 
prayers, let alone pray five times a day as instructed in the Quran. Sharia is entirely 
alien to the majority of western Muslims. At the extreme end of the spectrum are 
Muslims who drink alcohol, deal and use illegal drugs and commit adultery, acts 
strictly forbidden in the Quran. Of particular relevance is that at least ten per cent of 
British Muslims convicted of terrorism offences in the UK have a previous history of 
gang affiliation. Perhaps fearing divine judgement, those with a renewed or virgin 
adoption of Islam, believe that only the most significant act of self-sacrifice will be 
sufficient to absolve them of past mistakes. 
Theoretically, the ideal situation for every Muslim is to live in a country 
governed according to Sharia. In practice, this is neither achievable nor necessarily 
desirable. Muslims fleeing from the Taliban during the 1990’s consistently spoke 
negatively of their experience. Taliban leaders are largely uneducated Pashtun 
tribesmen with very little understanding of gender equality, progressive politics, 
democracy or any other “western” concepts. Harsh in their governance, the Taliban 
were strongly criticised for their strict interpretation of Sharia even by 
fundamentalists. There is little evidence to suggest that if these men had been better 
educated, Afghanistan would have thrived economically and stood proudly as a 
beacon of human rights. In wealthy countries governed by western educated, “liberal” 
Muslims, where Sharia is also rigorously applied, the experience is equally negative. 
Continuous accusations of human rights violations in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait 
for example, widely suggest that Sharia is unsuitable in today’s globalised world. 
Anne-Marie Waters, council member of the National Secular Society argues that 
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Sharia is entirely incompatible with western liberalism.30 As an alternative to secular 
liberal democracy, Islam fails to reflect progress made in governance, science, justice 
and indeed any other area of human advancement since the enlightenment. The 
problem lies in the totalitarian nature of Islam, which claims to be a holistic solution 
to regulate man, society, and the state. 
Separation between Church and State 
How might we address the question of whether Islam is inherently violent? Firstly, 
one cannot begin to understand the totality of Islam with a mindset rooted in western 
concepts of secular liberal democracy, the sovereign state, and citizenship. These 
synthetic social constructs are entirely alien to the Islamic faith. In part, this is 
because the principle of separating Church and State is entirely incompatible with the 
holistic nature of Islam. Instead, Islam is the solution to every problem, as the basis of 
a political system that touches every aspect of human life from medicine and 
economics to the welfare system and overall governance. 31 Many leading observers 
consider Islam totalitarian in nature, a radical utopian movement closer in spirit to 
communism and capitalism than traditional religions like Judaism or Christianity.32 
Former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, echoed this sentiment 
when he spoke of his governing party being not socialist, nor capitalist but rather 
Islamic. Conditioned by centuries of violence driven by Christianity, European 
countries were correct to remove the Church from the state thereby curbing its 
homicidal tendencies. Today, fewer than 15% of countries in the world permit 
religion to have a direct hand in governing the population. The Vatican and Iran being 
two prominent examples. In Islam, secular governance is simply untenable. For 
Muslims, accepting secularism would entail ignoring, inactivating or replacing 
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dictates from the Quran, contradicting the basic creed of Islam.33 Thus, we begin to 
see the difficulties faced by Muslims in seeking to co-exist with non-believers, 
especially against the rising tide of globalisation in which the world is contracting and 
borders continuously eroding.  
Christianity no longer embraces violence because it has superseded this role to 
secular government. The United Kingdom maintains a standing army and carries out 
all manner of violent acts in defence of the realm. Conditioned by structural anarchy, 
one school of thought within international politics argues that every state in the world 
must put the interests of its domestic population first. Islam is essentially no different. 
The global Muslim Ummah is a single body with a shared identity, values, norms, and 
ambition. Consequently, as a perceived sovereign state, Islam maintains a vanguard in 
which all Muslims subscribe to a kind of Islamic Responsibility to Protect doctrine. 
Although this concept has no legal status in western dominated International law, 
consent for acts of self-defence appear in the Quran, specifically verse 22:39:  
Permission [to fight] is given to those against whom war is being wrongfully 
waged … those who have been driven from their homelands against all right 
for no other reason than their saying, ‘Our Sustainer is God!’ For, if God had 
not enabled people to defend themselves against one another, monasteries and 
churches and synagogues and mosques — in which God’s name is abundantly 
extolled, would surely have been destroyed.34  
Writing in the Journal of Islamic studies, Muhammed Ahmed concludes the scope of 
self-defence in Islamic law does not confine itself to the defence of state territory 
alone; rather, it also includes defence of the global Muslim community and the value-
system of Islam.35 Consequently, this explains why Muslims from all around the 
world have flooded to northern Syria in order to fight alongside the insurgent group, 
which today refers to itself as the Islamic State (IS).  
Harris rejects any notion that violence within Islam is merely for self-defence. 
Successful in numerous debates with scholars and theologians, Harris contends that 
                                                
33 H. Hathout, Reading the Muslim mind, New York, American Trust Publications, 
1995, p.51 
34 Quran (22:39–22:40) 
35 M. Ahmad, ‘The Scope of Self-defence: A Comparative Study of Islamic and 
Modern International Law’, Islamic Studies, vol. 49, no. 2, 2010, pp. 155-194. 
Page 86 of 370 
Islam contains the offensive notion of Jihad, which includes an imperative to convert, 
subjugate, or kill non-believers. 36  Snubbing refutations from Islamic apologists, 
Harris is unrepentant in his belief that ‘those who claim Islam is a religion of peace, 
have either not read the Quran and Hadiths or are lying about them’.37 Artificial 
borders drawn centuries ago delineating people according to nationality are entirely 
alien to Muslims. Islam unites adherents on a global scale transcending international 
boundaries in direct competition with the sovereign state. Islam has been largely 
misinterpreted, branded a religion when better understood as a totalitarian ideology. A 
powerful movement encompassing both Church and State that offers a comprehensive 
alternative to western dominated liberal democracy. As an entirely holistic solution to 
global governance, it would be unreasonable to expect Islamic citizens not to defend 
both themselves and their way of life. This is arguably no different to the right of self-
defence afforded all states and duly enshrined in the founding articles of the United 
Nations. Is it not reasonable to conclude that Islam is inherently violent, but no more 
than western sovereign states determined to spread liberal democracy? Can it be 
argued that attempts by Muslims to achieve universal adoption of Islam are 
comparable to attempts by western states to achieve universal adoption of capitalism? 
Two ideologues that each believes their system constitute the best means in which to 
achieve peace within world politics. 
Terrorise the Enemies of Islam 
It is undisputed even amongst moderates that Islam retains the right to self-defence. In 
concluding this section, the question asked is whether terrorism is a corollary of this 
core principle. In short, is it correct to argue that terrorism carried out by Muslims is a 
direct consequence of the fundamental right of self-defence inherent within Islam? In 
October 2013, Mossah Yousef, oldest son of Hamas founding father and spiritual 
leader Sheikh Hassan Yousef, gave an exclusive interview to BBC News. Raised in 
the West Bank and considered a future leader of Hamas, Mossah Yousef offers a first 
hand account of the relationship between Islam and terrorism. During a heated debate 
with the presenter, Yousef argues, ‘All the Muslims who follow the God of Islam, 
interpret Islam as they like, but this does not negate the terroristic and murderous 
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character of Islam which incites people through the Quran to kill people and blow 
themselves up’.38 Yousef goes on to suggest that Muslims who claim Islam is a 
religion of peace and compassion do not understand their own religion.   
Shortly before undertaking a suicide mission, volunteers (shahids), record 
what they refer to as a living will or martyrdom video. In almost every publically 
available example, the shahid references verses in the Quran that detail cautionary 
rewards awaiting them in paradise. Several of those men who flew planes into the 
Twin Towers on 9/11, were educated to degree level in the fields of science and 
engineering. Highly intelligent with promising futures ahead, these men spent an 
extravagant amount of time discussing the divine rewards of martyrdom. British 
Muslim terrorists have also expressed their belief that God would reward them as 
martyrs by granting a place in paradise. In a 2013, propaganda video for Somali based 
Islamic insurgent group Al-Shabaab, the British narrator discusses the benefits of 
suicide bombing. He makes it clear that volunteers ‘are not driven by material 
incitements but rather the cautionary rewards of Allah in the Quran, verses that speak 
to them directly and incite them to defend their faith and honour of their Muslim 
brothers and sisters across the globe’. 39  Discrediting poverty and psychological 
theories of suicide terrorism, the narrator also states that volunteers for martyrdom are 
neither disadvantaged nor psychologically disturbed.40   
Many authors on suicide bombing reject any suggestion that volunteers are 
radicalised, indoctrinated or brainwashed. Rather each martyr acquires a sincere 
appreciation and understanding of the Islamic faith from an honest reading of the 
Quran and Hadiths. Those who volunteer have submitted entirely to God and accepted 
wholeheartedly His instructions as laid out in the Quran. Evidence in support of this 
proposition can be found in the case of western Muslims who readily pursue jihad in 
Afghanistan knowing they are highly unlikely to return home alive. As humans, we 
are biologically fine-tuned to nurture and protect our offspring. Consequently, we do 
not ordinarily expose ourselves to any risk that runs contrary to such programmed 
compulsion. How then can we explain why British Muslim men with children have 
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consistently volunteered to wage armed conflict in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Bosnia, 
Libya and since 2010 Syria? Alternatively, why do men with young children readily 
agree to blow themselves up aboard transatlantic planes and packed commuter trains? 
The reasons can be found in both the Quran and the Hadiths; put simply, it is the duty 
of every capable Muslim to defend their faith and co-religionists.  
Muslims willing to carry out acts of violence against civilians are in the 
minority. This is not necessarily because other Muslims disagree in principle with 
violence or because the Quran forbids it. Nasiri believes that if only for a brief 
moment, all Muslims around the world felt a strong sense of pride in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11. 41  The all-powerful America superpower responsible for the 
suffering of millions of Muslims through sanctions, military aid, and covert 
interference experienced a small taste of violence not witnessed since Pearl Harbour. 
While the moderate Muslim majority choose to compromise with their faith, this does 
not mean they read or interpret the Quran any differently to those who engage in 
insurgency or carry out acts of terrorism.42 Intellectually honest moderates recognise 
the right of Islam to self-defence and are not blind to events in Palestine, Iraq or 
Afghanistan; they simply lack courage to act. 
In conclusion, terrorism (defined as the deliberate targeting of non-
combatants) carried out by Muslims, gains legitimacy from the core principles of 
Islam. Consistent with structural anarchy as defined by Hobbs, when facing an 
existential threat, acts ordinarily forbidden within Islam, become permissible. 
Ethically this is no different to when Britain and Germany targeted non-combatants in 
the Second World War or when the United States killed thousands of Japanese 
civilians using nuclear weapons. Western religions have relinquished the monopoly of 
violence to the state, were this not the case, then the 2003 invasion of Iraq which 
violated its sovereignty according to the treaty of Westphalia, may have been judged 
as religious terrorism. While Islam continues to be branded a mere religion rather than 
a political ideology uniting a global sovereign state in which all Muslims are deemed 
citizens, acts of legitimate self-defence will continue to be labelled as terrorism. The 
next section introduces Islamic fundamentalism and the moderate project. Since it is 
socially unacceptable to blame Islam directly for terrorism, it has been necessary to 
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develop a label to use when justifying policies that ultimately affect all Muslims. 
Overall, dichotomizing Islam into these two polarised groups appears part of a 
strategy to prevent the re-establishment of an Islamic Caliphate that might rival 
western capitalist hegemony. 
Fundamentalism 
Following our basic introduction to the core principles of Islam, we turn now to a 
narrow interpretation known as fundamentalism. From a modern sense, the label re-
emerged within Islamic discourse following the 1979 Iranian revolution. Taking 
power, Ayatollah Khomeini transformed the idea of re-establishing a global Islamic 
empire from an unachievable ideal, to a realistic possibility. Until the fall of 
communism, fundamentalists posed the greatest threat to western hegemony. 
Notwithstanding a clash of civilisations, America relied heavily on fundamentalists to 
defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Financed and equipped by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Taliban leaders who would one day harbour Osama Bin 
Laden, were very much a creation of the west. However, their beliefs, motivation, 
ambitions, and driving force derive entirely from Islam. 
Consensus across academia suggests that Islamic fundamentalism draws upon 
an uncompromising interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah. Muslim adherents, 
strive to live their lives in a manner consistent with that led by Prophet Mohammed 
during the 7th Century. Experienced journalist Duncan Gardham who specialises in 
terrorism carried out by British Muslims has said of fundamentalism, ‘on reflection, it 
appears to be a kind of back to basics, a very doctrinaire version of Islam that is 
generally the domain of Salafism or Deobandism’.43 Controversially, Dr Kathleen 
Taylor at Oxford University believes religious fundamentalism may be categorised, as 
a mental illness, and that through therapy, normative moderation is achievable.44 
Given that Muslims are obliged strictly adhere to the Quran, all must arguably 
recognize the obligation of Jihad, at the very least in terms of self-defense. This leads 
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to two important questions. Are fundamentalists the only legitimate Muslims? 
Secondly, can there be such thing as a non-violent Islamic fundamentalist?  
According to Islam, God gave his final revelation to Mohammed. In the 
absence of any further instruction, Muslims consider the Quran to be the definitive 
word of God. As such, there can be no compromise or modernist interpretation of 
what it commands. Consequently, only those who follow the exact word of God, pray 
five times a day, reject polytheism and secularism, and wage Jihad against the 
enemies of Islam can legitimately claim to be Muslims.45 Non-fundamentalists or 
moderates have compromised with their faith in order to live amongst western 
society. Fundamentalists judge them hypocrites and argue they are no more Muslim 
than non-believers. This is an important point because politicians will often argue that 
since suicide bombing is indiscriminate, there is a risk of killing co-religionists. 
Fundamentalists argue that since moderates are hypocrites, it is entirely permissible to 
kill them while pursuing legitimate defence of the faith.  
Islam does not hold a monopoly on fundamentalism. In fact, the Arabic 
language has no direct translation of the word. The word can be traced within 
Christianity; used to describe early 20th century Protestant denominations reacting 
against the rise of theological and cultural modernism. The spirit of fundamentalism is 
a rejection of modernist, progressive interpretations of primary scripture and a return 
to core principles. Surveying fundamentalist movements in the United States, Israel, 
and the Middle East, we find this description to be largely universal across religions. 
Former British Home Secretary Charles Clarke believes all faiths have within them 
groups that are sectarian, extremist, and potentially destructive.46 Islam is not unique 
in this respect. Zionist oppression of Palestinians by their Jewish neighbours, 
persecution of Muslims in Arakan by “peaceful” Buddhists Monks and the Christian 
Crusades all amply demonstrate that far from holding a monopoly on fundamentalism, 
Islamic Fundamentalists are actually rather amateur. Religious leaders from all faiths 
may openly call for peace, forgiveness, and understanding and while the scriptures of 
major religions widely discuss such ideals, they do so concomitantly with powerful 
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fundamentalist narratives of war and extreme violence.47 Should we therefore be 
asking whether the core principles of all religions have the potential to lead 
fundamentalists to pursue acts of terrorism? Is it wrong to single out Islam and accuse 
it of being inherently violent? 
Historically all faiths have inspired acts of terrorist violence against civilians. 
Today, however, we find that only Islamic fundamentalists continue to promote the 
ideologically basis, authority, and impetus to fight militarily against enemies of Islam. 
Islamic fundamentalists subscribe to the theological concepts of divine judgement, 
rewards for martyrs, and importantly the idea of paradise. Without these tenants that 
are central to the Islamic faith, it is difficult to understand why fundamentalists would 
sacrifice their lives or face decades in prison in order to retaliate against the British 
public. No other religion asks for such dedication from its followers. Politically 
incorrect but empirically true, we simply do not have young fundamentalist 
Christians, Jews or Buddhists actively engaged in UK terrorist conspiracies. No level 
of covert surveillance will uncover Catholic priests instructing fundamentalist 
members of the clergy to pick up a weapon or help defend co-religionists facing 
persecution. The same, however, cannot be said of fundamentalist preachers who 
discuss the suffering of Muslims and from whom a minority have incited terrorism 
against the west. This researcher suggests Islam is more than a mere religion, rather a 
powerful totalitarian political ideology that legitimizes terrorism through its inherent 
advocacy of self-defence. Muslims are told it is their right to defend co-religionists 
and to remove all obstacles preventing non-Muslims from converting.  
It is suggested that not all Islamic fundamentalists support the notion of 
violence. For example, the socio-political organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) is widely 
labelled fundamentalist and yet the government has not prevented its operation and 
members do not routinely face arrest for terrorist offences. Professor of History, 
Lawrence Davidson has argued the vast majority of fundamentalists are indeed non-
violent, much like the average devout Catholic or Protestant. Davidson fails, however, 
to appreciate that his views are inherently contradictory. Even the most ardent left 
wing, apologetic reading of the Quran cannot ignore the command to pursue Jihad. 
Able Muslims must defend Islam using whatever means necessary up to and including 
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armed conflict. A fundamentalist cannot by very definition of what makes him a 
fundamentalist, ignore verses of the Quran deemed incompatible with western 
political thinking. Simply put, a British Muslim is not a fundamentalist without total 
adherence to the Quran, specifically that which obliges him to volunteer for jihad. In 
failing to advocate jihad against the enemies of Islam, Hizb ut-Tahrir fails to 
constitute a fundamentalist organisation. The group are better described as ‘moderates 
with extreme political views’, which although incompatible with western norms and 
values, does not make them any kind of terrorist threat.  
Earlier in the chapter, discussion centred on whether the problem of Islamic 
terrorism lies with the fundamentals of Islam. Protagonists of this argument cite a 
verse in the Quran, which states, ‘Those who believe, fight in the cause of Allah’.48 
Rebutting the negative connotations this statement implies, Islamic fundamentalists 
argue that what they do is no more of a problem for international peace and security 
than what hard-line republicans do when they lead America into illegal wars, or 
sanction CIA interference in the affairs of Muslim countries. Perhaps the greatest 
concern to the west is the increasing number of moderates questioning their faith and 
shifting more towards fundamentalism. This figure rose exponentially after September 
11th 2001. In particular, young Muslims who observed the sacrifice made by nineteen 
Brothers asked what they should be doing for the global cause. If all Muslims rejected 
moderation, might we witness a genuine clash of civilisations? This was the fear 
exposed by Samuel Huntington writing back in 1992 as the Cold War ended and 
fundamentalists emerged out of Afghanistan.  
Although well versed in respect of international politics, just war and theories 
of the sovereign state, Islamic fundamentalists do not attempt to rationalise or 
legitimise their views or actions from any kind of legal or normative standpoint. The 
only law that interests them is God’s law and the only legitimacy required derives 
from the Quran. In fulfilling what they perceive to be a kind of Islamic Responsibility 
to Protect doctrine, British fundamentalists have fought several Just Wars: Bosnia and 
Kosovo during the 1990’s, Egypt, Syria and Libya since 2010. British Muslims 
fighting to establish a moderate Islamic state are revolutionaries. In contrast, 
fundamentalists who support political groups with an Islamist agenda are terrorists 
and prosecuted accordingly. This researcher suggests the reason for this disparity is 
                                                
48 Quran (4:76) 
Page 93 of 370 
that publically at least, western governments refuse to openly acknowledge that Islam 
has been misbranded a peaceful non-violent, non-political religion, when it is far 
better understood as a holistic rival tto both communism and capitalism.  
When constrained as a mere religion, Islam operates within western ideas of 
secular liberal democracy. Classified as a religion, Islam is immune from direct 
criticism, thus leading to the moderate/fundamentalist dichotomy. Front stage, the 
west pushes moderate Islam in order to divert criticism against the American led War 
on Terrorism. Back stage western leaders oppress both moderates and fundamentalists 
who might otherwise establish an Islamic Caliphate to rival capitalist hegemony. A 
clear example is Egypt where American military aid has kept the legitimately elected 
Muslim Brotherhood from office and in Gaza where the Islamic Hamas Party face a 
constant struggle to govern due to an Israeli blockade. In the face of overwhelming 
military might, Islamic fundamentalists continue to strive towards unification, 
devoutly believing Allah has ordained them to one day achieve victory.49 
Moderates 
Promoted as an ideological response to Islamic fundamentalism, the term first 
described opponents of the post 1979 Iranian regime. Strictly speaking, moderation 
within the Islamic faith varies, but primarily it describes those Muslims who reject 
Jihad and embrace western concepts of human rights, democracy and freedom of 
religion. Writing in the Huffington Post, political observer Qasim Rashid has said that 
moderate Muslims reject violence because they recognise that “true Jihad is the 
struggle to attain nearness to God through good works”. 50  Moderation is the 
normative interpretation of Islam while divergent fundamentalists require 
psychological therapy. More recently, moderate Muslims have been popularised as 
those able to contain their anger and revulsion in response to public insults of the 
Prophet Mohammed.  
Western leaders champion the moderate project for two important reasons. 
Firstly, it helps delegitimise fundamentalism and secondly, moderates are not pushing 
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to establish an Islamic Caliphate that might rival capitalist driven liberal democracy. 
Political support for moderate Islam has been consistent amongst western nations. For 
example, shortly after the London Bombings in July 2005, former Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard held a summit for Muslim leaders. The outcome was a 
“statement of principles” committing Muslim communities to pursue “moderate 
Islam”.51 The Australian government is far less tolerant of fundamentalists and 
actively undertakes initiatives designed to curtail their activities. Manipulation of the 
British Muslim community does not appear to have gone un-noticed or without 
consequences. In 2010, British MP Dr Phyliss Sharkey warned that because of 
counter terrorism initiatives that began in earnest post 2005, many British Muslims 
felt the government had sought to engineer “moderate Islam” by promoting certain 
counter radicalisation groups over others.52 The moderate project extends beyond 
domestic boundaries and appears to have found favour within British Foreign Policy. 
In discussing peace with respect to Syria in 2013, Foreign Secretary William Hague 
spoke of how the West needed to ‘bolster moderate opposition in order to exclude 
fundamentalists from power’.53  
Muslim leaders in the UK who promote moderate Islam draw significant 
criticism from fundamentalist counter parts. Moderates are accused of working on 
behalf of the government to promote a diluted form of Islam that is at odds with its 
core principles, in particular the right of self-defence. Observers suggest these so-
called representatives of the Muslim community are unable to speak out against 
western aggression and instead they mutilate the teachings of Islam as a conciliatory 
gesture to non-believers. Former Jihadist Omar Nasiri has questioned the entire 
concept of moderate Islam arguing it simply does not exist. He argues, ‘the moderate 
is someone who drinks alcohol, does not pray and thinks of himself as assimilated 
into a western way of life and therefore is not a Muslim at all’.54 Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdogan agrees with Nasiri saying, ‘there is only one prophet, and one Allah 
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and only one Quran, hence there can be only one Muslim. A moderate Muslim is an 
oxymoron because there is no such thing’.55  
Consistent with Nasiri and Erdogan, atheist Dr Sam Harris criticises the entire 
moderate project at length. He argues that religious moderation is a cover for 
fundamentalist terrorism, because it diverts attention away from Islam itself, for 
which criticism is taboo. Consequently, it is necessary that governments appear to be 
at least trying to isolate fundamentalists from the moderates. In practice, however, the 
need to protect the majority outweighs the human rights of the minority. 
Subsequently, moderate British Muslims are treated the same as fundamentalists. 
Government policies designed to counter terrorism invariably add to the construction 
of the entire Muslim community as a threat to national security. As recently as 2012, 
police installed security cameras across a large Muslim community of Birmingham. 
Although never made operational and later dismantled, this activity demonstrates 
counter terrorism police believe privately as least, that all Muslims in the UK are 
potential terrorists. 
During a 2009 visit to Cairo just before the Arab Spring, President Obama 
steadfastly claimed the United States is not, and never will be, at war with Islam. 
Contrary to such public overtures that first began with the Bush administration, extra-
judicial drone strikes, financial sanctions, military aid and the invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan make it difficult for even the most moderate Muslims to refrain from 
becoming fundamentalists and pursuing Jihad against coalition forces. 
Fundamentalists point to the military led post Mubarak regime in Egypt, as evidence 
showing western distain for Islam and a steadfast refusal to allow even democratically 
elected fundamentalists to hold power. Despite free elections in 2013, leader of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed Morsi, was ousted by the American financed 
Egyptian military within his first year in office. Using the highly subjective cover of 
pursuing fundamentalists, the west is able to gain public support for activities that 
invariably target the entire Muslim community. The net result of the War on Terror 
has been to prevent even democratic attempts to re-establish an Islamic Caliphate.  
Western nations continue to stem the rise of Islam in order to protect capitalist driven 
liberal democracy. In the next section, we conclude this first chapter by introducing 
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our primary topic, specifically terrorism carried out by a minority of extreme 
fundamentalists. 
Extreme fundamentalist terrorism 
Modern day terrorism carried out in the UK since 2003 has been almost the exclusive 
domain of British born and raised fundamentalist Sunni Muslims. This includes the 
four men responsible for the unprecedented 7th July 2005 suicide bombing in London. 
Subsequent enquiries into the attack revealed the extent to which the men responsible 
all held deep fundamentalist views. Like other British Muslims who have pursued 
terrorism, these men were actively engaged in promoting political narratives and 
carrying out activities designed to further their religious beliefs. Since the early 
1990’s, hundreds of British Muslim men have loosely networked in order to form 
what this author defines as the Islamic fundamentalist Movement. From within this 
socio-political environment, a minority of those involved have later crossed the line 
and pursued terrorism. Well established within academic discourse is the proposition 
that while not all Islamic fundamentalists become terrorists, all Islamic terrorists are 
principally fundamentalists. 
Since 2005, fundamentalism has declined in favour of the term extremism 
when referring to British Muslims who commit Terrorism. A survey of relevant 
discourse suggests the media, politicians, and academia denounces these men as 
extremist terrorists. In part, this is due to the failure of the moderate project to 
adequately challenge fundamentalism. In turn, this had led to greater use of the word 
“extremism” to describe more than mere acts of terrorism. Since 2014, policy makers 
consider fundamentalist Muslims who reject atheism, democracy, and freedom of 
speech as extremists. W This contemporary descriptive entirely fails to capture the 
importance of Islam and how terrorists commonly refer to themselves as 
fundamentalists. Since the killing of Lee Rigby in 2013, the government has 
broadened the definition of extremism in order to clamp down on the politics and 
activities of fundamentalists. Historically, the only persons considered extreme were 
those who supported the Islamic right of self-defence and refused to condone 
terrorism. Since 2013, however, extremism now refers to any Muslim who rejects 
liberal concepts such as freedom of religion, democracy, and human rights. In order to 
adequately capture the religious and political nature of bombing campaigns 
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undertaken by British Muslims as well as the way in which government has sought to 
delegitimize any perceived justification, a more accurate label suggested in this thesis 
would be extreme fundamentalists. Acknowledgement is thus given to the deep level 
of religiosity as well as recognition that we are referring specifically to those 
fundamentalists who have crossed the line and adopted an extremist standpoint, such 
that they are willing to carry out acts of terrorism.  
Speaking in the House of Commons in 2013, British conservative politician 
Ken Clarke stated that in the aftermath of 9/11, the government and its international 
partners were suddenly adapting to a completely new scale and type of threat from 
fundamentalist religious extremists.56 Linguistically, this speech demonstrates that 
within the British Government, politicians deemed Muslims willing to carry out 
terrorism as both fundamentalists and extremist. In 2008, the National Council of 
Resistance of Iran submitted written evidence to a select committee on Foreign 
Affairs. The organisation stated clearly, ‘terrorism has been the main instrument of 
the Iranian regime in pursuit of its expansionist ideology. Islamic fundamentalism 
inspired terrorism now poses the greatest threat to peace and stability around the 
world’. 57 This statement offers further evidence of how the fundamentalist label is 
widely used amongst policy makers within the discourse on terrorism. 
Writing in the aftermath of the 1993 Al-Qaeda terrorist attack in New York, 
academic Sadik Al-Azm argued in favour of using the term Islamic fundamentalism to 
describe the ideology of those responsible. By referring to the terrorists as 
fundamentalists, Al-Azm implied the core principles of Islam condoned violence. In 
advocating the epistemological legitimacy, scientific integrity and critical 
applicability of the term Islamic fundamentalism, Al-Azm points to its liberal use in 
books, summaries and introductions produced by a prominent Egyptian compiler and 
editor of armed insurrectionary Islamist publications. He notes how it is ‘used in a 
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very matter of fact way and without further apologies, hesitations or reservations’.58 
In further support of his contention, Al-Azm cites a widely reported statement issued 
by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) - the group responsible for the assassination of 
Egyptian President Sadat in 1981. The author of the statement claims the underlying 
ideology of EIJ derives from a ‘fundamentalist call for a return to the understanding 
and doctrine of the good predecessors in an age where corruption prevails’. 59 The 
group’s manifesto states the purpose of the organisation is to, ‘show and recall the 
legitimate religious foundations and fundamentals which should never escape the 
attention of any Islamic movement’. 60 
Collectively, these statements support use of the term “fundamentalism” to 
describe insurgent groups which emerged from Afghanistan in the early 1990s. In his 
final remarks, Al-Azm agrees stating that it is entirely reasonable to conclude that 
referring to these groups as fundamentalist is both accurate and correct. At a meeting 
in Cairo in February 1995, three Middle Eastern leaders claimed to have been the 
target of Islamic fundamentalists. Hosni Mubarak, Yasser Arafat, and Isaac Rabin, 
stated publically that “Sunni terrorists” had tried to assassinate each of them. 61  This 
narrative greatly strengthens the proposition that terrorism carried out by Muslims 
since the early 1990s has emerged from the global Islamic fundamentalist movement. 
More recently, approximately 63% of organisations proscribed by the British 
government in 2003 can be suitably described as “Islamic fundamentalists”.62  
Almost exclusively, extreme fundamentalists point to the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq as being their primary motivation. A war deemed illegal even by western 
standards, fundamentalists judge it a neo-colonialist attempt to secure the country’s 
natural resources. Comments by former American President, George Bush, in which 
he inadvertently used the word crusade, left little doubt the invasion of Iraq was also 
                                                
58 S. Al-Azm, ‘Islamic Fundamentalism Reconsidered: A Critique Outline of 
Problems, Ideas and Approaches’, South Asia Bulletin, vol. 13, no. 1, 1993, p.96. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 D Pipes, ‘There are no moderates: Dealing with Fundamentalist Islam’, National 
Interest, 1995, http://www.danielpipes.org/274/there-are-no-moderates-dealing-with-
fundamentalist-islam, (accessed 9th October 2014) 
62 Home Office, Proscribed terror groups or organizations, UK Parliament, 12th July 
2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-
organisations--2, (accessed 9th October 2014) 
Page 99 of 370 
part of the long running campaign to subjugate Islam and prevent the re-establishment 
of a Caliphate. As the post-war occupation of Iraq continued to destabilise the 
country, division occurred amongst British fundamentalist Muslims. While the 
majority remained bound by a covenant of security, a minority claimed the British 
Government had broken this peace treaty and were now at war with Islam. 
Consequently, a small number of fundamentalists in the UK determined that terrorism 
was now the only way to fight back against the coalition. As a tactic in asymmetric 
conflict, terrorism empowered those who felt compelled to fight back against western 
aggression in Iraq and Afghanistan. Muslims with previously no interest in attacking 
the UK, who abhorred violence against non-combatants, appear to have renegotiated 
with their ethics. Events in Fallujah, Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib conflated with 
policies of targeted assassination, extra-ordinary rendition and the most controversial 
of all “enhanced integration” were sufficient reasons for fundamentalists to begin 
plotting attacks against fellow citizens. 
Terrorists in Northern Ireland typically belonged to well-established 
paramilitary organisations with access to weapons, explosives, and expert military 
training. In contrast, British Muslims growing up in the west enjoy little organised 
logistical support. Through the collective movement of likeminded fundamentalists 
around the UK, terrorists have been able to rely on others to facilitate introductions 
and help raise finance. Upon making the decision to act, fundamentalists provided the 
necessary connections to obtain training and operational support. Until 2007, Al-
Qaeda (ALQ) played a significant role in this process. Because of increasing drone 
strikes, ALQ has significantly declined as a sponsor of terrorism in the UK. In the 
next chapter, we formally introduce the Islamic fundamentalist movement. The 
researcher uses this label to describe the organisation, politics, and activities of British 
fundamentalist Muslims since the mid-1990s. Tracing the origins of fundamentalism 
to 1930s Egypt, we show how after a lengthy period of inactivity due to western led 
suppression, the movement re-emerged in post-Soviet Afghanistan and arrived in the 
UK shortly thereafter. British Muslims responsible for acts of extreme violence 
against western hostages during the Syrian civil war are a direct by-product of the UK 
fundamentalist movement. In September 2014, fundamentalist preachers in the UK 
who promoted the mindset which led hundreds of British Muslims to join the war in 
Syria, made a direct plea for them to release one hostage in particular. Controversial 
fundamentalist cleric Shaykh Haitham Al Haddad, a Judge for the Sharia Council in 
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London, warned that the execution of Mr Henning would be “haram” – forbidden 
according to Sharia Law.63 
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Chapter Two – Origins and Rise of Islamic 
Fundamentalism 
Previously chapter one introduced four important concepts namely Islam, 
fundamentalism, moderation, and fundamentalist extremist terrorism. Critically, the 
first chapter identified how fundamentalist British Muslims began organising 
themselves into a socio-political movement relying on a strict interpretation of Islam 
as the basis for mobilisation. Followers promoted a visceral anti-western political 
ideology and participated in a set of activities to help entrench their extremist beliefs. 
Arguably, the most common of which has been the pursuit of jihad. From this group 
of British fundamentalist Muslims, a minority would later undertake acts of domestic 
terrorism against fellow citizens. This relatively modern phenomenon has been a 
direct consequence, indeed championed by the fundamentalist movement. Without 
incubation provided by this socially constructed environment, neither the mindset nor 
the operational support necessary for the genesis of terrorism would have 
materialised.  
This second chapter presents the origins and rise of Islamic fundamentalism. 
This is necessary in order to recognise and challenge narratives that continue to drive 
young British Muslims to pursue jihad, which in itself offers a pathway towards 
violent terrorism. This chapter proceeds by examining how fundamentalism first 
emerged, specifically in response to western neo-colonialism. After a lengthy period 
of inactivity due to political suppression from authoritarian dictators in the Middle 
East, fundamentalism re-emerged in post-soviet Afghanistan spearheading by Al-
Qaeda. Over the next ten years leading up to 9/11, Islamic fundamentalism swiftly 
became prevalent in Muslim communities across the UK. In order to explain why this 
occurred, this chapter argues certain key events helped ensure ideologues for Islamic 
fundamentalism enjoyed a highly receptive audience in the late 1990s and early 21st 
century.  
The story of Islamic fundamentalism goes back to 1924. Following the 
abolition of the Ottoman Empire by Turkey’s founding father Kemal Ataturk, 
European powers moved swiftly to divide the vast Muslim nation into fragmented 
colonies. France, Britain and Spain dismembered what was once a powerful empire 
into thousands of diverse tribes living in disjointed territories that failed to reflect 
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religion, race or ethnicity.1 With over one billion adherents, Islam constitutes a 
potentially powerful force in world politics. If re-established, a unified Caliphate 
made up of Islamic republics holds the potential to rival both communism and liberal 
democracy in vying for global hegemony. 2  In recognition of this, Islamic 
fundamentalists have consistently accused both Europe and America of waging 
cultural and ideological warfare to supress the dispersion of Islam.3  
On the eve of the Second World War, British foreign minister Lord Curzon 
told Parliament, ‘Britain must help put an end to anything which brings about Islamic 
unity between the sons of Muslims. As we have already succeeded in finishing off the 
Khilafah so we must ensure it will never rise again’.4 While historically western 
nations have long subjugated the nation of Islam, geopolitics and the pursuit of oil 
provided an additional impetus to act. By the end of the Second World War, both the 
United States and Great Britain had thoroughly recognised the importance of energy 
security. Consequently, from 1945 onwards, both countries began a successful long-
term campaign to assist ‘puppet dictators’ in halting the re-establishing of an Islamic 
Caliphate. Interference in Muslim countries, however, helped construct the west as an 
enemy of Islam leading to the rise of opposition movements both secular and religious 
in nature. The next sub-section describes the “neo-colonialist” approach taken by the 
west in order to subjugate Islam and thus ensure the continued flow of Middle Eastern 
oil.5   
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Neo-colonialism secures the oil 
In the aftermath of a war against Fascism that was rationalised as a war for freedom 
and self-determination, allied politicians would now have to compromise with their 
ethics to ensure the continued flow of oil. Almost bankrupted by five years of war, 
Britain reached an agreement with the United States over control of Middle Eastern 
oil. Allegedly in 1944, American President Franklin Roosevelt told the British 
Ambassador, ‘Persian oil is yours. We share the oil of Iraq and Kuwait. As for Saudi 
Arabian oil, its ours’. Subsequently, on the 8th of August 1944, western superpowers 
signed the Anglo American Petroleum Agreement splitting Middle Eastern oil 
between the United States and Great Britain. Such realist discussions leave little doubt 
as to the contempt held for local leaders and the genuine lack of recognition afforded 
to Middle Eastern countries in terms of state sovereignty.6 Islamic fundamentalists 
commonly use the western pursuit of energy security to convince fellow Muslims 
there is a war against Islam and therefore jihad is necessary in order to shake off 
interference from foreign crusaders.  
In essence, neo-colonialism describes the post-UN strategy to secure Middle 
Eastern oil. Smith has suggested Marxist commentators used the term to denote the 
continued economic domination of newly 'independent territories by their former 
imperial overlords.7 Put simply, a means to extract natural resources from a country 
without actually having to govern it directly. Examples are bountiful. In 1949, Syrian 
Army Chief of Staff Husni al-Za’im gained power with assistance from the CIA.8 
During his four months in charge, Za’im approved a pipeline allowing the flow of 
Saudi Arabian oil to Mediterranean ports, signed peace treaties with Israel and 
cracked down heavily on communist politics. In 1951, Iranians democratically elected 
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prominent lawyer Mohammed Mosaddeq as Prime Minister.9 Strongly opposed to 
foreign control, Mosaddeq nationalised the country’s oil industry and cut all 
diplomatic ties with Britain. Heavily petitioned by the Anglo-Iranian oil company 
who stood to lose millions in revenue, the British and American governments 
approved a joint MI6-CIA effort to oust the new Prime Minister.10 By 1954, this led 
to the return of western friendly Shah of Iran. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi governed 
until a student uprising in 1979 finally brought an end to western interference and 
manipulation of the Shia dominated state. Today the process of neo-colonialism 
continues unabated in Libya, Nigeria, Yemen and Egypt. What Lord Curzon told the 
British Parliament in 1939 holds true in modern times: western leaders must never 
allow Muslims to unite and form an Islamic Caliphate since it would challenge their 
capitalist driven democratic hegemony.11 
Determined that the Second World War would be the last global conflict, the 
victorious allies established a forum known formally as the United Nations (UN). 
Theoretically, the UN, and especially its Security Council, would act as mediator 
between conflicting member states in order to prevent escalation towards all out war. 
Contained within the founding articles of this new leviathan was the right to pursue 
self-determination. As long as member states refrained from threatening neighbours, 
they could govern domestically free of external interference. States like India, who 
achieved independence as early as 1947 employed UN mechanisms to help promote 
independence for remaining colonial states in Africa, leading to a so-called ‘Wind of 
Change’ in the 1960s. As a result, by 1958, the European states enjoyed almost no 
territory under direct colonial rule in the Middle East region.12. Moreover, bound by 
their public commitment to the principles of the UN, western superpowers could no 
longer subjugate and exploit weaker nations directly through the historical practice of 
colonisation.  
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Unquenchable desire for oil however, meant that in the post-colonialist era, a 
new strategy of covert interference evolved. Both the CIA and MI6 assisted dictators 
favourable to the West into positions of power and more importantly to hold on to it. 
For example, in the case of Egypt, the authoritarian Hozni Mubarak was far more 
preferable to British and American politicians than leaders of Islamic fundamentalist 
groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood or Islamic Jihad. 13  Vast amounts of 
American military “aid” ensured he was able to retain power for 30 years before 
widespread protest eventually led to his overthrow and subsequent prosecution.14 
Notwithstanding extensive covert action designed to subjugate the nation of Islam, 
opposition movements continued to act both politically and militarily in campaigns 
designed to liberate Muslim land from colonial occupiers and establish an Islamic 
Caliphate.  
Shaking off western interference 
Roosevelt’s wartime anti-colonialism, bolstered by the establishment of the United 
Nations, pointed to the decline of the informal European empires in the Middle East.15 
In Egypt, both nationalist and Islamic fundamentalist groups soon emerged to 
challenge the last vestiges of British occupation, symbolised by residual military 
bases. Subjugated by neo-colonialism, Muslims turned towards brave, ambitious 
political opponents who promised reform and an end to western interference. 
Corruption, however, allowed the west to continue to plunder the Middle East by way 
of proxy dictators, often referred to as ‘apostate rulers’ by Islamic fundamentalists. 
Muslim leaders who agreed to co-operate in a deliberate strategy of indirect rule, 
received covert assistance from western intelligence agencies to both gain power and 
                                                
13 S. Shpiro,‘Intelligence Services and Political Transformation in the Middle 
East’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, vol. 17, no. 4, 
2004, pp. 575-600. 
14 Z. Karabell, 'The Wrong Threat: The United States and Islamic Fundamentalism', 
World Policy Journal, vol. 12, no. 2, 1995, pp. 37-48. 
15 J. Sebrega, 'The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Reappraisal', 
Political Science Quarterly, vol. 101, no.1, 1986, pp. 65-84. 
Page 106 of 370 
suppress political opposition from Islamists. Egypt was typical, gaining 
‘independence’ as early as 1935, but remaining a puppet state until the early 1950s.16 
Opposition to western interference in Muslim countries began long before the 
United Nations established the norm of self-determination. Responding to oppressive 
colonialism, Arab nationalism describes the various political groups united in their 
determination to shake of foreign interference and regain control of natural resources. 
Concomitant with these predominantly secular nationalists, religious fundamentalist 
Muslims also began organising into political groups. Perhaps one of the most widely 
recognised amongst them is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which emerged in Egypt 
in 1928. Rejecting western ideas of liberal democracy, the MB instead favoured 
establishing an Islamic republic governed according to Shariah Law. Following the 
example set by MB, several similar socio-political fundamentalist groups soon 
emerged in neighbouring countries. Collectively they constituted the global de-facto 
Islamic fundamentalist movement, a grass roots collection of Muslims whose 
protagonists would later transplant their ideology to the UK towards the late 1990s. 
One particular group Hitz ut-Tahir, is alleged to have provided the primary 
fundamentalist education to British Muslims that have pursued terrorism.17 
The Muslim Brotherhood 
In 2014, the British government announced a crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood 
and a network of Islamist groups accused of fuelling extremism in Britain and across 
the Arab world.18 This announcement followed an inquiry earlier in the year promoted 
by concerns that the group disseminated an ideology which encouraged British 
Muslims to pursue jihad in Syria and Iraq. 19 In founding the brotherhood, Egyptian 
cleric Hassan Al-Banna claimed to be responding to the wider decline of religion in 
global politics. Meanwhile, his fundamentalist movement would serve as a vanguard 
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against decadence and corruption; failures he believed had become synonymous with 
democracy due to the separation between Church and State. Al-Banna remarked at the 
time, ‘Politics is part of religion and that to impose upon Islam, the Christian 
separation of loyalties, is to deny its essential meaning and very existence’.20 Al-
Banna directed this proclamation towards the British who at the time were in their last 
decade as colonial rulers of Egypt. Seeking to replace colonialism with an Islamic 
state, Al-Banna sought to remove foreign occupiers through initially peaceful 
means.21 In order to build support for his ambitions, he began a programme of small 
charitable missionaries around the country. By the mid 1940’s as the Second World 
War ended, the Muslim Brotherhood had garnered sufficient momentum and popular 
support to launch an armed insurgency against the residual British military presence. 
The assassination of Al-Banna in 1949 had little impact on either the organisation he 
founded or the regional Islamic fundamentalist movement more generally. Due to Al-
Banna, Muslim ambitions to live under Shariah continued to gain support and quickly 
spread to Palestine, Syria and Jordan.22  
In 1952, British colonial rule of Egypt ended following a military coup d'etat 
led by a group of young Military officers.23 The Muslim Brotherhood played a 
supporting role in the regime change and were initially given a free reign as a quasi- 
opposition movement. Relations soon soured, however, after a failed attempt by the 
brotherhood to assassinate President Gamal Nasser in 1954. Security forces swiftly 
imprisoned thousands of supporters forcing the group to move its operations 
underground. After a lengthy period of internal exile, the brotherhood sought to re-
join mainstream politics in the 1980s by disassociating itself with armed violence and 
forming alliances with other mostly socialist political parties. In 2005, demonstrating 
either tacit approval of the group’s general Islamic fundamentalist ideology or a 
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rejection of authoritarian rule, voters enabled the party to secure 20% of 
parliamentary seats. In response to the growing challenge to his rule, authoritarian 
dictator Hosni Mubarak introduced ‘legal’ reforms designed to suppress religious 
based opposition, thereby again forcing the group and its leaders back on to the 
fringes of Egyptian politics. 24 
Popular protests that began sweeping the Middle East in December 2010, 
eventually led to the overthrow of President Mubarak in February 2011.25 Unarmed 
civilians utilising social media achieved in a matter of weeks what armed 
fundamentalist insurgents were unable to satisfy in a generation. Standing in 
subsequent parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood rebranded as the 
‘Freedom and Justice Party’ (FJP), secured nearly half the seats in the People's 
Assembly, eclipsing the earlier performances of independents allied to the 
movement.26 The following year, Mohammed Morsi, a long-standing leader of the 
brotherhood, became Egypt's first democratically elected president securing 51% of 
the vote in elections declared free and fair by international observers.27 After less than 
a year in office, the US financed Egyptian military ousted President Morsi, accusing 
him of inciting violence and conspiring with a foreign power.28 Following the coup, 
Egyptian authorities arrested thousands of supporters, sentencing hundreds either to 
death or a long prison sentence.29 At the same time the post-coup military regime 
banned the Muslim brotherhood whom they now designated a terrorist organisation.  
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Islamic fundamentalists decried the actions of the Egyptian military, citing 
pressure from Israel and the United States as the overarching catalyst. Leading 
observers argue the brotherhood renounced violence as a means of political change 
decades ago and that it had been ‘robbed of political power won fairly at the ballot 
box’. 30 The message to Islamic fundamentalists was that even if they gained power 
according to western ideals of democracy, fears of an Islamic Caliphate would 
inevitably prevent them taking office. Consequently, this untenable situation adds 
weight to the claims made by preachers in the UK, specifically that combative jihad 
and if necessary terrorism, presents the only realistic means of gaining and securing 
power in the world today. Extreme brutality witnessed in Syria at the behest of ISIS, 
is arguably the result of western nations failing themselves to abide by what they 
publically advocate in terms of democracy and non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of sovereign states.  
Hitz ut-Tahir 
British Muslims, who have later gone on to engage in acts of terrorism, have in many 
cases, gained their political and religious education from Hitz ut-Tahir (HUT). 31 The 
group’s primary objective is the unification of all Muslim countries into a single 
Islamic caliphate governed according to Sharia Law. In contrast with more overtly 
political groups such as the now banned Al-Muhajiroon (ALM) and its successor 
Islam4uK, HUT remains stubbornly influential, continuing to attract new members 
around the world and in particular the UK. There are several reasons that may explain 
this. Firstly, HUT lacks charismatic individuals such as Anjem Choudary who court 
media attention thus inviting a clampdown from government. Secondly, HUT strongly 
advocates against the use of violence in order to re-establish the Caliphate. 
Consequently, community leaders and parents are less inclined to discourage young 
Muslims from joining the organisation the same way the might with ALM. Palestinian 
Shariah Court Judge, Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, instituted this trans-national Islamic 
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fundamentalist movement around 1953 in Al-Quds (Jerusalem) within Jordanian 
controlled Palestine. Five years prior, Israel declared independence. This act in 1948 
remains unrecognised by the Palestinians; the majority of whom continue to seek 
liberation from what they perceive to be a Jewish occupation of their land.  
Primarily, Nabhani focused his attention on Israel. However, the vision put 
forth in the group’s manifesto was that HUT would serve as ‘an Islamic vanguard 
dedicated to liberating all of the Arab Muslim countries from the impact of Western 
colonialism’.32 In a clear rejection of modernism, today the group remain true to their 
original philosophy stating on their website: 
Revive the Islamic Ummah from the severe decline that it has reached, and to 
liberate it from the thoughts, systems and laws of Kufr (non-believers), as well 
as the domination and influence of the Kufr states. It also aims to restore the 
Islamic Khilafah State so that the ruling by what Allah (swt) revealed 
returns.33 
A consistently debated issue between HUT leadership and their detractors concerns 
whether the proposed caliphate would later seek to conquer non-Muslim states and 
subjugate all non-believers under Islamic rule. Writing in 2007, the leader of HUT in 
the UK, Dr Abdul Wahid, responds to allegations by MP David Davies, accusing him 
of recycling false allegations concerning the future intentions of their proposed 
Caliphate.34 Despite his protestation to the contrary, on the group’s website in the 
section entitled The Aim of Hitz ut-Tahir, it is clearly stated that ‘the Muslim nation 
will return to her rightful place as the first state in the world, as she was in the past, 
when she governs the world according to the laws of Islam’.35 
Popular with the younger demographic, today, HUT is active all over the 
world, with a significant number of student followers in the UK. Highly controversial 
due to allegations of anti-Semitism, misogamy and the failure to recognise human 
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rights, human rights groups have denounced the organisation, calling for a ban on 
membership in the UK. Renowned activist Peter Tatchell negatively describes HUT 
as ‘an Islamist fundamentalist organisation that seeks to impose its supremacist 
interpretation of Islam on the whole world’.36 Demonstrating his clear contempt for 
the group, Tatchell further argues that HUT are guilty of extreme intolerance towards 
those Muslims who do not share their harsh, fundamentalist interpretation of Islam’.37 
Despite successive calls to ban the organisation in the UK, the government has 
repeatedly concluded the group is non-violent in nature and while the ideology it 
promotes may be incompatible with western norms and values, this does not provide 
sufficient grounds for proscription. Former Home Secretary, John Reid, has concurred 
with this finding stating there is no evidence to support the allegation that HUT is a 
violent organisation.38  
Based on the established link between British Muslims convicted of terrorism 
and involvement in HUT, observers commonly ask whether the group serves as an 
‘incubator’ of extremist terrorism. Critics claim that it does so both directly and 
indirectly through political indoctrination of members, education that amounts to a 
light-touch form of ‘radicalisation’. Two leading antagonists of HUT are former 
members Ed Hussain and Maajid Nawaz. Both men left the group to set up counter 
radicalisation think tanks and now regularly denounce the organisation, accusing it of 
being a grass roots breeding ground for extremists. Specifically Hussain has 
lambasted the government policy concerning HUT, which he says has been ‘a 
disastrous combination of laissez faire and political correctness’.39 In drawing a 
comparison with Germany and their strict counter radicalisation policy, Hussain 
accuses the British government of failing to recognise the way in which HUT has 
‘incubated the mentality that saw some members graduate to terrorism’. 40 Zeyno 
Baran of the Nixon Centre supports this proposition, arguing that although the group 
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does not promote or engage in violence, it ‘acts as a conveyor belt for young Muslims 
who are indoctrinated before joining more extreme groups that may engage in 
violence’. 41  
Leader of HUT in the UK, Dr Abdul Wahid strongly rejects any association 
between his organisation and terrorism. He claims that HUT has a political culture 
that not only stresses non-violence but also the importance of finding intellectual and 
political solutions to the problems faced by Muslims.42 This proposition holds weight 
given the absence of any convictions of active HUT members for terrorism offences 
and the continued failure of the British government to ban the organisation despite 
several pledges to do so. Wahid also rejects the allegation that HUT serves as an 
incubator for future terrorists claiming it is analogous to demonising universities for 
educating far right politicians. Wahid points out that the leader of the BNP, Nick 
Griffin, was once an active member of the National Front while a history 
undergraduate at Cambridge. In a classified report, the British government have 
discounted the so-called conveyor belt theory widely promoted by critics of HUT and 
often used by antagonists to pressure the government into an all-out ban. Specifically, 
the report states, ‘we do not believe that it is an accurate to regard radicalisation in 
this country as a linear conveyor belt moving from grievance, through radicalisation 
to violence…this thesis seems to both misread the radicalisation process and to give 
undue weight to ideological factors’.43  
British Islamic fundamentalist preacher Omar Bakri Mohammed, founder of 
ALM, first began his career in London as a dutiful leader of HUT. In February 1996 
after 18 years of membership, Bakri quit the organisation to launch ALM. He claimed 
to have no ideological disagreement with HUT and on comparison with ALM, the 
only differences between them appear to be the more direct, media driven approach of 
the latter. It may be the case that ALM was eventually banned not for its ideology, but 
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rather because the government needed to be seen as strong in the face of growing 
fundamentalist aggression. In particular, the emotive business of noisy demonstrations 
held during the funerals of British soldiers killed in Afghanistan. A significant 
number of British fundamentalist Muslims that have pursued terrorism, previously 
engaged with both HUT and ALM. Observers widely alleged that Bakri Mohammed 
and his deputies regularly encouraged Muslims to pursue jihad in Afghanistan despite 
the risk that Al-Qaeda would recruit them for suicide terrorism back in the UK.44  
Revolutionary Egyptian scholar Sayyed Qutb  
Providing a rigorous intellectual basis for the increasingly popular fundamentalist 
ideology sweeping the Middle East were the writings of Egyptian scholar Sayyid 
Qutb. Educated in the United States, Qutb shared the fears of Muslim brotherhood 
leader Al-Banna over the decline of religion in favour of capitalist driven 
consumerism. Qutb advocated a back to basics style interpretation of Islam, strict 
adherence to the Quran and the Sunnah. Proving popular with the devoutly religious, 
Qutb quickly attracted widespread support, in particular among young students. One 
of his most ardent pupils was 14-year-old Ayman al-Zawahiri. In adulthood, Dr 
Zawahiri would eventually become the leader of terrorist group Al-Qaeda after the 
death of Osama Bin Laden. British fundamentalist Muslims that have engaged in acts 
of terrorism regularly cited the influence of Sayed Qutb. In order to understand the 
continued relevance of his work to fundamentalists, it is necessary to understand the 
key ideas he put forward that have helped inspire a minority of British Muslims to 
pursue terrorism.  
In 1964, Qutb published his seminal manifesto entitled Ma-alim fi al-Tariq, 
known in English as Milestones. This short book argues that Muslims have lost their 
way and in order to avoid damnation, must return to life under Shariah. Qutb 
advocated the establishment of an Islamic vanguard with two aligned objectives. 
Firstly to remove all obstacles preventing Muslims from living under Shariah, and 
secondly to ensure non-Muslims have freewill to choose Islam. Milestones offers 
providence for modern day use of the term “fundamentalism” as a means to describe 
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those Muslims who adhere to a strict interpretation of Islam. In his writing, Qutb 
constantly refers to the fundamentals of Islam, which he believes should provide the 
basis for mobilisation against western crusaders. In addition, Qutb promotes 
“movement” as being the most appropriate label for representing the nation of Islam. 
Specifically he writes: 
The construction of Islamic belief occurred under these stormy conditions, and 
not in the form of a theology or theory or scholastic argument. It was rather as 
an active, organic and vital movement, the concrete representation of which 
was the Muslim community. The evolution of this movement was wholly the 
practical manifestation of the evolution of its beliefs, and this is the true 
method of Islam, which reflects its nature and its spirit…. The requirement of 
Islamic belief is that it takes shape in living souls, in an active organization, 
and in a viable community. It should take the form of a movement. 45 
Drawing on the language adopted by Qutb whose literature appears on the reading list 
of conspirators engaged in several major terrorism plots carried out by British 
Muslims46, use of the words “fundamentalism” and “movement” within this thesis 
appear entirely justified. In particular, the terms accurately personify the organisation 
of British fundamentalist Muslims who now seek to establish the political objectives 
initially set down by Qutb. Specifically, that following the overthrow of apostate 
Middle Eastern dictators Islam would eventually come to dominate the world. 
Reacting to the growing popularity of Islamic fundamentalism, the Egyptian 
government executed Qutb in 1966. Prosecutors used excerpts from Milestones as 
evidence of treason. However, this act of political tyranny served only to ascend Qutb 
as a martyr. His call to remove the shackles preventing humanity from embracing the 
word of God resonated widely across the Muslim World. The demand for Shariah 
thundered loudly amongst both Sunni and Shia Muslims and in 1979, Iranian students 
led a revolution to oust the overtly pro-American Shah of Iran. The extent to which 
his ideas were path-breaking and had great resonance to modern day British 
fundamentalist Muslims is underlined by the way in which the writings of Qutb 
feature in almost every major UK terrorism trial since 2004.  
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Emergence of Al-Qaeda in post-soviet Afghanistan 
Between 2003 and 2006, Al-Qaeda operatives directed at least four terrorist 
conspiracies targeting the UK. The British Muslims who operated at the behest of Al-
Qaeda in these atrocities were previously radicalised through their involvement with 
the Islamic fundamentalist movement. It is therefore important to understand how Al-
Qaeda emerged and why the organisation has attracted followers in the UK, most 
notably Omar Bakri Mohammed, a self-proclaimed spokesman for the organisation 
during the late 1990s. The origins of Al-Qaeda are often glossed over by those who 
advocate western interference in the Middle East. Specifically, because this terrorist 
organisation is widely considered the result of US led support for the Afghan 
mujahedeen. Through an alliance with Saudi Arabia, the United States helped equip 
Sunni Mujahedeen in Afghanistan during the last years of the Cold War. At the time, 
the United States interpreted its own national security interests almost exclusively 
through the prism of a Cold War conflict and therefore it served their interests to ally 
themselves with the Sunnis, at least in the short term. Promoting the same doctrine 
that now directs thousands of young Muslims to take up arms against the west, the 
United States and Saudi Arabia encouraged Sunni fundamentalists to fight the 
Godless communists in Afghanistan. Writing for Global Research in 2012, Benjamin 
Schett has argued, ‘Saudi backed archaic ideology served as an incentive to thousands 
of confused young men to receive military training in Pakistan in the 1980’s, from 
where they were sent to Afghanistan in order to kill Russians’.47 While Sunni 
Muslims were busy fighting Soviet conscripts using state of the art military hardware, 
Iranian backed Shia militants were diligently carrying out acts of terrorism against the 
United States. This included the 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut as 
well as the 1984 torture and killing of two American citizens in the same city.48  
As the world adjusted to a post-communist era, the President of Iraq, Saddam 
Hussain, exploited the power vacuum to fulfil this countries long-nurtured ambition to 
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annex neighbouring Kuwait. With the former Soviet Union in turmoil, the United 
States dominated the UN Security Council. This allowed them to achieve a resolution 
authorising the use of force to liberate the small but oil rich state of Kuwait. US forces 
stationed in Saudi Arabia quickly overran the Iraqi army leading to heavy losses as 
they retreated to Baghdad. Unknown at the time, wealthy Saudi Arabian, Osama Bin 
Laden, took particular offence to the markedly increased presence of western soldiers 
on historical Muslim land. He accused the Saudi Arabian Royal Family of apostasy 
and of being illegitimate custodians of the holy shrines of Mecca and Medina. Also 
denounced by Islamic fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan, the ruling Saudi elite 
quickly became the primary target of Islamic revolutionaries, many of whom had 
received support, directly or indirectly from the House of Saud. How best to 
overthrow them however, continues to divide fundamentalists. 
Accordingly, from the mid-1990s, two different insurgent groups emerged 
from Afghanistan, both representing a serious threat to western interests. The first of 
these groups focused on the “Near Enemy”, that is to say, they sought to directly 
overthrow Muslim leaders in their own country who failed to rule according to Sharia. 
Observers describe this approach as classic insurgency. The second group, made 
notorious by the actions of Al-Qaeda, sought to achieve the same objective but 
indirectly by targeting foreign supporters. In order to remove the apostate Saudi royal 
family, Al-Qaeda reasoned that it was far more effective to cut off the support base 
keeping them in power. Bin Laden resolved that without US aid, domestic 
fundamentalists would feel empowered enough to rise up and implement regime 
change on their own. He urged all Muslims to focus their attention on the “Far 
Enemy”, the United States, without whose hidden support, all the apostate regimes 
would crumble. Many radical Muslim groups rejected Bin Laden’s approach, arguing 
that it would increase American support to their local enemies and retard Islamic 
interests.49 
In contrast to the fight against the Soviets, Al-Qaeda decided the best 
approach to take against the US would be a war of attrition. Consequently, acts of 
terrorism against non-combatants became the organisations preferred means to 
achieve their objective. The campaign began in 1993 when Khalid Sheikh 
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Mohammed, an associate of Osama Bid Laden, financed a successful bomb attack 
against the World Trade Centre in New York.50 Sunni fundamentalists, who had 
previously collaborated with the US during the 1980’s, were now engaged in all out 
war with the west. Further bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 quickly placed 
Bin Laden on America’s list of most wanted terrorists. These attacks were sporadic 
but underlined the way in which Bin Laden sought to build a global coalition. Support 
for Al-Qaeda amongst British Muslims came from an alignment between 
fundamentalist ideology and the goals exposed by the organisation, in particular their 
long-term objective to establish an Islamic Caliphate. In order to understand why Al-
Qaeda proved popular within Muslim communities across the UK (four terrorist plots 
carried out by British Muslims between 2003 and 2006 were directed by Al-Qaeda) 
the next section examines key events relevant to the British Muslim community which 
helped lay the foundations for Al-Qaeda’s virulent anti-western political ideology.  
A receptive audience for Islamic fundamentalism  
Why did Islamic fundamentalism spread so rapidly in the United Kingdom throughout 
the 1990s? In the latter decades of the 20th century, a number of domestic and 
international events relevant to British Muslims provided the groundwork that 
preachers would later rely on in order to gain a receptive audience for their 
fundamentalist message. The most significant issues concern insults to the Prophet 
Mohammed, Islamic Jihad as well as western sanctions against Iraq following the first 
Gulf War in 1991. In particular, opposition by British Muslims to Salman Rushdie’s 
Satanic Verses, helped construct a receptive audience for ideologues, men who 
preached back to basics Islam as a solution to the problems faced by the nation of 
Islam. In order to challenge Islamic fundamentalism in the UK, policymakers require 
an understanding of these key events in order provide suitable counter narratives. 
Kashmir 
The cities of Birmingham and Bradford have a strong concentration of Muslims from 
Pakistan whose parents emigrated from the Mirpur region of Kashmir. Within these 
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communities, support for secular nationalist insurgent groups fighting Indian forces 
began in 1976. That year, two Kashmiri’s namely Amandullah Khan and Maqbool 
Bhat founded the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in the Alum Rock district 
of Birmingham. The principle aim of the group was and continues to be the 
independence of Kashmir. Previously, Bhat engaged in various criminal acts that 
eventually led to his arrest, prosecution and death sentence for murder.51 In response, 
on February 3rd 1984, JKLF members in Birmingham kidnapped diplomat Ravindra 
Mhatre.52 The operation was part of a plot designed to force the Indian government to 
release Bhat from Prison. The President of India, Giyani Singh, steadfastly refused to 
negotiate and consequently JKLF shot Mhatre dead. In retaliation, Singh ordered the 
execution of Bhat a week later. The following year, Police arrested Amandullah Khan 
on suspicion of being behind the kidnapping plot. Although acquitted of any 
involvement, the government later deported Khan to Pakistan. The significance of 
British Muslim support for the JKLF is that it helped pave the way for 
fundamentalism in the UK. British Pakistani Muslims familiar with the concepts of 
jihad and insurgency made a receptive audience for preachers who would later invite 
them to join the Islamic fundamentalist movement originating out of London during 
the mid-1990s. 
During the roughly two year period spent in England, leader of the JKLF 
Amandullah Khan, built up a strong support base amongst the Kashmiri diaspora. 
This network would later prove vital to the armed struggle for independence that 
began shortly after disputed parliamentary elections in 1987. The JKLF are not 
Islamic fundamentalists, they do not share the same long-term goals for the disputed 
region of Kashmir in terms of an Islamic state. However, they compete with Pakistani 
backed groups such as Laskha-e-Taiba and Harakut Al-Mujihadeen who are Islamic 
fundamentalists and who profess religious ambitions for the country.53 Although a 
minority of British Pakistani Muslims widely support the JKLF, advocate armed 
insurgency and have provided both finance and equipment to the struggle, at the same 
time the majority reject the type of terrorism advocated by groups like Al-Qaeda.54 
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British Muslims that have pursued terrorism are widely known to have used networks 
connecting Birmingham and Kashmir in order to help facilitate training for jihad. In 
particular, British born Al-Qaeda operative Rashid Rauf initially trained with Harakut 
Al-Mujihadeen before travelling to Afghanistan to join Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces 
fighting the western coalition.  
The conflation of all British Muslims who support Kashmiri independence 
into a single polycot labelled ‘fundamentalists’ is naively misguided. In failing to 
recognise the distinction between fundamentalists and moderate Muslims supporting 
liberal democracy through armed insurgency, the British government potentially risks 
alienating the very people with whom it may one day have to do business.55 The 
distinction between rival insurgent group ideologies appears more nuanced in respect 
of the Syrian civil war that began in 2010. Britain has faced a difficult trade-off 
between achieving its foreign policy goal of removing President Assad, whilst not 
arming and training men who may one-day pursue terrorism against the west. 
Consequently, while Saudi Arabia has supplied weapons and finance to the entire 
opposition movement, British Foreign Secretary William Hague has shown a greater 
appreciation of the threat posed by fundamentalism. Consequently, he has 
campaigned to supply armoured cars and body armour to non-fundamentalist groups 
only.56 Moderate Islam therefore appears to be synonymous with secular nationalism. 
Notwithstanding the alignment of British foreign interests and the totality of rebel 
forces, policy makers are vehemently opposed to the prospect of an Islamic republic 
in Syria and therefore walk a fine line in pursuing their foreign interests.  
The Satanic Verses 
In January 1989, approximately one thousand Muslims marched through the northern 
city of Bradford burning copies of the Satanic Verses. Historically the greatest of 
enemies, Sunni and Shia united in their condemnation of Salman Rushdie’s novel, 
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which they both considered an insult to the Prophet Mohammed. Although acts of 
Islamic terrorism in the UK are largely a modern phenomenon, during the Rushdie 
affair, British Muslim protesters firebombed several prominent books stores. This 
predisposition to use violence, demonstrates that even before Islamic fundamentalism 
emerged in the UK, a minority of British Muslims were more than willing to violently 
defend their faith. Journalist Malies Ruthven who observed the Bradford protests has 
noted how placards with the most violent messages were carried by jean-wearing 
angry young men who failed to observe prayers in the same way as their elders. 
Almost twenty years later in contemporary protests against those who insult the 
Prophet Mohammed, we note the complete opposite. While young Muslims still 
dominate the landscape, they are at pains to dress and generally act in strict 
accordance with Islamic doctrine. Compared with peers from the previous generation, 
public demonstrations appear confined to the fundamentalist domain. Due to 
increased stigmatisation by media and the government, and out of fear of being 
labelled “extremist”, moderate Muslims of the type who protested against Rushdie, no 
longer appear willing either to speak out or protest publically.57  In June 2007, two 
years after the London bombings, the government announced the Knighthood of 
Salmon Rushdie in the Queen’s birthday honours.58 Despite protests around the 
Islamic world, politicians choose not to cancel the honour thereby failing to 
appreciate the importance of this issue as an agent of ‘radicalisation’ amongst British 
fundamentalists.  
1991 Gulf War 
The second event to help ingratiate Islamic fundamentalism into the UK concerned 
the first Gulf War. Responding to the 1991 invasion of Kuwait, the United Nations 
Security Council authorised an American led coalition to remove the occupying Iraqi 
army. Before western forces arrived in the Arab peninsula, British Muslims held anti-
war demonstrations outside mosques in both London and Birmingham. 
Fundamentalists abhorred the presence of foreign fighters in the most sacred of 
Muslim lands. At violent protests, they burned an American flag and called for a holy 
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war of liberation to remove occupying forces. In response to the US invasion and 
directly inciting British Muslims, leader of the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) 
called for the worlds Muslims to take up arms and strike the interests of American 
imperialists and their allies. As discussed earlier, the majority of British Muslims are 
not Arabs, which likely explains the relatively muted reaction to the first Gulf war 
amongst moderates.  
The loudest voices against western military engagement in Kuwait came as 
expected from Islamic fundamentalists in the UK. Public demonstrations condemning 
the government’s decision to expel Iraqi forces were beginning to influence the 
politics of British Muslims more generally. For example leader of the Bangladeshi 
Muslim community in Manchester told a reporter that general opinion appeared to 
have taken a more combative turn, and that personally he would consider going to 
Iraq to fight for Saddam.59 Secondly, a conference of UK Muslim leaders condemned 
US led aggression and declared that by supporting such action, the ruling family of 
Saudi Arabia had forfeited its right to act as custodian of Mecca and Medina. The 
importance of the first gulf war as an agent of radicalisation appears clear from even 
the most cursory examination of fundamentalist literature published in the years 
following the initial conflict. Western sanctions against Iraq during the 1990s caused 
widespread suffering amongst the ordinary population. This ‘act of oppression’ is 
widely condemned by British Muslims, in particular, those who have pursued acts of 
terrorism upon learning about the deaths of women and children due to a shortage of 
basic supplies. 
Bosnia 
The most contemporary event to help construct a receptive audience in the UK for 
fundamentalist Islam occurred not long after the liberation of Kuwait. Civil War in 
Bosnia Herzegovinia in the early 1990’s became a significant politicising event within 
the British Muslim community. Failure by the west to protect against genocide caused 
Bosnia to replace Afghanistan as an overtly religious conflict pitting Muslim against 
Non-Muslim. As Britain sought a peaceful resolution Muslim men, women, and 
children living less than two hours plane journey away, faced the combined tyranny of 
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Serbian militia and government forces. Even moderate Muslims in the UK recognised 
they had a religious obligation to act. Consequently, hundreds took up arms in order 
to halt the Serbian onslaught. While the majority of foreign fighters returned home in 
1995 when the conflict ended, a minority went on to fight in Chechnya and Kashmir. 
A number of British Muslims who returned to the UK after fighting in Bosnia felt a 
greater affinity to their religion. Consequently, men like Shahid Butt joined extremist 
preachers, helping to promote Islamic fundamentalism and gain support for global 
jihad. Today, the same individuals are responsible for constructing the environment 
that has led hundreds of young British Muslims to fight in the Syrian civil war. Unlike 
in Bosnia however, the objective is not merely to prevent genocide by a tyrannical 
dictator, but rather more importantly, to help establish a Caliphate – the dream pushed 
by fundamentalists in the UK since the late 1990s. Having considered key events that 
helped ensure the British Muslim community were receptive to the ideas promoted by 
fundamentalist preachers, the next section examines in detail how they managed to 
achieve this so quickly and how the environment they subsequently constructed led to 
the incubation of extremist terrorism.  
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the UK 
After the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1990, Islamic fundamentalism 
found a new lease of life. Buoyed by their relative success, veteran mujahedeen 
formed new revolutionary groups determined to overthrow Middle Eastern dictators. 
With the Taliban controlling Afghanistan and riding high on the wave of post-Cold 
War optimism, fundamentalists confidently sought to re-establish the once powerful 
Caliphate. The Islamic fundamentalist movement that began sixty years earlier in 
Egypt, now resurrected in Afghanistan, quickly gathered momentum around the 
world. As was the case before the Second World War, revolutionaries met fierce 
opposition from regimes enjoying full financial and military support from the West. 
In response, fundamentalists in Egypt, Libya, Syria and Jordan routinely suffered 
from extreme violence and politically orientated criminal prosecution. Those who 
avoided extra-judicial killing and lengthy prison terms fled to Europe. As a long 
established refuge for dissidents, political activists like Palestinian Abu Qatada, and 
Syrian born Omar Bakri Mohammed quickly obtained asylum from the British 
government. Unable to overthrow dictators in their home countries, these men began 
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organising grass roots support for insurgent groups in Yemen, Afghanistan and in 
particular Algeria. Collectively, these preachers and their growing number of 
supporters constituted the UK division of the Islamic fundamentalist movement. 
Amongst other narratives, followers argued the west was engaged in total war with 
Islam and therefore every able Muslim was obligated to fight back by waging Jihad.  
During the 1990s, politicians in Westminster laboured tirelessly on brokering 
long-term peace in Northern Ireland and this was the focus of MI5’s attention. 
Meanwhile, newly arrived preachers from the Middle East widely disseminated 
fundamentalist political ideology across the Muslim community of Great Britain. 
Their importance was not recognised for a decade. However, on 24 January 2000, the 
chair of the Home Affairs Select Committee asked Stephen Lander, the Director 
General of MI5, who the greatest threat to Britain was. Without hesitation, he replied 
‘France’. He explained that they had some very dangerous terrorists, mainly of 
Algerian decent and given the proximity of the border ‘they represent a very serious 
and present danger’.60 In the 1990s, MI5 had accepted the presence of some of these 
Algerian radicals in London because they provided an excellent source of intelligence 
and were thought only to be targeting France. Now, Al Qaeda was marshalling 
disparate Islamist movements into a global struggle and they looked more 
dangerous.61  
Spreading the fundamentalist message 
Fundamentalist narratives entirely at odds with concepts of equality, freedom of 
religion, human rights and secular democracy gained significant favour within 
Mosques, community centres, cafes and bookshops in the suburbs of Bradford, 
Birmingham and East London. Travelling the length and breadth of the UK, preachers 
used all means possible to encourage fellow Muslims to join the growing Islamic 
fundamentalist movement. Supplementing regular sermons, followers distributed a 
variety of literature and multimedia outlining both their political and religious views 
and invited fellow Muslims to join them. Scholar Gilles Kepel introduced the term 
“Salafist Jihadism” to describe the ideology uniting British Muslims across the UK 
during the mid-1990s. Kepel argued these men promoted violent jihad as a means to 
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re-establish the Caliphate and overthrow Middle Eastern dictators failing to rule 
according to Shariah. Demonstrating the 1990s link between fundamentalism and 
modern day Islamic terrorism, preacher Omar Bakri Mohammed responded to the 
events of 9/11 by praising the attackers and openly proclaiming he had become a 
Salafi Muslim, theologically aligned with Al-Qaeda. Bakri later became the terrorist 
groups spokesperson in Europe, taking responsibility for disseminating a fatwa issued 
by Bin Laden in 1998 in which he declared war on America.62 
Still a relatively small and insignificant movement in the early 1990s, 
fundamentalists were, however, starting to attract a growing number of followers. 
Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute, Raff Pantucci, has said of this period, 
‘During the first Gulf War, you have individuals who are now quite prominent for 
example, Omar Bakri Mohammad or his other permanent acolytes who were shouting 
about how the west was going to suffer for invading a Muslim country’.63 As these 
men moved from the mosques and onto the streets to protest against events in Iraq, the 
consequence was to greatly increase the public profile of the fundamentalist 
movement. With the Internet still in its infancy, ‘radicalisation’ relied heavily on 
printed publications. Followers openly distributed extremist material such the Al-
Ansar and Al-Jihad magazines outside of mosques at the end of Friday prayers. 
Muslims taking a copy also gained information about private meetings in which 
preachers offered attendees a greater insight into fundamentalism and the global 
struggle to establish a Caliphate.64 Relating back to the origins of fundamentalism as a 
political ideology, we note how the writings of Sayyed Qutb were also widely 
distributed amongst fundamentalists. 
In standing up against the United States whose troops now occupied the Arab 
Peninsula, fundamentalist preachers were afforded a great deal of respect and 
legitimacy amongst the Muslim community. This became especially true amongst 
young Muslims struggling with their identity in the face of racism, unemployment and 
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the false promise of social mobility.65 Race riots at the turn of the century in Bradford, 
Oldham and Burnley further isolated the Muslim community from mainstream British 
society. Muslims who turned to fundamentalism did not feel an intrinsic connection to 
the larger British society; some did not even feel a connection to their own 
community.66 Rejecting ordinary life in favour of total emersion in religion, these men 
found themselves drawn towards radical ideas promoted by the Islamic 
fundamentalist movement. Preachers contributed to making them feel indifferent to 
society, telling them they have been left out and isolated, let down by government. In 
contrast, fundamentalism offered them an opportunity to feel important, like they 
were part of something greater then themselves.67 With the fundamentalist message 
thoroughly received, the next step from the preacher’s perspective was to encourage 
new and existing followers to pursue jihad.  
Promoting overseas jihad 
By the late 1990s, an increasing number of moderate British Muslims found 
themselves drawn into fundamentalism. Small but vocal movements operated on the 
fringes of Muslim communities across London, Birmingham, Luton, Leeds and 
Bradford. Technological advances such as the Internet and mobile phones greatly 
assisted official ‘brands’ of the fundamentalist movement including Supporters of 
Sharia, Al Gharuba and Al-Muhajiroun to increase their reach and better organise 
activity thereby dramatically increasing number of followers. Recognising jihad as a 
core obligation, preachers consistently encouraged British Muslims to volunteer with 
the mujahedeen in Algeria, Chechnya, Kashmir and northern parts of Africa. More 
recently since 2012, Syria has become the number one destination of foreign fighters 
determined to establish an Islamic Caliphate. 
It is important to reiterate, especially in the case of Kashmir and to an extent in 
Syria that not all British Muslims who pursue jihad are necessarily fundamentalists. 
From the early 1990s, young Muslim men in Birmingham volunteered to fight with 
secular nationalist insurgent groups in Kashmir. Their motivation had less to do with 
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the Quran and more to do with tales told to them by fathers and grandfathers who 
themselves had fought brutal Indian occupation.68 Similarly, while British Muslims 
fighting in Syria initially did so out of concern for their oppressed co-religionists, the 
fundamentalists quickly came to dominate the conflict attracting foreign fighters with 
promises of an Islamic Caliphate.  
By September 11 2001, Islamic Fundamentalism had become deeply 
entrenched in Muslim Communities across the UK. Until 9/11 at least, the British 
government tolerated fundamentalist preachers as long as they did not incite followers 
to carry out terrorism in the UK. In essence, fundamentalists were free to encourage 
British Muslims to join overseas insurgencies because at the time, the government 
held concern that they might return to the UK and pursue terrorism. Former Home 
Secretary David Blunkett has said of this period: 
I think it was true, I think there was a presumption, including by the police, 
that if you knew who these people were, then you could monitor them. They 
say well if we know where they are and who they are, its better than dispersing 
them and people being underground. I think, whilst I understand the 
psychology of that, it does not make a lot of sense if you are trying to snuff 
out, if you are trying to deal at a very early stage with seedlings that might 
grow into something much bigger and which deliberately hide much 
serendipitous and dangerous activity.69 
Retired former head of Counter Terrorism (SO15) for the Metropolitan Police, Stuart 
Osbourne, believes the high profile nature of these preachers came from the gravitas 
they held within minority sections of the local community.70 Although religion may 
initially have drawn followers into the movement, the charismatic nature of men like 
Abu Qatada, Abu Hamza Al-Masri and Omar Bakri Mohammed and the revolutionary 
jihadist messages they promoted, were significantly important for retaining 
disillusioned young Muslims. Utilising their influence, preachers regularly 
encouraged and in certain instances, helped facilitate British Muslims to pursue jihad, 
which in turn brought them into contact with international terrorist groups like Al-
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Qaeda. Between 2003 and 2006, operatives linked to Al-Qaeda convinced a minority 
of those who volunteered for jihad, that they could better serve the cause by returning 
to the UK to pursue terrorism. The success of US led drone strikes in the tribal 
regions of Pakistan, significantly debilitated the global reach of Al-Qaeda and from 
2007 onwards, the pursuit of Jihad by British Muslims had become dominated by 
‘self-starters’.  
Incubating extremist terrorism 
After the 2001, US led invasion of Afghanistan, members of the UK Islamic 
fundamentalist movement performed various activities that were critical in 
establishing an environment from which terrorism could thrive. As discussed above, 
fundamentalist preachers arrived in Britain throughout the 1990’s. In London, these 
men commonly served as spokespersons for various insurgent/terrorist groups around 
the world. In tandem, they organised dissident political activism against apostate 
dictators, publically condemned the west, encouraged young British Muslims to 
pursue jihad and in a minority of cases post 9/11, were guilty of inciting acts of 
terrorism directly.71 
To enable the mujahedeen to wage jihad in Afghanistan and establish a 
Caliphate, they required finance and equipment from western supporters. Encouraged 
by preachers, fundamentalists in the UK solicited charitable donations from the 
Muslim community. Combined with credit card fraud, finance raised in the UK 
helped purchase weapons and equipment subsequently shipped to Afghanistan. 
Throughout the 1990’s, mosques in the Muslim communities of Birmingham, East 
London and Bradford administered collection tins on behalf of the mujahedeen. 
Although the practice was not obvious to outside visitors, it was common knowledge 
these funds were being sent to places like Kashmir and Afghanistan to aid 
insurgencies.72 Until a clampdown by the British government in 2000, significant 
amounts of finance and equipment from the UK found its way to the front line of 
Islamic insurgency around the globe. Actions taken in order to halt this activity 
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resulted in a number of individuals and charities in the UK having their bank accounts 
seized and appropriated by the government.73 The importance of this activity for 
incubating terrorism is clear. Firstly, by financially supporting overseas jihad, British 
Muslims developed the means by which to raise money for their own terrorist 
ambitions. Secondly, as financial backers of the mujahedeen, British fundamentalists 
were able to use their connections in Pakistan and Afghanistan to gain the training 
necessary to construct improvised explosive devices.  
In addition to fundraising, fundamentalists were also responsible for 
facilitating Muslims wishing to pursue Jihad. Those who did pursue jihad in 
Afghanistan were at risk of ‘volunteering’ as suicide bombers back in the UK. One of 
the most prominent facilitators was British born and raised Shahid Butt.74 The former 
jihadist first came to the attention of Police in 1999, when Yemeni security services 
detained him and seven associates found in possession of a catchment of arms.75 
Despite a conviction for terrorism in a Yemeni court, the men were eventually 
released and returned to the UK where they continued to play an important role in 
promoting Islamic fundamentalism amonst the Muslim community in Birmingham. 
Modelled on Butt, facilitators are typically jihadi veterans who have maintained 
contacts overseas and can therefore be relied upon to organise military training for 
fellow Muslims.  
Without preachers, fundraisers, recruiters, facilitators and jihadists it would 
have been difficult if not impossible for future terrorists to gain any kind of support, 
legitimacy or operational direction. The Islamic fundamentalist movement was 
therefore critical in this respect. Like any socio-political organisation, members 
required an ideology to attract new followers and direct their attention and activities. 
In the next chapter, we use an archive of literature published by the fundamentalist 
movement in order to decipher the core tenets and associated narratives of this 
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political ideology. Importantly, chapter five traces these ideas to discourse 
surrounding individuals convicted of terrorism offences in the UK.76 
                                                
76 T. Abbas, 'Ethno-Religious Identities and Islamic Political Radicalism in the UK: A 
Case Study' Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 27, no. 3, 2007, pp. 429-42 
Page 130 of 370 
Chapter Three - Politics of Islamic 
Fundamentalism 
The previous chapter examined how the Islamic fundamentalist movement first 
emerged within Muslim communities across the UK. Due to several key events, 
ideologues for Islamic fundamentalism found a highly receptive audience in London, 
Luton, Birmingham and Leeds. Insults against the Prophet Mohammed, insurgency in 
Kashmir, the first Gulf war, and race riots in Bradford all helped ingratiate extremist 
preachers amongst the Muslim community. Young Muslims struggling to reconcile 
their religious and national identities made perfect recruits to the fundamentalist 
movement. Preachers like Abu Qatada and Omar Bakri Mohammed convinced an 
entire generation that fundamentalist Islam offered them a way out of decadent, 
hedonistic, “western” lifestyles. Muslims who subscribed to fundamentalism adopted 
a distinct set of political narratives and participated in activities designed to help re-
establish the Islamic Caliphate.  
To reiterate a key point made in chapter two more succinctly, there is no 
formal registration or membership of the Islamic fundamentalist movement. 
Regardless of the school of Islamic law that a Muslim ascribes to, for example Salafi, 
Deobandi or Wahabi, affiliation to the fundamentalist movement requires only two 
common factors. Firstly, that a member adopt the political ideology thoroughly 
deconstructed in this chapter. Secondly, they carry out activities designed to achieve 
the primary objective, specifically the re-establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. 
Online communication and face-to-face contact help fundamentalists achieve this, 
either through support for insurgent groups or by encouraging terrorism. However, 
interaction and collaboration is not a prerequisite for membership. The term “Islamic 
fundamentalist movement” is academic shorthand, an expression adopted throughout 
this thesis in order to define the national organisation of fundamentalist Muslims in 
the UK. It is desirable that beyond this work, academics and policy makers will 
embrace the term within the relevant discourse, considering it the most suitable means 
in which to describe the environment from which domestic terrorism carried out by 
British Muslims has emerged. 
What are the politics of British fundamentalist Muslims who have volunteered 
to pursue Jihad in Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen and more recently Syria? How can we 
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explain the seemingly irrational decision taken by ordinary men and women in the 
UK to travel to a war zone in order to fight and die on behalf of people they have 
never met? The answers lay in the narratives widely promoted within the Islamic 
fundamentalist movement since the late 1990s.  It is from adoption of this extreme 
political ideology that a minority of British Muslims have developed the mindset 
necessary not only to pursue jihad but in a few instances, terrorism as well.  
In search of an answer to the above question, this chapter deconstructs the 
politics associated with the Islamic fundamentalist movement. Drawing on a detailed 
archive of literature published by protagonists towards the end of the century, focus is 
given to five distinct tenets constituted by around twenty extremist narratives. 
Individually and collectively, these anti-western ideas have mobilized and directed the 
activities of British Islamic fundamentalists since the mid-1990s. Overall, the thesis 
comprehensively argues that total immersion in the political ideology exhaustively 
detailed in this chapter, developed the necessary mindset amongst a minority of 
fundamentalists to pursue terrorism. Introduced in the previous chapter, the term 
extreme fundamentalist describes those British Muslims who have sought to kill or 
seriously injure fellow citizens since 2003. Primarily, Muslims who have pursued 
terrorism in the UK subscribe to a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. However, 
what are their politics? Extensively promoted by preachers, political narratives 
adopted by fundamentalists include western war against Islam, the inhumanity of 
Jews, the absence of Sharia from international politics and the legitimacy of jihad and 
terrorism. Individually and collectively, these extreme ideas led the majority of 
British fundamentalists to pursue armed insurgency and in later years, pushed a small 
minority to commit terrorism.  
In discussing motivation for political violence by non-state actors, writers 
commonly focus heavily on foreign policy.1 Domestic terrorism carried out by British 
Muslims is widely considered to have been a response to the 2001 and 2003 invasions 
of Afghanistan and Iraq respectively.2 While these events may have rallied a minority 
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of fundamentalists into action, alone they fail to capture the entire mindset of Muslims 
willing to sacrifice their lives in order to defend co-religionists and re-establish a 
Caliphate. More generally, this narrow approach that focuses exclusively on specific 
events in time, fails to appreciate the polycot of beliefs held by terrorists and how they 
interlink through social networking to form an aggressive tidal wave. A “perfect 
storm” combining fundamentalism, revenge, honour and opportunism, eventually led 
to the July 2005 suicide attack on the London underground. Consequently, to fully 
explain the emergence of terrorism carried out by British Muslims that began in 2003, 
it is necessary to examine the entire political discourse associated with the Islamic 
fundamentalist movement since the late 1990s.  
Reflecting on every major UK terrorism trial since 2003, prosecutors have 
introduced evidence detailing vast quantities of so-called “fundamentalist material”. 
Barristers commonly use literature and multimedia found at the home of defendants to 
explore their underlying motivations and demonstrate their intention to pursue 
terrorism. Almost exclusively, the nature of this material links back to the political 
narratives associated with the fundamentalist movement. In March 1999, a jury 
convicted long-term fundamentalist Amer Mirza of throwing a petrol bomb at a 
Territorial Army base in west London.3 In court, Mirza claimed his motivation lie 
with the continued sanctions and airstrikes against the civilian population of Iraq – a 
key radicalising narrative associated with the political ideology of the fundamentalist 
movement. Fourteen years later in May 2013, the link between ideology associated 
with Islamic fundamentalism and acts of terrorism became clear. Killer of soldier Lee 
Rigby, Michael Adebolajo, expressed a positive desire to live under Sharia, free from 
western interference. Such aspiration is consistent with rhetoric associated with 
Anjem Choudary, a protégé of long standing preacher Omar Bakri Mohammed. Jahan 
Mahmood, a counter radicalisation worker in Alum Rock, Birmingham, suggests Abu 
Izzadeen, an extremist preacher and leading figure within the fundamentalist 
movement, could have scripted the entire speech.4  
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This chapter relies heavily on an archive of literature published by two 
dominant fundamentalists groups who operated in London between 1995 and 2005. 
Specifically, attention focuses on discourse associated with Al-Muhajiroon (ALM) led 
by Omar Bakri Mohammed and Supporters of Sharia (SoS) directed by Abu Hamza 
Al-Masri. These two preachers and founders of the fundamentalist movement in 
London, stand accused of radicalising young British Muslims later convicted in 
relation to a number of high profile terrorist conspiracies in the UK.5 One of the main 
benefits of using this extensive archive is that it offers text authored before it became 
a criminal offence to “glorify acts of terrorism”. As such, the views expressed are 
more reliable and hold greater authenticity than self-censored public statements issued 
in the years that followed. It is paramount to recognise that members of the 
fundamentalist movement who later pursued terrorism, thoroughly immersed 
themselves in this extremist literature. The first section of this chapter summarises the 
major tenets of the fundamentalist political ideology that has driven men like 
Adebolajo to carry out acts of extreme violence against British citizens. 
In Summary 
British Muslims convicted of terrorism almost exclusively cite post 9/11 western 
invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan as their primary motivation. Notwithstanding the 
dominant orthodoxy, this chapter proposes that western interference in Muslim 
countries provides insufficient coverage in terms of a holistic explanation. Rejecting 
such a reductionist approach, it is comprehensively argued the new wave of terrorism 
that first appeared in the UK around 2003, emerged from an environment conditioned 
by a complex multi-faceted political ideology. Within this ideology, five core tenets 
constituted by twenty-one distinct political narratives give an insight to the mindset of 
fundamentalists that have carried out acts of terrorism against fellow citizens. 
Consequently, it is important to recognise and understand the political ideology 
associated with the fundamentalist movement. Using this knowledge, policymakers 
are better equipped to develop counter narratives in order to deter future membership. 
Furthermore, to comprehend the motivation behind British Muslims that have 
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undertaken terrorism against fellow citizens, it is necessary to determine the key ideas 
that pushed them over the edge. Chapter 5 of this dissertation attempts to link several 
case studies involving British fundamentalist terrorists with the political ideology 
deconstructed in this chapter.  
Re-establishing the Islamic Caliphate lies at the heart of the fundamentalist 
movement’s primary objectives. Since 2013, a significant number of members have 
travelled to Syria in order to fight with the Islamic State (IS). The nation of Islam 
governed by one legitimate Khalifah (leader) ruling according to Sharia, allegedly 
represents utopia for all fundamentalist Muslims. Former Home Secretary the Rt Hon 
David Blunkett has said of this seemingly universal goal, ‘fundamentalists all shared a 
single global vision, a view of the world where things should be, a concept of the 
caliphate that was completely incompatible to most of the values of the UK society 
today’.6 In pursuing the Caliphate, fundamentalists have and continue to promote a 
political ideology considered largely at odds with western concepts of liberal 
democracy, human rights, freedom of speech, religious tolerance and 
multiculturalism. The following table summarises the universe of political narratives 
strictly observed by Muslims associated with the Islamic fundamentalist movement 
since the mid-1990s. 
Political Tenet Associated Narratives 
Islamic Caliphate • To re-establish the Islamic Caliphate governed by Sharia 
is the primary goal of all fundamentalist Muslims in the 
UK 
• Through combative Jihad, the glorious mujahedeen must 
seek to over throw apostate Muslim leaders who fail to 
rule by Sharia  
• Man-made laws are oppressive, only Sharia offers a 
legitimate means in which to govern a nation 
• All regardless of religion are required to worship only one 
God (monotheism). Polytheists (those who worship 
multiple Gods) are an affront to Islam and must be ‘wiped 
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out’ 
Western war against 
Islam 
• Humanitarian Intervention masks western desire to 
prevent Islamic fundamentalists from gaining power 
either democratically or through Jihad 
• Western leaders financially and militarily support friendly 
dictators who aggressively contain Islamic 
fundamentalists 
• UK counter terrorism legislation has oppressed British 
Muslims and prevented them from supporting Islamic 
fundamentalist groups in their efforts to establish the 
Islamic caliphate 
Jews and the state of 
Israel will never see 
Peace 
• Jews are less than human and the greatest enemy of 
Muslims. They conspire with western leaders to oppress 
Islam in order to prevent the liberation of Palestine 
• Supported by the west whom they control, Jews steal land 
and oppress Palestinians 
• There can be no negotiation with Israel, the state must be 
wiped of the map and Jews can remain only remain in 
Palestine as slaves 
• The Palestinian Authority led by Fatah has betrayed its 
population. Only Hamas holds any legitimacy and can be 
trusted to fulfil the objective of destroying the Jewish 
state 
Jihad offers the only 
legitimate solution to 
the problems faced by 
Muslims in the world 
today 
• Jihad presents the only legitimate solution to the problems 
faced by the nation of Islam 
• Fighting against the enemies of Islam is obligatory for all 
able Muslims, moderate or fundamentalist 
• God has promised divine benefits to all those who 
participate in Jihad, especially any who are martyred for 
the cause 
• God has declared there will be a punishment for those 
who ignore the obligation to pursue Jihad 
Page 136 of 370 
• Financial and material support must be given to all 
Mujahedeen currently engaged in Jihad 
Terrorism and Suicide 
Bombing are 
legitimate means of 
self-defence against 
western aggression 
• British Citizens who pay taxes are as guilty of oppressing 
Muslims as the politicians they elect 
• Terrorism carried out on 9/11 and 7/7 is the direct 
consequence of western interference in Muslim lands and 
the oppression of those who follow Islam 
• British Muslims who are not fundamentalists are to be 
considered unbelievers and therefore should not be 
afforded any special treatment when pursuing terrorisms 
• God encourages Muslims to terrorise their enemies 
therefore, it is entirely legitimate for Muslims to fight 
back against oppression using whatever means necessary. 
• To die while terrorising the enemies of God and Islam is 
considered the greatest sacrifice any Muslim can possibly 
make 
Table 1.0 Core tenets and related narratives of the fundamentalist political ideology  as 
interpreted by the author from a thematic analysis of an archive of literature published 
by fundamentalists groups in 1999  
The first and arguably most pervasive tenet of fundamentalist political ideology 
concerns re-establishing the Caliphate. A modern Islamic empire holds the potential 
to rival western liberal democracy and capitalist hegemony. More importantly, 
fundamentalists believe a Caliphate is necessary in order to correct the absence of 
God’s law (Sharia) from domestic governance and international relations. 
Fundamentalists decry the widespread failure to implement Sharia, which they claim 
offers the only legitimate means in which to govern the Muslim nation. Middle 
Eastern leaders who ignore what God has commanded are criticised and denounced as 
apostates. The puppet dictators who pander to the west have compromised with 
religion in order to satisfy their own selfish egotistically desires. Although commonly 
perceived by the west to be an Islamic country ruled according to Sharia, in fact, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia breaks the most fundamental law of all. Specifically, that 
no man has the authority to rule over another. Fundamentalists who openly call for 
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regime change therefore despise the Saudi Royal family.7 Protests held in the UK by 
fundamentalist regularly feature banners calling for the global implementation of 
Sharia and the overthrow of apostate leaders. In January 2011, a group of 
fundamentalist Muslims known to have participated in such protests, pleaded guilty to 
conspiring to blow up the London Stock Exchange.8 This terrorist plot offers an 
important case study discussed later in chapter five. Significantly, it helps to 
demonstrate the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism.  
The second tenet of the fundamentalist political ideology argues the west is at 
war with Islam. US and European states stand accused of subjugating Islam in order 
to secure the continuous flow of Middle Eastern oil.9 Muslims are obliged to fight the 
enemies of Islam. Therefore, it serves the fundamentalist movement to establish and 
continuously reinforce the narrative in which a state of war exists, thereby making it 
compulsory for all Muslims to take up arms in defence of the faith. Fundamentalists 
argue that after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1924, European nations 
colonised the Middle East in order to exploit its vast natural resources. Consequential 
to this belief, fundamentalists claim that western foreign policy is deliberately 
orientated towards containing Muslim ambition. In support of their argument, they 
point to the continued occupation of Middle Eastern countries and the historical and 
contemporary interference in their domestic governance. Contemporary evidence 
appears in respect of the Syrian civil war that began in 2010. During the summer of 
2014, Sunni insurgent group Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS), swept rapidly 
across northern towns of Iraq and Syria, slaughtering enemy combatants in the 
hundreds. In response to this brutal campaign, the US sent military advisors to the 
                                                
7 According to Islamic fundamentalists, the only legitimate means in which to govern 
a country is by God’s law (Shariah). A leader is elected by a council of Islamic 
scholars and must govern in a manner consistent with how Mohammed ruled in the 7th 
century. By allowing American troops to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi forces, the Saudi 
government were ostracised by members of the Islamic fundamentalist movement 
worldwide. In fact, contrary to common belief, the primary aim of Al-Qaeda is not to 
destroy America, but to overthrow the Saudi Royal Family. Upon doing so, the 
mujihadeen would then restore the Sharia. 
8 Hope Not Hate, ‘The Al-Muhajiroun Network’, Undated, 
http://www.hopenothate.org.uk/hate-groups/am/, (accessed 27th October 2014) 
9 F. Nahdi, ‘Young, British and ready to fight: New laws and the war have pushed our 
Islamist radicals underground’, The Guardian Online, 1st April 2003, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/01/religion.uk, (accessed 27th October 
2014) 
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region and later carried out drone strikes designed to prevent ISIS from making any 
further territorial gains.10 Pointedly, in August 2014, President Obama declared he 
would not allow jihadists [ISIS] to carve out a Caliphate straddling the northern 
regions of Syria and Iraq.11 Concurrent with his announcement, US fighter jets began 
striking targets associated with the group, destroying heavy armour and vehicles 
captured during their lightening advance through northern Iraq. However, the 
powerful American military machine appears to have had little impact. In July 2014, 
ISIS unilaterally declared an Islamic Caliphate. Shortly after rebranding itself the 
Islamic State (IS)and through means of a democratic Shura election, Abu Bakri Al-
Baghdadi was appointed as Caliph (leader). 12   
The third tenet of the fundamentalist political ideology argues Jews and the 
state of Israel will never see peace. Financially and militarily supported by the US, 
Jews (who are consistently referred to as pigs, dogs and monkeys by fundamentalists) 
stand accused of stealing land, instigating global conflict and oppressing Palestinians. 
Entirely aligned with the proscribed Palestinian Terrorist group Hamas, British 
fundamentalists reject peace negotiations and call for the total eradication of Israel. In 
2003, two men from the UK carried out a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv on behalf of 
Hamas.13 Long term friends Asif Hanif, from Hounslow, West London, and Omar 
Sharif, from Derby were both committed Islamic fundamentalists regularly attending 
sermons delivered by preacher Abu Hamza Al-Masri at Finsbury Park Mosque in East 
London. There is no public source evidence to suggest either man had previously 
visited Israel. Radicalisation therefore occurred far from Gaza or the West Bank. In 
fact, the decision to pursue terrorism occurred while they were in London, active 
within the fundamentalist movement and deeply under the influence of its political 
ideology.  
                                                
10 Staff Reporter, ‘Iraq crisis: US to send military advisers’, BBC News Online, 20th 
June 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27932443, (accessed 27th 
October 2014) 
11 Staff Reporter, ‘Iraq conflict: Obama vows to stop jihadist state’, BBC News 
Online, 9th August 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28723050, 
(accessed 27th October 2014) 
12 Ibid. 
13 Staff Reporter, ‘Bomb Britons visited Gaza’, BBC News Online, 5th May 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3001665.stm, (accessed 27th October 2014) 
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The fourth tenet deals with the obligation commanding all able Muslims to 
pursue combative Jihad. Narratives within this tenet encourage fundamentalists to 
recognise that Jihad provides a mechanism in which they can channel anger and 
frustration built up from an appreciation of how the west has subjugated Islam and 
oppressed Muslims worldwide. British fundamentalists promote Jihad as the only 
viable solution to remove obstacles preventing the re-establishment of an Islamic 
Caliphate. Universally recognised even amongst moderate preachers, God has 
commanded Muslims to defend themselves and their religion from acts of aggression. 
In contrast with Christians, Muslims do not turn the other cheek. If an unbeliever 
throws a Muslim from his house, it falls upon co-religionists to throw the unbeliever 
out from his house.14 Since 2010, hundreds of British fundamentalists have travelled 
to Syria to engage in the civil war against President Assad.  
The fifth and final tenet of the fundamentalist political ideology concerns the 
legitimacy of terrorism and suicide bombing. Controversial and far from universally 
accepted, preachers have sought to convince fundamentalists that under certain 
conditions, it is legitimate to target non-combatants. Through narratives constituting 
this tenet, preachers have used Islamic doctrine to construct a bridge between 
legitimate Jihad and potentially illegitimate terrorism. A common argument put 
forward proposes that since western civilians pay tax used to arm the military, they 
are as guilty of oppressing Muslims as the politicians they freely elect. By supporting 
the enemies of Islam, British citizens become legitimate targets for fundamentalist 
terrorists who perceive themselves as soldiers in a war between Islam and the West. 
Moderate British Muslims who engage in behaviour forbidden in Islam, for example 
drinking and dancing in nightclubs with the opposite sex also constitute legitimate 
targets. Empirical evidence suggests not all fundamentalists accept the proposed 
legitimacy of violence against non-combatants. Michael Adebalajo chose not to kill 
any of the civilians standing beside him after he killed Soldier Lee Rigby in May 
2013. Such reservation is clearly not universal given the numerous plots in which 
British fundamentalist Muslims have deliberately sought to kill civilians. Chapter 5 
                                                
14 This core principle has its roots in the Quran and is used by extremist terrorists to 
legitimize attacks against western citizens at home. For example, it is argued that if 
British Soldiers carry out operations against Afghanistan citizens, it is religiously 
legitimate for Muslims to do the same back in the UK. 
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presents ten case studies in which fundamentalists have accepted the legitimacy of 
terrorism and sought to carry it out against innocent civilians. 
It is important to acknowledge the significant influence fundamentalist 
preachers exercised over their followers. Young Muslims who typically knew little of 
their faith, could not speak Arabic and who for the most part had never stepped foot in 
either Pakistan or Afghanistan, held men like Omar Bakri Mohammed in great 
esteem. In February 2014, British-born Shoe bomber Saajid Muhammad Badat agreed 
to give evidence against fundamentalist preacher Abu Hamza Al-Masri.15 Assistant 
US Prosecutor Ian McGinley stated that Badat would ‘show the court that Hamza was 
a terrorist leader of global reach, who among other things, sent his young lieutenants 
around the world to engage in terror training’. 16  Fundamentalist Muslims who 
engaged in terrorism previously spent hours listening to sermons and reading 
extremist literature promoting the core tenets constituting the fundamentalist political 
ideology. Preachers used a variety of real world examples to reinforce the narratives 
that were progressively radicalising young British Muslims and pushing them towards 
jihad and terrorism. The July 2005 London bombers shared audiotapes of sermons 
delivered by Jamaican preacher Abdul Al-Faisal, and on a regular basis met up to 
discuss his ideas and there implications.17 The first major section of this chapter 
discusses the most important goal for every Islamic fundamentalist, namely to re-
establish a Caliphate. So great is the desire to achieve this objective amongst British 
fundamentalist Muslims, that hundreds have flooded to Syria since 2011 in order fight 
alongside the Islamic State. 
Islamic Caliphate 
The most persistent tenet of fundamentalist political ideology promotes the re-
establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. In a video published by the Islamic State 
(formerly ISIS), British fundamentalist Abu Abdullah Al-Habashi tells viewers, ‘To 
                                                
15 P. Thompson, ‘Shoe bomber’s accomplice to give evidence against Abu Hamza to 
prove he was a terrorist with global reach’, Daily Mail Online, 3rd February 2014, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2551157/Shoe-bomber-accomplice-Badat-
evidence-against-Abu-Hamza.html, (accessed 27th October 2014) 
16 Ibid. 
17 Court transcript: R v Ali et al (Wahid Ali) et al [2009] EWCA Crim 2396 
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live by the Quran and the Sunnah, that is all we need as Muslims. We do not need 
democracy or communism; all we need is the Sharia’.18 Considered a primary 
objective, establishing the Caliphate provides the underlying motivation for every 
activity carried out by British fundamentalist Muslims. Only the Caliphate ruled 
according to Sharia can ensure true democracy, human rights and freedom from 
oppression. After overthrowing Muslim leaders who fail to govern according to 
Sharia, fundamentalists would then merge the host territory into the Caliphate.  
Understanding this tenet is important for understanding why British fundamentalists 
travel overseas to pursue jihad. Often it is while fighting with groups determined to 
establish a Caliphate, e.g. ISIS, when fundamentalists agree to return to the UK to 
pursue terrorism. Since 2013, the British government has strongly sought to deter this 
activity due to fears that jihadists trained in Syria, pose a potential terrorist threat 
upon their return. 
Monotheism 
Universally agreed upon by all Muslims is the proclamation that God is unitary and 
therefore has no associates. Known as monotheism, this belief causes the rejection of 
synthetic legislation in favour of Sharia. Theoretically, all observant Muslims 
moderate or fundamentalist desire Sharia as their overarching authority. Strictly 
forbidden, Muslims may not worship multiple gods (known as Shirk) or position 
themselves between fellow Muslims and God (like a King or a Dictator). Shirk can be 
in worship, obedience, love, trust and intention. Fundamentalists judge Muslim 
leaders who allow shirk and legislate over what God has commanded as apostates and 
therefore unfit to rule. Until the Arab Spring, fundamentalists despised leaders of 
Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, Libya and Syria. Until his incarceration, Al-Masri 
consistently preached to fundamentalists that leaders of these countries had 
compromised on their religion in order to satisfy their own selfish egotistically 
desires. Acting from within the UK, preachers like Al-Masri recruited fighters and 
                                                
18 M. Robinson, ‘Shocking moment British jihadi fighting with Isis in Syria and Iraq 
stands in front of beheaded man and boasts its what people want to see’, Daily Mail 
Online, 7th August 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2718816/Shocking-
moment-British-jihadi-fighting-Isis-Iraq-stands-beheaded-man-boasts-s-people-want-
see.html, (accessed 27th October 2014) 
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financially supported insurgent groups engaged in campaigns to overthrow Middle 
Eastern dictators.  
Reinforcing hatred of polytheism amongst fundamentalists, Al-Masri 
commonly highlights the divine rewards afforded those who fight against it. Writing 
in Issue five of Al-Jihad magazine, he rhetorically asks readers what is the key to 
paradise. ‘Undoubtedly it is the promotion of monotheism, believing, loving, and 
obeying Allah in a unique and perfect way to the best of one’s abilities’.19 Muslims 
must not worship anything other than God, ally themselves with enemies of Islam or 
permit blasphemy. Furthermore, Muslims must punish anyone who insults God or the 
Prophet Mohammed. Evidence demonstrating the strength of feeling concerning this 
narrative appears widespread. In March 2007, British fundamentalists received prison 
sentences due to their involvement in protests against cartoons satirising the Prophet 
Muhammad.20 Abdul Muhid, 24, said to be the leader of the demonstration, chanted 
‘Bomb, bomb the UK’ and waved placards with slogans such as ‘Annihilate those 
who insult Islam’. Other placards held by demonstrators included more graphic text, 
for example, ‘slay those who insult Islam’ and ‘butcher those who mock Islam’.21 The 
willingness of fundamentalists to incite murder demonstrates the importance of this 
narrative in constructing the mindset necessary to pursue terrorism. If British 
fundamentalists considered it legitimate to kill those who merely insult the Prophet 
Mohammed, there can be little doubt that a minority were ready to pursue terrorism in 
retaliation for the deaths of co-religionists by coalition airstrikes. 
Universal adoption of Sharia 
Between 1996 and 2001, the Taliban governed Afghanistan according to a strict 
interpretation of Sharia. Heralded by Islamic fundamentalists around the world, the 
Taliban enjoyed significant praise and assistance from Pakistan. Traumatised by 
                                                
19 A. Al-Masri, ‘Issue 5’, Al-Jihad Magazine, Circa 1998, 
www.angelfire.com/bc3/johnsonuk/eng/magazine/aj05.html, (accessed 27th October 
2014) 
20 Staff Reporter, ‘Four men jailed over cartoon demo’, BBC News Online, 18th July 
2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6904622.stm, (accessed 27th October 2014) 
21 T. Zada, ‘Photograph of Islamic fundamentalist Muslims in the UK protesting about 
the Danish cartoons in 2007’, Private Blog, 
http://tahseenz.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/danish_cartoon_protest.jpg, (accessed 
27th October 2014) 
Page 143 of 370 
decades of corruption, brutality and relentless civil war, Afghans initially welcomed 
their new rulers who brought order to the chaos. Religious zest for strictly 
implementing Sharia gradually made the Taliban unpopular. Many complained the 
majority of rules had no basis in either the Qur'an or the Hadiths. Observers 
questioned the legitimacy of leader Mullah Omar because he lacked scholarly 
learning, tribal pedigree and any genealogical connection to the Prophet Mohammed. 
Western fundamentalists however, considered life under the Taliban to be paradise on 
earth. Throughout Al-Jihad magazine, writers consistently praised the regime, raising 
its leaders up high amongst the global fundamentalist movement. Issue six; readers 
learn that religious police in Kabul are cracking down hard on beard trimmers.22 Al-
Masri applauds the Taliban for taking steps towards the Sunnah by ending the practice 
of “designer beards”. Of significant relevance, praise for the Taliban appears in the 
court transcripts for several major UK terrorism trials. Clearly, British 
fundamentalists thought highly of the regime and would therefore have been 
particularly sensitive to western aggression that sought to undermine or remove it. 
Giving evidence against five men accused of planning a bombing campaign in 
London in 2003/2004, fundamentalist turned prosecution witness, Junaid Babar, told 
the court it was the view of the defendants that by implementing Sharia, the Taliban 
had come the closest of any government to creating a perfect Islamic state.23 
Furthermore, evidence presented at the trial of three men accused of conspiring with 
the July 7th London bombers, indicates the conspirators and those around them widely 
approved of the Taliban. For example, asked by the prosecutor, ‘The Sharia that 
existed in Afghanistan at that stage, that was something that you approved of?’, 24 
Defendant Wahid Ali replies, ‘Yeah, a hundred per cent, yes, I do.. ultimate aim was 
that they were establishing an Islamic Sharia, and that is a aim of every Muslim to 
live under the Sharia state’. 25 Western aggression against the Taliban and the ultimate 
decision to remove them in favour of a democratically elected government caused 
widespread derision amongst British fundamentalist Muslims. While hundreds 
                                                
22 Al-Masri ‘Issue 5’ 
23 Court transcript: R v Ali et al (Wahid Ali) et al [2009] EWCA Crim 2396. 223. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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travelled to the country to wage jihad against the occupying forces, only a minority 
ultimately became recruits for suicide bombing in the UK. 
Although Muslims who fled Afghanistan complained that laws implemented 
by the Taliban had little basis in the Qur’an, fundamentalists considered the regime as 
revolutionary. Consequently, the Taliban received significant amounts of finance and 
equipment from fundamentalists in the UK who regularly travelled to the region in 
order to fight alongside veteran mujahedeen. The pursuit of jihad firstly occurred 
throughout the 1990s against the Northern Alliance who opposed the Taliban and later 
from 2001, against occupying US & UK forces. Without the political tenet 
encouraging support for the Caliphate and Sharia, British fundamentalists may not 
have felt so compelled to fight on behalf of the Taliban. Deprived of Afghanistan as a 
major theatre of operations for jihad, the recruitment of volunteers for suicide 
bombing in the UK many not have emerged.  
Preachers like Abu Qatada, Al-Masri and Omar Bakri greatly influenced 
British fundamentalists Muslims. While many followers pursued Jihad in the various 
Islamic conflicts around the world, a minority adopted an extreme position and 
plotted acts of terrorism against fellow citizens. British Jihadists believed that to 
establish the Caliphate, they must first overthrow apostate Muslim leaders. As 
recently as 2013, Michael Adebalajo had sought to pursue Jihad in Somalia and 
according to the speech he gave after killing Lee Rigby, this was because he was 
determined to live under Sharia but the west would not allow him and others like him 
to do so. In 2004, British fundamentalist Sulayman Keeler gave an interview to the 
BBC. Discussing politics and religion, he expressed strong opposition to fabricated 
democracy, which he argued, oppresses millions of people around the world.26 Keeler 
went on to claim there is little difference between Tony Blair sending fighters jets to 
bomb Iraq and Bin Laden who sent planes into the twin towers. Four years later, 
police successfully prosecuted Keeler and several other fundamentalists for the 
offence of actively raising funds for terrorist purposes.  
Overthrow apostate rulers 
                                                
26 Staff Reporter, ‘Al-Muhajiroun’, BBC News Online, 29th April 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/3670007.stm, (accessed 28th 
October 2014) 
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Fundamentalists in the UK have long sought to remove Muslim leaders who fail to 
rule according to Sharia. Four countries in particular stand out as targets for regime 
change namely Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Yemen. In the early days of the 
fundamentalist movement, preachers Abu Qatada and Abu Hamza Al-Masri were 
vocal supporters of the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA). In 1999, Yemeni 
police arrested the son of Al-Masri along with several other British Muslims whom 
they accused of terrorism. Ironically, at the time the family were outraged and called 
on the government to help free the ‘innocent young men’ held in terrible conditions in 
a foreign jail.27 Subsequently, a public campaign supported in the media to ‘bring our 
boys home’ eventually led to their release. In contrast, after 9/11, the public had little 
sympathy for efforts to release British Muslims held in Guantanamo Bay. Today it 
appears that terrorist suspects are guilty until proven innocent.  
Saudi Arabia  
Since the fundamentalist movement first emerged in the UK, Saudi Arabia has been 
the number one target for regime change. In issue five of Al-Jihad magazine, the 
editor directs readers to question the level of debt held by the country and condemns 
vast sums of money spent on the country’s military. Al-Masri argues the anti-Islamic 
government procures arms only to maintain favour with the west that in return offer 
sufficient protection to keep them in power.28 Fundamentalists refer to Saudi Arabia 
as the Arab Peninsula, entirely rejecting the legitimacy of the Royal House of Saud. 
By taking power, the Saudi King has positioned himself between fellow Muslims and 
God. Such an act is in defiance of the Quran specifically that God has no associates. 
Only an Islamic scholar elected by a council of elders may govern the Arab Peninsula 
according to Sharia. Universal amongst fundamentalists is a belief that the holy lands 
of Mecca and Medina are under the control of apostates. Unfit to rule this sacred 
region, the Saudi Royal family who are dependent on the west, continue to squander 
the country’s wealth in order to satisfy their own egoistical desires. 
                                                
27 Staff Reporter, ‘World: Middle East Yemen families demand meeting with Cook’, 
BBC News Online, 13th January 1999, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/254288.stm, (accessed 28th October 
2014) 
28 Al-Masri  ‘Issue 5’ 
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When invaded by Iraq, Kuwait quickly turned to the west. The United States 
and Great Britain liberated the country with logistical support from Saudi Arabia. 
More concerned with holding on to power than obeying Islamic law, the Saudi Royal 
family allowed foreign troops on the most sacred of Islamic land. There are several 
versus in the Quran which strictly forbid foreign armies from occupying the Arab 
Peninsula. In this situation, Muslims must fight militarily in order to remove them. 
The Saudi Royal family employ Islamic clerics loyal to the kingdom in order to 
provide the religious legitimacy for the presence of non-believers. Commonly this 
includes reference to the Hadiths and formation of military alliances by the Prophet 
Mohammed. Fundamentalists reject the legitimacy of any alliance between Saudi 
Arabia and the United States by reference to a surah in the Hadith of Adh-Dhahhak 
which states, “the Messenger of Allah went out on the day of Uhud, when all of a 
sudden there was a good squadron or a harsh squadron so he said: ‘Who are these?' 
They said: ‘The Jews of so and so.' So he said: ‘We do not seek assistance of 
disbelievers.'"29 Alliances can only form between those who believe in Allah. 
Condemnation of the Saudi Royal Family is patently clear throughout 
discourse associated with the fundamentalist movement. Issue 10 of Al-Jihad 
magazine reports on a protest outside the Saudi Arabian Embassy.30 Editor Al-Masri 
states the purpose of the demonstration was to highlight the continued abuse of 
Makkah and Madinah by the Royal family for personal and political gains. Al-Masri 
notes having met with other Islamic leaders in the UK to discuss ongoing campaigns 
to force the Saudi family from their un-Islamic tyrannical rule. Common amongst 
Islamic fundamentalists is the demand that western forces be expelled from the Arab 
Peninsula (Saudi Arabia). Allah commanded no two religions in the Arab Peninsula 
and that Jews and Christians flee the region until no one calls to anything except 
Islam.  
                                                
29 Staff Reporter, ‘Islamic Ruling on Military Alliances’, Khilifah, 26th June 2010, 
http://www.khilafah.com/index.php/the-khilafah/foreign-policy/9740-islamic-ruling-
on-military-alliances, (accessed 28th October 2014) 
30 A. Al-Masri, ‘Issue 11’, Al-Jihad Magazine, Circa 1998, 
www.angelfire.com/bc3/johnsonuk/eng/magazine/aj1.html, (accessed 28th October 
2014) 
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Egypt 
Second only to Saudi Arabia, the Egyptian regime before 2011 was at the heart of 
Islamic revolution. Members of the fundamentalist movement in the UK accused 
former President Mubarak of committing crimes against innocent men, women and 
children throughout his decades in power. Torture in Egypt was commonplace and 
extended to family members of those accused of seeking to overthrow the incumbent 
government. Fundamentalists consistently sought to remove Mubarak and have him 
executed for his crimes against Islam and the Muslim nation. Ultimately the moderate 
rather than the fundamentalists achieved regime change in Egypt. After the leak of US 
diplomatic cables that revealed US dislike for Mubarak, mass protests erupted in 
Cairo and other Egyptian cities on 25 January 2011. A few weeks later after failing to 
quash the popular uprising, the despised dictator stood down leading to widespread 
celebrations.  
Since the mid-1990s, fundamentalists in the UK regularly protested against the 
Egyptian regime. In October 1998, a commuter train crashed in Cairo, killing forty-
five Muslim passengers. Fundamentalist preacher Abu Hamza Al-Masri strongly 
condemned the Egyptian transport minister and suggested that if the he were not part 
of the Mubarak regime, state prosecutors would almost certainly have pursued a 
charge of manslaughter against him.31 Directly accusing the Egyptian Government 
and President Mubarak of being institutionally corrupt, Al-Masri told followers that 
by investing in tourism over national infrastructure, the incumbent regime had 
demonstrated Muslim blood is cheaper than the blood of unbelievers. Until his 
detention, Al-Masri consistently incited followers to support all efforts to remove the 
Egyptian dictator who failed to govern according to Shariah.  
Yemen 
In the late 1990s, fundamentalists strongly vilified Yemeni President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh. Issue five of Al-Jihad magazine published in 1999 celebrates an attack by the 
mujahedeen on an oil pipeline running south of the country.32 This incident was part 
of an overall campaign organised by the Sunni Islamic insurgent group Muslim Army 
                                                
31 A. Al-Masri, ‘Issue 0’, Al-Jihad Magazine, Circa 1998, 
http://www.angelfire.com/bc3/johnsonuk/eng/magazine/aj00.html, (accessed 28th 
October 2014) 
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of Abiyan (AOA). At the time, the AoA were engaged in an insurgency to remove the 
apostate government and establish an Islamic state governed according to Sharia. 
Writing in Al-Jihad, editor Al-Masri conveys a request from the AOA for British 
fundamentalists to volunteer for Jihad in Yemen. Specifically, ‘Supporters of Sharia’ 
(SOS) received statement number five from the army of Abiyan announcing and 
calling Muslim fighters to join their Jihad struggle and stop the invasion of the last 
state in the peninsular which is about to fall into the hands of the West’. 33   
When SOS published issue five of Al-Jihad magazine in 1999, it was not yet a 
criminal offence to participate in a foreign insurgency or to encourage others. Al-
Masri openly admitted he would like to see the Yemeni government ousted and 
defended the use of force as justifiably within Islamic doctrine.34 What is significant 
about Yemen is that Al-Masri believed it offered the best possibility for establishing 
an Islamic state. Shortly after issuing the statement encouraging fundamentalists to 
volunteer for Jihad, Yemeni police arrested five young British Muslims accused of 
plotting a bombing campaign in the country. Al-Masri admitted to knowing two of the 
men involved, his son and stepson respectively. Fifteen years later the British 
government extradited Al-Masri to the United States in order to stand trial in relation 
to acts of terrorism in Yemen including the kidnap of sixteen western tourists.  
The western war on Islam 
As clearly detailed above, pursuing the re-establishment of an Islamic Caliphate is the 
primary objective for every fundamentalist Muslim in the UK. Proponents argue the 
west is on a mission to prevent this from ever occurring. Consequently, throughout 
political discourse attributable to the Islamic fundamentalist movement, followers 
consistently portray western nations as enemies of Islam. America in particular 
receives the most condemnation, described by fundamentalists as “The Great 
Shaytan” (devil). In literature, public speeches and private sermons, preachers adopt 
various historical and contemporary examples to show how the west has supressed 
Islam in order to prevent the re-establishment of a Caliphate. In order for Muslims to 
                                                
33 Ibid. 
34 Staff Reporter, ‘UK Detained Britons 'linked' to militants’, BBC News Online, 12th 
January 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/253429.stm, (accessed 28th October 
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legitimately fight against the west, a state of war must exist between them, hence the 
strong promotion of this narrative amongst the fundamentalist movement. A number 
of key events provide the necessary evidence used to establish this tenet within 
fundamentalist political ideology. From the 1990s sanctions against Iraq, to the 
breakup of Yugoslavia, these actions help build narratives in which Islam faces an 
existential threat. Retaliation is paramount, Islam demands that all British Muslims 
fight back in order to defend their religion against western aggression. 
Fundamentalists in the UK, who have pursued terrorism, consistently discuss the 
narrative in which preachers argue co-religionists face oppression by a crusading 
western alliance. It is therefore critical to understand this tenet of the fundamentalist 
political ideology in order to develop counter narratives in which British Muslims are 
able to appreciate that western intervention is more commonly designed to end 
conflict in the Middle East rather than fuel it. 
Five days after the terrorist attack on 11th September 2001, Al-Mujiharoon 
(ALM) held a demonstration against the impending assault on Afghanistan.35 The 
protest titled “USA at War with Islam” sought to invoke strong emotions amongst 
fundamentalists and build up widespread opposition to western retaliation. Under 
threat from the United States, Pakistani President Musharaf pledged to support the 
US-led alliance against what he termed “Islamic Fundamentalists”. Preacher Omar 
Bakri Mohammed suggested at the time that war between Islam and the west now 
appeared inevitable. In announcing the demonstration, ALM claimed that, ‘far from 
fighting terrorism, something the US supports through the Israelis and the IRA, the 
actual motivation for the imminent invasion of Afghanistan is to prevent the Taliban 
from fully establishing Sharia in the country’.36 By suggesting the west is seeking to 
prevent the Taliban from taking complete control of Afghanistan, fundamentalists in 
both groups, ALM and SOS, appear entirely aligned in terms of political ideology. 
Previously in 1998, leader of SOS, Al-Masri, spoke of how UN sanctions on 
Afghanistan were designed to hinder the Taliban who were now close to defeating the 
western backed Northern Alliance. Post 9/11, the entire fundamentalist movement in 
the UK unified on the belief that the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan concerned the 
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suppression of Islam and removal of the Taliban, rather than any attempt to hunt 
down Osama Bin Laden. 
Breakup of Yugoslavia 
From February 1998 to June 1999, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) fought a war 
of independence from Yugoslavia. Armed insurgency led to a vicious military 
clampdown by government security forces orchestrated by alleged war criminal 
Slobodan Milosevic. Officially, accusations of ethnic cleansing eventually forced 
NATO intervention on the side of the KLA. Refugees who fled to the UK informed 
members of the Islamic fundamentalist movement about horrific war crimes 
committed by Serbian forces. Although NATO intervention in Serbia and Kosovo is 
widely considered to have been humanitarian, fundamentalists suggest a more realist 
motive. In the first issue of Al-Jihad magazine published in 1998, editor and noted 
preacher Abu Hamza Al-Masri, outlines the fundamentalist position.37 He argues that 
US and Europe only intervened because ‘they feared that if the democracy loving 
KLA were defeated, it would allow the Islamic mujahedeen veterans of Bosnia to get 
involved and restore law and order by means of the Quran and the AK47’. 38  
Al-Masri proclaims that god willing, the Balkans will eventually be as the 
west fears most, ‘in the hands of the Mujahedeen and under the discipline of the 
Quran’.39 In 1995, after the US negotiated a settlement to the Bosnian conflict 
(Daytona), foreign mujahedeen units were required to disband and leave the Balkans. 
This decision to weaken the defensive capability of Muslims in the region appears 
highly contentious. During the ensuing war in Kosovo, Serbian forces destroyed 40% 
of the country’s Mosques. To fundamentalists in the UK, the decision to downgrade 
Muslim defences and the consequential assault on places of worship, strongly 
demonstrate the western preoccupation with the rise of Islam over the obligation to 
prevent genocide. Overall, events in Bosnia and Kosovo during the 1990s provide the 
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basis for a general narrative in which western humanitarian intervention offers 
sufficient cover to inhibit attempts to re-establish a Caliphate. 
Algerian insurgency – the GIA 
Beside Kosovo, politics in Algeria towards the late 1990s also strongly influenced 
fundamentalist discourse. Following decades of brutal French occupation, the Armed 
Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA) sought to establish an Islamic state. In 1992, when  
the GIA were poised to gain power, the military intervened, cancelled elections, and 
imprisoned officers of the party.40 France stood accused of instigating the events and 
shortly afterwards, the GIA began a sustained terrorist campaign. Attacks included the 
1994 hijacking of Air France Flight 8969 and the 1995 bombing of the Paris Metro. 
Although predominantly seen as a French issue, members of the fundamentalist 
movement accused both the UK and the US of being complicit in cancelling the 
elections thus preventing the GIA from legitimately gaining power.41 To Muslims 
living in London, events in Algeria offered prima facia evidence that the west would 
not tolerate a powerful Islamic Caliphate even if the people were to vote for it 
democratically. Thereafter members of the fundamentalist movement offered vocal, 
financial and military provision to the GIA. So overt in their support, throughout the 
1990s French media consistently accused London of being ‘a sanctuary for terrorists 
associated with the GIA’.42 In response to the metro bombing, a leading French 
newspaper claimed terrorists planned the massacres while sitting on the banks of the 
Thames and urged Britain to crack down on London based supporters. 43  
In the run up to the 1998 World Cup, several European countries arrested over 
a hundred alleged members of the GIA. Of the fifty-six detained in France, courts 
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failed to prosecute a single detainee for terrorist offences. Fundamentalists deplore 
this event labelling it a gratuitous act of aggression against innocent Muslims. Shortly 
after French police released the prisoners, Al-Masri wrote in Al-Jihad magazine 
warning European nations from interfering in Islamic Holy war now raging in 
Algeria. 44 Further construction of the fundamentalist political narrative in which the 
west are accused of being at war with Islam concerns the Paris massacre of 1961. Al-
Masri accuses the French of genocide, a brutal slaughter of Muslims undertaken 
without any condemnation from either the US or the UK.  
Failing to make progress against the incumbent government, the GIA 
insurgency gradually became more brutal. Towards the end of the 1990s, accusations 
surfaced that the GIA were massacring innocent Algerian villagers who refused to 
pledge their allegiance. Despite protestations of a “false flag” operation, 
fundamentalists in London were not convinced the GIA were entirely blameless. Abu 
Qatada believed the insurgents were at least partially responsible for the deaths of 
civilians and consequently ended his vocal support for the group. This decision is of 
particular interest. Contrary to reports surrounding the Jordanian cleric, by ending 
support for the GIA, the implication is that Qatada does not necessarily agree with 
violence against non-combatants, Muslim non-combatants at least. With Qatada 
distancing himself from the GIA, hard-line supporters predominantly from North 
Africa appear to have drifted towards Al-Masri. We know from MI5 agent Omar 
Nasiri, that GIA supporters began attending sermons by Al-Masri at Finsbury Park 
Mosque. Behind closed doors the preacher told followers the Algerian government 
was behind the terrorist violence in order to erode support for the GIA. In the eighth 
issue of Al-Jihad magazine, he claims the Algerian government carried out the 
murders using soldiers dressed as mujahedeen.45 To fundamentalists, this was yet 
further evidence of how the west ignores genocide in order to allow the continued 
subjugation of Islam.  
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Continued acts of brutality in Algeria conducted by the GIA eventually forced 
even Al-Masri to concede fundamentalist support. Under pressure from non-GIA 
followers, he acknowledged the group were responsible for killing fellow Muslims 
and thereafter disassociated entirely. From the eighth issue of Al-Jihad magazine, 
which leads with an article entitled “Europe Hates Islam” to the final issue, there is no 
further mention of the GIA or indeed Algeria. Instead, the focus has switched largely 
to Chechnya and Yemen. Al-Masri believed that Yemen held the greatest prospect for 
re-establishing the Islamic Caliphate and thus pushed his followers to support 
insurgency in the country. Although the GIA lost support within the UK, 
fundamentalists continue to use the abandoned elections in 1992 as evidence that 
western nations in particular France, are willing to renegade on democracy in order to 
prevent Islamic fundamentalists from ever gaining power.  
Pharmaceutical factory in Sudan 
In August 1998, the United States bombed a medicine factory in Muslim dominated 
Sudan. Based on CIA intelligence suggesting the location had traces of a pre-cursor 
for the nerve agent VX Gas, President Bill Clinton ordered a missile strike. The 
incident was highly controversial and eventually led to the deaths of tens of thousands 
of Sudanese citizens who relied on the factory for simple medicines. Intelligence 
analyst Mary McCarthy opposed the strike, voicing doubts over the alleged 
connection to Al-Qaeda and claims the factory had been involved in the production of 
chemical weapons. Christopher Hitchens wrote at the time that the factory, ‘could 
have been folded like a tent and spirited away in a day or so... Well then, what was the 
hurry? ... There is really only one possible answer to that question. Clinton needed to 
look 'presidential' for a day’.46 At the time, Clinton faced accusations of impropriety 
with an intern, namely Monica Lewinsky. Despite the ensuing controversy, the US 
failed to supply medicines previously manufactured at the factory. In effect, tens of 
thousands of Sudanese men, women, and children died because the President acted on 
faulty intelligence in order to divert attention away from his own impropriety.  
Fundamentalists use the 1998 bombing of Sudan to help demonstrate US 
aggression and continued subjugation of Islam. In a 1998 article entitled “The latest 
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conflict; America vs Islam”, Al-Masri claims the bombing in Sudan terrorised and 
killed civilians through long-term deprivation of much needed medicines. 47 Quoting a 
US republican official who said at the time, ‘The US has now unilaterally and 
effectively declared war on all civilian and security targets in Muslim countries’, Al-
Masri easily builds on the narrative that argues the west is at war with Islam.48 
Importantly, this article concludes by highlighting how recently elected British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair gave his strong, uncritical support of US aggression against 
Sudan. Barely a year in office and fundamentalists in the UK consider the leader of 
America’s greatest ally to be an enemy of Islam. As early as 1998, trusted preachers 
in London were using the bombing of Sudan to convince followers that war now 
existed between the west and Islam. Having accepted such state of affairs, preachers 
encourage followers to think of themselves as soldiers and to do whatever they could 
to help bring about victory for Islam. In practice, this meant fundraising for the 
mujahedeen and volunteering for combative Jihad wherever the need appeared 
greatest.  
Western occupation of Afghanistan 
The 2001 invasion and long term occupation of historical Muslim land has been 
discussed in almost every major UK terrorism trial since 2004. Political narratives 
that encouraged British fundamentalists to carry out suicide bombings against fellow 
citizens were in fact, constructed many years before 9/11. As early as 1998, preachers 
were encouraging fundamentalists to demonstrate against a proposed UN arms 
embargo on Afghanistan. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan argued the sanction was 
necessary in order to help stem the civil war raging across the country. 
Fundamentalists appeared deeply sceptical of Annan and questioned his sudden 
decision to act despite the previous ten years of conflict. In Issue 8 of Al-Jihad 
magazine, Al-Masri rejects any suggestion the embargo is about peace, claiming that 
just like in Kosovo, whenever Muslims appear poised to win a war, the UN intervenes 
against them.49 Underlying his argument, Al-Masri notes that when the Taliban 
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controlled less than half of Afghanistan, there appeared to have been no attempt to 
intervene. In contrast, with the Taliban now governing 85% of the land and 
implementing Sharia, suddenly there becomes an impetus to act. From a modern 
perspective, after the Syrian insurgent group ISIS gained significant territory in Syria 
and Iraq, the leader Abu Bakri al-Baghdadi declared an Islamic Caliphate. 
Immediately afterwards, US, French and UK forces began a series of air strikes 
designed to debilitate the organisation and allow Syrian government soldiers to regain 
the upper hand. Fundamentalists perceive such acts to be further evidence of a 
western war on Islam designed to prevent the re-establishment of an Islamic 
Caliphate. 
In conjunction with the proposed UN arms embargo, the European Union also 
demanded that Pakistan halt its supply of oil to the country. These two acts of western 
interference into the affairs of a Muslim country caused widespread anger throughout 
the UK fundamentalist movement. Failure to recognise and respect the Taliban as a 
legitimate government, offered yet more evidence of the perceived war against Islam. 
Preachers told followers that by seeking to implement sanctions against the Taliban, 
there could be little doubt the Judeo-Christian west held Islam in contempt. Former 
home secretary David Blunkett has said the Taliban regime was entirely rejected by 
the Labour government under Tony Blair, ‘apart from being a very unpleasant, deeply 
unpleasant regime, they [Taliban] also hosted forces that were anti the west’.50 Unlike 
Muslim countries where puppet dictators kept Islamic fundamentalists from gaining 
power, Afghanistan offered western Muslims the opportunity to experience life under 
Shariah. Encouraged by Al-Masri, Qatada and Bakri-Mohammed, hundreds of British 
Muslims left relatively comfortably lives in the UK to train and fight alongside 
Taliban forces in Afghanistan. 
After 9/11, the United States government no longer distinguished between the 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda. In its annual terrorism report, US diplomats ask what action 
the British government has taken against the two groups. Evidently aligned with the 
revised narrative, diplomats reported to Washington that UK ministers and their 
department had given ‘complete support to action taken against both Al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban’. There appears to be no recognition of Afghanistan as a sovereign state or 
any suggestion that the extradition of Osama Bin Laden should be conducted through 
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established international diplomacy. Before the subsequent US led invasion in 2001, 
British Muslims were providing finance and equipment to Taliban fighters.  
Governed according to Sharia, British fundamentalists perceived Afghanistan 
as paradise, an Islamic state where they could eventually settle down and raise a 
family. Michael Adebolajo referenced his love of life under Sharia immediately after 
killing Lee Rigby. Speaking into the smart phone of a passer-by, he appears to be 
remonstrating with the British Government when he says, ‘so what if want to live by 
the sharia in Muslim lands’. 51  In 2001, police charged another prominent 
fundamentalist and member of Al-Muhajiroon, Yasser Al-Siri, with conspiracy to 
murder. Detained in relation to the assassination of Afghanistan Northern Alliance 
leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, police considered Al-Siri to be a primary suspect.52. 
Although police later dropped the charges, siding with the moderate Northern 
Alliance who controlled less than 20% of Afghanistan, this offered further evidence 
of UK government bias against the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. 
Undoubtedly, the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan strongly reinforced the 
narrative pushed by Al-Masri, that there existed a western war against Islam. Leader 
of the 2004 fertilizer bomb plot, Omar Khyam, absolutely held this view. During 
cross-examination about the politics of the fundamentalist movement, he is asked by 
the prosecutor, ‘once the war is going on [Afghanistan], how is that being portrayed, 
in a sentence, generally in the publications you were reading, sermons you were 
hearing and the like?’ Demonstrating the political narrative of the fundamentalist 
movement to which he belongs, Khyam replies, ‘the war in Afghanistan was seen as a 
war on Islam and Muslims’.53 Later in his testimony, Khyam tells the court that after 
meeting with his uncles who worked in the Pakistani security services, ‘he was more 
convinced than ever that there existed a war on Islam’.54 The four men who carried 
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out the 2005 suicide bombing on the London transport network all appear to have 
shared the view put forth by Khyam. At the trial of three men accused of being part of 
the wider 7/7 terrorist cell, defendant Wahid Ali is asked by the prosecutor if he is of 
the view that Islam is under attack. 55 Ali replies that in some states it is, because 
‘what happened in 9/11, fair do’s, a Muslim did it, and it was some fringe of Al Qaeda 
who did it, but you go into Afghanistan and destroying the Sharia, I believe that was 
to destroy Islam, yeah’.56 Ali is saying that he can understand retaliation for the 
terrorist attack in New York, the invasion of Afghanistan served not as retaliation but 
as part of a long-term strategy to subjugate Islam.  
Eventually cleared of any involvement in the London bombings, Ali and one 
of his co-defendants were however jailed for having previously attended terrorist 
training camps in Afghanistan. Cross-examination established the men were close 
friends of Mohammed Sidique Khan. Within this social circle, members adopted 
several narratives promoted by fundamentalist preachers. In response, they regularly 
sent finance and equipment to the Taliban and even travelled to the region in the hope 
of fighting alongside the Mujahedeen. This example adds weight to the proposition 
that the political ideology associated with the fundamentalist movement has directly 
influenced those who have later gone on to pursue terrorism. In the case of the 
London bombers, the most important narratives are those concerning the perceived 
western war on Islam.  
Officially, the US led invasion of Afghanistan concerned the hunt for Al-
Qaeda leader and alleged mastermind of 9/11, Saudi born Osama Bin Laden. In 
practice, the mission quickly morphed into a long-term campaign designed to effect 
regime change. President Bush unilaterally declared that Islamic fundamentalist 
groups seeking to re-establish the Caliphate could no longer use Afghanistan as a base 
of operations. Commenting on the pursuit of Bin Laden, Al-Masri suggested that it 
suited American interests for him to remain at large. In particular, it justified the 
continued war on terrorism and served to legitimise the ongoing occupation of 
Afghanistan, long after Bin Laden had mysteriously evaded capture in the mountains 
of Tora Bora. Fundamentalists considered that Islam and terrorism had now become 
synonymous in the minds of tax paying western citizens. By fuelling their fear of 
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Islam, Al-Masri claims the British government were able to carry out actions not 
tolerated by any other minority in the UK. Again, further evidence of how the 
fundamentalist movement constructs and propagates the narrative in which Muslims 
are being victimised by a brutal, crusading west, hell-bent on eradicating Islam. 
Consistent with the “show and tell” radicalisation process, Al-Masri and others like 
him draw attention to perceived acts of aggression by western governments. Having 
set up the ‘show’, fundamentalists then receive the ‘tell’. Specifically that the only 
legitimate Islamic response to what they have learned is combative Jihad. More 
importantly, if required, these Muslims should be willing to give up their lives 
defending Islam. 
Iraq pre and post 9/11 
Similar to Afghanistan, fundamentalists use historical and contemporary events in 
Iraq to help construct various narratives within their political ideology. In the sixth 
and seventh issues of Al-Jihad magazine published around 1998, Al-Masri again 
declares that America and Britain are at war with Islam.57 Referencing Operation 
Desert Fox (a bombing campaign against Saddam Hussain in 1998), he draws 
attention to the fact that in just four nights, ‘crusading forces fired more missiles than 
during the entire Gulf War’. 58 Use of the historically emotive term “crusading” is 
deliberate. Al-Masri promotes a narrative suggesting events in Iraq are religiously 
motivated, a continuation of the Christian war against Islam that began centuries 
earlier. Fundamentalists in the UK are encouraged to recognise the bombing of Iraq 
within a wider context. Specifically, that enforcement of the no-fly zone is part of the 
western campaign to supress Islam. Therefore, even if they dislike Saddam Hussain, 
they have a duty as Muslims to act according to what Allah has commanded in the 
Quran – fight those who fight against Muslims. 
It is important to note here that Osama Bin Laden recognised the need to 
liberate Kuwait from the occupying Iraqi army. President Saddam Hussain failed to 
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rule according to Sharia and was therefore highly unpopular amongst Islamic 
fundamentalists. In Issue seven of Al-Jihad, the author describes Hussain as a non-
Muslim dictator helped in power by one of the biggest enemies of Islam, the former 
Soviet Union. 59  Fundamentalists accuse the apostate leader of systematically 
removing Islamic law from the country and continuing to oppress Muslims with the 
aid and blessing of the enemies of Islam. In particular, he tortured his own people and 
of working with the west (through the corrupted Oil for Food programme) to deprive 
the area of money, dignity, safety, and above all Islam. While British fundamentalists 
clearly rejected Saddam Hussain, they spurned western attempts to undermine and 
eventually overthrow him.  
Discourse associated with the fundamentalist movement consistently 
highlights the impact of sanctions against Iraq. In issue thirteen of Al-Jihad magazine, 
the editor claims that as many as 5000 children die in Iraq every month from 
starvation. ‘Two million lives have been lost since the United Nations acting as the 
world’s police, poured out a torrent of fire over the skies of Iraq’.60 Intricately woven 
into examples of how the west is guilty of supressing Islam, are various references to 
the Quran and Hadiths. In discussing sanctions against Iraq, Al-Masri claims that 
Allah told the Muslims ‘the Christians and Jews will never cease attacking you, until 
you turn your back away from your religion’. 61 The act of aligning political narratives 
with text in the Quran as well as contemporary events in Iraq appears designed to 
position everything within a divine context. Fundamentalist preachers want to show 
that war between Islam and the west is pre-ordained thereby encouraging Muslims to 
recognise their divine duty and act accordingly. 
Chastising those who claim to support Saddam, Al-Masri asks why they have 
done nothing to prevent US airstrikes. Questioning this apparent paralysis, he 
attempts to humiliate the Iraqi population by highlighting how, ‘Mujahedeen all over 
the world are doing operations against the US and the UK in retaliation for events in 
Iraq’. The suggestion is that Muslims who may not even be in the region or directly 
affected by events in Iraq, are still willing to fulfil their duty of defending co-
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religionists. Although it appears Sunni Muslims living in Iraq are the primary target of 
this rhetoric, at the time there was almost no universal access to the Internet. Al-Masri 
had mainly sought to influence fundamentalist Muslims in the UK. As his primary 
audience, they were encouraged to reflect on what they were doing to help end 
western aggression against Iraq. In Issue 7 of Al-Jihad, Al-Masri argues the continued 
air strikes on military and civilian targets in Iraq now amounts to genocide. At least 
five years before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the members of the fundamentalist 
movement were using the impact of Western sanctions on the civilian population to 
help construct the narrative encouraging British Muslims to pursue Jihad. Al-Masri 
concludes his discussion about the lack of direct action against the west by stating, 
‘the Kuffar West is once again attacking the Ummah with full force and no 
opposition, but for a few words of protest sounding from the mouths of a handful. The 
Ummah is in a pitiful state, and it is imperative that awake from our state of slumber, 
and put effort in to stopping them.’ 62 There can be little doubt from even the most 
cursory analysis of what Al-Masri wrote in 1999, that he supported British 
fundamentalists who wanted to pursue Jihad in order to fight back against the western 
war on Islam. 
The term “shock and awe” commonly describe the initial air campaign that 
served as a precursor to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The world watched on television as 
the American military machine quickly devastated targets all over capital city 
Baghdad. Speaking publically just before his arrest, the man responsible for the May 
2013 killing of soldier Lee Rigby, references the historical and contemporary 
bombing of Iraq. Highlighting the impact or “collateral damage” referred to by the 
military when they carry out airstrikes, Abebalajo asks, ‘When you drop a bomb, do 
you think it hits one person, or rather your bomb wipes out a whole family?’63 
Politically active within the fundamentalist movement for many years, Adebaljo 
discussed events in Iraq at great length with his peers. It is entirely plausible that his 
decision to act came about because of guilt, of his failure to travel to Somalia and die 
on the battlefield fighting alongside Al-Shaabaab. Other fundamentalists responsible 
for extremist terrorism have also discussed western aggression against Iraq, in 
particular airstrikes. Convicted in relation to the 2006 transatlantic bomb plot, cell 
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member Umar Islam says in his martyrdom video, ‘as you bomb, you will be bombed. 
As you kill, you will be killed. And if you want to kill our women and children then 
the same thing will happen to you.’ 64  
Domestic counter terrorism strategy 
In the UK, fundamentalists argue the western war against Islam begins at home. 
Beyond the narratives concerning the global subjugation of Islam by the west, 
fundamentalists have actively campaigned against domestic counter terrorism 
legislation which they argue unfairly affects the Muslim community. On 23rd of 
September 1998, officers from the London Met’s counter terrorism unit arrested seven 
Muslims with alleged links to Osama Bin Laden.65 Reacting to the incident Al-Masri 
claimed it was politically motivated and that ‘the UK government does not realise 
they if they push someone far enough, that person who was not an enemy of them will 
end up becoming one’.66 Consistent with claims that Al-Masri never directly incited 
followers to attack the UK, this statement shows he had no problem doing so 
indirectly. The following year, in 1999, fundamentalists in the UK met to discuss the 
2000 Terrorism Act. Accusing the British government of oppression, they argued the 
bill sought to limit the freedom of Muslims and prevent them from supporting 
legitimate Jihad and the universal adoption of Sharia. Raising the issue of double 
standards, Al-Masri points to the billions of dollars given to Israel by the west, a 
government he accuses of terrorising Palestinian civilians through continued 
occupation. In concluding his commentary of the counter terrorism arrests, Al-Masri 
claims that despite attempts to portray Sharia as evil and backward, Muslims have 
recently shown an awakening for its legitimacy. He claims that in response, the UK 
and US governments have introduced anti “Terrorism” legislation designed 
specifically to prevent growing support for Islamic fundamentalism amongst Muslims 
living in the West.  
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The use of anti-terrorism legislation to supress Islam domestically and 
internationally appears in discourse relating to the civil war in Syria. Since 2010, 
insurgent groups have fought to overthrow the regime of President Assad. Those who 
publically declare they are Islamic fundamentalists and want to establish a Caliphate 
face proscription as terrorists. At the same time, moderate nationalist groups enjoy 
free reign to attract overseas support in terms of finance and equipment. Although 
non-government organisations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) accuse both 
types of insurgent groups of committing terrorism, it appears political ideology 
determines their legitimacy in the eyes of the west. Upon aligning themselves with the 
overall ideology of Al-Qaeda, western nations immediately proscribed the Syrian 
insurgent group Al-Nusra Front as a terrorist organisation. Other groups who profess 
to want to establish an Islamic state in Syria are equally ostracised whether they have 
links or have pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda or not. Condemning what they see as 
double standards over the interpretation of what constitutes a terrorist group, 
fundamentalists suggest that Syria provides prima facia evidence of their complaint. 
They ask if the west is against terrorism, why do they make  a distinction between 
those promoting Sharia and those claiming to want secular liberal democracy. Are 
fundamentalists correct when they argue the west is actively suppressing Islam 
because it fears the establishment of an Islamic State in Syria? In February 2014, Sue 
Hemming head of counter-terrorism at the UK crown prosecution service, said even 
'freedom fighters' that wanted to defeat 'loathsome' dictators such as Syrian President 
Bashar Assad would be dealt with 'robustly' when they returned to the UK.67  
On the 4th of April 2002, the fundamentalist group Al-Muhajiroon (ALM) 
issued a press release regarding the conviction of one of its followers.68 Found guilty 
of inciting racial hatred, prosecutors claim Iftikar Ali distributed leaflets that included 
text from a Hadith that concerned fighting and killing Jews. Responding to the 
conviction, leaders of ALM suggest that under new anti-terrorism and race hate laws, 
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it had become an offence to distribute or quote the Quran and the Hadiths. Freedom of 
religion was under threat. Omar Bakri argued that God has commanded Muslims to 
fight and defend their property, honour and lives when attacked. In sharing this with 
others, they claim to be merely following their religion. Somewhat sensationally, the 
group goes on to accuse the British government of following a path that may 
eventually lead to a ban on people from having the Quran and Hadith collections in 
their homes. Although this proposition is unfounded, to impressionably young 
fundamentalists emotionally charged by the invasion of Afghanistan, it would almost 
certainly have helped embed within their minds the narrative in which a crusading 
Judeo-Christian west is actively supressing Islam.  
Later in the press release, the author claims the British government plans to 
secularise the minority of fundamentalist Muslims in the UK who want to obey Allah 
and his messenger without compromise. Again, this baseless rhetoric helps to 
reinforce the narrative amongst members of the fundamentalist movement that the so-
called war on terrorism goes far beyond eradicating Al-Qaeda. What it is actually 
seeking to achieve is the abolition of Islam in favour of liberal democracy worldwide. 
In this scenario, the west has reduced Islam to nothing more than individual worship. 
Evidence to support the argument that fundamentalists believed the British 
government were oppressing Muslims and harbingering them towards secularism 
appears throughout the discourse. Fundamentalist Michael Adebalajo certainly held 
this view; ‘we swear by the Almighty Allah we will never stop fighting you until you 
leave us alone’. 69 
The final press release from ALM, issued on the 23rd of January 2003 
discusses a recent Police raid on Finsbury Park Mosque.70 Speaking to the BBC, the 
resident Imam, Abu Hamza Al-Masri, claimed the action was part of Tony Blair's war 
against UK Muslims. 71  Aligned with this proposition, Omar Bakri Mohammed 
suggests this ‘grotesque intrusion of a sacred building is an escalation of the black 
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propaganda war against Muslims and Islam in the West’. As they had done in a 
December 2002 press release, ALM continues to push the narrative that Judeo-
Christian crusaders have declared war against Islam and Muslims. 72 Potentially seen 
as inciting violence, the press release references the Prophet Mohammed who said 
that ‘the Mosque has more sanctity than the home and whoever dies defending his 
wealth, life, ideology or family is a martyr’.73 With War in Iraq looming heavy on the 
horizon, Bakri suggests the raid is part of an overall government attempt to construct 
widespread fear about Islam amongst the population. By doing so, public support for 
ousting Saddam Hussain whom Blair accuses of financing terrorism in the west will 
hopefully grow. Bakri is clear about the hidden agenda of the British government and 
proclaims, ‘the truth is the first casualty of War and the frenzied insults to Muslims is 
merely a smokescreen for the military build up in Iraq’.74  
Bakri concludes his statement by declaring that Bush and Blair are ready to 
commit mass murder. Unquestionably, the objective is to incite feelings of 
humiliation and despair amongst the UK fundamentalist movement. Suggesting that 
even so called “moderates” cannot withstand the western contempt for Islam, Bakri 
reduces the issue to a simply battle between good and evil, a fight that all Muslims are 
commanded by God to engage in. The press release concludes with a warning, 
‘ordinary people of the West should know what is being done in their name and the 
terrible price that may have to be paid when the victims have no more blood to shed 
and nothing to lose but their honour’. Although it appears clear, the authors of the 
press release fully expect some kind of violent reaction to any invasion of Iraq, 
publically these men claim ignorance when accused of constructing an environment 
conductive to terrorism in the UK.  
Throughout the first section of this chapter, it has been have shown how 
fundamentalists constructed a narrative in which the west stand accused of waging 
war against Islam. Consequently, all Muslims are required to take up arms in defence 
of their co-religionists. Somewhat disingenuously, fundamentalists have discredited 
western acts of humanitarian interventions since the early 1990s, labelling them as 
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neo-colonialist attempts to interfere in Muslim countries. Empirical evidence 
demonstrates a basis for complaints made by the Islamic fundamentalist movement in 
the UK. As of January 2014, the Egyptian Brotherhood, a moderate Islamic Party that 
legitimately gained power in 2013, was outlawed and their leader imprisoned. 
Although Mubarak is no longer in power, the US financed military remains in control 
of the country. Directed by the west, the Egyptian military continues to rule the 
country preventing any attempt by Islamic fundamentalists from gaining power.  
Jews and the state of Israel will never enjoy peace 
British Islamic fundamentalists strive to establish a caliphate in the face of western 
hostility. One of the main reasons to prevent the rise of Islam concerns the potential 
threat a caliphate would pose to the peace and security of Israel. Consequently, the 
third and perhaps most controversial tenet of fundamentalist political ideology deals 
with hatred towards Jews and the alleged illegal state of Israel. In 2006, prosecutors 
successfully convicted preacher Abu Hamza Al-Masri of promoting various anti-
Semitic narratives. Derogatorily referred to as pigs, dogs and monkeys, 
fundamentalists accuse Jews of stealing land and oppressing Palestinians with full 
financial and military backing from the US. Aligned with the political manifesto of 
Gaza based proscribed terrorist group Hamas, the UK based fundamentalist 
movement reject any negotiated settlement and call for the total eradication of the 
Israel state. Conflict in the Middle East and particularly the occupation of Palestine is 
central to the fundamentalist mindset. British Muslims who pursue terrorism 
commonly discuss how Israel is responsible for crimes against humanity. 
Consequently, in order to stem the growing number of adherents to fundamentalism, 
which in turn provides potential recruits for terrorism, it is necessary to understand the 
narratives associated with this tenet.   
The link between anti-Jewish & anti-Israel narratives pushed by 
fundamentalists, and acts of terrorism are significant. Firstly, conspirators responsible 
for the 2004 fertilizer plot were devout fundamentalists and at least two fully 
supported Palestinian suicide bombing in Israel. In an email recovered from an 
account owned by cell member Momin Khawaja, police discovered he had written, 
‘picture this, a young bro wearing a suicide vest walks into a busy Israeli nightclub, 
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he presses a button and detonates, killing himself and dozens around him’. 75 
Furthermore, in a discussion between fundamentalist terrorist Omar Khyam and FBI 
informant Junaid Babar, police allege that Khyam spoke in positive terms about a 
recent suicide bombing at a restaurant in Israel.76 Secondly, in his 2006 martyrdom 
video, British suicide bomber Umar Islam who planned to detonate explosives aboard 
a transatlantic flight outlined his motivation. He states clearly, the attack is ‘revenge 
for the actions of the US in the Muslim lands and their accomplices such as the British 
and the Jews’.77 On a laptop recovered by Police and linked to Umar Islam, audio 
files included the song Fahij Ahum. Translated, the lyrics include ‘Blow them up, 
blow them up wherever they are and slaughter them. Expel them from all the hillocks 
of Mazra [Arab town in Northern Israel] and defeat them…. They are the kin of pigs 
and monkeys’. 78  
Leader of the 2006 airlines plot, Abdullah Ahmed Ali engaged in the 
fundamentalist movement while studying at City University London 1999 to 2002.79 
As a friend of extremist preacher and prominent fundamentalist Abu Izzadeen, 
Ahmed Ali adopted narratives promoted within the movement for many years before 
events leading up to his arrest and conviction. Thirdly, long-term fundamentalist 
Dhiren Barot who maintained connections to Al-Qaeda, and his bodyguard Abdul 
Aziz Jalil were active members of fundamentalist group Al-Muhajiroon from the late 
1990s. In early 2001 before 9/11, Barot undertook a reconnaissance mission to New 
York where he filmed and made detailed notes on a variety of Jewish targets.80 Barot 
and his accomplices later received sentences of up to 30 years for planning a range of 
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terrorist bombing campaigns in London.81 Fourthly, court transcripts reveal the men 
involved in a failed suicide bomb attack in London on 21st July 2007 (Operation 
Vivace), had listened to sermons delivered by Jamaican Sheikh Abdullah Al-Faisal.82 
In particular, a videotape entitled “Religion is Sincerity”, Al-Faisal promotes hatred 
of Shia Muslims, Hindus, Russians, and most significantly the Jews. Alongside his 
friend and close associate Al-Masri, Al-Faisal served four years in prison, convicted 
of inciting racial hatred and soliciting the murder of Jews. According to a prosecution 
witness, the leader of Vivace, Muktar Ibrahim, agreed with the extremist views 
promoted by these two men and had been actively involved in the fundamentalist 
movement for many years before carrying out his suicide mission. 83 
Religious hatred of Jews 
Labelling of the Jews as “Pigs” and “Monkeys” is common within fundamentalist 
discourse. It is part of an overall narrative designed to dehumanize, delegitimize, and 
generally construct Jews as the worst enemies of Islam. In 2006, prosecutors convict 
Al-Masri of inciting racial hatred, in particular against the Jews. Evidence presented 
in court shows that he told a private audience, ‘God has decreed they will never leave 
Palestine rather they will be buried there’. Before sentencing Al-Masri to seven years 
in prison, Mr Justice Hughes tells the defendant he had ‘helped to create an 
atmosphere in which to kill has become regarded by some as not only a legitimate 
course but a moral and religious duty in pursuit of perceived justice’.84 The statement 
from the Judge offers compelling evidence that Al-Masri helped create an 
environment where fundamentalists were encouraged to develop a mindset in which 
terrorism and suicide bombing became a legitimate means in which to retaliate against 
Israeli occupation. Writing in Al-Jihad magazine, Al-Masri repeats and further 
reinforces his anti-Semitic views. Throughout issues of the magazine, it is common to 
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find at least one article discussing Israel and the humiliation of Palestinians by the 
Jews. Writers commonly use the Quran and Hadiths in order to provide justification 
for arguments that are entirely unfounded. For example, Al-Masri claims there is 
religious legitimacy for attacking Jews because the Prophet Mohammed said, “You 
(i.e Muslims) will fight against the Jews till some of them will hide behind stones. 
The stones will betray them saying, oh slave of Allah! There is a Jew hiding behind 
me; so kill him”.85 A second Hadith quoted by the preacher states, ‘The hour will not 
come until you fight against the Jews’. 86 
Ever since the fundamentalist movement first emerged in the UK around the 
mid-1990s, associates have pushed a political narrative that argues Jews represent the 
greatest threat to Islam. Consequently, all Muslims are encouraged to despise Jews 
and actively work towards wiping Israel off the face of the earth. In issue 10 of Al-
Jihad magazine, Al-Masri tells readers that, ‘Jews have always killed Prophets, and 
religious teachers and leaders’.87 He then states that Allah has commanded Muslims 
to ‘fight against them [Jews] so that Allah will punish them by your hands and 
disgrace them and give them victory over them’.88 From an international relations 
perspective, fundamentalist blame Jews for the sanctions on Iraq that caused the 
deaths of millions of Muslim men, women and children. Al-Masri argues there were 
two types of people involved in the crusade against Saddam Hussain, Christians and 
Jews. Rhetorically he suggests that although the US and UK implemented sanctions 
and the no-fly zones, Jews directed their actions thereby making them even more 
culpable for the destruction of this once great nation. Although not discussed in the 
article, fundamentalists were fully aware of the 1981 Israeli air strike on Iraqi nuclear 
facilities - evidence that Israel has long feared a nuclear-armed Iraq posed a 
significant threat to its national security.  
Reject negotiations with Israel 
                                                
85 A. Al-Masri, ‘Issue 10’, Al-Jihad Magazine, Circa 1998, 
www.angelfire.com/bc3/johnsonuk/eng/magazine/aj1.html, (accessed 28th October 
2014) 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Al-Masri ‘Issue 13’ 
Page 169 of 370 
Al-Masri discusses the Jews and their occupation of Palestine in a two-hour sermon 
given in 1997/98 to a private meeting of fundamentalists in Whitechapel, East 
London.89 He begins by arguing the Jews have enslaved western leaders who in fact 
hate them more than the Muslims. Guilty of inciting racial hatred and violence, Al-
Masri claims that ultimately, God will wipe the Jews and the state of Israel of the face 
of the earth. Recognising the sanctity of the Al-Aqsa mosque, the message to 
fundamentalists from Al-Masri is emotive and provocative, ‘the tunnels that they [the 
Israelis] dug underneath the al-Aqsa mosque will be filled with their skulls and their 
bodies’. 90  In the years preceding the second intifada, fundamentalists strongly 
rejected the legitimacy of Yassar Arafat and the Palestinian Authority. Labelled a 
dirty rat by Al-Masri, Arafat attracted widespread international criticism for 
surrendering 87% of Palestinian land to the Israelis.  
Showing openly his disgust for the Jews and the alleged traitor Arafat, Al-
Masri suggests the terrorist turned political leader sacrificed former supporters in 
order to ‘please the rotten Benjamin Netanyahu and the rest of his pig nation’.91 At a 
demonstration in May 2000 attended by members of the fundamentalist movement, 
one speaker is reported as having pointed to the Jewish community and said: ‘your 
state is a blasphemy according to Jewish law so that makes you not only cowards, 
garbage, scum, thieves’.92 Finding great favour with the audience, he accuses Jews of 
being ‘.... the most gangrenous part of humanity that has always killed its own 
prophets, betrayed its own people…that is why in our religion you are described as 
pigs, swine’s and apes’. 93 In the minds of fundamentalists, there can be absolutely no 
negotiations or peace treaty with the occupying Israeli state. Al-Masri states clearly in 
issue three of Al-Jihad that Muslims should never stop opposing the peace treaty 
because, ‘it allows the dirty Israeli Dogs to plunder and loot Palestinian territory as 
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they choose’. 94 Instead of peace, Al-Masri consistently promotes violence as the only 
practicable solution. He argues the Palestinians are not in need of politicians like 
Arafat but of great warriors such as Salah-ud-Deen to regain their honour, dignity and 
values. 95 According to Al-Masri, ‘all Muslims should begin to have a physical 
reaction in order to stop the human injustice that is going on in Palestine and God 
willing (insh’allah) justice will be done to the unbelieving Israeli dogs.’ 96  
In October 2000, leader of Al-Muhajiroon, Anjem Choudary, co-signed a 
warning to all Jews in the UK. It stated unequivocally, ‘If they [Jews] support Israel 
financially, verbally or physically they will become part of the [Middle East] 
conflict’.97 Any Jew, who spoke openly in support of Israel, ran the risk of retaliation 
at the hands of fundamentalists. In a newsletter dated April 2002, Omar Bakri 
Mohammed claims the state of Israel is worse than Nazi Germany and apartheid 
South Africa in terms of atrocities committed against minorities.98 Clearly aligned 
with Al-Masri, Hamas, and the global Islamic fundamentalist movement, Bakri argues 
there can never be peace in Palestine until Muslims have eradicated the state of Israel. 
Widely cited by fundamentalists is the claim that Prophet Mohammed promised the 
annihilation of the Jewish state 1300 years ago. In a veiled warning to the British 
public, Bakri claims that the British and American stance towards Islam and Muslims 
means they should not be surprised if Muslims target them in retaliation for their acts 
of aggression.  
Islamic fundamentalist group Hamas 
Within fundamentalist discourse, there is absolutely no tolerance for the Jews or the 
state of Israel. By means of Jihad, Muslims will liberate the entire region of Palestine 
with the Jews allowed to remain only as slaves. Hostile to the Palestinian Authority 
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controlled by Fatah, Al-Masri claims the political party have sold out, and therefore 
Muslims must instead support the Islamic fundamentalist group Hamas. Issue six of 
Al-Jihad contains an article celebrating the 1998 release of the group’s spiritual 
leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin from house arrest in Gaza.99 There is evidence to suggest 
Al-Masri and other fundamentalists developed a long-standing relationship with 
Hamas. In April 2003, two British Muslim men from Hounslow carried out a suicide 
bombing attack in Tel Aviv, Israel. Three people died when Asif Muhammad Hanif, 
detonated his improvised explosive device at the entrance of Mike’s Bar.100 A second 
bomb, strapped to Derby-born Omar Khan Sharif failed to detonate and he briefly 
absconded before mysteriously washing up on a beach two days later.  
Two weeks before leaving for Israel, Sharif had been on the streets of Derby 
distributing leaflets on behalf of Al-Muhajiroun101 and his wife Tahira Tabassum had 
written down the mobile phone number of Omar Bakri Mohammad at the end of notes 
she made on a lecture about suicide bombings.102 Both men are alleged to have strong 
connections to Finsbury Park Mosque and when Police raided the building in January 
2003 (four months before the attack), they found a letter from Sharif to Al-Masri, 
inquiring about the proper conduct of jihad.103 Articles written in Al-Jihad magazine 
demonstrate that Al-Masri strongly supported Hamas and encouraged followers to 
recognise them as the only legitimate Palestinian opposition to Israel. Consequently, it 
is unsurprising that of the various Palestinian militant groups, Sharif and Hanif carried 
out their suicide bombing on behalf of Hamas. At a refugee camp in Gaza, the two 
men were equipped with explosives devices, given a specific target, and provided 
with an opportunity to record martyrdom videos, released shortly after the attack.  
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Combative Jihad is the duty of every able Muslim 
Preachers strongly encourage fundamentalists to recognise that jihad offers the only 
legitimate solution to problems faced by Muslims in the world today. Primarily, Jihad 
is necessary in order to expel foreign occupiers and remove apostate dictators in the 
Middle East. The ultimate objective of every fundamentalist Muslim is to re-establish 
the Islamic Caliphate; consequently, preachers consistently eulogise the necessity of 
Jihad in order to achieve this. From a religious perspective, God commands every 
able Muslim to defend their property, wealth, land and Islamic faith using all means 
necessary. Scholar Giles Kepel referred to members of the fundamentalist movement 
who first united in the 1990s as Salafist jihadists. 104  Kepel believed that all 
fundamentalists focused their attention on waging jihad in order to re-establish the 
Islamic Caliphate. It is self-evident that not all fundamentalists who pursue jihad later 
go on to pursue terrorism. However, a minority clearly do. Therefore it is important to 
understand the concept from a social and religious perspective in order to develop 
counter terrorism strategy that can prevent young British Muslims from going down a 
path that may eventually lead them to volunteer for suicide bombing.  
Preachers instruct Muslims who live in non-Muslim lands such as Europe and 
America to help fellow Muslims facing oppression in places such as Iraq and 
Palestine. Failure to do so makes their existence in non-Muslim Haram (unlawful). 
The constant reinforcement of the need to act militarily is part of a general narrative 
in which members of the fundamentalist movement are told they can only live in the 
west if they are engaged in Jihad or actively supporting it either by preaching or 
fundraising. In 2001, reports surfaced that three British Muslim men from Luton died 
in Afghanistan while fighting Jihad with the Taliban.105 All three were alleged to have 
been active fundamentalists suggesting the constant rhetoric from preachers like Al-
Masri and Bakri Mohammed, were successful in encouraging followers to fulfil the 
obligation of Jihad. 
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Early chapters of this dissertation argued that jihad and terrorism are not 
necessarily synonymous. Jihadists focus on defending co-religionists and establishing 
a Caliphate, terrorists are more concerned with revenge and the restoration of honour 
to the Muslim nation. There can be little dispute that in the Quran, God has 
commanded Muslims to defend themselves, property, family and religion. However, it 
takes a great deal of manipulation to extend this command to permit the deliberate 
killing of civilians. Islamic scholars involved in various fundamentalists groups have 
certainly tried. Members of the UK fundamentalist movement appear divided on the 
issue of terrorism against non-combatants. As noted earlier, when Abu Qatada learned 
the GIA were targeting innocent villagers, he immediately withdrew support. 
Furthermore, the killer of Soldier Lee Rigby deliberately chose not to kill members of 
the public who had gathered around him. In contrast, convicted of inciting followers 
to murder Jews, fundamentalist preacher Abu Hamza Al-Masri presents no issue with 
respect to the legitimacy of terrorism. Disagreements between fundamentalists on 
whether it is permissible to kill civilians in Islam, has meant that only a minority have 
ultimately volunteered for terrorism. This final section of the chapter considers the 
narratives that arguably have been responsible for convincing that small minority. 
Returning to the issue of jihad, this section begins by considering the religious basis 
for the practice, arguing jihad is ordained by God and therefore necessary for all 
Muslims whether moderate or fundamentalist.  
Religious basis for jihad 
Fundamentalists promote the virtues and necessity of Jihad in two complimentary 
ways. Firstly, Muslims hear of the divine benefits bequeathed by Allah upon those 
who fight. For example, a Muslim who dies while engaged in Jihad will immediately 
go to Paradise and space will also be reserved for seventy members of his family. 
Conversely, every Muslim knows the penalties they face on the day of Judgement for 
not carrying out their obligation to undertake combative Jihad. Issue ten of Al-Jihad 
magazine published in 1999 contains a general question and answer section with 
editor Al-Masri.106 One reader inquires as to whether or not Jihad is compulsory. Al-
Masri replies ‘it is, as long as he physically able to do so’.107 Having established that 
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Jihad is an obligation that falls on every Muslim, Al-Masri then adopts a salesman 
like approach telling readers ‘the need to act has become critical because the world is 
plagued by polytheism, without a general leader and most people are now worshiping 
their selfish desires instead of God.’ 108 Jihad is the only legitimate solution offered to 
Muslims in order to fight the unbelievers until there is no more shirk (polytheism) and 
the Islamic religion is in totality for Allah.   
Versus from the Quran and narrations from the Hadiths are used by Al-Masri 
to develop a narrative in which jihad is second only to worshiping Allah. Followers 
are encouraged to believe there exists nothing more rewarding for a Muslim than to 
die heroically on the battlefield while fighting to establish the dean of Allah. Life on 
earth is short and insignificant compared with the afterlife. Upon death and before 
they reach paradise, Muslims will face judgement from Allah. Those who ignore what 
He has commanded will certainly spend an eternity in hell fire. These rather 
unsubstantiated claims may seem entirely ludicrous to most people, however to 
fundamentalists who fear God’s judgement, the need to carry out his commands form 
the basis of all rational decision making.  
Western policy makers should not underestimate the power of faith. British 
Muslims sacrificed their obligations as fathers, sons and brothers in order to carry out 
the July 7th London bombings. One line of theory suggests they did so on the belief 
they had been ordained by God to carry out the operation. At the very least, they 
believed they were doing God’s work and would be rewarded in the afterlife. 
Evidence for this comes from the martyrdom video of Mohammed Sidique Khan in 
which he states clearly, “I myself, I myself, I make dua (pray) to Allah... to raise me 
amongst those whom I love like the prophets, the messengers, the martyrs”. 109 
Devout religiosity may help explain why men widow their wives and risk a lifetime in 
solitary confinement in order to pursue extremist terrorism. Given such a proposition, 
writers who suggest that religious belief is not at least partially the root cause of 
terrorism, entirely ignore the irrational behaviour of so many Muslims. The question 
is whether absent of faith, terrorists would act as rational actors. There are cases of 
individuals pursuing suicide bombing for purely secular reasons without any 
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expectations of an afterlife. Irrational behaviour that strikes against man’s natural 
instinct does not appear to be limited to Muslim suicide bombers.  
In general, believers must strive through Jihad to achieve two things. Firstly, 
to remove all those who worship more than one god and secondly, to establish Islam 
over the entire world. One might contrast this objective with the perceived objectives 
of the war on terrorism, in particular, the pursuit of establishing liberal democracy 
throughout the world and reducing Islam to nothing more than personal worship. 
Recognising that not all Muslims are able to wage Jihad, Al-Masri states if a Muslim 
cannot reach the battlefield, they must speak out against polytheism and if they cannot 
do this then they must at least hate it in their hearts. Without question, those engaged 
in the fundamentalist movement completely reject the worshiping of multiple Gods. 
This may explain why so many have pursued Jihad in Kashmir against India, a 
country in which Hinduism dominates the population. Speaking of the benefits of 
Jihad, the author claims that for those who participate, God immediately forgives all 
their sins and faults. Moreover, participants will not feel the agonies and distress of 
death; in fact, the pain of dying will be nothing more than a pinch.  
The message disseminated to fundamentalists is that by participating in jihad, 
they can gain absolution for both themselves and their families. This is critically 
important for anyone who believes in the day of judgement and fears it more than 
orphaning their children or spending the rest of their lives in prison for acts of 
terrorism. Pushing this political narrative amongst fundamentalists, issue one of Al-
Jihad Magazine published in 1998 contains an article, which relates an anecdote from 
the Hadith concerning jihad. In summary, a man asks the prophet Mohammed if there 
is a deed equal to jihad to which he replies, ‘Can you, while the mujahid is in the 
battlefield, enter the mosque to perform prayers without cease and fast and never 
break your fast’.110 Clearly, an impossible task thereby implying there is absolutely 
nothing that any member of the fundamentalist movement can do that is equal or 
greater in merit than the pursuit of Jihad. In the same article, the author talks about 
those who fail to recognise this saying, ‘he who died without having ever fought in 
the way of Allah nor did he express any desire for Jihad, he died with the semblance 
of hypocrisy’. 111  
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Defensive Jihad 
In Issue 6 of Al-Jihad, Al-Masri makes it clear that Muslims must perform their 
Islamic duties, one of which is Jihad. ‘They should do this even though others hate it 
and even it affects their personal interests. Consequently, any state or group, which 
attacks Muslims, should be stopped and removed by force if necessary’. 112 Al-Masri 
informs readers there is no price which is too big to pay for this action, even if it 
means giving up their lives because everything they do is to seek the pleasure of 
Allah. Evidence perhaps, that within the fundamentalist movement, members were 
being encouraged to die in pursuit of Jihad. The wider implication appears to be that 
fundamentalist preachers considered suicide bombing to be a perfectly legitimate act. 
When Al-Jihad appeared online in 1998, the UK and US were busy enforcing a no fly 
zone in Iraq. Widespread sanctions had crippled the country leading to the deaths of 
thousands of citizens through malnutrition and disease.  
Writing at the time in Al-Jihad magazine, Al-Masri suggested that Muslims 
must make sacrifices in order to alleviate the situation in Iraq and remove the 
overwhelming humiliation of the Muslim Ummah. Speaking directly to his followers, 
Al-Masri tells them to stop wailing and get up so they can burn the unbeliever’s hand. 
Reinforcing his article by reference to the Quran, he concludes by saying ‘fight them 
until there is no more tumult or oppression and there prevail justice and faith in 
Allah’. Although this article appears targeted at the people of Iraq, in fact, the aim of 
the message is to encourage a spirit de corps amongst members of the fundamentalist 
movement in the UK. Humiliation is a common narrative within the Al-Jihad 
magazine; readers are encouraged to reflect on how the oppressive west degrades the 
Muslim Ummah and how it falls upon them to respond in kind.  
Issue seven of Al-Jihad magazine is far more emotive. The editor directly 
accuses the US of murdering women and children in Iraq and instructs readers to fight 
against this western reign of terror. Failure to do so will result in the west continuing 
to label Muslims as terrorists, dump them in prison and torture them relentlessly. 
Muslims must act upon what they know to be right; they must not sit and do nothing 
if they fear Allah’s punishment. The sanctity of the Ummah and the wealth of Islamic 
lands are the responsibility of each individual Muslim according to their ability. Al-
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Masri states that some can defend these things by their tongues, some by money and 
others by Jihad, even dying in the act if it is the will of Allah. 
Support for the mujahedeen 
For Muslims that are unable to pursue Jihad, Al-Masri discussed a secondary option 
considered just as important for the cause. In Issue 6 of Al-Jihad he writes, ‘He who 
provided equipment unto a mujahid in the way of Allah, and he fought, and he who 
remained behind to look after the family of a mujahid in the way of Allah, he also in 
fact fought in the way of Allah’.113 Al-Masri suggests that woman and the disabled, 
who provide material support to Jihadists on the front line, have acted as if they had 
themselves fought against the enemies of Islam. In 2014, media reports suggested 
British Muslim women were travelling to Syria in order to transit finance and offer 
themselves as wives to insurgents fighting the Assad regime. Preachers consistently 
refer to versus in the Quran that both legitimize Jihad and praise those providing 
material support to those fighting on the front line. Since the early 1990s, 
fundamentalists have been encouraged to supply funds and equipment to the Islamic 
jihadists in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Somalia, and Yemen. In 2009, jurors found three 
British-born Muslims guilty of supplying equipment to the Taliban who at the time 
were fighting British soldiers on the Pakistani-Afghani border.114  
The need to support the mujahedeen and those Muslims suffering at the hands 
of the west is strongly emphasised in Issue 8 of Al-Jihad. Readers are encouraged to 
reflect on how they may go through each day and not remember those going hungry, 
who have no shelter and who are terrorised by the bombing campaigns conducted by 
western nations.115 Referring to the many hadiths on the subject of Jihad, the author 
makes it clear that the Prophet Mohammed was active in Jihad and that he spread 
Islam by way of the sword. Rhetorically he asks why Muslims today do not follow the 
commands of Allah and partake in Jihad to rescue those who suffer at the hands of 
western crusaders. Also writing in Issue 8 of Al-Jihad magazine, Al-Masri conveys a 
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request for support from the Taliban in Afghanistan. Formally, the Taliban stated, ‘we 
expect our Muslim Brothers to lend us a helping hand in making the Holy Jihad 
rewarding and fruitful in establishing justice over the world and we assure you that we 
are willing to lay down our lives to make every sacrifice’.116  
In the years immediately preceding the 2003 fertilizer bomb plot the 
conspirators actively supplied both finance and equipment to Taliban commander 
Abdul Hadi Al-Iraqi. This state of affairs offers further evidence that Al-Masri was 
able to directly influence fundamentalists, inciting them to defy counter terrorism 
legislation in order to directly supply foreign mujahedeen. In a 2002 newsletter 
published by Al-Muhajiroon, editor Omar Bakri Mohammed also emphasises the 
need for fundamentalists to support the Taliban.117 He claims they are sincere 
mujahedeen fighting on behalf of Muslims worldwide and subsequently deserve 
support in the fight against aggression and oppression led by the US and UK. Omar 
Bakri concludes by saying that Jihad is the only way to liberate Muslim land, to 
protect the life of Muslims and to propagate Islam around the World (by the sword if 
necessary)  
Legitimacy of terrorism and suicide bombing 
The fifth and final tenet completing the fundamentalist political ideology consists of 
narratives designed to legitimise terrorism and suicide bombing. Contrary to public 
perception, British Muslims who have pursued acts of terrorism commonly acted only 
when given permission to do so from their ‘Emir’. It is important, therefore, to 
understand how terrorism is legitimized in fundamentalist discourse, in particular how 
the issue of suicide is overcome since it is theoretically forbidden in Islam as is the 
targeting of non-combatants. Largely an extension of the tenet that deals with the 
obligation of jihad, preachers developed narratives designed to build a bridge from the 
legitimacy of jihad to the questionability of terrorism against non-combatants. In this 
respect, it is considerably important to recognise that only a tiny minority of 
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fundamentalists acknowledge and are willing to act upon the narratives that make up 
this tenet.  
Overall, this aim of this section is to show how preachers within the 
fundamentalist movement sought to remove any stigma attached to the deliberate 
targeting of civilians, thereby enabling a new generation of terrorists to plot suicide-
bombing campaigns across the UK. Whenever speaking in public, preacher Al-Masri 
told members of the fundamentalist movement that Islam forbid the deliberate 
targeting of civilians. In a sermon given outside Finsbury Park Mosque around 2003, 
he stated, ‘we cannot support those who are ignorant and try to vent themselves using 
easy targets which have nothing to do with the war’.118 According to the non-
government organisation (NGO) Cage Prisoners, this shows that Al-Masri did not 
advocate violence against non-combatants. However, this section will demonstrate 
that preachers like Al-Masri have on several occasions crossed the line and at least 
privately instructed fellow Muslims that terrorism is both legitimate and necessary in 
order to defend the Muslim nation from western aggression. 
Fundamentalist Sunni Muslims in the UK appear strongly orientated by their 
entrenched belief in the superiority of Islam. Notwithstanding decades of western 
suppression, these ideologues continue to believe in and perpetuate the dream of re-
establishing a Caliphate. While most fundamentalists agree with the principle of Jihad 
as a means in which to fight the enemies of Islam and establish the Caliphate, only a 
small minority accept terrorism to be a legitimate or necessary military tactic. 
Amongst those willing to carry out suicide bombings on busy commuter trains, is the 
widespread belief that western modernity is in direct conflict with Islam. Self-defence 
including acts of terrorism are therefore not only legitimate but what Allah has 
commanded. Directly quoting the Quran, fundamentalists cite the following as 
justification for their actions: 
Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including 
steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and 
your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah 
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doth know. Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of Allah, shall be repaid unto 
you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly.119 
In this, seemingly Clausewitzian total war between Islam and the west, extreme 
fundamentalists consider all non-believers to be legitimate targets. British citizens 
elect white middle class politicians who send troops to Muslim lands and pay taxes 
that facilitate long-term occupation. Extreme Islamic fundamentalists in the UK use 
this justification as the basis in which to de-humanize fellow citizens against whom 
they have plotted terrorist violence in order to influence policy makers in Whitehall. 
Martyrdom not suicide 
Recognising that Islam forbids suicide (only Allah can decide when a Muslim dies); 
Al-Masri is at pains to convince young Muslims that martyrdom and suicide are not at 
all synonymous. Rejecting the label “suicide bombing”, he applauds the activity 
stating that ‘whoever undertakes such an operation is amongst the very best of the 
mujahedeen’. More generally, preachers argue that what appears to be a seemingly 
abhorrent tactic, traced to Iran and the war against Iraq, is to be encouraged amongst 
fundamentalists because it is the only effective means in which to fight back against 
powerful western nations. 120 In support of the efficiency of suicide bombing, Al-
Masri points to the 1983 attack on the US Marine barracks in Beirut. A relatively 
unknown group calling themselves Islamic Jihad, claimed responsibility for the 
attack, which killed 241 US service personal, thus forcing the subsequent withdrawal 
of US troops from the region. In order to gain legitimacy for martyrdom operations, 
Al-Masri cites the Muslim cleric Al-Alzhar of Egypt when he argued that ‘in the case 
of Palestine, martyrdom operations are legitimate in Islam, this is acceptable and these 
people are the best Shaheed’.121 As far as Al-Masri is concerned, what is good for 
Palestine is good for all Muslims. Members of the fundamentalist movement are 
repeatedly instructed that not only is suicide bombing legitimate and effective, it is 
also the highest, most devout act any Muslim can possible undertake. In speech given 
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by Al-Masri around 1998, he tells the audience that when they are killed in the cause 
of Allah, ‘you are doing the right thing’. 122 When asked whether suicide bombing is 
permissible, Hamza replies: ‘It is not called suicide, it is called shahid (martyr) 
operation and yes it is absolutely permissible within Islam’. 123 
Necessary conditions for targeting civilians 
In a general question and answer session within issue five of Al-Jihad magazine Al-
Masri responds to a question about whether or not it is permissible to kill civilians.124 
Although he begins with the same narrative expressed publically (that generally such 
action is forbidden), he goes on to argue it is permissible under certain conditions. 
Firstly, if the enemies of Islam use civilians as a shield, then the war must still go on. 
Secondly, if a civilian man or a woman acts as a utility for fighters against Islam i.e. 
giving advice, manufacturing weapons, spying or even managing vital sites used 
against Muslims, then fundamentalists may considered them legitimate targets. 
Extreme fundamentalist terrorists have used these two justifications given by Al-
Masri as the basis in which to plan bombing campaigns against commuters on the 
London Underground. This is despite the potential that such acts might inadvertently 
result in the deaths of fellow Muslims. British citizens both believers and unbelievers 
pay tax and vote for politicians who ultimately send soldiers to Islamic lands to 
occupy and oppress Muslims. Consequently, they are as guilty and as responsible of 
waging war against Islam as the British soldiers fighting on the front line.  
The leader of the July 7th London bombings demonstrated the connection 
between this narrative pushed by Al-Masri and his act of terrorism when he said in his 
martyrdom video, ‘your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate 
atrocities against my people all over the world, and your support of them makes you 
directly responsible’. 125 The justification given by Khan for targeting civilians came 
not from him or his fellow conspirators; rather he paraphrased it from the many 
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narratives promoted by Al-Masri which sought to legitimize the act of terrorism and 
suicide bombing.  
The events and aftermath of 9/11 
Ten years after the US first put boots on the ground in Saudi Arabia, 19 Muslim men 
carried out the most lethal act of terrorism in history. The 2001 attack in New York is 
widely considered to have led Muslims all around the world to reflect on their faith. A 
great number of British Muslims turned their back on previously hedonistic lifestyles 
and sought redemption by joining the fundamentalist movement in the UK. In a 2002 
newsletter, the editor blames the foreign policies of the US, UK, and their allies in 
Muslims countries for the events on 9/11.126 Bakri Mohammed states this includes the 
sanctions against Iraq, the support of the pariah state of Israel, the presence of foreign 
fighters on Muslim soil and lastly western support for corrupt regimes in the Middle 
East. Speaking publically to the BBC, Bakri lambasted western nations stating, ‘what 
happened was a direct consequence of the evil foreign policy of the US. This is the 
compensation and payback for its own atrocities against the Muslim nation’.127 In 
2003, Al-Muhajiroon gained worldwide notoriety when they publicly advertised a 
conference entitled “The Magnificent 19”. At this event, fundamentalists sought to 
celebrate the second anniversary of 9/11. Speaker Anjem Choudary tells his audience, 
‘those individuals are Muslims, they were carrying out their Islamic responsibility and 
duty, so in that respect they were magnificent’.128 
 
Almost a year after 9/11 on the 12th of July 2002, Al-Muhajiroon issued a second 
press release regarding the attacks on New York. The author is unequivocal in 
outlining the fundamentalist narrative, which argues the west is at war with Islam and 
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is now on a crusade to further oppress Muslims worldwide. Referring to events that 
followed 9/11, Bakri argued,  
The war launched after 11th of September 2001 against ‘terrorism’ is in fact a 
war against Islam and Muslims, initiated by the US and the UK, legitimised by 
the United Nations, supported by the corrupt leaders of Muslim countries and 
hidden behind the masks of freedom, democracy and so called human 
rights.129 
Showcasing the determination of the worldwide Islamic fundamentalist movement, the 
July 2002 press release retorts defiantly, ‘the persecution, torture, imprisonment, 
arrest or internment of innocent Muslims will never damped the determination of the 
fundamentalist movement to liberate Muslim land from occupation and to establish 
the Islamic caliphate ruled according to Shariah’. 130 The author appears determined to 
use the events of 9/11 to construct camaraderie between Muslims in the UK and their 
brothers and sisters worldwide. In particular, he attempts to contrast the Muslim 
nation with NATO such that an attack on one Muslim represents an attack on all. 
Somewhat prophetic, towards the end of the following year, the US stood accused of 
committing war crimes in Iraq. Media outlets beamed pictures of human rights abuses 
at Abu Ghraib prison around the world thereby electrifying the very narratives that 
fundamentalists in the UK had been widely promoting since 2002. By the time the 
abuse story broke, members of the fundamentalist movement were already discussing 
how the US and Britain were guilty of abusing Muslims, now publically they had 
confirmation and an impetus to act. Degrading treatment of detainees by occupying 
forces in Iraq would almost certainly have led fundamentalists to feel vilified and 
pushed a minority to question how they should respond. Ultimately, a minority choose 
to pursue terrorism in order to exact revenge and regain a sense of honour amongst 
the Muslim nation. 
To liberate Muslim lands 
While the US negotiated in the Security Council to liberate Kuwait in 1991, Osama 
Bin Laden met with Saudi King Fahd. He advised the Royal family to reject 
                                                
129 O. Mohammed  ‘The Declaration of the Conference on a shout in the face of 
falsehood’ 
130 Ibid. 
Page 184 of 370 
assistance from non-Muslim countries and instead offered help from his Arab legion 
of mujahedeen stationed in Afghanistan. The Saudis spurned this offer, instead 
allowing the deployment of western forces on their territory.131 Almost two years after 
the first Gulf war officially ended and to the disgust of Islamic fundamentalists, US 
military personal remained in the Arab Peninsula. To all Muslims, especially 
fundamentalists, the situation was untenable. Consequently, the latter pursued a 
campaign of violent terrorism designed to coerce the Americans to leave the region. 
Spearheading the operations, Osama Bin Laden with support from fellow Afghan 
veteran Mohammed Khan, carried out a series of terrorist attack in Yemen designed to 
kill US Marines on route to Somalia.132 Although this new wave of terrorism first 
targeted soldiers, it quickly moved on encapsulate civilians and government workers 
stationed in US embassies around the world. Unlike the politically oriented 
nationalists, these postmodern terrorists found motivation within religious doctrine. 
The Quran told them what to do while the Hadiths offered guidance on how to do it. 
In the UK, leader of Al-Muhajirooun, Omar Bakri Mohammed, claimed to speak on 
behalf of Bin Laden whom he praised and encouraged fundamentalists to follow suit. 
In self defence of the Muslim nation 
British Muslim fundamentalist Abu Abdullah gave an interview to CNN journalist 
Dan Rathers in 2009. He stated that if Muslims wished to take up arms against the 
west then it was their Islamic right to do so. Abdullah argued that while Islam is a 
peaceful religion, at the same time it maintains the right to self-defence. Mindful of 
events in Iraq and Afghanistan, he told Rathers, ‘If a Muslim is killed by the west then 
we [British fundamentalist Muslims] have the right to retaliate’. This statement by 
Abduallah echoes more recently in the case of Michael Adebalajo. In the immediate 
aftermath of the slaughter of soldier Lee Rigby, he told an observer that this was ‘an 
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’.133 Given the relatively small and closed network of 
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fundamentalists in the UK, it is likely that Adebalajo and Abdullah were 
acquaintances and equally familiar with the political narratives that have influenced 
their thinking. Although Abduallah does not explicitly state the Islamic right to 
retaliate extends to targeting civilians, he does say that it is mainly against the army, 
thereby leaving scope for acts against non-combatants.  
At one of the regular sermons given by Al-Masri during Friday prayers at 
Finsbury Park Mosque, he discussed suicide bombing in Chechnya. 134 The talk titled, 
‘she died a mujaahida Killing 27 Russian soldiers’, concerned two young girls who 
had recently volunteered to carry out a suicide bombing. Twenty two year old Khava 
Barayeva and sixteen year old Luiza Magomadova drove a truck laden with 
explosives into a Russian special forces building killing themselves and at least two 
government soldiers.135 Al-Masri claims that Allah had decreed the girls carry out the 
martyrdom operation and he celebrates how they ripped apart the enemies of Islam. 136 
In conclusion, he asks Allah to accept the sacrifice and grant them and their family the 
company of Muhammad the Messenger of Allah (SAW). Importantly, Al-Masri 
reminds the audience of British fundamentalist Muslims that by carrying out a suicide 
mission, the girls have secured a place in paradise with God, not only for themselves, 
but also for their families. The views expressed in this private sermon are consistent 
with those communicated by Al-Masri in 1998 through Al-Jihad magazine. 
Contradictions appear between the public and private views given by Al-Masri. In 
particular, speeches given outside Finsbury Park Mosque in 2000 do not reflect the 
political narratives that Al-Masri propagated amongst fundamentalists in London 
before his arrest and incarceration.  
Permissible domestically 
In 2004, reporters obtained copies of private sermons given by Al-Masri between 
2000 and 2002. In various recordings, the cleric encourages British fundamentalists to 
carry out suicide bombings by telling them, ‘Our immediate duty is to correct our 
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homeland. You do not have to travel thousands of miles to become a shaheed (suicide 
bomber) - you can be shaheed right on your own doorstep. This is the best jihad’. 
Author Neil Doyle who originally obtained the tapes, claim they show evidence that 
Al-Masri supported terrorism in the UK. An alternative interpretation argues that Al-
Masri would not have considered Britain to be his “homeland” and therefore his 
audience were Egyptian dissidents rather than British fundamentalists. Therefore, any 
incitement to terrorism was more likely directed towards persons in either Egypt or 
Yemen, or Afghanistan. Whether or not Al-Masri is talking to Muslims in the UK or 
overseas, his message at the time was clear, fundamentalists should do whatever they 
can, where they can in order to liberate Egypt from the tyranny of President Mubarak.  
Longstanding fundamentalist and protégé of Omar Bakri Mohammed, Abu 
Izzadeen, described the London bombers as ‘completely praise worthy’.137 In sermons 
delivered privately to fellow members of the fundamentalist movement, Izzadeen 
argued the British and Americans only understand the language of blood. Therefore, 
any Muslim that assists them is guilty of apostasy, the penalty of which is death. 
Simon Keeler, a close associate of Izzadeen told an audience at Regents Park Mosque 
in 2004: ‘give your money to Osama Bin Laden and the mujahedeen. Go there 
[Afghanistan] physically and fight. Come fight the jihad. Islam will dominate the 
world, inevitable.’ He went on to call September 11 2001 a ‘great day’ and praised the 
suicide bombers as ‘the Magnificent 19’. All speakers at the mosque during this event 
were members of, or associated with Al-Muhajiroon and the overall UK 
fundamentalist movement. Police later charged Izzadeen and Keeler with inciting 
terrorism during this event and both eventually spent four years in prison. 
As the fundamentalist movement gathered momentum, terrorism in the UK 
conducted by British Muslims became inevitable. In March 2004, Police arrested five 
British fundamentalists on suspicion of conspiracy to carry out a bombing campaign 
across London. Members of the Crevice cell actively participated in activities 
associated with the fundamentalist movement. In particular, like many of their fellow 
British Muslim terrorists, they pursued Jihad and supported the Taliban by sending 
money and equipment on a regular basis. Preachers like Al-Masri and Omar Bakri 
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were careful not to directly instruct followers to pursue terrorism in the UK. However, 
by promoting extreme political narratives to impressionably young Muslims, they laid 
the foundations that were necessary to encourage a process of self-discovery. Muslims 
who encountered the fundamentalist movement developed an extreme mindset over 
western aggression against Islam. Consequently, they merely required some brutal act 
by western occupiers to tip them over the edge. Publicity surrounding events in Abu 
Ghraib, Guantanamo bay, water boarding and CIA black sites served this purpose, 
brutality against co-religionists all fed into the paranoia of British fundamentalist 
Muslims, convincing them of the need to strike back against the enemies of Islam.  
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Chapter Four - Activities carried out by 
Islamic Fundamentalists 
This dissertation began by introducing several important concepts in particular 
“Islamic fundamentalism”. Critically, chapter 1 concluded by arguing that since the 
mid-1990s, British fundamentalist Muslims had organised themselves into a socio-
political movement utilising religion as the basis for mobilisation. Chapter 2 
examined how this de-facto Islamic fundamentalist movement emerged and became 
prevalent in Muslim communities across the UK. Notably, the second chapter 
identified how certain key events towards the end of the century, ensured the 
ideologues of Islamic fundamentalism, and enjoyed a highly receptive audience in the 
Muslim communities of London, Luton, Birmingham and Leeds. The previous 
chapter exhaustively detailed the fundamentalist political ideology from analysis of an 
archive of literature published towards the end of the 1990s. Influenced by the 
narratives that constitute this political ideology, fundamentalists based in the UK 
participated in a variety of activities in furtherance of their strategic goals, primarily 
to re-establish an Islamic Caliphate governed according to Sharia. Chapter 4 now 
presents an in-depth examination of the five most important activities carried out by 
fundamentalist Muslims in the UK. Participation in recruitment, preaching, 
facilitation, jihad, and logistical support, help immerse British Muslims in the politics 
associated with the fundamentalist movement. For a minority, this process develops in 
them the mindset necessary to pursue terrorism.  
Ideologies, concepts, associations and affiliations require a continuous flow of 
new supporters, especially when they promote armed conflict as a core activity. 
Recruitment to the Islamic fundamentalist movement is both organic and targeted. 
Observing publicity surrounding fundamentalists groups such as al-muhajiroun and 
Islam4UK, predominantly young British Muslims attend public events and often 
willingly submit to “radicalisation” by preachers like Anjem Choudary and Omar 
Bakri Mohammed. In contrast with the organic pathway, targeted recruitment occurs 
when existing members deliberately use a variety of social networks to identify often-
vulnerable Muslims whom they engage with and encourage in the adoption of 
fundamentalist Islam. For example, at the mosque, sports club or community centre, 
recruiters identify Muslims showing a devout appreciation of Islam. Privately, the 
recruiter will then approach the individual, inviting them to attend a religious-political 
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meeting, typically held in a domestic home. At this location, experienced members of 
the fundamentalist movement will discuss the war that is raging between Islam and 
the west and how it falls upon all Muslims to volunteer for jihad in order to fight 
back. 
Following the discussion on how the movement recruits Muslims, the second 
section of this chapter examines political indoctrination of new members through the 
art of preaching. Charismatic individuals continuously promote the movement’s core 
political ideology through a complex set of well-argued narratives. Referred to as 
‘radicalisation’, this activity does not begin in basement of a mosque or front room of 
a fundamentalist preacher. The necessarily precursors are innocently laid by moderate 
preachers through sermons and lectures discussing the plight of co-religionists around 
the world. Debates concerning war and occupation in the Middle East, Northern 
Africa, and Chechnya raise awareness amongst moderate Muslims and encourage 
them to appreciate how they are not alone in the world. Moderate Imams at the 
mosque will suggest prayer and donations to reputable charities helping to alleviate 
the suffering. However, thoroughly primed with a belief that Islam is under threat, 
British Muslims become far more receptive to political narratives promoted by the 
fundamentalist movement.  
Highly charged with a strong sense of idealism about how the world should 
be, British Muslims will commonly express an interest in pursuing jihad. The third 
section of this chapter therefore concerns the process of facilitation. Specifically, the 
practice in which experienced fundamentalists support fellow Muslims by helping 
them to gain access to training camps overseas. An important activity, facilitation can 
range from a basic introduction to full-scale sponsorship of a potential jihadist. Those 
who facilitate jihad may simply provide a piece of paper, one that vouches for the 
bearer and gives them entry to an overseas training camp. At the other end of the 
spectrum, more dedicated facilitators with greater connections may offer the complete 
package whereby a recruit is both financed and given an itinerary to follow after 
arriving in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen etc.  
Following on from the examination of facilitation, the fourth section of this 
chapter presents a detailed account of what it means to actually pursue jihad. Holy 
war fought against the enemies of God is an obligation taken seriously by all able 
fundamentalist Muslims, an activity universally recognised as the most rewarding of 
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all earthly deeds. It is believed by many that there is no more glorious a death than to 
fall on the battlefield. This is certainly true of the hundreds of British Muslims that 
have travelled to Syria since 2010 to participate in the overthrow of President Assad 
in order to help establish the Caliphate. It is important to understand jihad as an act 
separate to terrorism – the distinction is clear in the minds of those who pursue it. 
However, not all members of the fundamentalist movement are physically able to 
participate in jihad. Harsh living conditions common to the mountainous, tribal 
regions of Afghanistan compounded by the constant threat of western counter 
insurgency initiatives make this activity particularly challenging. Those willing to 
brave this environment and wage war against coalition forces, often require support in 
terms of finance and equipment. The final section of the chapter therefore looks at the 
important activity of fundraising and sending equipment to those in pursuit of jihad.  
Financing of foreign jihadists became far more high profile in 2014 when 
Police arrested two young British Muslim girls attempting to smuggle thousands of 
pounds to fighters in Syria.1 Extreme fundamentalists that have pursued terrorism in 
the UK over the last ten years, previously sent finance and equipment to the Taliban 
on a regular basis. This facilitation network enabled the men to later gain the training 
needed to construct improvised explosive devices. Consequently, after the 2005 
London bombings, the British government made it a priority to clamp down heavily 
on those who financed foreign insurgencies. Success has been limited and today, 
funds raised in the Muslim community continue to enable the purchase of arms and 
logistical equipment used by mujahedeen all around the world.  
This chapter continues now by examining the five most common activities 
carried out by members of the Islamic fundamentalist movement in the UK. In the 
absence of these activities, fewer British Muslims would be encouraged to adopt an 
extremist political ideology. Therefore, if policy makers can better understand the 
process by which British Muslims begin down a pathway that may eventually lead 
them to the front line in Afghanistan and more recently Syria, they have a much 
stronger chance of preventing future generations from following suit. The first activity 
                                                
1 M. Prynee, ‘Student tried to smuggle £16,500 in her underwear to Syrian fighters, 
court hears’, The Telegraph Online, 24th January 2014, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/10593999/Student-tried-to-
smuggle-16500-in-her-underwear-to-Syrian-fighters-court-hears.html, (accessed 7th 
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now considered is recruitment of moderate Muslims to the fundamentalist movement 
by existing members. 
Recruitment 
Drawing fellow Muslims into the Islamic fundamentalist movement is an activity 
carried out by all existing members in a variety of different ways. It may be as simple 
as inviting a friend to a public demonstration or as complex as a long-term strategic 
initiative to radicalise an entire generation of school children. Establishing the Islamic 
Caliphate is a long-term project and therefore it is not entirely surprising to discover 
an alleged plot by fundamentalists to take over faith schools in Birmingham.2 In 
planting the seeds of segregation, gender inequality and the flaws of democracy, 
fundamentalists expect that when young Muslims reach a certain age and begin to 
look for an explanation of how the world works, the first place they will turn to is 
their religion.3 Many British Muslims, who have later gone on to become active in the 
fundamentalist movement, begin by reading material published on the Internet by so-
called extremist preachers. Upon learning of the great battles fought by jihadists 
against invaders and occupying forces, young Muslims have sought out groups in the 
UK in the hope of joining the struggle. Sajjit Badat is powerful case study in this 
respect. Before volunteering to become a suicide bomber, he engaged with 
fundamentalist groups in London for several years. Prosecutors allege that members 
of these groups facilitated Badat’s trip to Pakistan where he ultimately fell under the 
control of Al-Qaeda operatives. 
Discussing the process of self-radicalisation, former home secretary David 
Blunkett suggests it may occur because of difficulties in an individual’s life and their 
perception about what is happening to co-religionists around the world.4 When a 
British Muslim sets his mind on following the fundamentalist path, he will then seek 
out likeminded individuals either at school, the mosque, sports club, or community 
centre. Going down this route either alone or with friends will eventually lead him to 
attend events hosted by members of the fundamentalist movement. Gradual 
                                                
2 P. Burns, ‘Trojan Horse: What have we learnt?’, BBC News Online, 11th June 2014, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-27779524, (accessed 7th November 2014) 
3 Author interview with Raff Pantucci, London, 20th August 2013 
4 Blunkett Author interview with David Blunkett, London, 9th October 2013 
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socialisation will follow whereby existing members involve potential new recruits in 
activities designed to draw them deeper into the organisation. Public demonstrations, 
private study groups and invitation only weekends away to the countryside provide 
sufficient opportunities for experienced preachers to indoctrinate new recruits on the 
fundamentalist political ideology.  
The Islamic fundamentalist movement draws in individuals during periods of 
their life when they are most vulnerable. Many have previously been involved in 
gangs, drugs, or other criminal behaviour. They present lifestyles that have proved 
difficult to escape from by other means such as education, employment or a loving 
relationship. Preachers tell potential recruits there is a war going on between Islam 
and the west; an existential conflict between good and evil that waged by the 
mujahedeen for generations.  In order to atone for past mistakes and earn a place in 
paradise, Muslims must turn their back on society and become part of the 
fundamentalist movement. Isolation plays an important role in this respect. Preachers 
tell those who express an interest in fundamentalism that society does not care about 
them. They are not loved, respected, or genuinely considered ‘British’ by racists who 
call them ‘Pakis’ and terrorists just because of their skin colour and heritage. In 
contrast, the fundamentalist movement offers fellowship, a welcoming community, 
which provides salvation and divine rewards to all those participate. New members 
find themselves drawn into an identity crisis between the dual roles of being Muslim 
and British. Preachers encourage them to choose fundamentalism above friends, 
family all other social commitments. Gradual conditioning leads new recruits into 
believing their adoptive community is struggling against a western onslaught that is 
killing and oppressing Muslims all over the world. As fundamentalists, they are 
encouraged to participate in various activities that will collectively support the global 
fight back and potentially lead to the re-establishment of a Caliphate.  
For the rebellious young Muslim, fundamentalism offers an escape mechanism 
from parental control. This controversial sub culture provides an alternative lifestyle 
to the stereotypical, arranged marriage, family oriented way of life typically pressed 
upon second and third generation British-Asians. Former head of Counter Terrorism 
Command (CTC) Stuart Osborne compares the initial attraction of young Muslims to 
the fundamentalist movement with certain genres of pop or rock music. 5 He suggests 
                                                
5 Osbourne Author interview with Stuart Osbourne, London, 10th September 2013 
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parallels can be drawn firstly in terms of why new recruits initially go along to 
meetings, and secondly the role of group dynamics in drawing individuals deeper into 
the movement, often to the point where they lose all notion of personal identity. 
Although religion appears to be the initial instrument of attraction, Osborne points to 
the charismatic nature of preachers and their anti-establishment messages that hook 
followers and keep them engaged. 6 One might draw comparisons here with artists 
like Marylyn Manson and the kind of heavy punk rock gothic movement that 
continues to attract generations of angry young teenagers unsure of their place in 
society. In terms of the specific message going out to new members, Stuart Osborne 
has said: 
It was sort of anti-establishmentarians in terms of this is what we need to do, 
we need to rise up, we need to be different, and we need to be somewhat 
aggressive in terms of the activity. Now there were lots of people who would 
have gone to those meetings and would never have been aggressive in their 
entire lives but actually liked to be part of that different culture.7 
British Muslims who turn to the fundamentalist movement may do so in order to find 
a sense of unity and importance. Unlike parents, racists, school bullies and religious 
leaders, the fundamentalist movement treats them as a valuable resource, soldiers in 
an existential war against the west. An offer of respect, adulation and an invitation to 
become a hero present compelling reasons for young Muslims to engage with the 
fundamentalist movement. Three Birmingham men convicted in 2013 of plotting to 
repeat 7/7 were arguably social outcasts. Overweight, partially sighted and with few 
friends, Irfan Nasser, Irfan Khalid and Ashik Ali had sought respect within their 
community. To achieve this, they openly promoted themselves as dedicated 
fundamentalists with direct connections to Al-Qaeda.  
Recognising the limitations of Islamic doctrine in retaining members, the 
fundamentalist movement promotes itself a lifestyle. Members pray, work and often 
socialise together, isolated from non-members who do not understand their way of 
life. By insulating themselves from the rest of the community, fundamentalists are 
more willing to accept radical suggestions like pursuing jihad than they would if they 
were on the outside looking in. While preachers are responsible for political 
                                                
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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education, social interaction causes an intensification of the experience and deeper 
commitment to the cause. Consequently, members of the fundamentalist movement 
will commonly organise events like adventure weekends and paintballing in order to 
achieve a sense of fellowship. When new members progress into the inner sanctum, 
that is to say attendance at private team building events, they may be encouraged to 
travel overseas to countries like Yemen or Pakistan. In these far away often-lawless 
lands, recruits can undertake armed military training in preparation for jihad. Based 
on previous examples, preachers within the fundamentalist movement appear reckless 
and negligent about the possibility such activity may eventually lead members to 
commit acts of terrorism either in the UK or overseas.  
Recruitment to the fundamentalist movement is both a bottom up and top 
down process. While British Muslims are known to have actively sought out 
charismatic leaders like Abu Hamza Al-Masri within fringe groups such as Al-
Muhajiroon, at the same time, senior members have travelled around the UK, 
preaching about fundamentalism at mosques, book shops, gyms and community 
centres. Birmingham based counter radicalisation worker Jahan Mahmood has 
described how in 2011, Anjem Choudary and Abu Izzadeen came to the city in order 
to recruit new members.8 These two men believed that Muslims would empathise 
more with their fundamentalist political ideology following the controversy 
surrounding the ill-fated Project Champion.9 Mahmood has said of the attempted 
recruitment campaign: 
He thought this is a great time now, Muslims are upset with the authorities, 
this was a good time to recruit them. His perspective, and his way of 
radicalising people was very dangerous. He was very impressive in the way he 
operated and convinced people. My friend that went with me, he is very 
impressive in some of the stuff he is using. I can see why these guys are just so 
compelling.10 
                                                
8 Author interview with Jahan Mahmoood, Birmingham, 16th August 2013 
9 Staff Reporter, ‘Birmingham Project Champion 'spy' cameras being removed’, BBC 
News Online, 9th May 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-
13331161, (accessed 7th November 2014) 
10 Mahmood Author Interview 
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Top down recruitment has and continues to take place at a variety of places both 
public and private. Evidence from previous studies suggests that recruitment to the 
fundamentalist movement has occurred in mosques, private homes, community 
centres, sports facilities and university campus. In the latter case, so great has the 
concern been over Muslim students adopting fundamentalist views and engaging in 
terrorist activities, that since 2005, university administrators have increasingly 
regulated visiting speakers, especially those attending events organised by Islamic 
societies. What follows now is a more detailed review of the locations where 
recruitment has previously taken place since the late 1990s. As a direct consequence 
of government intervention since 2005, traditional spaces such as the mosque and 
university campus have now declined in favour of private locations such as password 
protected Internet chat rooms and invite only lectures. 
Mosques 
Recruitment of Muslims to the fundamentalist movement occurred openly in mosques 
until at least 2005. Following the London bombings, government pressure led to an 
increase in accountability on the side of Imams. Private rooms and basements 
previously used to deliver sermons designed to encourage audiences to adopt a more 
fundamentalist ideology became contested spaces. Previously unregulated and 
unchallenged, fundamentalists commonly distributed leaflets outside of mosques 
following the end of Friday prayers. Worshippers showing an interest were then 
directed to private events held at less public venues including Islamic bookshops and 
domestic homes. The official government report into the July 7th 2005 terrorist attack 
highlights the role of mosques in the recruitment of fundamentalists noting, ‘from 
previous investigations the normal activities of a mosque can be entirely proper, but 
with extremists – unknown to the mosque hierarchy – operating on the margins’.11 
Furthermore, the report notes that after 2005, fundamentalists appear to have 
increasingly moved away from recruiting at Mosques, due to concerns about 
monitoring from the security services. 12 Implied in the report is that no blame can be 
                                                
11 HM Government, ‘Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 
7th July 2005’, 11th May 2006, http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc10/1087/1087.pdf, (accessed 7th November 
2014) 
12 Ibid. 
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attributed to the ordinary mosque hierarchy in respect of radicalisation. However, 
there is good reason to believe that far from being part of the solution, moderate 
Imams were actually part of the problem.  
During the 1990s, former agent working on behalf of MI5, Omar Nasiri, 
infiltrated the UK fundamentalist movement in order to report on its activities. 
Recounting the means by which he carried out this activity, Nasiri explained that he 
would randomly attend Friday prayers looking for fundamentalist undertones within 
official sermons. If the Imam was apologetic of the west or failed to discuss the plight 
of Muslims engaged in jihad then he would move on to the next mosque. When it 
became clear that a Mosque had a strong fundamentalist presence, he would then 
befriend regular attendees looking for an invitation to private talks and discussions. 
The account given by Nasiri suggests potential fundamentalists gravitated to certain 
Mosques because they knew the Imam was sympathetic to their ideology and 
therefore they could expect to meet likeminded individuals. Between 1995 and 2005, 
Green Islamic Centre, Brixton, Baker Street and Finsbury Park Mosques served as 
important social hubs for members of the fundamentalist movement.  
Today, while fundamentalists still congregate at mosques, there is no evidence 
to suggest they still use this kind of location for anything other than worship. Media 
reports indicate the majority of Imams now co-operated with local PREVENT officers 
in order to remove the threat of fundamentalism from their establishments. For 
example, in June 2014, Police arrested two men from Cardiff who travelled to Syria in 
order to purse jihad. This investigation came directly from information passed to 
Police by the local Imam. 13 Exceptions do still occur in terms of ad-hoc events. In 
2013, Greenwich Islamic centre played host to a circuit presentation designed to draw 
attention to events in Syria. After the talk, the speaker invited individuals to join a 
humanitarian mission delivering aid to the country. Police allege fundamentalists used 
these aid convoys as means to transmit both finance and equipment to insurgents 
fighting on the front line against the Assad regime.  
Private homes 
                                                
13 A. Qureshi, ‘Cage Interview: Muthana Brothers more questions than answers’, 
Cage Prisoners, 25th June 2014, http://www.cageuk.org/article/cage-interview-
muthana-brothers-more-questions-answers, (accessed 7th November 2014) 
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After July 2005, recruitment to the fundamentalist movement would no longer go 
unchallenged in the public and semi-private domain. Consequently, ideologues 
increasingly relied on closed spaces such as domestic homes and bookshops to 
radicalise fellow Muslims and convince them to join the struggle. The most notable 
case to shed light on closed-door radicalisation concerns Manchester based 
fundamentalist Munir Farooqi. Born in Pakistan but raised in the UK from the age of 
five, the veteran jihadist featured heavily in the fundamentalist movement from the 
mid1990s. Inspired by the sacrifice of his fellow Muslims on 9/11, Farooqi travelled 
to Afghanistan in order to re-establish contact with Taliban fighters. Prosecutors 
allege the intention of his visit was to set up a network through which he would 
supply finance, equipment, and eventually volunteers for jihad. Investigated by police 
and the security services, Farooqi eventually stood trial for his activities and is now 
serving four life sentences.14  
In contrast with other fundamentalists returning to the UK from fighting in 
Afghanistan, the security services failed to place Farooqi under any kind of control 
order restricting his movements. This meant he was free to carry out recruitment and 
raise finance on behalf of the Taleban for up to seven years before police finally 
arrested him in November 2007.15 Undercover officers who infiltrated his network 
discovered evidence of ‘radicalisation ceremonies’ taking place within the basement 
of his home in Manchester.16 Prosecutors alleged that over a period of several years, 
Farooqi had recruited young British Muslims to fight, kill and die in either 
Afghanistan or Pakistan by persuading them it was their Islamic duty to do so.17 
Following a successful conviction, Police sought to confiscate the Farooqi family 
                                                
14 J. Narain, ‘Jailed: Muslim extremists who used Manchester market stall as front to 
persuade men to head out to Afghanistan and kill British troops’, Daily Mail Online, 
7th November 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2035578/Munir-
Farooqi-trial-Muslim-extremist-jailed-using-market-stall-recruitment-
centre.html#ixzz3IOAJ27CV, (accessed 7th November 2014) 
15 Staff Reporter, ‘Munir Farooqi given four life sentences for terror charges’, BBC 
News Online, 9th September 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-
manchester-14851811, (accessed 7th November 2014) 
16 J. Narain, ‘Family of Al Qaeda terrorist set to be evicted from the home they own 
because he used it as a base to recruit jihadists’, Daily Mail Online, 7th November 
2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2058551/Al-Qaeda-terrorist-Munir-
Farooqis-family-evicted-home.html#ixzz2t75Qxu24, (accessed 7th November 2014) 
17 Anonymous, ‘Case File: Munir Farooqi’, Cage Prisoners, Undated, 
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home on the grounds it had served as a secret Al-Qaeda recruiting school. Appeal 
judges later rescinded the confiscation order allowing family members to remain in 
the property. 
Private home based recruitment and radicalisation also feature heavily in the 
case of fundamentalist, Mohammed Hamid. In February 2008, jurors convicted the 
fifty-one year-old of soliciting murder and facilitating terrorism training to British 
Muslim jihadists. Police secretly recorded Hamid telling recruits about his 
connections to insurgents in Afghanistan, a network that allowed him to facilitate the 
pursuit of jihad against coalition forces. Hamid first became involved in the 
fundamentalist movement around 2004 in relation to the controversy surrounding 
Finsbury Park mosque and its outspoken Imam, self-proclaimed Sheikh Abu Hamza 
Al-Masri. Acting as mediator between trustees of the Mosque and members of the 
fundamentalist movement, Hamid helped negotiate an end to the standoff in which 
Al-Masri had sought to take control. Impressed by the religious and political ideology 
promoted by Al-Masri, Hamid quickly developed what became a long-term 
relationship with the movement, in particular Al-Masri’s close associate, Atilla 
Ahmet.18  
Serving as an important member of the fundamentalist movement, Hamid 
began inviting fellow members to his home in East London.19 Discussions centred on 
the political narratives, which collectively define the movements underlying ideology. 
In particular, Hamid constantly reminded members of their divine obligation to pursue 
and support jihad. Prosecutors argued that Hamid used these gatherings to radicalise 
impressionable young men, a process they claim had deeply intensified shortly after 
the July 2005 suicide bombings.20 This proposition holds weight given that in addition 
to the failed 21st of July London bombers, the killer of soldier Lee Rigby, Michael 
                                                
18 O. Bowcott, ‘Profiles: Mohammed Hamid and his followers’, The Guardian 
Online, 26th February 2008, 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/feb/26/uksecurity.july7, (accessed 7th 
November 2014) 
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20 D. Casciani, ‘Top extremist recruiter is jailed’, BBC News Online, 26th February 
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7256859.stm, (accessed 7th November 2014) 
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Adebelajo, also attended these meetings until they came to an abrupt end in 2009. 
Within weeks of Hamid’s arrest, police stopped Adebelajo in Kenya on route to 
Somalia where he planned to join the proscribed Islamic insurgent group Al-Shabaab. 
Overwhelming evidence from an undercover police officer codenamed Dawood (who 
infiltrated the group and covertly recording Hamid at his home encouraging young 
Muslims to pursue jihad) resulted in a guilty verdict and subsequent life sentence. 21 
Children are at risk of being radicalised and encouraged into fundamentalism 
while still resident in the family home. In 2014, a mother asked a high judge to 
investigate their child’s father accused of negatively influencing his two teenage sons 
by encouraging them to adopt ‘radical fundamentalist thoughts that are associated 
with terrorism’. 22 Barristers told court that their father, a Libyan national and Islamic 
fundamentalist, radicalised his children to the extent that both openly expressed a 
desire to pursue jihad as soon as they had reach sufficient age to do so. In the majority 
of cases, parents do not share such aspirations for their children. 
Adventure weekends 
Isolation and team building play an important role in the recruitment and 
radicalisation process. Taking a person away from their natural environment and 
bonding them with others, helps build a sense of camaraderie. A simple camping trip 
to the Lake District ensures a captive audience for preachers who use the opportunity 
to remind participants there is a war against Islam and a genuine need for them to 
volunteer for jihad. Preachers who deliver the fundamentalist political ideology 
intertwine the process with team building exercises. Running up hills with backpacks 
and doing bear crawls using sticks to imitate rifles may appear trivial, but the 
objective is to encourage fundamentalists to pursue actual military training in 
Pakistan. In August 2004, less than a year before their attack, members of the 21st July 
2005 terrorist cell were photographed attending a ‘terrorist training camp’ organised 
by Mohammed Hamid.23 These ad-hoc camps took place on at least six occasions 
                                                
21 Bowcott ‘Profiles: Mohammed Hamid and his followers’ 
22 Staff Reporter, ‘Judge to probe 'jihadist' claims’, Belfast Telegraph Online, 12th 
March 2014, http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/uk/judge-to-
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between 2004 and 2006 in various remote outdoor locations around the UK.24 Over a 
period of several days, mostly unfit attendees with no previous military experience 
learned how to perform basic military manoeuvres. To make it as realistic as possible, 
the men carried mock rifles fashioned from wooden sticks. Considering the relatively 
amateurish nature of this training, the objective was to build camaraderie and allow 
Hamid to identify fundamentalists with the greatest potential to succeed as jihadists. 
The Afghan veteran had a reputation amongst the Afghan Taliban to consider, he 
could not recruit just anyone. Therefore, these training camps along with paintball 
sessions where followers could demonstrate newly acquired skills, served as an 
important and useful means of screening those who met the standard to pursue jihad.  
Schools & University Campus 
In May 2014, allegations emerged concerning an organised plot by the Islamic 
fundamentalists to ‘take over’ twelve Muslim faith schools in Birmingham.25 This 
long-term strategy code-named Operation Trojan Horse, sought to oust moderate 
Muslims in favour of head teachers and school governors more amenable to Islamic 
values within the classroom. Leaked papers outlined a five-point guide to ensure 
schools ran according to strict fundamentalist principles. Defending this action, the 
unknown author states, ‘whilst sometimes the practices we use may not seem the 
correct way to do things you must remember this is a jihad and as such all means 
possible to win the war is acceptable’.26 Going beyond the mere adoption of Islamic 
principles, Governors at one school in particular, Park View Academy organised for 
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pupils to attend a lecture given by Sheikh Abu Al-Suleiman. This notoriously 
fundamentalist preacher has previously called on God to destroy the enemies of Islam 
and for Muslims to prepare for jihad. 27 In addition, former staff at the school alleges 
that one senior teacher had repeatedly endorsed the extremist preacher Anwar Al-
Awlaki. Security services link the now deceased Al-Qaeda operative to several major 
UK terrorism plots between 2003 and 2006. In response to allegations of a 
fundamentalist takeover, shadow education secretary Tristram Hunt publically warned 
against the threat from religious infiltration of UK schools.28 Commenting on the 
revelations, former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, suggested the alleged plot was part of 
a wider global problem of ‘extremism based on a warped and abusive view of a 
religion’.29 Far more aggressive in his stance towards Islamic fundamentalism since 
leaving office, Blair has no longer sought to apologise for Islam by arguing that a 
minority have merely hijacked the religion.30 Instead he now points to a wider support 
base for fundamentalism and an incubatory environment for future terrorism that 
includes the individuals responsible for trying to direct the education of British 
Muslim children.   
Shortly after reports concerning Operation Trojan Horse first emerged, a 
witness came forward offering an insight to events at a second school targeted by 
fundamentalists. A former teaching assistant working at Satley Comprehensive in 
Birmingham until 2012 identified Zahool Iqbal as one of several male teachers and 
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governors known collectively as The Brotherhood. 31 According to the witness, this 
extremist group sought to turn Satley into an Islamic School, ‘everyone was 
intimidated by the Brotherhood, they were the ones really running the school and part 
of this involved excluding moderates’.32 This case is particularly relevant to the 
recruitment of Muslims to the fundamentalist movement because Zahool Iqbal left the 
school in 2008 after his arrest and subsequent conviction for supplying finance and 
equipment to foreign mujahedeen fighters – a core activity of those who engage in the 
fundamentalist movement. 33  In the case of schools, evidence suggests that 
fundamentalists recognise the need to win the hearts and minds of young British 
Muslims. Controversially, they appear to have actively sought to do this through the 
education system. Rejecting any accusation of fabrication in the case of the leaked 
papers, former members of staff support allegations that a fundamentalist infiltration 
has been going on in Birmingham since the early 1990s.  
Traditionally, University students have been a receptive audience for all kinds 
of radicalisation. Communism, socialism and even fascism have found a willing set of 
protagonists on campuses around the UK. Free from parental control, young 
inquisitive minds keenly embrace radical ideas and readily pursue new experiences. A 
significant number of British Muslims that have engaged in terrorism are educated to 
degree level. In several cases, the most intense period of radicalisation occurred 
during their time as students. As early as July 1998, Universities UK, which 
represents vice-chancellors, issued a pamphlet entitled ‘Extremism and intolerance on 
Campus’ designed to tackle on campus recruitment to the fundamentalist movement. 
The guidance contained within it, came in response to complaints from moderate 
Muslims who felt bullied by recruiters associated with Islamic fundamentalist group 
Hizb ut-Tahir.3 In written evidence submitted to a parliamentary committee 
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investigating the roots of radicalisation, The Henry Jackson Society, a UK based think 
tank stated in 2010: 
A significant number of students and graduates from UK universities have 
committed acts of terrorism or have been convicted for terrorism related 
offences, in the UK and abroad. Our research shows that 30% of individuals 
involved in Islamist-related terrorism in the UK were educated to degree level 
or higher. Of these, 21 studied at a UK university; 16 were graduates; three 
were postgraduate students and one had achieved a postgraduate 
qualification.34 
In 2011, The UK Department of Business, Innovation, and Skills (BIS) confirmed that 
thirty-nine universities received extra funding to improve staff training due to fears 
that students were at risk from fundamentalism.35 At the same time, Prime Minister 
David Cameron told Parliament that government needed to make sure it did more to 
‘de-radicalise our universities’.36 Published in April 2011, a report carried out by the 
All-Party parliamentary group on homeland security, concluded that campus 
extremism was indeed a ‘serious problem’.37 In conclusion, the group expressed 
concerns that Muslim students were being recruited on campus by fundamentalists, 
                                                
34 Henry Jackson Society, Roots of violent radicalisation: Written evidence submitted 
by The Henry Jackson Society (RVR05) to the Home Affairs Select Committee, UK 
Parliament, 17th November 2011, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/writev/rootviol
/rv05_2.htm, (accessed 11th November 2014) 
35 R. Brant, ‘How widespread is campus extremism?’, BBC News Online, 7th February 
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12337531, (accessed 11th November 
2014) 
36 C. Hope, ‘David Cameron: We will drain the swamp which allows Muslim 
extremists to flourish’, News article about David Cameron tells Parliament the 
government needs to do more de-radicalise universities’, The Telegraph Online, 3rd 
June 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10097006/David-Cameron-We-
will-drain-the-swamp-which-allows-Muslim-extremists-to-flourish.html, (accessed 
11th November 2014) 
37 A. Harrison, ‘Campus extremism 'a serious problem' say MPs and peers’, BBC 
News Online, 28th April 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-13223026, 
(accessed 11th November 2014) 
Page 204 of 370 
adding that some academics did not cooperate with efforts to tackle the problem 
because ‘they did not wish to be seen to be spying’.38  
Shortly after the killing of soldier Lee Rigby, media reports emerged 
suggesting that Greenwich University Islamic Society played a definitive role in 
radicalising the two men responsible. Supporting this claim is the suggestion that in 
his late teens, Michael Adebolajo concluded that Islam could answer his questions 
and he reverted to Islam during the first year of his undergraduate degree in politics.39 
During his time as a student, Adebolajo shared in the anger of those around him who 
were protesting against the Iraq war. In light of this discovery, Home Secretary 
Theresa May criticised universities for complacency in tacking radicalisation. May 
announced the government would clamp down hard on Universities who failed in 
their duty of care to protect vulnerable students from recruiters associated with the 
fundamentalist movement.40  
As a politics student, Adebolajo was particularly sensitive to international 
affairs and the impact of British foreign policy on his fellow Muslims around the 
world. This may explain why he became involved in the fundamentalist movement 
and subsequently attended public demonstrations with various preachers including 
Anjem Choudary and Abu Izzadeen. In 2014, an article in the Spectator magazine 
suggested the government had still not adequately addressed the problem of 
fundamentalist recruitment on university campus.41 The suggestion is that student led 
Islamic societies continue to host preachers who promote a fundamentalist political 
ideology and who seek to recruit students. Examples given in support of this 
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proposition include Westminster University who played host to Murtaza Khan in 
2011 and Brunel University who invited Dr Khalid Eikry to be a guest speaker in 
2012.  
Prisons and young offender institutes 
In 2014, a BBC documentary entitled ‘From Jail to jihad’ discussed the problem of 
Muslims being radicalised while detained in UK prisons.42 Responding to claims 
made in the programme, the head of the Prison and probation service accepted there is 
a small but ‘significant risk’ of Muslim prisoners becoming radicalised and 
subsequently joining the fundamentalist movement. 43  Shadow Minister for 
communities and local government Paul Goodman agreed that prisons are a cause of 
concern and noted the alleged link between prisons and ‘terrorist indoctrination’. 
Discussing the subject in parliament, Goodman highlighted how the shoe bomber 
Richard Reid was partially radicalised while detained in Feltham Young offenders 
institute. Also radicalised behind bars, leader of the July 21st terrorist conspiracy 
Muktar Ibrahim joined the fundamentalist movement while serving a two-year prison 
sentence. In 2002, prison governors suspended two Islamic imams amid fears they 
were preaching a fundamentalist political ideology to inmates. From Jail to jihad, 
detailed extensive efforts by Prison authorities to combat radicalisation, which 
included special vetting of Imams and the literature made available to Muslim 
prisoners. 44 
James Brandon at the Henry Jackson society spent a year investigating the 
problem of fundamentalist radicalisation and recruitment behind bars.45 Using first 
hand accounts given by prisoners themselves, Brandon offers the following highly 
informative insight in respect of prison-based radicalisation: 
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Extremists, particularly in Category A prisons, deliberately aim to recruit 
individuals into their ideology through offering them support, protection and 
advice while at the same time filling their heads with an ever-more extreme 
ideology. Many of their recruits are ordinary Muslims doing time for minor 
crimes like fraud and robbery who want to do their sentence with the 
minimum amount of fuss. These people often turn to religion in prison to pass 
the time and because it helps them get through a difficult period in their lives. 
Instead, their new extremist friends, in the guise of helping them, gradually 
draw them into adopting an ideology that preaches hatred and intolerance for 
non-Muslims and towards Muslims who have different understandings of 
Islam. 46 
From the work undertaken by Brandon, the evidence suggests prisoners who turn to 
religion to help pass the time are encouraged to adopt a fundamentalist religious and 
political ideology. Upon release, existing members welcome these new recruits going 
so far as to pick them up at the prison gate.47 It appears that recruitment within 
detention facilities operates in two stages. Those already incarcerated draw in new 
volunteers, while those on the outside eventually take over, handling the more intense 
indoctrination occurring far away from any kind of police observation. Responding to 
the problem of radicalisation & recruitment behind bars, Brandon suggests the 
following response: 
Make sure that known extremists are separated from the mainstream prison 
population… In the long run, the government will probably have to do what 
Egypt and other countries have already done – to create special centres to de-
radicalise extremists through exposing them to moderate Islamic teachings and 
showing them the consequences of spreading hatred and intolerance. 48 
Preaching 
With new members drawn into the movement, the next step is to indoctrinate them 
towards adopting fundamentalist political ideology. In this respect, the importance of 
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friendship and group dynamics appears well established. Proponents of the social 
network and social movement theories contend that radicalisation is transmitted and 
intensified though social affiliations. As early as 2008, leading academic Marc 
Sageman argued that radicalisation of Muslim youth takes place through bonds of 
friendship, kinship, discipleship and other social networks.49 In support of Sageman, 
writer Ed Hussain has claimed that preachers like the radical and eloquent Omar 
Bakri Mohammed, seduced British Muslims into fundamentalism through a series of 
fiery speeches delivered at various social events up and down the country. According 
to Hussain, Bakri held a masterful command of the Arabic language and was able to 
quote from the Quran without hesitation.50  In a sample of 100 ‘militant-jihadists’, 
Sageman found that only thirteen attributed their affiliation with ‘jihad’ solely to 
religious beliefs, thereby indicating that what draws people in, is not necessarily, what 
keeps them engaged. Friends trust friends, and when a person joins any kind of 
organisation or movement, they are keen to demonstrate their commitment to the 
cause. The easiest way in which they can do this is by expressing a deep interest in 
ideas promoted internally. This explains why Muslim converts are often the most 
devout, the most extreme in following religious doctrine because they want to be 
respected by existing members of their adopted faith. 
The task of disseminating narratives constituting the political ideology of the 
fundamentalist movement falls to preachers of varying capability. Exclusively men 
aged over thirty; preachers either have experience of combative jihad or studying 
Islam in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Within certain discourse, preachers 
find themselves referred to as either hardliners or extremists; derogatory terms used to 
delegitimise their authority within the Muslim community. To fundamentalists, 
however, preachers like Anjam Choudary have earned sufficient legitimacy and 
respect to rule on a wide range of subjects ranging from Islamic divorce to violence 
against non-combatants. On a national scale, the promotion of the fundamentalist 
political ideology has taken place consistently and effectively since the mid-1990s. 
Extreme narratives designed to unite Muslims have pervaded mosques, schools and 
sports clubs and university campuses all around the UK. It is the fact that not all 
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preaching falls into the domain of terrorism, extremism or radicalisation that explains 
why these ideas have been so successful transplanted into the Muslim community. 
Even so called “moderate preachers” disseminate beliefs that terrorists may use as a 
rallying cry to garner support and legitimacy for acts of violence.51 Just as there is a 
fine line between preaching anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism, so too can we find a grey 
area between promoting ideas that encourage young British Muslims to be politically 
active, and more extreme ideas that may radicalise a minority towards pursuing 
terrorism against the west.  
Preaching of the political ideology associated with the fundamentalist 
movement took hold in the UK around the mid-1990s. According to an official report 
into the 2005 London Bombings: 
As Al Qaida developed in the 1990s, a number of extremists in the UK, both 
British and foreign nationals – many of the latter having fled from conflict 
elsewhere or repressive regimes – began to work in support of its agenda, in 
particular, radicalising and encouraging young men to support jihad 
overseas.52  
The most notorious preachers linked to this report include Abu Hamza Al-Masri, 
Abdullah al-Faisal, Abu Qatada and Omar Bakri Mohammed. Explaining the rising 
popularity of these men, former head of Counter Terrorism Command (CTC) Stuart 
Osborne, has said, ‘Their profile mainly came from the gravitas they held within 
minority sections of the local community’. 53  Resistance appears to have failed 
because police were powerless to remove fundamentalists despite calls from moderate 
Muslims for them to do so. In their defence, preachers claimed the right of free 
speech, freedom to celebrate, demonstrate and hold public meetings in defiance of the 
community view. Protection of Human Rights trumped fears about fundamentalism 
and the movement quickly gained traction amongst the Muslim community. Osborne 
also believes preachers gained popularity because, ‘followers became quite excited by 
this radicalisation, you know, this is against the establishment, this has a different 
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fervent to it’.54 Fundamentalist Islam as a sub-culture quickly became fashionable; it 
arrived in the UK at a time when the fall of communism created an opportunity for 
new ideas and new movements around the world. 
Although widely arguing that Muslims hold the right of self-defence, the 
majority of those who undertake the task of preaching do not specifically endorse 
terrorism. The majority of preachers recognise that targeting civilians runs contrary to 
the teachings of the prophet Mohammed. In contrast, jihad in defence of fellow 
Muslims commands a greater degree of legitimacy and therefore acceptance amongst 
fundamentalists. Throughout the 1990s, the British government largely tolerated Abu 
Qatada, Abu Hamza Al-Masri and Omar Bakri Mohammed.55 Observers allege that in 
exchange for ‘no blood on British soil’, these men were gifted a safe haven from 
which to incite jihad overseas – in particular Algeria.56 A change in the status quo and 
recognition of the role preacher’s play in incubating terrorism appeared on the horizon 
in 2003. Judge Sir Michael Astil told six convicted terrorists, ‘the spiral of 
contamination does not begin with you, it has its origins in the teachers and preachers 
of hatred and revenge who radicalise idealist and impressionable young minds’.57 
Following this damning indictment, national policy on countering radicalisation and 
terrorism appears to have changed. Consecutive home secretaries have gone to great 
lengths to deport outspoken preachers not holding British citizenship.58  
The complex hierarchy of preaching divides into three loosely distinct 
categories. Firstly, at the very broad level, individuals generally considered 
moderates, publically denounce western aggression against Muslims. This can occur 
in a regular mosque at Friday prayers and concern nothing more than raising 
awareness of genuine grievances. For example, Imams regularly raise the issue of the 
occupation of Palestine and more recently crimes against humanity in Syria. 
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Secondly, at a more focused level, preachers like Anjem Choudary build upon the 
messages given by moderates to encourage Muslims to adopt a more fundamentalist 
stance. They offer followers a generalised, agenda driven view of world events 
deliberately designed to encourage the adoption of extreme political narratives. For 
example, controversial acts carried out by the UK government that concern the 
Muslim nation fall into the narrative in which the west is engage in an overall strategy 
to subjugate Islam and prevent the rise of an Islamic caliphate. Preachers in this 
category understand the law and make a concerted effort to sail close to the line but 
never cross it.  
Consensus suggests that young British Muslims are radicalised by second 
level extremist preachers. Evidence indicates however, that individuals drawn to these 
men often already harbour thoughts of pursuing jihad and living as fundamentalists. 
They seek out likeminded individuals as part of a process of self-radicalisation driven 
partially by what they learn from moderate preachers at Friday prayers. Completing 
the hierarchy, the third level of preaching concerns various clandestine efforts to 
solicit murder and incite terrorism. Almost exclusively conducted in private, a 
minority of extreme preachers convince a minority of fellow fundamentalists that it is 
legitimate to terrorise the enemies of Islam along with those who collaborate or assist 
them in any way. Characters fitting this profile against whom the British government 
have either deported or imprisoned include Abu Hamza Al-Masri, Omar Bakri 
Mohammed, Abdul el-Faisal, Abu Izzadeen and his close friend Atilla Ahmet also 
known as Abu Abdullah.   
Laying the foundations (broad radicalisation) 
In a series of online lectures entitled “Living Islam in West”, London based preacher, 
Dr Haitham Al-Haddad, discusses the topic of jihad. Responding to various questions 
posed by Muslims, he is less instructive and more reflective. He encourages Muslims 
to consider the various standpoints on jihad without directly adopting any specific 
position himself. Asked what a Muslim should do if his country’s laws don’t allow 
citizens to pursue jihad, Al-Haddad states that Muslims must do what they believe in, 
but they will bear the legal consequences of their decision. Like other preachers in the 
moderate category, this respected cleric merely offers advice on what is legitimate in 
the context of Islam. He places the emphasis on individuals to make up their own 
mind about any action they should take. By raising awareness of the subject, Al-
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Haddad is opening the door to towards fundamentalism albeit not necessarily pushing 
anybody through it. Illuminating problems faced by the Muslim nation is common by 
moderate Muslim preachers. In fairness they have a legitimate right to do so, 
however, without a strong counter narrative to the fundamentalist movement’s 
political ideology, British Muslims will continue to follow a path that leads them to 
volunteer for jihad.  
Adopting what appears from the outset to be a responsible moderate position, 
American Sheikh, Khalid Yasin, encourages young Muslims ‘not to rush in to 
jihad’.59 Concurrently however, he also praises the mujahedeen who he says are 
fighting for the sake of Allah. In the mind of Yasin and other moderate preachers, 
Muslims waging legitimate holy war are praiseworthy. Western governments should 
not therefore discredit these freedom fighters by conflating them with terrorist groups 
like Al-Qaeda. Reflecting on the Syrian civil conflict, Yasin states, ‘it is not wrong for 
young Muslim men to have the feeling in their heart to make a legitimate jihad, where 
there is a legitimate theatre of jihad. It is not wrong per se for a brother to want to 
fight, but he should have a mentor, a leader, and an imam who approves this 
feeling’.60 Yasin offers cautionary advice suggest that before any Muslim even 
considers the pursuit of jihad, he needs to take care of his immediate responsibilities 
including family and local community. ‘Muslims cannot travel to another country to 
put out a fire while their own home is burning. If the brothers are sincere and want to 
go for jihad, they need to consult with a responsible Muslim Scholars in authority in 
their country, a wali ul-amr, so he can check the situation of the young man and give 
proper advice’.61 
Preaching fundamentalism (narrow radicalisation) 
Moderate preachers lay the foundations that fundamentalist preachers commonly 
build upon. They use a variety of different mediums to disseminate the message but 
recently the Internet has proved to be the most effective. Social media websites for 
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example, Facebook and YouTube, allow preachers to broadcast to a wider audience. 
Far more British Muslims now hear their messages than could previously have been 
reached through traditional avenues like the Mosque or community centre. One of the 
most popular YouTube channels for disseminating the fundamentalist political 
ideology is SalafiMedia. Sampling available videos, one can immediately recognise 
the political narratives audiences are encouraged to adopt. In War on Islam, Abu 
Izzadeen argues that without question, the so-called War on Terror is in reality a War 
against Islam. Speaker Abu Izzadeen decries how Muslim men, women and children 
are losing their lives by the thousands and all the while, the British public mourn the 
loss of one soldier in Woolwich.62  
Concomitant with videos published on YouTube, web pages maintained by 
fundamentalists on the popular social network website Facebook, consistently 
reinforce their political narratives. Posts made by Abu Abdullah Al-Britani in 2014, 
include:  
There can never be justice under manmade law, and those who work for it are 
fools. Allah says 'the one who rules and judges by other than what Allah has 
revealed, such are the oppressors (February 19th 2014) 
Many out there are in the fields of dawah and jihad but yet there intention is 
not to implement the shariah of Allah or working towards the khilafah but 
rather for a law and order which is manmade. (February 20th 2014) 
May Allah protect all those who are in the lands of jihad defending the ummah 
of Islam, they are in jihad defending the innocent men, women and children, 
Protecting the weak, the orphans and the needy from the hands of the 
oppressive rulers. (Jan 2nd 2014) 
The above three examples demonstrate how Al-Britani openly promoted narratives 
associated with fundamentalism, in particular the absence of Sharia and the obligation 
to pursue jihad. 63  In addition to western aggression against Islam, Al-Britani 
constantly highlights the plight of British Muslims arrested and held for various 
terrorism offences. These media channels and web pages effectively serve as 
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propaganda tools, allowing preachers to build a sense of camaraderie, inform 
fundamentalists about key events while at the same time preaching political narratives 
that attract moderate Muslims towards fundamentalism. In terms of reach, as of 
March 2014, Abu Abdulla Al-Britani broadcasts to almost two thousand followers.64  
In his broadcast entitled, Can there be peace with Israel? preacher Abu 
Muwahhid promotes several narratives associated with the fundamentalist political 
ideology.65 In particular, that there can be no peace treaty with the Jews as long as 
they continue to occupy Palestine. Muslims must continue the intifada to liberate the 
land or they must die trying. Peace treaties with Israel are not valid. As long as the 
Jews occupy Palestine, it is the duty of all able Muslims to fight against them. 
Speaking at the Islamic Awakening conference in December 2010, fundamentalist 
preacher Abu Mounisa told his audience that Muslims must strive to replace the 
western system of democracy with Islam. Calling for revolution, he argued that all of 
society must bow down to Allah and be provoked in order to achieve this. Mounisa 
provocatively tells the audience ‘we need to behead democracy from its roots, we 
need to behead capitalism from its roots, take it, kill it from its roots, everyday we 
should attack their system just like the prophet Mohammed did’.66  
Appearing to incite the audience towards insurgency against the state, 
Mounisa argues that Muslims must seek to turn society around by removing the root 
of the problem, specifically by attacking the government that controls law and order. 
Although these fiery public speeches seek to delegitimize western methods of 
governance in favour of Islam and Shariah, the speakers rarely cross the line. 
Preachers involved in narrow radicalisation will seldom if ever, directly tell listeners 
to carry out acts of terrorism against the west. The purpose of this rhetoric is to recruit 
Muslims into the Islamic fundamentalist movement. Once inside, they can if they 
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wish, hear sermons from more extreme fundamentalists pushing narratives that are 
widely seen as inciting terrorism. In the next section, we consider examples of where 
this process has been uncovered either as consequence of investigate journalism or by 
a member of the audience innocently recording the activity and later publishing it on 
the Internet.  
Encouraging violence (targeted radicalisation) 
Several terrorism trials in the UK demonstrate that sermons delivered by 
fundamentalist preachers in the UK have on occasion directly incited racial hatred and 
violence. Secretly filmed at Regents Park Mosque in November 2004, Abu Izzadeen 
instructed a group of listeners that it is obligatory on all Muslims to physically support 
jihad against the enemies of Islam and the unbelievers. Specifically, he told them, 
‘there is a western crusade against Muslims and therefore terrorism is a legitimate part 
of the dean of Islam. Muslims must terrorise the enemies of Islam, fathers must teach 
their sons to become Mujahid, to ride and to shoot’.67 In the same speech, Izzadeen 
argues that no unbeliever is innocent. The British government kill and rape Muslims 
therefore anybody who joins the army and is part of this activity should have his head 
removed. In 2007, Birmingham based Parvez Khan conspired to kidnap a British 
soldier. Thankfully, counter terrorism police intercepted him and his co-conspirators 
before they could act. Unfortunately, seven years later in 2014, police were unable to 
prevent fundamentalist Michael Adebalajo from undertaking a similar operation 
leading to the death of soldier Lee Rigby.  
One of the most controversial preachers accused of inciting terrorism against 
the west is former US citizen Anwar Al-Awlaki. Initially a moderate Imam who spoke 
out against fundamentalism, Al-Awlaki returned to Yemen in 2004. Thereafter he 
began encouraging Muslims to rise up against what he argued was a concerted 
western campaign to supress Islam. Courting media attention, Awlaki claimed to have 
encouraged Nidal Hassan, the US soldier responsible for the 2009 Fort Hood 
Massacre. In addition, police have linked Awlaki to British educated Nigerian Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted but failed to detonate explosives aboard a 
transatlantic flight on Christmas Day 2009. According to journalist Patrick Sawer, 
between 2007 and 2009, Al-Awlaki appeared via a video link on at least seven 
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occasions to preach his fundamentalist views at five separate locations across the 
UK.68 Until February 2010, a collection of audiotapes containing his sermons were 
available at a library in the predominantly Muslim district of East London, namely 
Tower Hamlets.69 Police also linked Al-Awlaki to the case of Roshonara Choudary 
who in 2010, attempted to murder MP Stephen Timms in revenge for his support of 
the war in Iraq. At trial, Choudary admitted to having listened to and been influenced 
by sermons published on the Internet by the radical American cleric. Since 
recovering, MP Timms has actively sought to ban “incendiary material” on popular 
Internet sites in order to protect other vulnerable young people from going down the 
same road as Choudary.  
Between 1991 and 2003, Jamaican Sheikh Abdullah el-Faisal lectured to 
members of the Islamic fundamentalist movement across the UK. Until 2005, 
audiocassettes and videotapes of his sermons were widely distributed through Islamic 
bookshops. Today, police continue to recover copies of his publications from the 
homes of men investigated for terrorism offences. Public access to this material is 
generally difficult, however, this researcher was able to view two videos recovered 
from the Internet. Each provides a compelling insight into what the cleric preached to 
followers in relation to the fundamentalist political ideology. In the first lecture 
entitled jihad - Its Aims and Objectives, Faisal endorses jihad against unbelievers 
(kuffar) and promotes several political narratives typically associated with the 
fundamentalist movement. 70 The lecture begins by making a distinction between 
jihad and Fitna, the latter being the correct term to describe Muslims fighting other 
Muslims. He states that it is not jihad when a Muslim wages war for nationalism, 
tribalism or to establish democracy. ‘Only he, who fights so that Allah’s word should 
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be superior, fights in Allah’s cause’.71 Referring to the tenet of the fundamentalist 
political ideology that deals with the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate, Faisal 
claims that Muslims are suffering around the world because of the absence of Sharia. 
He argues that apostate dictators are responsible for the failure to implement Sharia 
and therefore it falls on fundamentalist Muslims to strive for their removal. Faisal 
points to the now deposed Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak, Syrian President Hafaaz 
Al-Assad, and the former President of Iraq, Saddam Hussain as prime examples of 
much needed regime change. Given that Hafaaz Al-Assad left office in June 2000, 
Faisal recorded this sermon and published it before the events of 9/11.  
Facilitation 
Guided by the movement’s political ideology, a significant number of fundamentalists 
acknowledge and fulfil the purported obligation to undertake jihad. At the very least, 
they are required to carry out training in preparation. In contrast with western armed 
forces, recruits for jihad have no access to structured military training programmes. 
Consequently, the majority rely either on historical clandestine networks established 
by family members or as a last resort, their own initiative to obtain training and gain 
access to the front line. The desire to pursue jihad is predominantly organic, albeit the 
result of being constantly reminded of their religious obligations. On occasion, top-
down targeted recruitment of fundamentalists to undertake jihad does occur. Senior 
fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, Raff Pantucci, suggests that experienced 
facilitators proactively seek out potential recruits for jihad and encourage them to go 
overseas for training.  
I think the role of facilitators is they provide an interesting connective tissue, 
they are important, and they become more important over time.  They kind of 
become spotters, more active in the sort of recruiting edge, in some ways you 
can look at preachers as the flame that draws the moths, and these guys are 
kind of around and pick up some of the moths.72 
Actively targeting new recruits to pursue jihad appears to have been prevalent during 
the 1990s. Security services acknowledge that during this period, a constant flow of 
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young Muslims from the UK travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to undertake 
military training. In 1999, the Sunday Telegraph published the findings of a lengthy 
investigation into the emerging Islamic fundamentalist movement. The article reports 
that members received weapons training at secret locations in the UK before 
subsequently heading to Chechnya, Kosovo, Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and Kashmir. The article identifies high profile preacher Anjem Choudary as a key 
recruiter for overseas combative jihad. Until 2001, fighting abroad was not yet a 
criminal offence. Choudary openly admitted at the time that volunteers trained in 
Britain and that this training included guns and live ammunition. Reinforcing the 
researcher’s distinction between jihad and terrorism, Choudary’s mentor and leader of 
the fundamentalist group Al-Muhajiroon, Omar Bakri Mohammed, told the reporter, 
‘volunteers are not terrorists, they are not targeting civilians and they do not target 
people in Britain.’73 Providing weight to the validity of the Telegraph’s investigation, 
Russia asked the British government at the time to help stem the flow of British 
volunteers who were swelling the ranks of Islamic insurgent groups in Chechnya. 74 
Fundamentalists who undertake the task of facilitation maintain connections to 
insurgent groups all over the world. Personal relationships are the cornerstone of 
facilitation and therefore this task is almost exclusively the domain of retired 
mujahedeen. In order to avoid detection, facilitators will rarely visit their contacts or 
communicate directly. Omar Nasiri recounts his experience of covertly relaying 
messages between Abu Hamza Al-Masri and the leader of a jihadi training camp in 
Khalden, Afghanistan.75 Police accused Al-Masri of providing hundreds of British 
Muslims with introductory letters that allowed them access to training handlers in 
Pakistan. Since the American war on terror began in 2001, the number of British 
volunteers for jihad has declined; the main cause of this being extensive efforts by 
western governments to progressively dismantle training bases in Afghanistan. The 
remaining sub-sections examine the most common destination for jihad training, 
beginning with Pakistan. Following this, we discuss three of the most prominent 
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facilitators between the late 1990s and 2005 and the role humanitarian convoys play 
in facilitating British Muslims to pursue jihad. This method of reaching the front line 
has been particularly common in respect of the Syrian civil war. Since 2010, British 
Muslims have volunteered to join aid convoys with the deliberate intention of joining 
insurgent groups upon arriving at refugee camps in Turkey. In concluding this section, 
focus turns to identifying the difficulties faced by the British government in 
attempting to shut down the networks used by facilitators. 
Pakistan 
As one of the most dangerous and lawless countries in the world, Pakistan has always 
been a well-known destination for British Muslims with a desire to pursue jihad. 
Between 2003 and 2006, a mere six CIA drone strikes killed just nine militants in the 
border regions of Pakistan. In stark contrast and reflecting the importance of Pakistan 
in the war on terror, since 2007 when President Obama came to office there have been 
over three hundred and fifty such strikes, eliminating two thousand active militants in 
the country. Alleged number three in Al-Qaeda, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, complained 
that drone-launched missiles were killing his operatives faster than he could replace 
them.76 Former head of Counter Terrorism Command (SO15), Richard Walton has 
remarked, ‘British Muslims continue to go to the tribal areas of Pakistan for training 
with access provided by a number of facilitators in the UK’.77  
Jahan Mahmood is a counter-radicalisation worker based in Birmingham. 
Drawing upon his previous experience of engaging with young men that have trained 
in Pakistan, he offers the following account describing how they commonly gained 
access to the camps: 
It’s very easy to go to Pakistan and just to meet people who are connected to 
someone who knows someone. Therefore you don’t need an uncle in Kashmir. 
if you already have the links to start off with, it makes life easier. But anyone 
who is really motivated, does not necessarily need to have a link. He can quite 
easily go over, I am sure there are people in this country, British Pakistanis 
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who have gone over and just told someone else in clandestine fashion, this is 
how you do it. Networks of families as well who know each other, Kashmiris 
here connected to what is going on in their homeland.78 
Mahmood appears to suggest that gaining access to a training camp in Pakistan is 
relatively straightforward. Not everyone shares his opinion. Respected print journalist 
Duncan Gardham has written extensively on the subject of jihad over a period of at 
least ten years. In his experience, language barriers have often made it difficult for 
British Muslims to both gain access to camps and later progress to the front line in 
Afghanistan.79 Disputing the commonly held belief that if one is Pakistani, it must be 
easy to gain contacts in Afghanistan, Gardham points out that Pakistan has many 
ethnic groups with their own customs and dialects. 80 Since the majority of British 
Muslims are of Punjabi or Kashmiri heritage, in order to access the tribal regions 
bordering Afghanistan, they need to learn Pashto and Dari. Failing this, they require 
support from both UK and Pakistani based facilitators. Since 2001, the number of 
potential facilitators has steadily declined. Reflecting generally on the importance of 
facilitators to those pursuing jihad, Gardham explains: 
Some [jihadist] had links dating back to the 90’s and some of them had family 
links back there and some of them had just rocked up at the right time in the 
right moment and ended up in the tribal areas. So the fixers came three 
different groups. The old school jihadist who had been there, done that, and 
then come back, the guys who had family links already there which made it 
easy for them to do, or spoke the language, and the guys who had fortuitously 
turned up at the right time and were still able to communicate from inside. So 
those three different groups provided invaluable links. Abu Hamza Al-Masri 
would come into the first category, Junaid Babar would probably come into 
the second and then probably Rashid Rauf into the third.81  
Although many British Muslims have specifically sought out jihad training camps in 
Pakistan, Osbourne has said that in some instances, this was not their initial intention. 
In some cases, British Muslims have gone to Pakistan in order to attend religious 
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schools (madrassas). Osbourne explains that during their religious studies, 
experienced facilitators spot the most religiously devout. Through gradual 
radicalisation, recruits are convinced to go to training camps and later pursue jihad. 
The full account is given by Osbourne in interview: 
So a pleasant faced individual that had some good intent, went into the 
training camps that were initially religious training camps not actually focused 
on jihad. At that point within that religious training camp they were introduced 
first of all to the Quran and it was fairly moderate, as it progressed it became 
slightly more hard line and then the discussion turned into jihad and whether 
people would be prepared to engage in it. At the end of that first phase there 
was an unseen selection criteria going on…those who didn’t take the bait 
around jihad, were thanked very much and they went off and they carried on 
their normal lives. Those who stayed then moved on to military training 
camps. 82 
Certainly not all British Muslims were recruited from the Madrassas. Many who 
travelled to Pakistan had the deliberate intention of pursuing jihad and merely sought 
an introduction to one of the training camps. Pantucci describes the way in which 
jihad training may be seen as a simple financial transaction:  
I  go over there and I say I want to train... and after some digging around and 
careful looking, I find a Harakat ul-Mujahedeen guy or some person who says 
I might know someone and I persuade him... now the groups will still take you 
to train because they are mercenary. If you show up and say I will pay £5000 
for you to train me, they will go OK we will take your money and we'll let you 
dig ditches for 5 days and then say that we've trained you..then once you're in 
that process, you're in that community, you're in those groups. Who else do 
you meet, and you meet others who might give you connections to go 
somewhere else and do more, and get deeper in and so you know I think 
getting that first foothold would take effort but I think its doable.83 
The remaining sub sections examine high profile individuals accused of performing 
the task of facilitation. Following the review of three recognised facilitators, an 
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examination is made of how aid conveys (in particular since 2010 and the civil war in 
Syria) have also unwittingly served as facilitators, providing cover for British 
Muslims seeking to travel to conflict regions in order to participate in jihad. In 
concluding this section, we review British government attempts to shut down the 
facilitation networks that fundamentalists use in order to pursue overseas jihad 
training 
Mohammed Quyyum Khan 
Also known as Q, Khan is an Islamic fundamentalist typically associated with 2003 
fertilizer plot along with the London bombers.84 Married with several children, 
journalists allege that that he served as a prolific UK facilitator until 2005 with 
extensive links to militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The former president of 
Luton Central mosque, Haji Sulaiman, accused Khan of bringing other 
fundamentalists, in particular Omar Bakri Mohammed to the location forcing him to 
refuse their entry.85 Respected documentary maker Peter Taylor has claimed that 
Khan is responsible for sending two of the July 7th London bombers to Pakistan for 
military training.86 Former jihadist turned police informant, Junaid Babar, supports 
Taylor’s accusation. Testifying at the trial of three men accused of being involved in 
the July 7th plot, Babar claimed to have been told by ring-leader Mohammed Sidique 
Khan, that Q had sent him to Pakistan to determine whether it was possible for British 
Muslims to cross the border and pursue jihad in Afghanistan.87 Counter terrorism 
police interviewed Khan over his role as a facilitator, but found insufficient evidence 
to file any charges. Privately, officers claim that evidence, which prosecutors could 
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not introduce in court, demonstrated just how invaluable Khan was to British Muslims 
in their efforts to pursue jihad training in Pakistan.88 
Abu Qatada Al-Filistini 
Detained without trial for almost ten years and publically admonished by the British 
government, Muslim cleric Abu Qatada inspired a generation of fundamentalists. 
Authorities first detained Qatada in 2002 on allegations that he was facilitating the 
pursuit of jihad and inciting acts of terrorism overseas. Prosecutors claimed that 
Qatada met leader of Al-Qaeda Osama Bin Laden on several occasions before the 
events on 9/11 and later served as his right hand man in the UK. Formally trained as 
an Islamic scholar in Saudi Arabia, Qatada professed to hold expert understanding on 
the teachings of Islam.89 In the opinion of Omar Nasiri, Qatada held significant 
influence over fundamentalists who accepted every ruling he issued. Even today, 
despite prohibition, audiotapes of his sermons continue to be widely distributed 
amongst members of the fundamentalist movement. Lawyers acting for the 
government alleged that Qatada retained direct links to Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and 
that he facilitated British Muslims to pursue jihad by giving them necessary letters of 
introduction. Nasiri confirms that throughout the 90s, British Muslims were regularly 
going off to fight in overseas but in order to gain access to training camps, they 
required an introductory piece of paper given to them by Qatada. During his time 
infiltrating the fundamentalist movement in London, Nasiri warned his MI5 handlers 
that Qatada posed a far more significant threat than the more visible Abu Hamza Al-
Masri. In September 2014, a Jordanian court cleared Abu Qatada of any involvement 
in terrorism, the British government however, refused to allow him to return to the 
UK.90 
Abu Hamza Al-Masri 
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In 1997, Al-Masri began preaching at Finsbury Park Mosque. Elders had invited him 
to resolve tensions between South Asian and North African worshipers. After the 
massacre of six British tourists by Islamic fundamentalist terrorists in Egypt, MI5 
spoke to Al-Masri about his sermons. Officers told him that he had freedom of speech 
and had nothing to worry about as long as there was no blood on British streets. There 
is strong evidence to suggest that he complied with this warning. Between the summer 
of 1996 and August 1998, MI5 agent Omar Nasiri infiltrated the mosque and attended 
sermons given by Mustafa. Nasiri later claimed in his book ‘Inside the Jihad’, that 
Abu Hamza was inciting his followers to attack just about everywhere else, but never 
within England.91 Before his arrest and subsequent detention in 2004 on charges of 
inciting racial hatred and murder, Al-Masri enjoyed widespread support and adulation 
amongst the UK fundamentalist movement. Respect for the cleric as an authority on 
jihad appears to have been elevated because he was outspoken against the west and 
claimed to have lost his hands fighting in Afghanistan. In contrast with Abu Qatada, 
Al-Masri lacked a strong religious background. Notwithstanding this, he was able to 
attract significant donations from fundamentalist sympathizers, which he then used to 
facilitate Muslims who expressed an interest in training in Pakistan and fighting in 
Afghanistan. British Muslims who had had an interest in jihad gravitated towards him 
for inspiration, guidance, introductions and funding.92  
The initial 2004 arrest of Al-Masri occurred due to an extradition request by 
the US. Prosecutors alleged that he was part of a global terror network who had 
actively plotted terrorism against the west. In early 2012, the European Court of 
Human Rights prevented the extradition due to concerns that Al-Masri would suffer 
cruel and unusual punishment. On 5 October 2012 after a lengthy court battle, the 
British government extradited Al-Masri along with four other terror suspects. On trial 
in New York, he faced charges that included plotting to set up a terror camp in rural 
Oregon, providing support for terrorists in Afghanistan and conspiracy in relation to 
the kidnapping of American tourists in Yemen in 1998. Although Al-Masri denied all 
of the charges against him, the jury found him guilty and as of October 2014, he 
awaits sentencing. Demonstrating the role Al-Masri played as a significant facilitator 
                                                
91 Omar Nasiri, Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda: A Spy's Story, New York, 
Basic Books, 2006 
92 Counter Terrorism Officer Author interview 
Page 224 of 370 
within the Islamic fundamentalist movement, US Attorney General Preet Bharara 
commented, ‘Abu Hamza was not just a preacher of faith, but a trainer of terrorists’.93  
Babar Ahmed 
In 2013, British born and raised Ahmed pleaded guilty in a US court to the criminal 
offence of supporting “terrorists” based in Afghanistan. 94 According to prosecutors, 
Ahmed served as the administer of a series of websites that sought to raise cash, 
recruit fighters and solicit equipment including gas masks, flares and camping items 
needed by fighters on the front line. Under a plea deal, he avoided a more serious 
charge of conspiracy to murder in relation to his facilitation of British Muslims 
attempting to pursue jihad. Over a period of several years, Ahmed is alleged to have 
served as a committed fundamentalist, maintaining extensive contacts to mujahedeen 
in Afghanistan.95 A close associate of preacher Abu Hamza Al-Masri, Ahmed acted as 
a facilitator by enabling British Muslims in his close circle to obtain military training 
in Pakistan. Funding for this enterprise came from the sale of fundamentalist literature 
and media publications including audiotapes of various sermons that encouraged 
individuals to adopt the fundamentalist political ideology and carry out activities in 
support of the mujahedeen. According to a London based counter terrorism officer, 
Ahmed was responsible for sending the failed shoe bomber Sajid Badat to 
Afghanistan in pursuit of jihad.96 Like many other young fundamentalist Muslims, 
Ahmed provided Badat with the finance and necessary introduction that eventually 
led him to meet up with an Al-Qaeda handler who convinced him to join Richard 
Reid on a suicide mission targeting planes bound for the US. 
Humanitarian aid convoys 
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Facilitation is not limited to specific individuals. International relief organisations 
maintain networks and supply routes to Islamic conflicts all around the world. They 
provide a vital link exploited by fundamentalists seeking to avoid detection when 
gaining to the front line. In 1999, a court in Yemen convicted Shahid Butt along with 
a group of other young British Muslims of plotting to commit acts of terrorism in the 
country.97 Four years earlier, Butt pursued jihad in Bosnia against Serbian forces and 
afterwards sought to help over throw the western backed Yemeni government. 
Interviewed about his experience, Butt rejected any suggestion of being radicalised or 
indeed motivated by any particular political or religious ideology. From his own 
account, ‘he was simply at the mosque when a visiting preacher showed a video 
detailing widespread atrocities committed by Serbian forces against Muslim women 
and children’.98 Initially this led him to volunteer for a relief convey taking much 
needed humanitarian aid to the region. When there was no more food to hand out, he 
felt pained and believed he could not leave because of the stories he had heard. 
Coincidentally he found himself introduced to two Arab fighters who invited him to 
join them in the pursuit of jihad. 99 Although in the case there appears no prior 
intention to fight, it more likely demonstrates the deliberate attempt by experienced 
fighters to recruit British Muslims. Since 2010, the practice of recruiting “aid 
volunteers” has become common in refugee camps along the Turkish border with 
Syria. Pantucci has commented on this practice and offers the following informative 
account:  
You drive across Europe with a bunch of brothers, trucks filled with aid and 
whatever else. You get to Turkey and dump it at a refugee camp. Then you are 
wandering around the refugee camp and meet a guy who says: hey you know, 
great to see you brother, you've come all the way from England, that's so 
wonderful, you want to try to shoot a gun? 100 
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Chairperson of the British Charity commission William Shawcross believes the link 
between “charity” groups and terrorist organizations is either frequently not 
recognized or more disingenuously ignored. 101 In 2014, he expressed his deep 
concern that fundamentalists were using charities as vehicles for the recruitment of 
British Muslims to fight overseas.102 Speaking publically about the growing threat, 
Shawcross warned, ‘the problem of Islamist extremism… is not the most widespread 
problem we face in terms of abuse of charities but is potentially the most deadly... and 
it is growing.’ 103 His comments followed the discovery that British suicide bomber 
Abdul Waheed Majeed had travelled to Syria by way of an organised humanitarian 
aid convoy.104 Media reports link the father-of-three from Crawley who blew himself 
up at the entrance to a Syrian jail to fundamentalist preacher Omar Bakri Mohammed. 
Openly acknowledging the relationship, Bakri described the 41-year-old as a 'very 
dear brother'. 105  According to a report by CTC Sentinel, Abdul Majeed had a long 
history of fundamentalist activity, an allegation that highlights the persistent and long-
term terrorist threat such individuals pose.106 Following the suicide bombing in Syria 
and to the detriment of thousands of Muslim refugees, mosques in Crawley made the 
decision to halt humanitarian missions to the region. Publically, Muslim leaders 
expressed concerns that members of insurgent groups lie in wait for volunteers 
                                                
101 M. Curtis, ‘Telling the Truth about Terrorism and Islamic Charities’, American 
Thinker, 26th April 2014, 
http://www.americanthinker.com/2014/04/telling_the_truth_about_terrorism_and_isla
mic_charities.html, (accessed 11th November 2014) 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 C. Greenwood, ‘Are Syria charities a front for Jihadists? Fears convoys in the 
country are being used to help militants after thousands in cash is seized’, Daily Mail 
Online, 14th February 2014, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2559042/Are-Syria-
charities-jihadists-Fears-convoys-country-used-help-militants-thousands-cash-
seized.html, (accessed 11th November 2014) 
105 C. Greenwood, ‘British jihadist who died driving truck full of explosives into 
Syrian prison is revealed to be former driver for hate cleric Omar Bakri as footage of 
his suicide assault emerges’, Daily Mail Online, 13th February 2014, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2558463/Driving-doom-Rebels-release-
footage-British-jihadist-driving-truck-explosives-suicide-assault-Syrian-prison.html, 
(accessed 11th November 2014) 
106 R. Pantucci, ‘The British Foreign Fighter Contingent in Syria’, CTC Sentinel, vol. 
7, Issue 5, May 2014, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/may-2014, (accessed 11th 
November 2014) 
Page 227 of 370 
travelling on aid convoys before encouraging them to join the civil war once inside 
the country. 107  
In February 2013, clerics from Green Lane Mosque in Birmingham lectured at 
the Greenwich Islamic Centre in London. Highlighting the deteriorating situation in 
Syria and atrocities carried out by government forces in the country, the visiting Imam 
encouraged members of the congregation to do everything in their power to help 
support refugees as well as the opposition movement. In a private video shown during 
the lecture, the visiting Imam appeared at a hospital in Aleppo, Syria where he 
interviewed both civilians and opposition fighters. At the end of the evening, a 
member of the delegation approached two young Afghani men and asked them if they 
were interested in volunteering on an aid convoy due to depart the following week.108 
Given the insular nature of Muslim communities and charities in the UK, it is difficult 
to accept those who organise such aid convoys are blissfully unaware of how 
fundamentalists have used them to gain access to the front line undetected. 
Engaging in holy war (combative jihad) 
British Muslims have readily engaged in religious armed conflict overseas since the 
early 1990s. According to UK security agencies, as of 2008, more than four thousand 
had passed through Pakistani training camps before going on to fight Indian forces in 
Kashmir and coalition forces in Afghanistan.109 When political unrest led to civil war 
in Syria, an increasing number of British Muslims travelled to the region to fight 
against government forces. Initially, volunteers joined non-fundamentalist groups 
seeking to replace President Assad with a progressive democratic government. By 
2014 however, the majority of foreign fighters were serving with the hardline Islamic 
fundamentalist group known as ISIS. It is important to recognize that while a 
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significant number of British Muslims train for jihad, it is a small a minority who 
make it to the front line. Upon completing basic training, the majority of recruits 
return home and resume normal life.110  
In the following sub section, we begin by arguing that jihad is not necessarily 
synonymous with terrorism. Differentiation is required because academic research 
conflating the motivation to pursue jihad with the motivation to kill civilians is 
arguably, methodologically flawed. British foreign policy, commonly cited as the 
motivation behind terrorism in the UK, played no role in convincing fundamentalists 
to fight in Bosnia, Kashmir, or more recently in Syria. Unlike the July 7th London 
bombers, the hundreds of young Muslims in the UK currently fighting against 
President Assad are not seeking to liberate a country from western occupation. With 
the distinction between a jihadist and a terrorist in mind, this section then goes on to 
examine the motivations behind westernised Muslims who give up comfortable, 
relatively care free lives in the UK, for the harsh conditions encountered on the front 
line in Afghanistan and more recently Syria. The second half of this section reviews 
popular destinations chosen by British Muslims to pursue jihad. 
Jihad is not synonymous with terrorism  
British Muslims who fought with the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and 
Kashmir would not consider themselves terrorists. Until recently, the British 
government did not denounce those who volunteered to fight in the Syrian civil war as 
terrorists either. In 2010, western foreign policy concentrated on regime change, or at 
the very least, the removal of President Assad. Islamic fundamentalists that initially 
fought with the Free Syrian Army enjoyed tacit approval in their pursuit of jihad.  By 
late 2013, it became clear that British Muslims were rapidly switching allegiance 
from moderate opposition to hard-line Islamist groups, firstly Al-Nusra and then ISIS. 
Concerned about the potential threat posed by these fighters returning home to pursue 
terrorism, police and security services announced a clampdown. The message from 
government became acutely clear; any British Muslims who travelled to Syria in order 
participate in the civil war, faced arrest and prosecution upon their return. Although 
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not all jihadists’ progress on to become terrorists, almost all terrorists begin as 
jihadists. Three noteworthy examples include shoe bomber Saajid Badat and 
Guantanamo bay detainees Feroze Abassi and Martin Mubanga. 111  All three 
individuals engaged for several years in the Islamic fundamentalist movement before 
travelling to Afghanistan to pursue jihad and later acts of terrorism.   
Historically there has been a subjective distinction within western politics 
between terrorists and freedom fighters. Competing national interests explain the 
absence of any kind of universal agreement on what constitutes a terrorist and what 
differentiates them from insurgents and or revolutionaries. Former US president 
Ronald Reagan once famously equated the Taliban to America’s founding fathers. In 
October 2014, the Emir of Qatar spoke to CNN saying; ‘some of the groups we fund 
in Syria and Libya are considered terrorist groups by the US but not by us’.112 Perhaps 
always a false dichotomy, after 9/11 and the commencement of the war on terror 
however, seemingly all fundamentalist Muslims engaged in armed conflict faced 
proscription under UK counter terrorism legislation. It is important to ask whether 
pursuing jihad makes one a terrorist regardless of political ideology or the degree of 
international legitimacy afforded to whatever conflict they engage in. Arguably, 
western leaders have refrained from referring to insurgents responsible for 
overthrowing former Libyan dictator Muhmar Gaddafi, as terrorists. Recognised as 
revolutionaries, Muslims who contributed to his downfall received widespread praise 
from western politicians cynically hoping to do business in the oil rich country.  
In August 2013 before the rise of ISIS, former head of SO15 Richard Walton 
confirmed his unit were tracking a number of British Muslims fighting in Syria. At 
the time of interview, he concurred with the proposition that these men did not 
constitute terrorists. 113 Less than a year later, tacit approval turned to outright 
persecution. Home Secretary Theresa May appeared steadfast in her condemnation of 
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fundamentalists who had travelled to the region in order to pursue jihad. Throughout 
2013, Filmmaker Ben Allinson-Davies spent a significant amount of time in Syria 
interviewing foreign fighters. 114 Critical of how the British government has sought to 
homogenise fundamentalist insurgents into a single group now disingenuously 
referred to as terrorists, Davies contends those who commit violence against non-
combatants represent a tiny minority of the total contingent of foreign fighters. For the 
majority of participants in the Syrian civil war, the aim is to overthrow Assad and 
establish an Islamic Caliphate – neither act constituting terrorism per se. 
These young men have families, friends and close ties with their home 
countries. The last thing they would want to do is to come home and harm 
their nation and their family’s chances, especially when their goal is to fight to 
defend oppressed people. Most are young men (predominantly Muslims) who 
are moved by the wholesale slaughter and genocide of a whole population, and 
feel the need to act. They simply feel that they cannot stay away as the death 
toll rises, and very few people seem willing to do anything.115 
Birmingham based counter radicalisation worker Jahan Mahmood, also rejects the 
conflation of jihad and terrorism, arguing it is a dangerous misconception amongst 
government policy makers.116 In making the comparison, he is specifically contrasting 
jihadists with the extreme fundamentalists responsible for plotting suicide-bombing 
campaigns against British citizens in the UK. Several of the individuals involved in 
terrorism since 2003 have no history of pursuing jihad: Mahmood refers to them as 
clean skins.117 Questioned about the link between jihad and terrorism, an experienced 
counter terrorism officer could list only three individuals whom he was aware of 
having previously fought jihad before later going on to pursue terrorism.118 The 
implication is jihad does not necessarily serve as pre-cursor or have any radicalising 
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effect such that a fundamentalist becomes any more conducive to pursuing terrorism 
than those with no such prior experience. Mahmood suggests there are clear 
difference between humanitarian jihadists and the ‘extremist thuggish terrorists intent 
on killing British citizens as well as British soldiers on the streets of London’. 119   
Adebolajo is the thuggish urban jihadi, there is a difference. These thuggish 
urban jihadists are not the same as the international jihadist. Even in the 
international jihadis you have a problem. Some will resort to suicide methods. 
Most of the guys going from here do not have the suicide bombing mentality. 
They have a different take and interpretation. Some of these so called religious 
leaders encouraging people to fight, they are brainwashing people to use a 
military strategy that we call suicide bombing. The guys going from here to 
Syria do not see that as an option.120 
Playing down the need to track humanitarian jihadists due to fears they may be 
radicalised abroad, Mahmood points out that if they were going to kill innocent 
civilians they would have done it here: ‘Instead, they are going off to fight in what 
they believe to be legitimate armed combat that has absolutely nothing at all to do 
with either terrorism or groups like Al-Qaeda’. 121 
Offering his account of the distinction between terrorists and jihadists, retired 
former head of counter terrorism Stuart Osbourne has commented: 
The academic scholars would say that there is. They would say that the 
definition of jihad is not necessarily about terrorism its about the struggle and 
the terrorist, depending on which book you read is using a sense of violence to 
achieve a political purpose.122 
In his own opinion, Osborne suggests there are a lot of British people fighting out in 
Syria because they think it’s the right thing to do morally and religiously. 123 Pointedly 
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in respect of the jihadist/terrorist dictum, he concludes by arguing, ‘to say that 
everyone that has gone out to Syria is a terrorist is an oversimplification’.124 
Pantucci suggests that as long as a jihadist returns to the UK after fighting and 
does nothing, then he does not necessarily fulfill the criteria necessary for him to be 
prosecuted as a terrorist. 
I think that you know if you were to talk to most Islamists, they would say yes 
there is a very strong separation between the two; there are two very different 
concepts. Two very different notions, what I would say- I would say 
historically we have seen yes some individuals who go off and fight will come 
back and do absolutely nothing, will go back to day to day lives, they tend to 
have issues because they've seen a pretty horrific experience.125 
Drawing on extensive interviews with former jihadists, Duncan Gardham strongly 
supports the proposition that jihad is an entirely different concept to terrorism focused 
predominantly on attacking defenseless civilians. British fundamentalist Muslims 
interviewed by Gardham believed strongly in fighting what they believe is a just war 
to bring Islam to the world but who do not believe in killing innocent civilians either 
in the UK or abroad. 126 Based on his experience, Gardham suggests terrorism is about 
bringing terror to a population by means of killing usually defenseless civilians while 
jihad is a different concept, ‘which involves in the first place struggle and where 
necessary physical struggle against whatever the obstacles to Islam are. So they are 
entirely different ideas’. 127Asked in September 2013 before the emergence of ISIS, 
whether British Muslims who have taken up arms against Syrian President Assad are 
terrorists, Gardham suggests it is a very difficult area but that volunteers wouldn’t see 
themselves as terrorists, rather they see themselves as freedom fighters. The danger he 
believes is whether they want to engage in attacking the west when they return. 
Specifically he argues, ‘they are really only terrorists if they have a desire to kidnap or 
kill or blow up innocent people as a direct aim as part of their method to achieve 
victory’.128 Reflecting more generally on the terrorist threat to the UK posed by 
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British fundamentalist Muslims fighting Syria, Gardham believes, ‘there are lots of 
jihadists who have returned to the UK and not done anything. …and also even when 
they were out there fought a reasonably conventional battle,  so the people I’m always 
writing about will probably come back [from Syria] and not do anything.’ 129 
Motivation to take up arms 
There is a general distinction between what motivates a fundamentalist to pursue jihad 
and what motivates an extreme fundamentalist to engage in terrorism. Based on 
conviction rates, there is a strong indication that only a minority of Muslims agree 
with the legitimacy of terrorism and suicide bombing. It is important therefore, that 
researchers consider this distinction when drawing any conclusions. Scholarly work 
that relies on firsthand accounts given by veteran jihadists, may not reliably 
extrapolate to explain the rationale behind British Muslims who volunteer for suicide 
bombing. Consensus suggests that western foreign policy adequately accounts for 
what motivates British fundamentalists to commit acts of terrorism against fellow 
citizens. However, there is little merit to any proposition that foreign policy has 
motivated the same type of persons to pursue jihad in Kashmir, Bosnia or more 
recently Syria. A desire to protect co-religionists and establish an Islamic Caliphate 
offers a far more reasonable explanation.  
At the elementary level, many British jihadists present a rebellious based 
eagerness to escape from the mundane reality of organised marriage. To young 
Muslims rejecting a future of working in the family business and raising a family, 
jihad represents an escape route. Many who pursue this option do so in collaboration 
with close friends. Consequently, when a fundamentalist has become committed to go 
and fight on the front line, peer pressure and a desire not to upset friends, makes it 
difficult to leave the activity once it has started.130 In videos depicting the activities of 
jihadists, participants constantly refer to the Quran and of a desire to fight for the sake 
of Allah. Religion strongly motivates these individuals who constantly talk about the 
glory and divine rewards afforded to those killed on the battlefield while fighting 
against the enemies of Islam. There is little evidence to suggest western Muslims 
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volunteer to serve with the mujahedeen for money or glory any other reason other 
than their strongly fundamentalist beliefs, both political and religious.  
Many of the recruits who give up relatively comfortable lives in the west to 
pursue jihad, consider it a kind of religious rite of passage. An obligation fulfilled by 
fundamentalist Muslims before marriage and the perceived drudgery of family life 
within the same neighbourhood in which they grew up. If only for a relatively short 
period, jihad may be considered a form of escapism. For the more experienced 
jihadist, simple romanticism, camaraderie and an opportunity to fire AK-47’s with 
friends’ offers more than sufficient incentives.131 Mark McCauley’s concept of male 
bonding as a powerful motivation for jihad, commands a broad consensus. He argues 
the pull of comradeship can be as strong as politics in directing individuals towards 
underground groups.132 Transcending the social spectrum, volunteers hail from a 
diverse mix of socio-economic backgrounds. Defying attempts to profile a “typical 
jihadist”, evidence suggests recruits range from bored teenage bachelors with limited 
career prospects to wealthy married men employed in senior management.133 The only 
common denominator one can deduce from the available evidence concerns their 
involvement in Islamic fundamentalism. Growing consensus suggests the 
fundamentalist movement serves as a production line, drawing in naïve young 
Muslims at one end, churning out jihadists and potential terrorists at the other.  
Jihad is not an activity pursued by all fundamentalist Muslims living in the 
UK. Generally, those who do, find motivation in their religious belief that it is an 
obligation commanded of them by God. Jahan Mahmood suggests British Muslims 
travel overseas to wage jihad for two very simple reasons. Firstly, they strongly 
believe they can change society and feel obliged to do something to prevent the deaths 
of co-religionists. Secondly, they have no fear of death. On the contrary, for the 
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majority, dying on the battlefield and thus becoming a martyr constitutes a primary 
objective. London bomber, Mohammed Sidique Khan, appears to have expressed this 
very desire in a video recorded shortly before he left to fight in Afghanistan towards 
the end of 2004. Consistent with many of those who had gone before him, Khan 
believed the moment he shed blood on the battlefield, Allah would forgive all of his 
sins. Fundamentalists perceive jihad, specifically dying while fighting the enemies of 
Islam to be a fast track route to heaven.134 British Muslims that have fought in Syria 
appear particular motivated by the real possibility of establishing a Caliphate. For 
years, preachers told fundamentalists the Caliphate represents heaven on earth. 
Unsurprising, the success of insurgent group ISIS, caused a significant number of 
British fundamentalists to travel to Syria in order to live and die if necessary within 
the Islamic State declared by Caliph Abu Bakri Al-Bagdadhi in May 2014.135 
Popular destinations 
Until at least 2000, British fundamentalist Muslims regularly pursued jihad within 
conflict zones throughout the world. Counter terrorism officers at Scotland Yard held 
limited intelligence on the activity because at the time it was not yet a criminal 
offence.136 In the years following 9/11, partially inspired by the so called “magnificent 
19”, the number of organized fundamentalist Muslims in the UK increased 
exponentially.137 As a direct consequence, more individuals volunteered for jihad, 
travelling first to Pakistan for training and then on to Afghanistan to engage in 
combat. 138 In the last ten years, there have been a series of figures published detailing 
the most popular destinations for new recruits. Between 1997 and 2000, as many as 
two hundred British Muslims had fought on the front lines in Chechnya, Kashmir and 
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Afghanistan. One such individual, Salman Abdulla, pursued jihad in the late 1990s 
and regular attended sermons given by Abu Hamza Al-Masri.  
Speaking candidly on the subject, Abdulla estimates that from Finsbury Park 
Mosque alone, at least fifty devout fundamentalist Muslims died while fighting in an 
overseas conflict.139 As part of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, the 
British government introduced a more permanent terrorism act to replace the 
temporary provisions used in relation to the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The 
terrorism act 2000 made it a criminal offence for any citizen to engage in an overseas 
conflict, except for a recognised state, e.g. the Israeli Defence Force. Despite the new 
legislation, Islamic fundamentalists continued to volunteer for jihad - God’s law 
prevailed over those set by man. The remainder of this section examines the most 
common destinations, in particular Syria. By 2014, this rapidly collapsing state had 
attracted thousands of Islamic fundamentalists from all around the world, each drawn 
by the promise of a new Caliphate, one that would restore the Muslim nation to its 
former glory. 
Somalia 
Considered a failed state since 1993, Somalia has long served as a testing ground for 
British fundamentalist Muslims pursuing jihad. When the Islamic insurgent group Al-
Shabbaab took over the capital Mogadishu in 2007, the British newspaper, The 
Independent, identified a significant number of young Somalis from London that were 
actively fighting against government forces in the region.140 Demonstrating a division 
between moderate and fundamentalist Muslims, one jihadists from the UK acting as a 
bodyguard for Islamist commander Sheik Yusuf, told reporters, ‘the only true 
Muslims are the ones who are honest and who are patriots. We are doing our duty by 
fighting for the cause of Islam, which is above all countries.’ 141 Highlighting the 
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problem of interference from western Muslims, the Somali government accused 
Britain of being ‘the number one source of finance and new recruits for insurgent 
groups seeking to establish an Islamic state’.142 In 2009, Jonathan Evans, head of the 
domestic security service MI5, confirmed that British Muslims from the UK were 
being actively indoctrinated in Somalia and engaging in the fight against government 
forces.143 CIA direct Michael Hayden warned the civil conflict waging across the 
country had proved to be a “catalyst” for recruiting expatriate Somalis in the west, 
echoing comments made by Evans. By 2013, MI5 ranked the country alongside 
Yemen and Pakistan, as one of the top three regions in the world that posed a 
potential terrorist threat to the UK. 
Since roughly 2006, the most renowned Islamic insurgent group in Somalia to 
attract British Muslims has been Al-Shabaab. Devolved from the more organised 
opposition movement known as the Islamist Court Union (ICU), Al-Shabaab are 
accused of having close ties with both Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb as well as 
Boko Haram. Consequently, the civil war in Somalia represents a significant threat to 
international peace and security, in particular the security of the UK. In part, this 
comes from the danger that British Muslims who fight in the region, may be recruited 
to pursue terrorism – as witnessed in Pakistan in 2005. For example, believed to be a 
senior member of Al-Shabaab, police accused Semantha Lewthwait, widow of 
London bomber Jermaine Lindsay, of masterminding a terrorist attack on a Kenyan 
shopping mall in Sep 2013 that led to the death of four British citizens.144 Shortly 
before the fatal attack on soldier Lee Rigby, Michael Adebelajo, had previously 
sought to pursue jihad in Somalia. Kenyan police detained the young volunteer as he 
crossed the border and after minimal checks, returned him to the UK where he was 
free to continue involvement in the fundamentalist movement. In 2009, a 21-year-old 
Briton of Somali extraction, raised in west London, blew himself up in the Somali 
town of Baidoa, killing 20 people. 145 It appears that growing up in the west does not 
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inhibit a person from carrying out the kind of suicide mission more typically 
associated with Palestinians living under direct occupation. As recently as 2014, a 
former community worker from Camden, North London, awaits trial in the US for 
alleged terrorism offences connected to Al-Shabaab. Prosecutors accuse the British 
Muslim of having ‘specific knowledge regarding Al-Qaeda members operating in 
East Africa who sought to carry out attacks against US and western interests’. 146 
Afghanistan & Pakistan 
Until the protests referred to as the Arab Spring began in 2010, the federally 
administered Tribal Areas (FATA) represented the number one destination for jihad. 
North Waziristan in particular, has hosted a number of training camps attended by 
British fundamentalist Muslims that have later gone on to pursue terrorism. However, 
a significant increase in the number of CIA drone strikes since 2007 has made it 
difficult for insurgents to operate in the region. Evidence presented to the special 
immigration appeals commission in 2002 showed that, ‘upwards of a thousand 
individuals from the UK are estimated on the basis of intelligence to have attended 
training camps in Afghanistan in the last five years, and that, the backgrounds of those 
detained show the high level of involvement of British citizens’.147 In July 2005, Sir 
John Stevens, then Metropolitan police commissioner, claimed that approximately 
3,000 British-born or British-based Muslims had attended training camps in 
Afghanistan over the past decade. 148  
Since 2007, the US has significantly stepped up its surveillance inside 
Pakistan as part of a more aggressive policy concerning the war on terror. Increased 
counter terrorism activity has included a rise in the number of cross-border raids by 
unmanned Predator aircraft.149 Intelligence gathered as part of these operations has 
produced considerable new evidence to indicate that British Muslims are training in 
FATA before joining the Taliban fighting against coalition forces. Acknowledging the 
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flow of volunteers from the UK to Afghanistan, Chairperson of the commons sub-
committee on counter-terrorism, MP Patrick Mercer has told Parliament, ‘we know 
the problem we have with UK-based jihadists. We also know that a number of them 
have been arrested trying to leave the country. With the UK intelligence services at 
full stretch, it is not surprising some of these jihadists had ended up in 
Afghanistan.’150 Former commander of British Forces, Brigadier Ed Butler, offers 
further evidence to support that proposition that British Muslims have and continue to 
fight on the front line in Afghanistan against coalition forces. In 2008, he told 
reporters, ‘There are British passport holders who live in the UK who are being found 
in places like Kandahar.’151 The same article notes how British spy planes monitoring 
radio transmissions had picked up discussions between operators speaking with broad 
regional accents common to the areas of Birmingham and Bradford. As well as posing 
a threat to the UK, the recruitment of British Muslims for jihad threatens the security 
of the US. As UK passport holders, these fundamentalists are able to travel to the US 
with relative ease in order to pursue terrorism. Before his conviction and subsequent 
life sentence for terrorist offences in the UK, Dhiren Barot, carried out detailed 
surveillance in New York on behalf of Al-Qaeda. 
Syria 
In January 2011, protestors calling for the overthrow of President Assad faced 
overwhelming police and military retaliation. Gradually the state descended into civil 
war providing space and opportunity for the rise of Islamic militants determined to 
establish a Caliphate. In pursuing this highly significant and popular objective through 
acts of truly barbaric violence, the group commonly known as the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have attracted fundamentalists from all around the world. So 
successful, by mid 2014, Syria had outpaced Afghanistan and become the number one 
destination for British Muslims determined to fight jihad. Media reports in May 2014 
suggested that security services were closely monitoring British Muslims fighting 
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with ISIS due to concerns they may return to the UK and pursue terrorism. MI5 have 
said that “blowback” from Syria represents one of the main threats to British 
security.152 Specifically, officers are concerned that British Muslims fighting in the 
country may return to the UK battle-hardened and indoctrinated, ready to attack the 
British way of life and punish politicians for decades of interference in Muslim 
countries. In April 2014, the British Government released its annual report discussing 
the progress made in respect of its counter terrorism strategy known as CONTEST.153 
In particular, the report highlights concerns over the threat posed by foreign fighters. 
Officials state that 33-50% of security service workload now focuses on British 
Muslims fighting with ISIS in Syria.154 
In respect of ISIS, Charles Cooper, researcher at the anti-extremist think tank, 
Quilliam Foundation, has suggested the group offer a genuine prospect of establishing 
an Islamic Caliphate, which presents an attractive proposition for British 
fundamentalists volunteering to travel there in pursuit of jihad.  
ISIS are the only group in the world that has come close to establishing its 
version of an Islamic state, which is a big thing for people - including the 
British - who feel drawn to this kind of Islamic extremism. People who are 
starting to go out to Syria from Britain will see the huge gains that ISIS has 
made in Iraq in the last few days and they will be keen to join them because 
they see the potential.155 
Academic researcher Shiraz Maher with Kings College London has said that Syria 
now dominates global jihad, to the envy of insurgent groups in both Somalia and 
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Yemen. Maher notes, ‘One of the interesting things we've seen is that other jihadist 
groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and (al-Shabab) in Somalia have 
issued a communiqué saying, 'Listen, don't forget about us, we also need foreign 
fighters, don't all go to Syria’.156  
Discussing the flood of British Muslims to Syria, Research Fellow at the 
Henry Jackson Society Robin Simcox, discusses the various motivations that have led 
to the rise in volunteers and the threat posed to Britain in terms of future terrorism: 
The war in Syria will continue to attract Brits. Some will travel because they 
sympathise with al-Qaeda's ideology, others because they genuinely wish to 
alleviate Muslim suffering and who do not intend to join up with al-Qaeda or 
ISIL. Unfortunately, the radicalising effect of conflict means this could 
sometimes be the outcome anyway.157 
Rejecting the implication from Simcox that British jihadists fighting in Syria 
constitute altruistic revolutionaries motivated by the desire to save co-religionists 
from oppression, Dr Usama Hasan, senior researcher in Islamic Studies at the 
Quilliam Foundation, remarks: 
There is no question that British jihadists continue to further destabilise the 
Syrian Civil War. Moreover, in the last year, we have seen Britons becoming 
suicide bombers in Syria, allegedly perpetrating war crimes and, according to 
intelligence reports, posing an active threat to UK national security.…We 
would do well not to propagate the myth that these men are freedom fighters 
or that they should be compared to Britons who fought in the Spanish Civil 
War.158 
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In response to the increasing number of British Muslims volunteering to fight in 
Syria, Deputy assistant commissioner Helen Ball, senior national coordinator for 
counter terrorism policing has said:  
We want to ensure that people, particularly women, who are concerned about 
their loved ones are given enough information about what they can do to 
prevent this from happening. We want to increase their confidence in the 
police and partners to encourage them to come forward so that we can 
intervene and help. This is not about criminalising people. It is about 
preventing tragedies.159 
Ball appears naïve over the role of women in traditional Muslim communities from 
which volunteers are originating. Mothers are rarely aware of what young people 
were doing and even if they did, traditional Islamic values and historical mistrust of 
the police make it difficult if not impossible for them to inform the authorities. 
Consequently, young Muslims both male and female continue to flock to Turkey 
before crossing the border in order to help establish and maintain the Islamic State 
currently spanning the northern regions of Iraq and Syria. 
Financing and equipping the mujahedeen 
Between 2001 & 2008, UK courts convicted roughly ten British Muslims of 
fundraising for terrorist purposes.160 Two of these convictions occurred in 2001, after 
which there would be no more until the London bombings in 2005. It would appear 
that during this four-year interval, fundraising had become a low priority for the 
security services. In actual fact, ministers invested a great deal of resources into 
disrupting this activity and although only ten individuals were found guilty, police 
charged a total of thirty-four fundamentalists in relation to channelling funds and 
equipment to the Taliban. The low conviction rate of 29% may be attributed to the 
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complexity of proving a defendant had knowingly given money to a terrorist group 
thousands of miles away in Afghanistan.  
From studying political ideology, it is apparent that fundamentalists were 
strongly encouraged to send finance and equipment to overseas mujahedeen. 
Evidence suggests that fundraising occurred in a variety of different ways including 
the trade of fundamentalist multimedia, collection tins at the mosque, fraud, 
philanthropy, and lastly the misappropriation of charitable donations from within the 
Muslim community.161 Pantucci has said that foreign mujahedeen consider Muslims 
in the UK to be more valuable as fundraisers than combative jihadists.162 Terrorist 
involved in the 2003 fertilizer plot had been strongly encouraged by their contact in 
Afghanistan to return to the UK and raise funds. Specifically he told them that his 
group had more than sufficient number of fighters and that if they wanted to help the 
cause, they should send finance and equipment.163   
Former home secretary David Blunkett has said that fundraising in the UK for 
overseas Islamic insurgency occurred extensively during his time in office. 164 
Consequently, money laundering became a significant focus within counter terrorism 
strategy. Policy makers introduced prominent checks within both the formal banking 
system and informal currency exchange bureaus in an effort to stem the flow of 
finance from the UK to Pakistan in particular. In contrast to the IRA who ran 
sophisticated frauds equivalent to the Mafia, fundraising by members of the 
fundamentalist movement occurred at a far lower level, fragmented and disorganised. 
Blunkett admits that it was simply not possible to know the full scale of fundraising 
carried out by British Muslims. In part, this may be due to the informal, trust-based 
mechanism of transferring money between countries known as Hawala. Common in 
the Middle East, Hawala transactions occur by telephone with no electronic audit trail 
that government agencies can detect, monitor or trace thereby making it difficult for 
counter terrorism officers to disrupt the activity. 
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British Muslims have physically transported cash directly to fighters. In 2013, 
student, Nawal Msaad, appeared in court accused of attempting to smuggle £16,000 in 
her underwear to insurgents fighting in Syria. 165 Along with her co-accused Amal 
Elwahabi, the two young Muslim girls became the first British women charged with 
terrorism offences in relation to the Syrian conflict. Provocative, un-Islamic 
photographs of Msaad discovered on social media website Facebook, strongly implied 
that she was not a fundamentalist Muslim. Therefore, she did not fit the profile of 
someone who would engage in in fundraising for terrorist purposes. Unsurprisingly, a 
jury cleared her of the charges but convicted her friend whom she had accused of 
tricking her into carrying the money.166 During the trial, Msaad told the court she had 
been ‘stitched up’ by her friend Elwahabi, who had offered the naïve young girl £790 
to take the 20,000 euros to Turkey.167 
Collections at Mosques 
Throughout the 1990s, mosques in the Muslim communities of Birmingham, East 
London and Bradford administered collection tins for foreign mujahedeen. Although 
the practice was not obvious to outside visitors, it was common knowledge that these 
funds would be sent to places like Kashmir and Afghanistan to aid insurgencies.168 
Until a clampdown by the British Government in 2000, significant amounts of finance 
and equipment from the UK found its way to mujahedeen fighters in almost every 
Islamic Insurgency around the globe. Substantial attempts to stop this activity resulted 
in a number of individuals and charities in the UK having their bank accounts 
seized. 169  Despite extensive campaigns to halt British support for Islamic 
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insurgencies, the practice continues unabated. Primarily this is because even Islamic 
Moderates recognise the duty of every Muslim to financially support those 
undertaking legitimate jihad. There are clear parallels between British 
Fundamentalists responsible for the task of fundraising and the Irish-American 
diaspora known to have raised funds and enabled the supply of arms and equipment to 
mainly the Provisional IRA during The Troubles.170  Asked whether individuals in 
Muslim communities have previously collected money for overseas insurgents 
Osbourne has said:  
Definitely for Kashmir, no doubt about it for Kashmir, but ironically the 
militants in Kashmir were never particularly short of money given that they 
had plenty of government money behind them usually, but with the Afghan 
situation they tended to collect for Afghan refugees and I think it remains and 
open question whether people genuinely believed it was going to Afghan 
refugees or did know that it was going towards militants in that area. 171 
In fairness to the Muslim community for whom charity is a pillar of Islam, not 
everyone may have believed money they were donating was going directly to 
jihadists. Osbourne adds to his account of the process: 
I mean before you tar a whole community with fundraising for terrorism you 
have to understand the obligation to help out poor people and refugees within 
Islam. That’s what they would give money for and it would be Syria now, and 
it has been other causes over the years and there is some collecting but not a 
large amount of collecting for poor people in this country. So it does tend to be 
foreign causes and it is quite often shaking tins and people will look at the 
individual shaking the tin and think how much do I trust you and should I put 
my money somewhere else. 172 
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Asked whether there were members of the Muslim community who knowingly 
funded foreign fighters and if so why, journalist Amardeep Bassey adds to the account 
given by Osbourne stating:  
I think you will still find the case that the majority, and I am sticking my neck 
out here, the majority of Muslims in this country believe that the west is 
against Islam and there is this us against them thing about it. So if I am giving 
money to this guy and it might end up in the hands of terrorists, I did not give 
it to terrorists, if it ends up in their hands then fair play, the British have been 
fucking us for years. To put in no uncertain terms, and I think you will find in 
their unguarded moments nearly every second generation British Asian feels 
that.173 
There is a case to be made that members of the British Muslim community were at 
worst complicit in fundraising and at best complacent in the possibility that money 
donated might end up being used to buy weapons for the Taliban at a time when they 
were engaged in an insurgency against British and American forces in Afghanistan. 
Fraud 
Since 2001, British fundamentalists have committed credit card, mortgage and 
personal loan fraud in order to raise much needed finance for overseas insurgents. 
Between February and March 2004, the leaders of two major UK terrorist plots Omar 
Khyam and Mohammed Sidique Khan met on four separate occasions. 174 According 
to police, the only subjects these two men discussed were how to defraud banks, 
building societies and trade merchants. Evidence from court transcripts suggests they 
did this for three reasons. Initially to support insurgents in Afghanistan, then to 
finance military training in Pakistan and later on to fund terrorism plots in the UK.175  
Investigators have concluded that the July 7th London bombers raised the 
estimated £8,000 cost of their jihad and Terrorist operations through a series of 
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fraudulent activities, in particular the men applied for bank loans they no intention of 
repaying. 176  In addition, Mohammed Sidique Khan defaulted on personal loan 
repayments, and his personal bank account had become significantly overdrawn by 
the time of the attack. Fellow bomber Jermaine Lindsay made a number of purchases 
with bank cheques that subsequently bounced in the weeks before July 7th 2005.177 
According to the official government report into the London bombings, there is no 
evidence the cell obtained any external sources of income from Al-Qaeda or other 
fundamentalists in the UK. 178  On the contrary, conspirators were established 
fundraisers with a history of sending finance and equipment to mujahedeen fighters in 
Afghanistan. Through this association with members of the Taliban, the future 
terrorists proved their commitment to the cause thereby helping to facilitate access to 
training camps in 2003 and 2004 respectively. 
Evidence of fundraising for overseas mujahedeen goes back to at least 2001. 
The Telegraph newspaper reported at the time that “Islamic Extremists” with links to 
Osama bin Laden had raised hundreds of thousands of pounds by defrauding 
taxpayers in a string of sophisticated benefit swindles across the UK.179 Police traced 
some of the money to known Al-Qaeda bank accounts used to finance jihadist 
conflicts all around the world, including Afghanistan and Kashmir. Proving a link 
between fundamentalists in the UK and overseas insurgents, Police discovered the 
source of the benefit fraud to members of the fundamentalist group Supporters of 
Shariah (SoS). This organization had been operating, undetected for more than five 
years. Founded by Abu Hamza Al-Masri, SoS ran predominantly though Finsbury 
Park Mosque in north London and maintained links to a second high profile 
fundamentalist group in the city known as Al-Mujiharoon.180 
Private philanthropy 
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In 2010, former teaching assistant Shabaaz Hussain pleaded guilty to seven counts of 
fundraising for terrorism purposes. 181 In total, he personally donated £9,114 to three 
friends who had left the UK to pursue jihad in Somalia. Police searching his home 
uncovered a hoard of fundamentalist literature including 26 speeches by 
fundamentalist preacher Abu Hamza Al-Masri. This proscribed material included 
sermons by Al-Masri in which he preached the obligation of Muslims to wage jihad 
and financial support those who do. In a second case, between August 2008 and 
October 2012, brothers Shabir and Mohammed Ali regularly sent money to a third 
brother also pursuing jihad in Somalia. 182 These two British born and raised Islamic 
fundamentalists were in regular contact with Shamim Ali and admitting in court of 
being fully aware of his activities. Although prosecutors accept they sent funds 
primarily out of concern for their brother’s physical and mental health, this did little 
to reduce the gravity of their offences. Without financial support from individuals in 
the west, insurgents in countries like Somalia would not be able to purchase the 
weapons and equipment that fuels civil war raging all over the country. Before, and to 
a lesser extent, after the introduction of the terrorism act 2000 individual British 
Muslims sympathetic to the global Islamic fundamentalist movement have regularly 
donated a portion of their income to overseas insurgents.  
Misappropriation of charitable donations 
To what extent have charities in the UK served as a vehicle for transporting finance 
and equipment to various Islamic insurgent groups around the world? In 2014, aid 
convoys were at the centre of a counter terrorism investigation over fears they 
supported Al-Qaeda militants in Syria.183 According to an article in the Daily Mail, 
authorities seized tens of thousands of pounds in cash from relief vehicles travelling 
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from Britain to the war-torn state. Journalists report that an investigation by Kent 
police led to the confiscation of £40,000 from one particular aid convoy at the port of 
Dover in December 2012. British Security Services expressed concern that radical 
Islamists determined to support networks of violent jihadists had hijacked this huge 
relief effort. Stuart Osbourne has said charitable organisations are responsible for a 
great deal of the funding going to jihadists.  
A lot of small charities were set up in the early 2000’s that were able to divert 
that money, not a lot a handful, and again around Syria there are a handful of 
small charities and again we don’t know where the money is going in that 
regard. But again as with Afghanistan there are huge numbers of Syrian 
refugees who need the money and there were huge numbers of Afghan 
refugees across the borders in chaman and elsewhere who needed that 
money.184 
Gardham suggests that recent terrorism cases have shown how charity fundraising can 
be a useful means of raising finance quickly, particularly during the holy month of 
Ramadan.185 Discussing the subject in 2013, Gardham was referring to the case of 
three men from Birmingham who prosecutors allege were engaged in a terrorism plot 
designed to rival the July 7th London bombings. Evidence presented as court showed 
all three defendants had made bogus charity collections for Muslim Aid as well as a 
local Muslim centre.186 In fact, the two causes received only a fraction of the money 
they had collected. Prosecutors claimed the defendants used the rest for planning their 
terrorist attack. Representing the crown, barrister Brian Altman told the jury that the 
men were ‘despicably stealing money from their own community donated to 
charity’.187 Gardham has said that in his experience, there was a degree of reluctance 
from some fundamentalists to money intended for refugees, to fighters serving on the 
front line. Notwithstanding this however, he accepts that within Muslim communities 
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there were people who absolutely wanted to donate money to the mujahedeen. Boyed 
by the events of 9/11, Gardham contends that after this victory for Al-Qaeda, the 
amount of donations from the UK Muslim community to foreign fighters significantly 
increased.188  
Discussing methods of fundraising for jihad, David Blunkett acknowledges 
“charitable scams” went on within the Asian and Arabic community because people 
were genuinely keen to give to causes they believed were right.189 Those of means 
and goodwill were likely to respond positively when asked to give in terms of 
rebuilding a school after an earthquake or housing or welfare of children somewhere 
on the border country between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Like the Hawala method of 
transferring money, it was equally difficult to track funds purportedly destined for 
humanitarian relief. Blunkett accepts it took the government sometime to get up to 
speed on all of it. Success appears to be limited. However, in 2008, the charity 
commission banned notorious fundraiser and facilitator Mohammed Al-Ghabra from 
being in involved in charitable organisations in the UK. Police alleged that he 
misappropriated donations, using them to facilitate British Muslims going to Pakistan 
for military training. 190 
Chairperson of the UK Charity Commission William Shawcross has said that 
Islamic extremism currently presents the “most deadly” threat to British Charities. 
‘The problem of Islamist extremism and charities ... Is not the most widespread 
problem we face in terms of abuse of charities, but is potentially the most deadly. And 
it is, alas, growing’.191 Shawcross told the Sunday times that the regulator is taking 
action against charities sending money to various groups in Syria. He has asked Prime 
Minster, David Cameron, to introduce changes to charity law, including disallowing 
those with terrorism convictions to set up charities. In 2014, the charity commission 
investigated two organisations following allegations of complicity in the raising of 
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funds for terrorist groups in Syria.192 Since 2013, Police have arrested and charged a 
number of British citizens on suspicion involvement in alleged charity fraud in which 
police believe money donated to help victims of the Syrian conflict, has in fact found 
its way to Islamic insurgents. 
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Chapter Five - Terrorism born of Islamic 
Fundamentalism 
The previous chapters of this dissertation have looked in detail at the rise and inner 
workings of the Islamic fundamentalist movement (fundamentalist movement). 
Chapter one identified fundamentalism as a concept distinct from moderate Islam, 
chapter two outlined how fundamentalist British Muslims organised themselves into a 
socio-political movement, chapter three examined in detail the politics of this 
movement while chapter four presented a study of activities pursued by followers. 
Throughout the dissertation, the central thesis has argued that domestic terrorism 
carried out by British Muslims since 2003, has been a direct consequence of the 
incubation like nature of the fundamentalist movement. Absent of this environment, 
neither the mindset nor the operational support necessary for the genesis of “Islamic” 
terrorism could have materialised.  
In this fifth and final substantive chapter, we present evidence in direct 
support of the core thesis. Specifically, we explore the pursuit of terrorism by British 
Muslims who to varying degrees have engaged in the Islamic Fundamentalist 
Movement since it first emerged in London during the late 1990s. In particular, the 
chapter concentrates on the subset of fundamentalists who crossed the line and 
conspired to kill fellow citizens. Primarily our interest in this chapter lies in 
understanding and thereby seeking to explain what differentiates a minority of British 
Muslims who accept and act upon the legitimacy of terrorism, from the majority of 
those who do not. We begin our investigation by presenting ten case studies in 
support of the core thesis. Amongst others, examples include the 2003/2004 fertilizer 
plot, the two 2005 London plots and most significantly the 2007 transatlantic airline 
conspiracy. The latter example led to the introduction of restrictions concerning the 
amount of liquid that passengers could take in their hand luggage. A more recent case 
study discussed in this chapter concerns two fundamentalist Muslims responsible for 
the murder of Soldier Lee Rigby. In light of his death, it quickly emerged that killer 
Michael Adebolajo had been a long-term fundamentalist Muslim, regularly attending 
events hosted by extremist preachers. In the aftermath of the attack, photographs 
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quickly emerged of Adebolajo attending demonstrations organised by leading and 
outspoken protagonist of Islamic fundamentalism Anjem Choudary.1  
Published in 2013, an empirical study by a UK think tank, linked both active 
and former members of the fundamentalist movement to almost every major UK 
terrorism plot, discovered or executed between 2003 and 2013.2 Notwithstanding the 
arguably erroneous conflation of jihad and terrorism, this report based on research 
conducted by Hope not Hate, demonstrates that involvement with Islamic 
fundamentalism, contributes towards incubating an extremist mindset – the type 
necessary to legitimize and encourage violence against non-combatants. Over the last 
twenty years since approximately 1995, several hundred British Muslims have 
engaged with the fundamentalist movement. While the majority carried out activities 
promoted by the movement, only a small percentage conspired to commit acts of 
terrorism in the UK. On the surface, all members appear outwardly similar and yet 
there is clearly something unique about those willing to give up their lives to further a 
political cause. This chapter therefore moves forward by profiling as far as possible, 
individuals who shift from mere fundamentalist to extremist terrorist.  
Critically, the first section of this chapter attempts to connect individuals that 
have engaged in terrorism, with prior involvement in the fundamentalist movement. 
Evidence suggests that by adopting extreme political narratives, British Muslims with 
a history of fundamentalist activity, later go on to pursue terrorism. Drawing upon 
case studies presented in section one, section two then seeks to construct a standard 
profile of these individuals based upon several factors including education, family 
life, emotional wellbeing as well as political interests. The third section of this chapter 
considers their underlying motivation. Specifically, it considers the core thesis 
questions: What motivates British Muslims to give up their lives and in some cases 
parental responsibilities, in order to kill or seriously injure fellow citizens? How 
might we account for the minority of fundamentalists seemingly pushed over the edge 
to pursue terrorism? In many cases, third parties manipulate individuals to “volunteer” 
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for suicide bombing as opposed to any kind of self-discovery leading to an organic 
independent, unbiased decision to join in with a terrorist conspiracy.  
Building on the extensive analysis of individual terrorists, the penultimate 
section of this chapter examines how terrorists work together within a single 
operational cell. In particular, to what extent do conspirators receive support from 
other fundamentalists both domestically and internationally? Between 2003 and 2006, 
Al-Qaeda operatives predominantly based in Pakistan and Afghanistan played a 
critical role in training British terrorist cells and directing their operations. Since 2007 
however, while the domestic element of the fundamentalist has remained important, 
access and support from the global movement in Pakistan appears to have 
significantly declined. In concluding the chapter, the final section examines the 
response of the British Government to the rise and impact of the fundamentalist 
movement in terms of its role as an incubator of extremist terrorism. Initial failure to 
recognise the importance of the movement back in the 1990s allowed membership to 
grow exponentially. Despite a limited clampdown after the London bombings, this 
grassroots organisation of fundamentalist Muslims remains strong. In 2013, however, 
Prime Minister David Cameron finally acknowledged fundamentalism to be at the 
heart of the terrorist threat in the UK.3 He immediately pledged a new task force 
would be set up to do everything it could to find new ways to disrupt and disable the 
fundamentalist movement without compromising on the tradition of civil and human 
rights afforded to all UK citizens regardless of religion. 
Terrorism carried out by extreme fundamentalists 
This section presents several case studies demonstrating the relationship between the 
Islamic fundamentalist movement and extremist terrorism carried out domestically by 
British Muslims since 2003. Long before any kind of formal recruitment or 
association, fundamentalists immerse themselves in the kind of extreme political 
narratives outlined in chapter three. As a consequence of years spent socialising 
within circles that encourage anti-western sentiment, members become highly 
sensitive to acts of aggression that appear to reinforce messages promoted by 
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fundamentalist preachers. Iraq offers in an important case study in this respect. 
Enforcing sanctions during the 1990s and then invading the country in 2003 supported 
the proposition made by preachers that the west is directly at war with Islam. Due to 
the anarchic nature of international relations and the absence of an overarching 
leviathan, inevitably states will act in their own best interests. Regrettably, this often 
leads them to commit acts of violence against the Muslim nation that invariable serves 
to legitimize and give weight to the response proscribed by fundamentalist preachers, 
namely the pursuit of jihad and to a lesser extent, terrorism. 
Over the last ten years, associates of Al-Qaeda deemed a minority of British 
Muslims who sought to pursue jihad in Afghanistan as unsuitable for combat. Still 
determined to “serve the cause” however, these men either returned voluntarily or 
were sent home to the UK with the intention to become suicide bombers. This 
dissertation argues that involvement in the fundamentalist movement incubates a 
mindset that leads a minority to believe that terrorism is both legitimate and necessary 
in order to help re-establish an Islamic Caliphate. In support of this proposition, the 
dissertation asks to what extent can the pursuit of terrorism, be connected to the 
fundamentalist movement, specifically its political ideology. Although we cannot say 
definitively that one has followed the other, there is clearly an alignment between the 
messages promoted within the movement and what terrorists commonly cite as their 
overall motivation. In every case study presented in this chapter, police have 
recovered video and audiotapes of sermons delivered by fundamentalist preachers at 
the homes of those who have pursued violent terrorism. Furthermore, as this section 
will show, conspirators routinely attended events held by preachers and in many 
cases, undertook non-violent fundamentalist activities that brought them into contact 
with actors who would later assist them.  
At least twenty per cent of British Muslims convicted of terrorism offences in 
the UK had previous links with the Islamic fundamentalist group Al-Muhajiroon 
(ALM).4 Outlawed in January 2010, critics linked this Salafi-Wahabi organisation 
founded by Syrian born Omar Bakri Mohammed to international terrorism, 
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homophobia and anti-Semitism. 5  From the mid-1990s, ALM were one of two 
prominent groups in which members of the overall fundamentalist movement 
organised themselves in order to promote the political ideology detailed in chapter 
three. Days after the killing of soldier Lee Rigby in May 2013, journalists uncovered 
evidence suggesting the main suspect, Michael Adebolajo, had been deeply involved 
with ALM since 2004. Videos and photographs of him attending public 
demonstrations quickly appeared in the media and on social networking web sites. 
With his hands soaked in blood, Adebolajo told stunned observers ‘the only reason we 
have killed this man today is because Muslims are dying daily by British 
soldiers…it’s an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth’.6 This rhetoric appears drawn 
from the political narrative promoted by the fundamentalist movement in which the 
west are accused of being at war with Islam. Building on this example, the section 
now moves forward by presenting ten important cases in support of the thesis that 
involvement with the fundamentalist movement incubates the necessary mindset and 
provides the required introductions necessary to pursue terrorism.  
2001 - The Shoe Bombers 
Shortly after the 2001 terrorist attack in New York, Al-Qaeda recruited two London 
based Islamic fundamentalists to undertake a follow up operation. Born and raised in 
the UK, Saajid Badat and Richard Reid volunteered to detonate explosives hidden in 
their shoes while aboard transatlantic flights from Europe to the United States. 
Fortunately for the passengers of American Airlines flight 63, degradation of the 
explosive material prevented it from detonating. Unlike Reid, Badat decided he was 
not ready for martyrdom and phoned his handler to say that Van Damn (Reid) would 
have to go it alone. Although both men were active in the fundamentalist movement 
for at least a year before their operation, they first met while jointly attending an Al-
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Qaeda training camp in the Khalden region of Afghanistan.7 During his engagement 
with the fundamentalist movement in Tooting, South West London, Badat came under 
the influence of established jihadist and training facilitator Babar Ahmed.8 In 2014, 
Ahmed pleaded guilty in the United States to charges of recruiting men like Badat and 
helping them to pursue Jihad in Afghanistan.9 Since Badat failed to cross the line 
from fundamentalist to extreme fundamentalist terrorist, he provides a textbook case 
study in support of the argument that jihad and terrorism are not necessarily 
synonymous. While prosecutors rightly identified Reid as a terrorist – an individual 
willing to kill innocent civilians, Badat was nothing more than an idealistic jihadist, 
an individual evidently incapable of crossing the line. Environment is important for 
generating a pool of potential terrorists but only those who have adopted an extremist 
political ideology (detailed in chapter 3) and previously engaged in activities designed 
to support the re-establishment of a Caliphate, hold the mindset necessary to target 
innocent civilians. In contrast with Reid, Badat did not have a close association with 
Abu Hamza Al-Masri – a preacher known to argue for the legitimacy of suicide 
bombing. Furthermore, Badat was not involved in raising funds for foreign 
mujahedeen and he believed Jihad was only permissible against an occupying force. 
While initially going along with the plot during his time in Afghanistan, withdrawn 
from the fundamentalist environment, Badat reverted to his beliefs that targeting 
civilians and committing suicide were not permissible in Islam. 
Following a similar path to Badat, the journey to Afghanistan for Reid, began 
with his gradual radicalisation at a mosque in Brixton, South London. Rapidly 
ascending the Islamic fundamentalist movement, Reid eventually sought out like-
minded individuals by attending lectures and sermons given at Finsbury Park Mosque 
by Abu Hamza Al-Masri. Until around 2003, both Brixton and Finsbury Park have 
been at the centre of allegations concerning the radicalisation of British Muslims. 
Fundamentalists from around the country travelled hundreds of miles (e.g. from 
Yorkshire) in order to hear certain preachers speak and to network with other 
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members. When giving evidence at his trial in New York, Reid clearly demonstrated 
how the political narratives of the fundamentalist movement had influenced his 
thinking about the world politics and almost certainly led him to volunteer for 
terrorism. In particular, he told the court, ‘With regards to what you said about killing 
innocent people, I will say one thing. Your government has killed 2 million children 
in Iraq. If you want to think about something, against 2 million, I don't see a 
comparison’.10 Given the 2002 trial took place before the US led invasion of Iraq, 
Reid appears to have been referring to the decade long sanctions enforced by NATO. 
Fundamentalist political ideology argues these sanctions starved the civilian 
population of vital resources leading to the deaths of millions of innocent Muslim 
men, women and children.  
2003 - Suicide Bombing in Tel Aviv 
Demonstrating the link between fundamentalism and terrorism, two British Muslims 
volunteered to carry out a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv in April 2003. Aged 22 and 27 
respectively, Asif Hanif from London and Omar Sharif from Derby were both active 
members of the fundamentalist movement for several years before travelling to Israel. 
Just two weeks before leaving for Israel, police observed Omar Khan Sharif on the 
streets of Derby distributing leaflets for the fundamentalist group Al-Muhajiroun.11 
While searching the men’s homes, Police discovered literature associated with Hitz 
ut-Tahir (HUT). Following a similar ideology to other fundamentalist groups albeit 
absent of any encouragement to pursue Jihad, the UK division of HUT was founded 
by Omar Bakri Mohammed.12 In 1996, Bakri left the organisation to set up ALM 
taking several more hard-line followers with him. Of particular relevance in the case 
of Omar Sharif, is that his wife had noted down Bakri’s mobile telephone number 
during a lecture concerning the legitimacy of suicide bombing.13 Although Sharif had 
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been associated with Bakri and other fundamentalist Muslims in the UK, it has not 
been established who put the two men in touch with Hamas, the Palestinian insurgent 
group who sponsored the operation by providing both men with the necessary 
explosive vests.  
There is circumstantial evidence that members of an Islamic fundamentalist 
group in Birmingham facilitated Hanif and Sharif. Around the time of the attack, 
leaflets published in Birmingham by the group al-Sunnah, encouraged Muslims to 
volunteer for Suicide bombing. 14 After Police discovered copies of the leaflet in the 
West Bank, Israeli authorities demanded the British government conduct an 
investigation. Although based in Derby, Sharif attended sermons by preachers linked 
to al-Sunnah at Green Lane Mosque in Birmingham. It is entirely plausible that Sharif 
obtained a copy of the leaflet during his weekly visits to the Mosque. Omar Nasiri has 
written extensively about how fundamentalist groups routinely distributed extremist 
literature outside of mosques, which served to recruit potential suicide bombers. Close 
co-operation between Mosque imams and local counter terrorism units since 2005 
however, has meant that any such activity today is quickly uncovered and action 
taken.  
Media reports link Hanif and Sharif to the July 7th London bomber 
Mohammed Sidique Khan.15 According to the BBC, Manchester based businessman 
Kursheed Fiaz, visited the trio in summer 2001. If correct, the relationship between 
these three suicide bombers demonstrates how fundamentalist Muslims networked 
domestically in order to gain support and encouragement for their endeavours. The 
fundamentalist movement therefore provides the river that terrorists rely on in order 
to achieve their objectives. Of greater significance is that the fundamentalist 
movement also provides necessary international connections. The link between the 
fundamentalist group al-Sunnah in the Midlands and the leaflets found in the West 
Bank suggest that fundamentalist Muslims in the UK were actively networking with 
fundamentalists all around the world, in particular those in Palestine and Pakistan.  
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2004 - Fertilizer Bomb Plot (Crevice) 
The first major investigation into British fundamentalist extremist terrorism began in 
late 2004. Acting on specific intelligence, counter terrorism officers pursued six men 
engaged in a conspiracy to kill thousands of fellow citizens.16 Referred to by the 
codename Crevice, covert audio surveillance recorded cell members discussing 
potential targets including nightclubs, shopping malls and various domestic utility 
installations. Court proceedings began in March 2006 and lasted over a year. 
Transcripts consisting of almost 7,000 pages shed significant light on how the cell 
formed, trained and eventually pursued terrorism in the UK.17  
From the late 1990s, the leader of this group Omar Khyam and at least four 
others, attended events either facilitated or promoted by ALM.18 Observers allege that 
Omar Bakri Mohammed first introduced Khyam to Islamic fundamentalism while he 
studied for A-Levels. Shortly afterwards, Mohammed is believed to have facilitated 
Kyham to undertake jihad in Kashmir in 2000.19 Similar to Birmingham based al-
Sunnah in the Midlands, the Tooting Crowd in South London and Supporters of 
Shariah (SoS) in East London, members of ALM pursued activities and promoted a 
political ideology designed to help achieve the objectives of the Islamic 
fundamentalist movement. Deeply involved, Khyam and his associates would spend 
time with fellow members at lectures and weekends away organised by leaders of 
either ALM or SoS.20 In addition to hearing speeches from preachers, the men 
watched videotapes depicting alleged war crimes carried out by Indian forces against 
men, women and children in Kashmir.21 
In a 1998 private sermon, fundamentalist preacher Abu Hamza Al-Masri 
rhetorically asks the audience why Muslims who see nightclubs and brothels calling 
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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1550107/The-Crawley-targets.html, 
(accessed 12th November 2014) 
17 Court transcript: R v Khyam (Omar Khyam) et al [2007] EWCA Crim 1612 
18 Staff Reporter, ‘Profile Omar Khyam’, BBC News Online, 30th April 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6149794.stm, (accessed 12th November 2014) 
19 Hope Not Hate ‘The Al-Muhajiroun Network’ 
20 Silber The Al Qaeda Factor pp.85-89 
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people to evil do not “blast them”.22 Omar Khyam appears to have taken this 
statement literally. In covert audio surveillance, he discusses possible targets for a 
bombing campaign with fellow conspirator Jawad Akbar telling him, ‘a big nightclub 
in central London, no-one can put their hands up and say they’re innocent – those 
slags dancing around’.23 Under cross-examination by prosecution barristers, fellow 
conspirator Salahudin Amin acknowledged that discourse attributable to Al-Masri, 
directly influenced the conspirators. 24  Although circumstantial, this example 
demonstrates a connection between operational decisions taken by terrorists and the 
sermons given by fundamentalist preachers. 
By 2002-03, after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the attitudes of 
persons involved in the fundamentalist movement (which included Khyam and his 
associates) significantly hardened. According to Khyam, ‘when people mentioned 
things like the UK or the Americans need to be attacked, there would be no defending 
the UK any more’.25 During the last two weeks of May and into the first week of June 
2003, Crevice cell member Salahuddin Amin and cell leader Khyam undertook 
explosives training using ammonium nitrate and urea at a camp in Kohat, Pakistan.26 
According to a 2010 research study in the Long War Journal, as late as the summer of 
2008, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban were operating roughly 157 training camps in the 
tribal area around Kohat.27 When it became clear in June 2003 that members of the 
Crevice cell were unable to cross the border in to Afghanistan, the more extreme, 
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more experienced Khyam encouraged cell members to participate in a bombing 
campaign targeting London. 28 
In Court, Khyam admitted that alleged facilitator and fellow fundamentalist 
Mohammed Quyyam Khan (also known as Q) gave him funds to take to Pakistan. 29 
Expressing concerns about investigation by the Police, Q told Khyam, ‘its better for 
both of us if we don’t meet each other, because the security services may be 
monitoring me’.30 Media reports suggest Q served as an Al-Qaeda leader in Britain 
providing funds and equipment to Mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan.31 On 30th of 
April 2007, after almost a month of deliberations, the jury found all six men guilty of 
conspiracy to cause explosions. Making a direct reference to the role of the Islamic 
fundamentalist movement in terms of incubating the now convicted terrorists, 
presiding Judge Sir Michael Astill told the court: ‘the spiral of contamination does not 
begin with those standing in the dock, its origins lay in the teachers and preachers of 
hatred and revenge, who radicalize idealistic and impressionable young minds which 
in turn go on to infect others’.32 The central thesis of this dissertation builds on the 
words of Astil, arguing the origins of terrorism lay in the socialization of young 
British Muslims into hardcore Islamic fundamentalists, individuals who maintain the 
potential to progress on to become terrorists.   
2005 - July 7th London Bombers (Theseus) 
In 2008, three men stood trial accused of conspiring with the July 7th 2005 London 
Bombers.33 Prosecutors alleged that Waheed Ali, Mohammed Shakil and Sadeer 
Saleem carried out a reconnaissance mission in late 2004 with suicide bombers Hasib 
Hussain and Germaine Lindsay. Comprehensive DNA and fingerprint evidence linked 
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all three men to the group’s bomb factories in Leeds.34 Shakil and Mohammed 
Sidique Khan jointly attended the Malakand training camp set up by American 
Jihadist turned super grass Junaid Babar in June 2003. Consequently, the CPS recalled 
Babar to give evidence. Thirty-two thousand pages of Court transcripts including 
testimony from Babar provide a detailed insight into how the Theseus cell formed, 
radicalised and obtained the necessary training for their operation.35 
Consistent with terrorist Omar Khyam, London Bomber Mohammed Sidique 
Khan attended several events hosted by fundamentalist groups. A friend of the Tel 
Aviv bombers, Khan travelled to Israel just two weeks before their attack – allegedly 
to conduct reconnaissance. Shortly after returning to Leeds in 2003, Khan underwent 
explosives training at a camp set up in Pakistan by fellow members of the UK 
fundamentalist movement. The camp in Malakand began in the first week of July 
2003, and lasted roughly 4-6 weeks.36 What does Khan say motivated him to carry out 
the London bombings? In a video released shortly after the London bombings, Khan 
discusses his motivation, telling the audience, ‘Your democratically elected 
government continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. 
And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly 
responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters’.37 In giving 
his justification, Khan is clearly citing political narratives associated with the 
fundamentalist movement, in particular the alleged war on Islam and the legitimacy of 
terrorism against civilians. There is little doubt that Khan believed the British 
government had caused the death of millions of fellow Muslims around the world 
either through sanctions, direct military action or else via covert encouragement of 
sectarian violence between Shia and Sunni Muslims designed to divide and weaken 
the Muslim nation. Demonstrating his agreement with the fundamentalist political 
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narrative that argues for the legitimacy of terrorism, Khan rhetorically informs the 
audience they are directly responsible for the actions of their government, thereby 
making them lawful targets.  
Fundamentalist preacher Jamaican Sheikh Abdullah Al-Faisal has been widely 
linked to the London bombers. Reflecting on the government’s account of the events 
of July 7th 2005, then home secretary John Reid told reporters in 2006, that cell 
member Germaine Lindsay regularly listened to tapes of lectures given by Al-Faisal.38 
It is reasonable to infer that Lindsay distributed these tapes to fellow conspirators. 
Throughout 2004, Al-Faisal travelled and lectured to audiences of predominantly 
young Muslim males in mosques around the country. These include Markazi Masjid 
in Dewsbury, Leeds, a location previously frequented by Sidique-Khan and alleged to 
be a “hotbed” of radicalisation.39 Court evidence demonstrates that the London 
bombers wholeheartedly agreed with the obligation to pursue Jihad as promoted to 
them by Al-Faisal. At least two of the London bombers had attended training camps 
in Kashmir facilitated by the insurgent group Harakut-ul-Mujahedeen. Before hearing 
evidence from Junaid Babar, defendant Wahid Ali discussed training in Pakistan. He 
told the court that in 2001 [prior to 9/11], he travelled with Mohammed Sidique Khan 
to a training camp run by Kashmir insurgent group Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen. 40 
Somewhat nonchalantly, Ali explained, ‘we went there [Pakistan], we signed up and 
told them, you know, we want to do a two-week thing, course, and they said, Sweet, 
no problem, we’ll send you off’.41 In his evidence, Babar claimed that Sidique-Khan 
had told him that he had previously fought in Afghanistan before 9/11.42 If true, it 
supports the proposition that members of the fundamentalist actively pursued Jihad 
and that such activity reinforced their belief in the legitimacy of political narratives 
promoted by the movement. British Muslims do not suddenly volunteer to pursue a 
suicide bombing. Only through lengthy involvement in the fundamentalist movement 
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can they develop the mindset, encouragement, and eventually operational support 
necessary to do so.  
In terms of operational support, there is circumstantial evidence to suggest the 
London bombers were assisted by fellow members of the fundamentalist movement in 
the run up to their operation. Demonstrating foresight into the tragic events of July 7th 
2005, fundamentalist movement preacher Omar Bakri Mohammed had previously 
warned the public of a “well-organised group” linked to Al-Qaeda who was on the 
verge of launching a big operation against London. The announcement came a year 
before and could simply have been a prediction based upon non-specific chatter 
between Islamic fundamentalist. However, in the months leading up the attack, Bakri 
told followers of an Internet forum, ‘I believe the whole of Britain has become Dar al-
Harb (land of war). The kuffar [non-believer] has no sanctity for their own life or 
property. Muslims are obliged to join the jihad... wherever you are, and suicide 
bombings are permitted because Al-Qaeda... have the emir’.43 
The extent to which Bakri held genuine forward intelligence of the London 
bombings is difficult to quantify since he has never stood trial as a co-conspirator. 
Drawing on his various sermons however, there is a direct link between the actions of 
terrorists and the political narratives he promoted including the legitimacy of 
terrorism against civilians. Recognition of this untenable relationship between 
fundamentalism and terrorism forced the British government to make Bakri persona 
non grata thereby resulting in his lifetime exclusion from the UK. Seeking to 
downplay any suggestion that the fundamentalist movement incubates terrorism, 
Bakri denied any connection between ALM and Al-Qaeda whose operatives gave the 
July 7th bombers explosives training. Responding to the decision to ban him from the 
UK, Bakri told reporters: 
We have no direct links with Osama bin Laden, he declared. But we have 
ideological links with the world Islamic movement, including Osama bin 
Laden. We may agree with him in something and disagree with him in 
something. At the end of the day, there is no proof yet that he is involved in 
any terrorist activity. If terrorism means someone is supporting Muslims 
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against the occupying forces in Somalia or in Arabia, I will never call him a 
terrorist. I will call him a freedom fighter. I will call him a hero.44  
Although Bakri may rightly claim not to have maintained direct links to Al-Qaeda, his 
role as a fundamentalist preacher helped convince a generation of young Muslims 
including the London bombers that it was their duty to fight against the western war 
on Islam. In referring to Bin Laden as a Freedom Fighter, Bakri has legitimised the 
actions of Al-Qaeda and made it Halal (lawful) for young British Muslims to follow 
his example.  
2005 - July 21st London Bombers (Vivace) 
Following the success of the initial attack on the London underground, two weeks 
later, a second terrorist cell sought to repeat the operation. Codenamed Vivace by 
Police, the copycat plot carried out by six Islamic fundamentalist Muslims failed only 
due to the degradation of explosive material. Trained by the same Al-Qaeda 
explosives expert, the 21st of July 2005 suicide bombing involved six Islamic 
fundamentalist Muslims of African origin. Shortly afterwards, Police apprehended all 
six terrorists who eventually stood trial at Woolwich Crown Court.45 We know a great 
deal about the cell’s activities from a study of 12,000 pages of court transcripts.46 In 
particular, evidence given by a man referred to in court only as Michael Bexhill, sheds 
significant light on how the men mobilized, trained and sought to carry out their 
operation. What is clear from a review of the available evidence is that Police and 
Security Services maintained no intelligence on the conspirators and were therefore 
fortunate that the second attack suffered from technical problems thereby preventing a 
second more devastating attack on the London transport network. 47  
Similarities between the two plots in July 2005 were by no means 
coincidental. Firstly, the leaders of both operations had received explosives training 
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from the same Al-Qaeda operative in Pakistan, namely Abu Ubaida Al-Masri. 
Secondly, long term member of the fundamentalist movement, Rashid Rauf, served as 
the facilitator, mentor and general line manager for both cells. 48 Thirdly, all of the 
conspirators had regularly attended lectures delivered by preacher Abu Hamza Al-
Masri at Finsbury Park Mosque. 49 According to a prosecution witness Michael 
Bexhill, cell members Muktar Ibrahim and Yassin Omar regularly listened to Al-
Masri and possessed tapes of sermons given by another extremist preacher namely 
Abdullah Al-Faisal.50 What is important about this evidence is that Al-Faisal has been 
directly linked to the July 7th London bombers as discussed above. Firstly, this adds 
weight to the proposition the two groups were linked and secondly it builds on the 
narrative that fundamentalist preachers have and continue to influence British 
Muslims to the extent that a minority will cross the line and pursue terrorism.  
Members of the cell held deep religious views and would often discuss 
political narratives promoted by the fundamentalist movement. This included the need 
to establish an Islamic Caliphate governed by Sharia, intense hatred of Jews and the 
state of Israel as well as the most important narrative of all, the obligation of ever able 
Muslim to pursue Jihad. In contrast with the majority of fundamentalists however, 
only those involved in the July 21st 2005 terrorist cell acknowledged the legitimacy of 
violence against non-combatants. 51  After the conspirators were arrested, Police 
searched their homes and recovered a significant cache of extremist material 
including homemade films featuring images of beheadings and other terrorist 
atrocities. Prosecutors argued the material clearly demonstrated the defendants were 
supportive of the notion of Al Qaeda and the creation of a Muslim state, they 
supported the views of Osama Bin Laden, and that they were sympathetic towards 
acts of terrorist violence. 52  This evidence demonstrates a further link between 
material published by the Islamic fundamentalist movement and the actions taken by a 
minority of its followers.  
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Over a period of several years before volunteering to carry out a suicide 
bombing, members of the July 21st cell actively participated in events organized by 
members of the fundamentalist movement. On the 3rd of May 2004, Police 
photographed conspirators Ibrahim, Yassin Omar and Adel Yahya attending what 
prosecutors would later describe as a terrorist training camp in Cumbria.53 An expert 
witness claimed the men undertook a variety of manoeuvres that were military in 
nature, similar to those witnessed in Afghanistan. In addition to the event in Cumbria, 
Yahya and Omar attended a second camp in Scotland during the summer of 2004.54 
Participants told prosecution witness ‘Michael Bexhill’ that the camp in Scotland 
provided physical and tactical training in preparation for jihad in Afghanistan.55 
Police have identified the facilitator responsible for the UK training camps as former 
drug addict Mohammed Hamid. Nicknamed “Osama Bin London”, Hamid is 
currently serving seven years in Prison having been found guilty in 2008 of providing 
terrorist training and soliciting murder.56 This example demonstrates how the Islamic 
fundamentalist movement served as an incubator, providing Muslims with access to 
the necessary facilitators able to arrange training in both the UK and later overseas. 
During cross-examination, Bexhill told the court that leader of the cell Ibrahim 
had asked him if he could take Omar and Yahya to Yemen for military training, in 
particular, to learn how to handle small arms.57 This testimony is important. It shows 
that until Summer 2004, the Vivace cell lacked any viable connection to a facilitator 
either in the UK or Pakistan. By December 2004, after cell members had attended the 
Scotland training camp, the situation had evidently changed. Through a connection 
made either at one of the UK training camps or though Finsbury Park Mosque where 
the men prayed and socialized, the cell gained the support of known facilitator, 
Mohammed Al-Ghabra. The security services believe Al-Ghabra arranged for Ibrahim 
and two other companions namely Rizwan Majid and Shaheel Ismail to travel to 
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Pakistan in order to pursue Jihad.58 This example reinforces the central proposition 
made in this dissertation. Specifically, that through engagement in the fundamentalist 
movement, i.e. the UK training camps, British Muslims gain the necessary 
connections which in turn enable them to undertake jihad training – an activity that 
can potentially lead them into the hands of Al-Qaeda recruiters. 
2006 – Transatlantic Liquid Bomb Plot (Overt) 
On the 9th of August 2006, Police arrested twenty-five suspects in relation to a 
conspiracy to detonate liquid explosives aboard transatlantic flights.59 Codenamed 
Overt, police identified the ringleader as Ahmed Ali Khan, a long-term 
fundamentalist Muslim with previous experience of Jihad in Afghanistan. In a video 
recorded by Ali-Khan and shown in court, he attempts to rationalise his actions. He 
tells the audience that his motivation is to ‘punish and humiliate the kuffar (non-
believers), to tell them enough is enough, we have warned you many times to get out 
of our lands and leave us alone’.60 The western occupation of Muslim land is one of 
the strongest grievances pursued by fundamentalists. Preachers constantly remind 
British Muslims of their duty to fight and die if necessary in order to remove foreign 
infidels, in particular, those occupying the Arab Peninsula. Directly linking this 
narrative to terrorism, the motivation of the Overt conspirators echoes those of 
Theseus, specifically to punish the British government for their decision to invade 
Iraq & Afghanistan. References by Ali-Khan to “honour” and “brave” imply a desire 
by members of the cell to satisfy a perceived injustice, a settling of scores between 
Islam and the west 
Two of the lead conspirators involved in Overt, namely Ali-Khan and Assad 
Sarward attended events hosted by fundamentalist preachers. At a school in East 
London, preachers including Abu Hamza Al-Masri would tell the young men about 
the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq and how God commanded Muslims to liberate 
their land by all means necessary including suicide bombing. One might argue this 
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process led by experienced fundamentalists had the effect of creating sleeper cells, 
groups of young men who would wait patiently until the time came for them to pursue 
training and then carry out an operation. Preachers discerned that America would 
react to 9/11 with overwhelming force and brutality against Muslims. With this in 
mind, it allowed them to act in the capacity of soothsayers. Responding to the ‘war on 
terrorism’, preachers told fundamentalists ‘look at the aggressive Western 
governments, occupying Muslim lands, killing women and children, torturing men, 
they really are at War with Islam and we need to fight back to end this humiliation’. 
Ahmed Ali Khan and his co-accused are a textbook example of fundamentalists 
crossing the line because of political narratives eulogised by extreme preachers. 
During cross-examination, Khan claimed the war in Iraq catalysed his negative 
feelings towards the United States and the UK. Preachers foretold the invasion 
thereby priming fundamentalists, a minority of whom including the Overt 
conspirators would later volunteer to pursue terrorism.61  
British fundamentalist Muslim Rashid Rauf served as the link between Al-
Qaeda and the UK. Interviewed by journalist Peter Taylor for a BBC documentary, 
former head of the Met’s Counter Terrorism Unit Peter Clarke, said that while in 
Pakistan, the ISI observed Ali-Khan meeting with known facilitator and long term 
Islamic fundamentalist Rauf. This admission suggests the Security Service linked 
Rauf to previous terrorist plots in the UK and were monitoring anybody who met him. 
It also again reinforces the importance of the fundamentalist movement in connecting 
potential terrorists with individuals who can help facilitate their operations. When Ali-
Khan returned to the UK from Pakistan, MI5 immediately placed him under 24-hour 
surveillance.62 Prosecutors firmly established the defendants were in regular email 
and phone contact with an individual in Pakistan who appeared to be greatly assisting 
the conspirators and at times directing their activities.63 Phone records show that on a 
regular basis, Ali-Khan contacted the leader of Vivace, Muktar Ibrahim, thus linking 
the two plots together. Through this connection, Ali-Khan had access to known 
facilitator and established jihadist recruiter Mohammed Al-Ghabra. On the 18th July 
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2006, a month after the Overt bombers returned to the UK, Mohammed Gulzar, an 
associate of Rashid Rauf, flew to London from South Africa.64 On arrival, he 
immediately went to see Al-Ghabra. Although never substantiated in court, counter 
terrorism officers privately acknowledge that Al-Ghabra previously radicalised young 
British Muslims and served as the preacher and facilitator to individuals convicted in 
relation to the liquid bomb plot. 65 The Overt liquid bomb plot firmly demonstrates 
how British Muslims can be radicalised towards pursuing terrorism by fundamentalist 
preachers, and secondly how the organisation of fundamentalist Muslims provides the 
network to allow those who wish to pursue terrorism, access to facilitators. 
2010 – London Stock Exchange Plot 
This case study while short due to the success of the Police operation to disrupt the 
conspirators, thoroughly demonstrates the incubation of terrorism within the 
environment socially constructed by the organisation of fundamentalist Muslims. 
Arrested in December 2010, two fundamentalist Muslims from London, Mohammed 
Chowdhury and Abdul Miah and two from Cardiff, Shah Rahman and Gurunkanth 
Desai, conspired to detonate a bomb in the London Stock Exchange. All members of 
the cell were actively involved in the Islamic fundamentalist movement for many 
years before the plot emerged. Ringleader Mohamed Choudury along with several of 
his co-conspirators were photographed holding placards advocating political 
narratives promoted by the fundamentalist movement at rallies organised by the now 
banned group Islam4UK. On the placard held by Choudury were the words ‘Shariah: 
The Laws of Allah can solve all problems’. In addition to Islam4UK, four of the 
defendants were also associated with Muslims against Crusades (MAC), another 
fundamentalist group proscribed by government and subsequently disbanded. All four 
men pleaded guilty in January 2011 to conspiracy to blow up a variety of targets 
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including, the London Stock Exchange, two Jewish Rabbi’s, the US Embassy and the 
London Mayor Boris Johnson. Think Tank Hope Not Hate claims the US-born radical 
extremist Anwar Al-Awlaki inspired the men. Lectures by Al-Awlaki were previously 
available to download from the website of fundamentalist group Al-Ghurabaa. It is 
alleged that all four members of the plot had formal links with Al-Muhajiroun and are 
known to have attended demonstrators organised by Islam4UK and Muslims Against 
Crusades (MAC).66  
2011 – Birmingham Ruck Sack Plot 
During 2012, three British Muslims from Birmingham engaged in a conspiracy 
designed to repeat the July 7th London Bombings.67 By the time police made the 
decision to intervene, cell members had set up a bomb-making factory and were 
experimenting with various explosive ingredients. This recent conspiracy was the first 
major plot to take place separate to the 2003-2006 cluster, which included Crevice, 
Theseus, Vivace and Overt. It is also the first conspiracy in which there appears to be 
little if any direction, support or authorisation from Pakistan. Compared with the first 
generation of British Muslim terrorists largely influenced by the likes of Abu Hamza 
Al-Masri and Omar Bakri Mohammed, the Pitsford conspirators were themselves 
concerned in the radicalisation and recruitment of others.  
The core cell consisting of Irfan Nasser, Irfan Khalid and Ashik Ali spent a 
great deal of time and effort persuading at least two others to join their plot.68 
Demonstrating a clear commitment to the politics of the fundamentalist movement, 
leader of the cell Irfan Nasser had sought to act as a facilitator, enabling fellow 
Muslims to pursue jihad. In his opening statement, prosecuting QC Brian Altman 
explaind to the court that Naseer and a defendant in a separate trial, Rahin Ahmed, 
were instrumental in sending four young local men, Ishaaq Hussain, Naweed Ali, 
Khobaib Hussain and Shahid Khan to Pakistan for terror training.69 Importantly, 
Pitsford represents a transition from a loose hierarchical command and control 
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structure witnessed in the London cluster, to a more isolated, ‘cells should do what 
they can, when they can’ approach. In this respect, we observe greater levels of self-
reliance by members of the fundamentalist movement. Members were facilitating 
their own training in Pakistan, choosing their own targets and undertaking their own 
fundraising with little if any support from the wider network of fundamentalist 
Muslims in the UK.  
At Woolwich Crown Court in June 2013, jurors were unanimous in finding all three 
defendants guilty of preparing for an act of terrorism. 70  When sentencing the 
conspirators, Judge Henriques identified Irfan Nasser as the main driving force behind 
the plot, describing him as a skilful bomb-maker and the radicaliser of a determined 
team of individuals.71 Before commencing the trial, prosecutors issued a 300-page 
summary outlining the main elements of the conspiracy. An important archive for the 
study of terrorism, the document contains extracts from an array of covert audio 
probes installed in the months leading up to the eventual arrests.72 Transcripts reveal 
what the men were thinking about in terms of political beliefs and their religious 
ideology. It is clear that they strongly agreed with the narratives associated with the 
fundamentalist movement in particular the need to establish an Islamic Caliphate in 
order to fight back against the western war on Islam. Although the group did not 
directly associate with other fundamentalists in London, they clearly adopted the same 
politics and pursued similar activities consistent with the objectives of the Islamic 
fundamentalist movement. Police recorded cell member Ashik Ali instruction to 
fellow conspirators to read Sayeed Qutb’s book Milestones. This text directly informs 
the extreme narratives that constitute the fundamentalist political ideology. In 
addition, forensic examination of computers used by the plotters revealed an 
exhaustive collection of material published by American born Islamist Extremist 
Anwar Al-Awlaki. Resident in Yemen, Al-Awlaki strongly associated with Al-Qaeda 
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in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and featured prominently in their monthly Jihadist 
publication, Inspire Magazine. 
 
 
 
 
2012 - Plot against Territorial Army base 
In April 2012, police arrested four men in relation to allegations of preparing for acts 
of terrorism.73 Led by Zahid Iqbal the very early stage plot concerned attacking a 
Reserve Army base in West London. Clear evidence of a determined effort by all 
members of the cell to gain training in Pakistan, eventually led them to plead guilty to 
preparing for acts of terrorism. In sentencing, the Judge Mr Justice Wilkie remarked, 
‘In each of their cases, their persistent commitment to terrorist activity, in a number of 
different ways, over a significant period of time and, in each case, their willingness to 
take practical steps to obtain terrorist training abroad, marks them out as particularly 
dangerous’.74 Lawyers acting for the men said that despite pleading guilty, they did 
not pose an imminent threat to people in the UK and it was an overstatement to 
suggest they had made genuine plans to pursue terrorism. Consistent with all case 
studies discussed in this section, the four convicted terrorists were active in the 
Islamic fundamentalist movement, strongly associating with Al-Muhajiroun and were 
regular attendees at sermons and demonstrations organised by Omar Bakri 
Mohammed and Anjem Choudary. This case study also demonstrates the declining 
significance of Pakistan as a training ground for British Muslims. Unable to secure 
access to any kind of military camp in North Waziristan due to an increase in US 
drone activity, the men instead relied on camping trips to the Brecon beacons to 
develop basic military skills. 
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2012 - Royal Wootton Bassett Bomb Plot  
Muslim revert Richard Dart offers a compelling example of an Islamic fundamentalist 
who crossed the line to become an extremist terrorist. Featured in the 2014 
documentary My Brother the Terrorist, Dart had been deeply involved in the Islamic 
fundamentalist movement for several years.75 Filmed for a BBC documentary by his 
brother Rob Leech, Dart demonstrated fanatical adherence to the fundamentalist 
political ideology. Consistent with other members, he would eventually attempt to 
pursue Jihad in Afghanistan by first seeking to undertake military training in Pakistan. 
It was this activity in conjunction with a loosely defined plot to target members of the 
Security Services, which eventually led Dart and two accomplices to plead guilty to 
the offence of preparing for an act of terrorism.76 It is widely debated as to whether 
the terrorist plot constituted a genuine conspiracy or whether it was the mere bravado 
of young fundamentalist Muslims about to embark on the more common pursuit of 
Jihad. However, when customs agents stopped Dart’s co-accused Imran Mahmood at 
Manchester Airport in 2010, they discovered traces of explosives on his luggage and 
he later admitted to having received basic explosives training while in Pakistan. In his 
defence, one of the most common methods of insurgency conducted by the Afghan 
Taliban involves the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED’s), which may 
explain his decision to receive such training thereby leaving traces of explosives on 
his clothes. It may simple be the case that these three men were mere jihadists with no 
sincere desire to pursue acts of terrorism in the UK. Mr Justice Simon disagreed, 
stating during the sentence hearing that in his opinion, all three held ‘radical Islamist 
beliefs’ and showed they were ‘committed to acts of terrorism’.77 
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Profiling a British fundamentalist Muslim terrorist 
Drawing on the above case studies, to what extent can we profile fundamentalist 
Muslims who engage in terrorism? Is it possible to identify any trends or chart any 
commonalities in terms of age, religiosity, education, employment, sociology or 
psychology? The consensus amongst academia suggests there is no such thing as a 
typical terrorist because volunteers transcend the entire social spectrum. This may be 
true in respect of jihadists and non-violent members of the fundamentalist movement, 
but there is reason to believe it does not fully extend to the domain of British Muslims 
who commit acts of terrorism. In fact, this study has discovered a number of attributes 
linking those who have crossed the line and volunteered for a suicide bombing 
thereby challenging the orthodoxy. For example, scholars would struggle to identify 
any suicide bomber who did not entirely believe he or she would immediately 
transcend to paradise upon the moment of detonation. Drawing on the available 
literature, in particular studies of Palestine, the overwhelming conclusion is that all 
Muslims who volunteer for suicide bombing appear on the surface at least to be 
deeply religious individuals. 
By adopting the fundamentalist political ideology, British Muslims create a 
separation between themselves and potential victims of their acts of terrorism. 
Subscribing to narratives including the perceived war against Islam, fundamentalists 
who become terrorists mentally construct fellow citizens as enemy combatants 
thereby eliminating the guilt typically associated with what are effectively acts of 
murder. For this minority, the social contract has collapsed and they find it easier to 
accept the legitimacy of violence against their victims. Such psychological distancing 
is far from unprecedented. In the 1990s Rwandan civil war, when Tutsi slaughtered 
Hutu, it was a consequence of government apartheid. Incendiary radio broadcast 
propaganda divided the two groups into opposing enemies and this eventually 
escalated into violence and the subsequent genocide. This analogy is particularly 
useful. British Muslims are socialised through their involvement in the fundamentalist 
movement to adopt extreme narratives and undertake activities that eventually lead a 
minority towards pursuing acts of terrorist violence. On the surface they would appear 
to be violent, thugs with complete disregard for the rule of law and human life. This 
section rejects the orthodoxy and instead argues that terrorists are compassionate, 
empathetic and believe strongly in the greater good of their actions. The London 
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bombers believed the death of 52 civilians would help end the oppression of fellow 
Muslims at the hands of western governments. Viewed from an altruistic perspective, 
it could be argued that Mohammed Sidique Khan acted rationally, sacrificing his one 
life for the lives of millions.  
Not all fundamentalists become terrorists 
When profiling British Muslim’s who undertake acts of terrorism, it is important to 
avoid confusing, misinterpreting, extrapolating or conflating different types of 
research into the subject. A 2013 study claimed that youth, wealth and educational 
status were risk factors associated with violent radicalisation.78 On closer inspection, 
however, the report presented an insight into who is sympathetic of terrorist violence, 
not necessarily who has the potential to pursue it. While a specific demographic may 
endorse terrorism and agree with its legitimacy, this does not imply they would 
engage in such conduct themselves and thus require preventative intervention. By 
misinterpreting research on radicalisation, policy makers risk wasting valuable time 
and resources. For example, one of the most common criticisms attached to the 
government’s PREVENT programme, which seeks to divert young Muslim men away 
from pathways towards radicalisation, is that it engages with persons who were never 
at risk of becoming radicalised in the first place. Only a small minority of British 
Muslims who engage with the Islamic fundamentalist movement will eventually go 
on to pursue terrorism. Individuals, those who call for the worldwide implementation 
Sharia, send finance and equipment to insurgents or pursue Jihad in Syria – do not 
necessarily present the same characteristics as those who volunteer for suicide 
terrorism. If there were no such distinction, one expects a far higher number of 
fundamentalist Muslims volunteering for suicide bombing.  
Psychology 
With over ten years experience of pursuing extremist terrorists, one member of SO15 
counter terrorism command has suggested that the typical volunteer, ‘lacks education, 
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may have suffered parental abuse, fallen out with fathers or felt the need to prove 
themselves’.79 This description leads us to ask whether terrorists suffer from any kind 
of psychological deficiency that predisposes them commit violence against unarmed 
civilians. Is it the case that traumatic experiences in childhood have stunted normal 
behavioural development? Convicted British terrorist Isa Andrew Ibrahim used drugs 
from an early age; this caused severe emotional and social problems both at home and 
at school. His life further disintegrated when the drug habits worsened and he became 
addicted to heroin and cocaine. 80  The fundamentalist movement offered him 
salvation, but like his dependency on drugs, Ibrahim was only happy when 
descending to the very extreme of the spectrum – in the case of the fundamentalist 
movement, this meant volunteering to commit terrorism. 
Our natural instinct is to assume terrorists are cold heartless individuals with 
little regard for human life. By deliberately killing unarmed civilians, they must surely 
be devoid of compassion, mercy and humanity. Yet, when interviewed, their 
apologists rarely support this proposition. Instead, they commonly paint a picture of 
someone that is kind, compassionate, caring, empathetic and strongly influenced by 
perceived injustice. In particular, they feel deep personal anger about the deaths of 
women and children, fatalities the West often refers to as “collateral damage”. 
Birmingham based Journalist Amardeep Bassey has interviewed the friends and 
families of many young British Muslims convicted of terrorist offences. Reflecting on 
the psychological profile of those who make the ultimate decision to take the lives of 
others as part of a politically orientated terrorist campaign, Bassey has said:  
Surprisingly enough, it’s the guys who go out and strap the bombs to their 
bodies who are the most emotional, the most empathic, it’s because they can’t 
take seeing their fellow Muslim brothers and sisters being persecuted. They 
are seeing the pictures and they hear what is going on, they are so driven they 
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are actually willing to give up their lives. In a perverse kind way, these are the 
softest, the most empathic, emotionally fragile people around.81 
In contradiction, those who claim to act in retaliation for the deaths of women and 
children are often guilty of killing the very people they seek to protect. This is not 
always the case. There are reports of Palestinian suicide bombers waiting until 
children have left an area before detonating explosives strapped to their bodies. 
Professor Jerrold Post at George Washington University suggests there is widespread 
belief that a person, who is willing to kill himself and take the lives of others, must be 
psychotic, deranged or somehow anomalous.82 In his experience, however, Post 
argues that such men and occasionally women are normal individuals, part of a group 
with a particular cause to which they have been socialised. This proposition fits well 
with the concept of the Islamic fundamentalist movement. Through socialisation, 
members are encouraged to adopt certain extreme narratives and undertake activities 
in furtherance of a core political ideology. In turn, this helps develop the necessary 
mindset that allows them to internally and externally rationalise violence against non-
combatants. 
Empowerment over a victim mentality 
Why would seemingly kind-hearted men become terrorists and deliberately target 
unarmed civilians? Perhaps it is because in asymmetric warfare, when the weak have 
nothing but their lives to give, suicide bombing offers the only realistic opportunity to 
fight back. One might argue there exists no greater weapon than terrorism, and 
therefore no greater threat to peace than the risk posed by individuals willing to die in 
order to destabilise their enemy. Author and senior fellow at the Royal United 
Services Institute (RUSI) Raff Pantucci, has written extensively on the subject of 
“Islamist Terrorism” in the UK. He supports the above proposition when he says, ‘the 
decision to pursue terrorism is not just about guys being oppressed, its about them 
being empowered, its about them seeing this as a form of empowerment, they are 
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doing something about their system.’ 83 The case study of July 7th London bomber 
Mohammed Sidique Khan supports this proposition. In the years before the London 
bombings, when Khan was active in the fundamentalist movement, he was also 
strongly involved in positive community action. Along with several other 
fundamentalists, Khan helped steer young members of the community away from 
drugs. Mozzam Begg offers a similar example; he was also part of a group that 
actively protected the community from drug dealing and other criminal and anti-social 
behavior.  
Ability to disassociate 
Common amongst British Muslims who commit terrorism, is their ability to 
distinguish themselves from non-Muslims. This is an important part of the de-
humanisation process necessary for the targeting of civilians without feeling any 
sense of guilt or regret. Part of the mechanism that creates the necessary separation is 
the construction of a victim mentality. Members of the fundamentalist movement 
believe there is a war against Islam, they use this and other political narratives to 
justify acts of extreme violence and their own decision to die – self-sacrifice is the 
most powerful way of demonstrating just how deeply committed a person is to any 
given cause. In reflecting on the mind-set of those who become terrorists and what 
connects them together, Birmingham based investigative journalist Amardeep Bassey 
suggests terrorists perceive themselves as distinct from ordinary British citizens. He 
offers the following highly informative narrative concerning fundamentalist Muslims 
who conspire to carry out acts of extreme violence in defence of co-religionists: 
The common denominator between all of them, is that they almost see 
themselves as, I don’t know if victims is the right word but second class 
citizens, as in there is us and then there is the rest of the British society. We 
are not quite part of that British society. But in a different kind of way, they 
are in that they see themselves, we are not British, we are British Asians, we 
are a separate class of people. We are still British, we can’t help but being 
British, our cultural traits, the way we speak, the way we act, there is no 
denying it. We are western, we are British but that does not mean we share 
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any kind of shared history with this island and the people in Europe. So they 
have made themselves a state within a state almost kind of thing.84 
British Muslims who pursue terrorism do not class themselves as “British Citizens”. 
They are Muslim first, second and third. The “United Kingdom” is merely a label on 
their passport denoting where they were born. When making the decision to pursue 
domestic terrorism, conspirators have already dehumanized their targets. Caught up in 
the war between the West and Islam, terrorists perceive themselves as soldiers and 
fellow British citizens as legitimate targets. 85 
Crossing the line from fundamentalism to terrorism 
Since 2003, only a small minority of fundamentalist British Muslims have pursued 
terrorist violence against fellow citizens. The motivation behind men willing to fight 
and possibly die in a just war against a brutal oppressive enemy is not necessarily the 
same as what drives a person to murder innocent civilians regardless of how 
legitimate they believe their actions to be. In this section, we present evidence 
concerning British Muslims who have crossed the line from fundamentalism to 
terrorism. Evidence suggests a link between the reasons given by terrorists for their 
actions and the political discourse associated with the Islamic fundamentalist 
movement. Terrorists rarely plead guilty; consequently, it is difficult to know for 
certain what they were thinking in the lead up to their arrest or in some cases 
successful operation. Our most important resource for establishing evidence of 
motivation is the transcripts of covert audio surveillance. When alone in private 
amongst themselves, terrorists are honest, in contrast with public martyrdom videos 
where they may often embellish reasons in order to further a specific agenda. Besides 
these recordings, elite interviews with front line counter terrorism officers privy to 
countless investigations and intelligence material not publically available are a useful 
source of information. 
This section seeks to understand the motivation of British fundamentalists who 
become terrorists, looking in particular at the role played by the fundamentalist 
movement. In this respect, there are two key influences. Firstly, the fundamentalist 
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movement has greatly institutionalised amongst its members the concept that British 
foreign policy has supressed Islam and humiliated Muslims. In part, those who have 
crossed the line to become terrorists have done so in order to exact revenge upon the 
west as part of an attempt to restore Muslim honour. Certainly, Islam readily provides 
the foundations for the concept of “honour killing” amongst devout believers. 
Secondly, through association with the fundamentalist movement, individuals may 
have reluctantly crossed the line from sympathisers to active terrorists. Believing 
deeply in the cause, British fundamentalist Muslims have engaged in activities that 
drew them into extreme circles. From this environment, a minority met up with 
charismatic, persuasive leaders who encouraged them to go further than they might 
have previously planned. Initially signing up for a tour of duty in Afghanistan, brave 
young jihadists suddenly find themselves at the centre of a conspiracy to pursue 
suicide terrorism in London.  
What drives young British Muslim men to fight alongside Syrian rebels, will 
not necessarily shed light on what motivated the July 2005 London suicide bombers. 
While they may share similar religious and political beliefs, the mindset necessary to 
defend women and children from a brutal dictator cannot easily be reconciled with a 
mindset that is willing to kill them. British Muslims, who subscribe to the underlying 
political ideology and carry out activities associated with the fundamentalist 
movement, are prime candidates to undertake acts of terrorism. Years spent 
internalizing and further disseminating sermons given by preachers, has convinced 
them that a state of War exists between Islam and the West. Consequently, those who 
cross the line and pursue terrorism often perceive themselves as soldiers, legitimate 
and lawful combatants no different to any member of the British armed forces.  The 
norm that only a sovereign state can maintain a standing Army does not apply to these 
men, they are Muslims and as such, they reserve the right to defend co-religionists 
from acts of aggression.  
British fundamentalist Muslims and a minority of moderates agree with the 
principle of jihad. Consequently, a significant number of them have fought on the 
front line of various Islamic conflicts around the world. Historically Afghanistan has 
attracted the majority of western Muslims, since 2010 however, Syria has increasingly 
become the number one destination. In part, this is due to ease of access and the 
success of the “Islamic State” in establishing a legitimate Caliphate spanning an area 
far greater than the territory of the United Kingdom. Although a significant number of 
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British fundamentalist Muslims undertake some kind of military training, few actually 
see first hand combat, the majority simply return home after training and get on with 
their lives. 86 Between 2003 and 2006, the leaders of four major UK terrorist plots 
were unable to pursue ambitions of jihad. Instead, they were headhunted by Al-Qaeda 
operatives to become suicide bombers back in the UK. Trained by experienced 
operatives in Pakistan, the cell leaders recruited close friends and put in motion their 
respective operations, two of which succeeded albeit the devices of one cell failed to 
detonate.   
While a typical jihadist is altruistic and sincere, the men who sought death and 
carnage through terrorist violence acted upon an entirely different mindset. Primarily, 
it is the need to exact some kind of revenge on the enemy, however minor, in order to 
restore honour to the Muslim nation. This “settling of scores” is what differentiates a 
member of the fundamentalist movement who volunteers for and pursues terrorism, 
from the other members who are satisfied with a simple jihadist tour of duty in some 
far away land. Those who take up the gauntlet are often reasonably well educated and 
unlikely to believe their actions will produce real change in the political landscape. In 
choosing to pursue terrorism regardless, we must consider the possibility these men 
have effectively been sold the concept of redemption through the act of self-sacrifice. 
Preachers associated with the fundamentalist movement have given sermons that 
suggest the moment a suicide bomber presses the trigger, angels carry his body to 
heaven. In discourse associated with the fundamentalist movement, we find examples 
of how preachers have elevated suicide bombing above mere Jihad. Abu Hamza Al-
Masri sold the concept of “martyrdom” as the ultimate key to paradise, not only for 
the volunteer but also for members of their family too. To what extent have terrorists 
acknowledged belief in the day of judgement? By sacrificing their lives in order to 
punish the enemies of God, terrorists may feel this will weigh heavily in their favour 
and atone for past mistakes. 
British Foreign Policy  
The first and most important tenet of fundamentalist movement political ideology 
argues there is a western led war on Islam. Terrorists routinely cite British foreign 
policy manifested through the global suppression of Muslims, plundering of natural 
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resources and an active campaign to prevent the re-establishment of an Islamic 
caliphate as their primary motivation. Narratives expounding this tenet of 
fundamentalist political ideology capture the sense of British Muslims angst with the 
latest western bombing of an Islamic country. Although the perceived war on Islam 
helps recruit jihadists and individuals willing to fund the mujahedeen, the question of 
whether foreign policy is unilaterally responsible for pushing a minority of 
fundamentalists towards extremist terrorist appears widely debated. In 2014, former 
Director of the Security Service MI5, Eliza Manningham-Buller, gave an important 
public lecture, during which she acknowledged that foreign policy plays a major role 
in motivating terrorists groups like Al-Qaeda, known to have recruited British 
Muslims for suicide terrorism campaigns in the UK.    
It is the view, exemplified by the Palestinians' plight, but not only that, that the 
West has exploited and occupied Muslim lands – oil - often supported 
dictators, and killed its citizens. The Crusades are not forgotten and we believe 
that it was the arrival of American bases in the holy lands of Saudi Arabia, that 
first motivated Osama Bin Laden to attack the West, especially the USA, and 
to launch a global jihad. Indeed the three stated aims of al-Qaeda are to 
remove the United States and its allies from the Arab lands, to depose apostate 
rulers and to restore the Islamic form of government known as the caliphate.87 
Manningham-Buller cites a number of motivating factors behind terrorism that link 
directly to the political ideology of the Islamic fundamentalist movement. From the 
early 1990s following Operation “Desert Fox”, preachers in the UK were instructing 
followers that western governments had occupied Kuwait in order to exploit the oil. 
Together, preachers laid the foundations for terrorism in the minds of those 
fundamentalist Muslims who would later go on to commit acts of extreme violence. 
Terrorists like Omar Khyam and Mohammed Sidique Khan listened intently to the 
sermons of Abu Hamza Al-Masri and Abdullah Al-Faisal in which the preachers 
argued the British government was responsible for infant mortality in Iraq through the 
enforcement of sanctions.  
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Pantucci acknowledges the importance of British foreign policy as a 
motivating factor behind terrorism. He suggests that foreign policy within a composite 
of factors help encourage fundamentalist Muslims already deeply engaged in the war 
against the west to cross the line and pursue terrorism. Specifically Pantucci argues: 
Foreign policy blended into an ideology, blended onto a community of people 
you become involved in, blended into a sort of global movement that you feel 
you are a part of…but also a sort of general world view about you know the 
west being at war with Islam and all the injustices around Israel/Palestine. I 
think its a whole composite of these, I think foreign policy... 88 
Although Pantucci rejects the government line that foreign policy holds little 
explanatory power, he suggests it covers only ‘a part of the overall motivation’. 
Otherwise, in his opinion, there would be an awful lot more people pursuing 
terrorism. 89 The narrative offered above by Pantucci greatly underlines the central 
proposition of this doctoral thesis. Specifically, the argument that the UK Islamic 
fundamentalist movement has blended a community of Muslims together from which 
a pool of potential future terrorists have been incubated. Respected journalists Duncan 
Gardham has attended and reported on every major UK terrorism trial since 2001. 
Asked in his experience what has motivated British Muslim terrorists, Gardham 
points to several foreign policy related narratives associated with fundamentalist 
movement’s core political ideology, specifically, the perceived western war on Islam 
including the occupation of Muslim land and support for Middle Eastern dictators. He 
argues: ‘I think they would say get your troops out of our land and they would include 
in that propping up regimes, financing regimes that are not Islamic’. 90  
Investigative journalist Amardeep Bassey claims that in the broad sense, 
western foreign policy is the single most compelling motivation behind terrorism 
carried out by British Muslims. However, in his expert opinion based on ten years of 
writing on the subject, foreign policy is not the initial reason young Muslims orientate 
towards the Islamic fundamentalist movement.  Those who align themselves with 
Islamic fundamentalism initially do so in pursuit of redemption for past mistakes. 
Many British Muslims convicted of terrorism have previously accumulated a criminal 
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record involving offences related to drugs and gangs. It is only later when preachers 
politicize the new recruits that they begin to understand the impact of western foreign 
policy and how it has prevented the re-establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. For the 
minority of fundamentalists who progress on to become terrorists’, fighting to end 
western aggression against Muslims becomes the means by which they internally 
rationalize and legitimize the life changing decisions they have made.  
The most relevant foreign policy linked to Islamic extremist terrorism 
concerns the post 9/11 invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Asked why they conspired 
to commit terrorism in the UK, the majority of British Muslims currently serving 
prison sentences point to the invasion of Iraq as the final straw.91 Opposition to the 
invasion appeared not just from Muslims, but also from wider British society. The 
failure of a million demonstrators to prevent war going ahead sent a strong message to 
members of the fundamentalist movement. It told them that democracy is ineffective, 
politicians do not listen to the people and therefore the preachers are entirely correct 
when they claim there really is a war against Islam. Consequently, those members of 
the fundamentalist movement who went on to pursue terrorism believed that even 
though a million people marched, it was ignored and they had no choice but to meet 
fire with fire so to speak. 92 
Iraq not only motivated terrorists, it also hindered the fight against them. 
Manningham-Buller has argued that regardless of whatever merits there might have 
been to putting an end to Saddam Hussain, the invasion caused a distraction for 
British intelligence whose focus should have been on pursuing Al-Qaeda and Bin 
Laden.93 Manningham-Buller has suggested the invasion of Iraq increased the threat 
of terrorism by convincing more people that Islam was indeed under attack. This 
proposition is well established within fundamentalist political ideology, which 
strongly contends there is absolutely a war on Islam. Consequently, the invasion of 
Iraq served to strengthen this argument in the minds of those Islamic fundamentalists 
who are the time were contemplating acts of terrorism. Offering no doubt as to her 
position on the subject of Iraq as a motivating factor, Manningham-Buller explains: 
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It also showed very clearly that foreign and domestic policy are intertwined - 
actions overseas have an impact at home and our involvement in Iraq spurred 
some young British Muslims to turn to terror…no sooner had we resolved one 
conspiracy, than several more emerged and indeed they proliferated, partly 
because of our involvement in Iraq. 94  
From the perspective of consecutive British governments, foreign policy is not 
responsible for the acts of terrorism witnessed in the UK since 2003. However, 
questioned in 2013 on whether invading Iraq might lead British Muslims to pursue 
acts of domestic terrorism, former home secretary David Blunkett commented: 
There were two elements. Firstly, we were concerned about those who would 
react against British government policy and therefore could be radicalised. 
And secondly, the white indigenous population in terms of low level racism, 
people believing that anybody that looked different was a potential threat, 
which did happen. We were also trying to deal with the aftermath of the 
Bradford, Oldham and Burnley disturbances and therefore we were dealing 
with other forms of breakdown in society as well as this now more obvious 
one. So there were several strands running at the same time. All at the same 
time dealing with these broader and much deeper issues, yes the answer is to 
the original question; we had to deal with both those elements.95  
Alleged war crimes in Iraq roughly coincided with terrorist plots in the UK between 
2003 and 2006. Humiliating mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib Prison in April 
2004 and the battle of Fallujah the same year was followed by the fertilizer plot and 
shortly afterwards the July 7th and July 21st plots respectively. Islamic fundamentalist 
preachers in the UK found abhorant the two events in Iraq and used them as examples 
of western oppression against Sunni Muslims. Retaliation to restore Muslim honor 
became inevitable.  When asked whether the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism 
worldwide and the consequential rise of terrorism occurred due to the war in Iraq, 
former British Prime Minister Tony Blair vehemently denied such proposition.  
So you can carry on explaining all this by saying, ‘It’s us, we provoked them, 
it’s really — they’re just trying to react against Western imperialism — it’s 
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nonsense! Blair fumed. If it were the case, for example, that the reason why 
they were engaged in this terrorism in Iraq was because of the presence of 
American troops or British troops, you would expect when we get out, the 
terrorism would stop. It doesn’t, and it doesn’t because it’s not coming from 
us. It’s coming from this ideology, and we aren’t going to defeat it until we 
liberate ourselves from the attitude that somehow we’re the cause of it.96 
There is no question that for Blair at least, terrorism is the consequence of an 
ideology, not the actions of the west. Chapter 3 of this dissertation rejects this, 
highlighting how the western sanctions against Iraq led to the deaths of millions of 
women and children thereby providing the necessary discourse to radicalize a 
generation of British Muslims. Since leaving office, Blair has openly spoken out 
against Islamic fundamentalism in places like Syria, Yemen, Iraq and North Africa, 
suggesting it is the fuel that provides the fire needed to push a minority of Muslims 
into pursuing terrorism. In polar opposition to Manningham-Buller and downplaying 
the suggestion by Blunkett that the government feared the invasion of Iraq might lead 
to terrorism, former home secretary Charles Clarke sits firmly with Tony Blair, 
dismissing any suggestion that Iraq motivated British Muslims to carry out acts of 
terrorism. Clarke argues the invasion of Iraq is irrelevant and points to 9/11 as 
evidence of this. Interviewed in 2013, Clarke claims Iraq is, ‘something propagandists 
try and make their arguments in various ways. You can have an argument on Iraq and 
its rightness or wrongness. The suggestion that Iraq war was the cause of terrorist 
attacks in Britain is simply not made’.97  
In support of Clarke, it is correct that Al-Qaeda declared war on the west as 
early as 1993 with the World Trade Centre bombings – long before the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq. However, the first instance of domestic terrorism carried out by British 
Muslims occurred in 2003, one year after the invasion of Iraq. From studying political 
narratives associated with the fundamentalist movement, it is clear that since the mid 
1990s, members spoke out against British foreign policy. Yet they did not make the 
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decision to pursue terrorism until after 2003. If 9/11 inspired fundamentalists to 
reflect more on the ideology of the fundamentalist movement, the invasion of 
Afghanistan and Iraq almost certainly motivated a minority to have courage in their 
convictions.  Manningham-Buller recognises that revenge can play an important role 
in motivating terrorist. Referencing martyrdom videos she argues: ‘if you watch the 
chilling video wills made by the British 7/7 bombers, or those convicted in London 
for the ambitious plot of 2006 to destroy a series of transatlantic aircraft, to mark the 
fifth anniversary of 9/11, it is clear that their perception of revenge is the main 
motive’.98  
Bassey has also discussed the possibility that several of the major terrorism 
plots in the UK between 2003 and 2006 were a direct consequence of the invasion of 
Iraq. He reflects on the subject from the perspective of those who commit terrorism: 
Well you lot messed up our country all those years ago and now here is a bit 
of payback for you. I think that has been kind of understated as an additional, 
almost subconscious sort of thing, and it helps them get over the fact that well 
you know we are going to have to kill some of our fellow citizens, well they 
are not really our fellow citizens.99 
The question raised from reflecting on the views given by Manningham-Buller and 
Bassey is the whether terrorists are trying to influence policy makers or merely punish 
them. Terrorists do not realistically expect foreign policy to change because of their 
actions; instead, they want nothing more than to restore some level of honour to their 
religion and fellow Muslims. Honour with the Islamic faith is important; so much so 
that fathers kill their own daughters in so called “honour killings”. If revenge and the 
desire to restore honour are central motivations for British Muslims who commit acts 
of terrorism, then these individuals differ entirely from traditional left wing, right 
wing and nationalist terrorists because they have no specific end goal. While the 
Islamic Caliphate is the ambition of all Islamic Fundamentalists, carrying out an act of 
terrorism is a sideline, something undertaken in response to a specific act of 
oppression against the Muslim Umma. For example, events in Fallujah, Abu Graieb 
and Guantanamo Bay trigger outrage in the Muslim world with universal calls for 
revenge. So entrenched are the beliefs of fundamentalists in honour, that specific 
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actions such as the 2004 assault on Fallujah push them over the edge. Driven by a 
strong sense of injustice, fundamentalists cross the line and become extremist 
terrorists in order to exact revenge and restore honour to their faith. If they are not 
killed or captured in their act of terrorism, the individuals will return to the primary 
objective, carrying out actions to help restore the Caliphate. 
In conclusion, would a change in foreign policy help stem the rising tide of 
British Muslims pursuing acts of terrorism? Retired former head of counter terrorism 
command (CTC), Stuart Osborne, suggests that no matter what the foreign policy with 
respect to Islam, fundamentalists will always find an excuse to maintain an 
environment that incubates terrorism.  
You will get various motives for doing it. So there will be some that will say, 
‘Yeah, we’ve got soldiers in Afghanistan, right, pull the soldiers from 
Afghanistan, will you stop doing it, and then well then you’ve got soldiers 
somewhere else and actually we want this’.100 
In short, the politics of the fundamentalist movement are irreconcilable with western 
modernity and the archaic nature of international relations. States must act in their 
own best interests and this inevitable requires the west to prevent any re-establishment 
of the Islamic Caliphate. Consequently, while British foreign policy has exacerbated 
the situation, equally there can be no negotiated settlement as witnessed in Northern 
Ireland with the Good Friday Agreement. 
Reluctant terrorists 
In several cases, British Muslims who pursued terrorism did so following recruitment 
by a third party. Reluctant volunteers are the result of “top down” radicalisation. 
Traditionally, upon completion of basic military training in Pakistan, recruits for jihad 
have either joined the fight against Indian forces in Kashmir or the ranks of the 
Taliban in Afghanistan. Between 2003 and 2006 however, Al-Qaeda recruited a 
minority of volunteers and convinced them to return home to the UK to pursue suicide 
terrorism. British fundamentalists have acted as the go between, regularly scouting 
devout fellow Muslims and introduced them to Al-Qaeda operatives. Arguably, the 
most high profile example would be former British citizen Rashid Rauf. Born in 
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Pakistan but raised in Birmingham UK, he fled to Pakistan in 2004 after allegations 
arose concerning his involvement in the murder of his uncle. Upon arriving in 
Pakistan, Rauf immediately joined the ranks of Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence 
(ISI) backed Islamist group Harakut al-mujahedeen in Rawalpindi. A committed 
fundamentalist, Rauf quickly immersed himself in the armed insurgency against 
Indian Forces in Kashmir. However, believing the real fight to be against America, 
Rauf travelled to Afghanistan and eventually gained the trust of senior Al-Qaeda 
commander Abdul Hadi Al-Iraqi. Over the next few years, Rauf helped recruit British 
Muslims jihadists for terrorism back in the UK. Having convinced them they could 
best serve the cause by carrying out terrorism, Rauf then organised for a number of 
British Muslim terrorists to have explosives training with Al-Qaeda trainer Abu 
Ubaida al-Masri.101 At least two major UK terror plots between 2003 and 2006 link 
directly back to Rauf.102 
Duncan Gardham elucidates the idea of top down radicalisation by painting 
the picture of an “accidental terrorist”. British Muslims with altruistic intentions to 
wage jihad and potentially die on the battlefield were deemed either unfit to fight or 
surplus to requirements.103 Conditioned by their political beliefs (internalised as a 
result of years of engaging with the fundamentalist movement), recruits found 
themselves manipulated by Al-Qaeda operatives into returning to the UK in order to 
carry out suicide terrorism. Pantucci succinctly defines the profile of a fundamentalist 
Muslim who either stumbled upon a terrorism plot or became part of one because he 
was involved in an altruistic struggle in the defence of co-religionists. 
Do these people wake up in the morning, and say I want to go be a terrorist? 
they probably wake up in the morning, and say they want to go fight for my 
struggle for my people and then someone along the way, someone says 
something that gets twisted in their minds and on their heads because they see 
people die, because they see something happen... so it’s that or glory of being 
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a martyr and fighting for my cause, and dying for my cause, which would be a 
more interesting option to you. 104 
British Muslims who went to Afghanistan in pursuit of jihad expected to die on the 
battlefield. When it became clear this was not going to happen for whatever reason, 
they convinced themselves or others convinced them to return to the UK and pursue 
terrorism. Having already made the decision to sacrifice their lives for the sake of 
Allah, it then became a case of building the necessary improvised explosive devices 
as quickly as possible - both the 7/7 and 21/7 London bombers executed their attacks 
less than six months after returning home from Pakistan. 
The reluctant terrorist is also one that has effectively been “radicalised” by a 
third party. It is not as common as might be inferred from high profile government 
initiatives designed to prevent radicalisation, but it certainly does happen. David 
Blunkett gives weight to the common narrative in which experienced fundamentalists 
indoctrinate vulnerable young British Muslims. Motivation to pursue terrorism then 
arises from this process which is based on a distortion and misunderstanding of the 
Islamic faith. Asked if this has come from preachers, Blunkett replies, ‘Well yes, but 
there are preachers that preach and there are those who sit behind them, working out 
how this can be done’.105 What he is referring to is the mechanism in which preachers 
involved in the fundamentalist movement draw in new recruits and install the 
necessarily political ideology, later on, men sitting behind them will exploit that 
foundational indoctrination in order to convince potential terrorists to go overseas for 
training. Deep within the process, young British Muslims who eventually become 
terrorists find it difficult if not impossible to leave. Aborted shoe bomber Sajit Badat 
is a textbook example. Believing fundamentalists had recruited him for jihad, Badat 
journeyed out to Afghanistan in pursuit of training, but in fact, he had been 
“groomed” to become a suicide bomber. In 2014, he would testify about this process 
at the New York trial of Abu Hamza Al-Masri and the son of Osama Bin Laden, both 
men accused of being involved in terrorism.106 
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There appears to be two distinct types of extremist terrorist. Firstly as 
discussed in the previous section, the pro-active fundamentalist who desires revenge 
for British involvement in the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Secondly, as 
outlined in this second section the “reluctant terrorist” who is radicalised into 
pursuing extremist violence. In this sense, the fundamentalist Muslim, who originally 
planned to be a jihadist but along the way found himself caught up in a terrorist 
conspiracy. Convincing the latter to pursue terrorism is not particular difficult if he or 
she has spent years being involved in the fundamentalist movement. The idea of doing 
one’s duty for the cause finds favour with Manningham-Buller who has argued: 
It would be wrong to suggest that all terrorists belonging to al-Qaeda, or its 
affiliates, or merely inspired by it, share an identical motivation. But a single 
narrative compelling to some, seems to prevail, namely that it is the duty of 
good Muslims to wage jihad against the West, to avenge their Palestinian co-
religionists, and more recently those in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as 
elsewhere. 107 
The political ideology of the Islamic fundamentalist movement constantly reminds 
British Muslims of their duty to pursue jihad in retaliation for the western war on 
Islam. Buller believes this narrative to be central in explaining the motivation behind 
British Muslims who pursue terrorism. She also raises the issue of an identity crisis 
amongst would be terrorists which recruiters exploit to their advantage. 
Fundamentalist Muslims in the UK are the most likely of their peer group to be 
unemployed and uneducated. Growing up in closed communities, they face an 
identity crisis between multi-cultural, pluralistic western society and the more 
religious faith based lifestyle that isolates them the rest of the world. Manningham-
Buller suggests these potential terrorists seek to engage with Al-Qaeda or individuals 
they think have a link to Al-Qaeda because it offers them a stronger sense of identity. 
It gives them a focus, something they mistakenly believe is noble in a society they 
find alien:  
I am convinced that many are not driven by the al-Qaeda ideology but by the 
attraction of belonging to a group, doing something exciting, which gives a 
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purpose to their lives. Loyalty to the group then becomes the main motivation. 
And, of course, those committed to the cause are unscrupulous about 
exploiting and grooming young and vulnerable people for terrorist acts.108 
Amardeep Bassed and Duncan Gardham share a similar view, suggesting Al-Qaeda 
operatives in Pakistan are responsible for motivating initially reluctant British 
Muslims to pursue Terrorism. Bassey believes that once they make their intentions 
known while undertaking training, ‘the people who are actually out there on the 
ground realise, well hang on, you are better off going back… in some of the cases 
they show their reluctance, ‘no we want to stay here, we want to fight here’. But they 
are literally told no hang on you are better of going back home’. 109 Whatever 
apprehension fundamentalists may have initially, Bassey believes that after the 
decision is made they become fully committed. He comments, ‘So whether it was 
always their intention to do that, but I think once that, once that call has been made by 
whomever, that you are going to do something back in your home country, I think 
they completely switch and their focus becomes right now we know what we are 
going to do’.110  
Omar Nasiri rejects the idea of “top down radicalization” arguing terrorists are 
not influenced to do anything they have not already internally agreed to do. In fact, 
they themselves work out in their own minds how best they can serve the cause and 
act accordingly. Asked to comment on this proposition, Stuart Osborne is of the 
opinion that there are indeed two different pathways leading British Muslims towards 
terrorism. He suggests those who gain no direction from overseas will eventually take 
it upon themselves to form small cells in order to pursue terrorism.111 What is 
interesting about the second type, those who essentially self-motivate, is their desire 
to gain approval. It would appear that for some British Muslims who have pursued 
terrorism, the need for it to be sanctioned weighed heavily on their decision making 
process. Osborne reflects on the 2010 Pitsford conspiracy saying ‘there was some 
information to say there was an individual quite prepared to be one of the suicide 
bombers, but had asked where it was being sanctioned from. Because if I die I want to 
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make sure it’s for the right cause and I’ve actually got a greater destination’.112 In this 
respect, we can compare British Muslim terrorists with German soldiers who carried 
out atrocities in the Second World War. Nazi guards stationed at the concentration 
camps ‘went through a process that actually meant that it was about obeying an order, 
they were quite prepared to do that, and it’s about that sort of indoctrination’. 113 
Operational Cycle 
When a British fundamentalist Muslims becomes motivated to cross the line and 
pursue terrorism, there is almost no turning back. The operational cycle from 
inception to execution is typically short in order to reduce the likelihood of detection. 
In the case of international sponsorship as witnessed predominantly between 2003 and 
2006, the timeframe can be as rapid as a few months. If the security services detect 
the operation, then it will terminate as soon as they have gained sufficient evidence 
for a conviction. Variables that commonly determine the time to execution include 
finance, training, acquiring ingredients for an improvised explosive device (IED), 
prototyping, testing and finally construction of the IED(s). For example, in the case of 
the July 7th and July 21st 2005 London bombings, inception occurred in early January 
2005 with execution less than six months later. In both cases, the suicide terrorists 
proved both technically proficient and sufficiently experienced enough in counter 
intelligence allowing them to avoid detection.  
In discussing the operation cycle of terrorism plots carried out by members of 
the fundamentalist movement over the last ten years, Pantucci offers the following 
account which suggests individuals recruited overseas are trained and then sent back 
home and given a free reign over how to undertake their operation, certainly in terms 
of recruitment. 
There is a clear operational cycle, guys who were radicalised here then went to 
Pakistan, received some training there, came back, started running their own 
plot. Targeting seems to have been left up to them pretty much... in terms of 
their devices.. they were trained in something over there... so they were taught 
this is how you make the bomb and this is how you do it. the operational cycle 
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here seems to be that have other individuals they've identified from within 
their local community, who they will be able to use as part of their plot... again 
they tell them about a very special job they need help with.114 
Building on this summary account offered by Pantucci, we now go into greater depth, 
exploring the formation of cells, domestic networking, explosives training, finance 
and lastly foreign support and direction. Our analysis focuses on the connection 
between each phase of the operation and the role of the fundamentalist movement in 
helping to facilitate conspirators. It is the central thesis of this dissertation that 
involvement in the fundamentalist movement provides the necessary support, both in 
terms of political ideology necessary to gain a sense of legitimacy as well as practical 
assistance for access to facilitators and sponsors.  
Cell formation 
Political violence carried out by British fundamentalist Muslims in the UK presents a 
new wave of terrorism in terms of organisation, finance, direction and support. For 
example, Shia and Sunni groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza 
have overtly distinct political and military wings. In particular, each maintains a 
recognised “brand” and a clearly defined set of objectives. This includes non-violent 
activity for example acting in the capacity of local government by providing welfare 
services. Comparatively, we can better align these two groups with the Irish 
Republican Army (Army) whose political wing Shin Fein served as the organisation’s 
negotiating arm. In contrast with the IRA, British Muslims who form terrorist cells 
tend to do so on an ad-hoc basis and mostly recruit from long-term close friends. 
There is no political wing and therefore no opportunity for negotiation. The purpose 
of the cell is to execute an operation, not to breakdown the enemy through a war of 
attrition.  
Empirical evidence suggests that within each terrorist cell, at least one 
individual takes the lead, recruiting cell members, organising the necessary training, 
seeking finance and directing the operation.115 Bassey has investigated several cases 
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of terrorism that originated in the UK and offers the following account of how cells 
have formed in order to carry out one off suicide bomb plots: 
Yeah its always close friends, and its always, close friends who have grown up 
together, been to school together, live in the same area, have their 
camaraderie, have had shared experiences of racism, of whatever. The main 
thing being shared experiences…their loyalties go beyond the fact that he is 
my fellow Muslim or he is my fellow conspirator, these guys they are only 
willing to die for each other because of that close link in born and brought up 
together. 116 
This close kinship amongst British Muslim terrorists is why the Security Services 
have found it difficult to infiltrate cells. Bassey adds: ‘that is why I think that you 
know 7/7 and those kind of plots were so hard to infiltrate in that these guys were 
very tight, they knew each other inside out, any little nuisances they could pick up on 
that. There was never going to be any infiltration’117 The exclusion of “outsiders” has 
made undercover police operations that were common to the prevention of terrorism 
in Northern Ireland, far more difficult to carry out. Consequently, tip offs from inside 
the Muslim community or more commonly mistakes made by conspirators, presents 
the best opportunity for Police to disrupt operations before execution.118  
The above narrative given by Bassey does not necessarily account for all 
terrorist cells that have emerged in the UK. In the case of the July 7th London 
bombers, none of the conspirators grew up together or attended the same schools. 
Friendship between them developed within approximately five years of the decision 
to commit terrorism. Explaining the formation of the London bombers requires 
reference to the Islamic fundamentalist movement. Through the socialisation process 
in which British fundamentalist Muslims attend lectures, spend weekends away and 
demonstrate at various protests, bonds are developed that increase trust and construct 
deep long term friendships that potential conspirators can rely upon to form cells. 
Ultimately, when an individual makes the decision to pursue terrorism, it is towards 
                                                
116 Bassey Author Interview 
117 Ibid. 
118 For example when purchasing large quantities of the ingredients needed to 
construct explosive devices, use of a single supplier will often raise an alarm. 
Page 298 of 370 
fellow members of the fundamentalist movement that he first turned to in order to 
recruit.  
Responsibility for bringing the July 7th 2005 group together appears to have 
fallen to Mohammed Sidique Khan. Fellow cell members Germaine Lyndsay 
converted to Islam in 2001 and Hasib Hussain met Khan in 2003. Evidence from 
court transcripts at the trial of Wahid Ali; suggest that Khan and Tanweer jointly 
founded the London terror cell in January 2005. While pursuing jihad in Pakistan, cell 
members agree to undertake a suicide mission back in the UK. Lyndsay and Hussain 
may not have been first choice; it is entirely plausible that Khan had approached other 
individuals known to be involved in the fundamentalist movement. Pantucci notes the 
importance of Khan as a leader claiming, ‘Khan recruited a bunch of guys who were 
part of his community in Beeston, younger men who were clearly in awe of him, who 
trained with him at their gym’.119 The implication is that cell formation relies on a 
charismatic individual, someone able to attract impressionable others and convince 
them that what they are doing is important for the overall fundamentalist cause. 
Domestic Networking 
Islamic terrorism in the UK has emerged from the environment socially constructed 
by the organisation of Islamic fundamentalist Muslims. Cells have formed from 
amongst this environment with additional support from others in terms of training, 
direction and finance. Between 2003 and 2007, four major UK terror plots were part 
of a co-ordinated Al-Qaeda linked cluster. Cells shared the same facilitators in the UK 
and Pakistan and conspirators socialised at various religious, political and family 
events organised by members of the Islamic fundamentalist movement. Long standing 
fundamentalist preachers including Omar Bakri Mohammed, Abu Hamza Al-Masri 
and Abdullah Al-Faisal provided the connections to Al-Qaeda needed by the cells to 
successfully gain the required legitimacy and approval for their operations. Evidence 
uncovered during an investigation into the July 7th London bombings revealed that 
two independent cell leaders namely Omar Khyam and Mohammed Sidique Khan had 
met on several occasions. Covert surveillance recorded the men exchanging ideas on 
how to raise finance in support of overseas insurgents – a key activity of individuals 
engaged in the fundamentalist movement. 
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Since 2007, domestic networking between cells dramatically decreased. In 
part, this may be due to an increase in counter terrorism operations making it more 
risky for individuals to associate with others engaged in similar behaviour. Amardeep 
Bassey comments that cells have progressively turned to the Internet, communicating 
more through websites, forums and social media. He also suggests that domestic 
networking is now less about gaining practical assistance and more about gaining 
encouragement from a wider audience, ‘they would not necessarily be exchanging 
ideas on plots anyway, rather more on religious lines and religious galvanisation. 
Egging each other on and giving each other support’.120 Significant degradation of Al-
Qaeda as a direct consequence of the US led war on terrorism has led to a shift in 
tactics. This more isolated “do it yourself” approach, which really began after 2007, 
has been part of a global shift in which individuals are encouraged to stay quiet and 
do what they can where they can. Bassey believes, ‘their [Al-Qaeda] directions are, do 
not communicate too much, just go out and act. So I think in that respect, there has 
been a far less co-ordinated effort amongst cells in the UK’. 121 
Explosives training 
British fundamentalists who undertake acts of terrorism may have previously 
undertaken military training while pursuing jihad. Invariably this has taken place at 
camps typically located in either Pakistan or Afghanistan. Assad Kashmir is also a 
well-established region for young Muslims to learn basic fighting skills before going 
off to join fellow mujahedeen on the front line. A minority of those who volunteer for 
jihad eventually become suicide bombers back in the UK. The seemingly de-facto 
modus operandi of these individuals would appear to be based on detonated home 
made explosive devices aboard the transport network or against other high profile 
targets such as shopping centres, nightclubs or more secure military installations. 
Although instructions on how to build an IED appear online, until at least 2007, 
British Muslim terrorists gained explosives training from experienced Al-Qaeda 
operatives in Pakistan. Commonly, a member of the fundamentalist movement in the 
UK would facilitate access to such individuals.  
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Between 2003 and 2006, Pakistan served as the main training ground for 
British Muslims who would later go on to pursue terrorism. In all four major plots 
between that time-period, evidence suggests the conspirators received explosives 
training in the tribal region of Pakistan from Al-Qaeda specialists, namely Abdul Hadi 
Al-Iraqi and Abu Ubaida Al-Masri. Former UK based Islamic fundamentalist and 
alleged Al-Qaeda operative Rashif Rauf provided the necessary introductions for both 
cells. Operation Crevice (discussed in detail at the start of this chapter), clearly 
demonstrates the importance of Pakistan for the training of potential terrorists. In 
response to the US led 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, Members of the Crevice cell 
became determined to fight coalition forces.122 To do this, leader of the cell Omar 
Khyam asked an associate to negotiate with a tribal elder in Northwest Pakistan to 
establish a military training camp.123 Two weeks before the camp took place, Khyam 
and fellow cell member Salahuddin Amin, undertook explosives training using 
ammonium nitrate and urea at a camp in Kohat, Pakistan.124 It was during this time 
that Al-Qaeda operatives recruited the two men to carry out a bombing campaign in 
the UK. While the cell members may originally have been on a mission to pursue 
jihad, all quickly became willing conspirators in a plot designed to target nightclubs, 
shopping centres and domestic utility installations.125 Unlike plots that followed, 
members of Crevice were evidently not suicide bombers. Omar Khyam recruited 
Canadian engineering student Mohammad Momin Khawaja to develop radio 
controlled trigger mechanisms.  
Since the failed liquid airline plot in 2006, British Muslim terrorists have 
increasingly relied more domestic facilitators than Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan. 
The four men involved in the 2010 London Stock Exchange plot followed bomb 
making instructions published online.126 In the case of the 2011 Birmingham Ruck 
Sack bomb plot, the three conspirators received only basic military training delivered 
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by insurgent groups in Kashmir. Throughout the trial, the prosecutors offered no 
evidence to suggest Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan arranged for the terrorists to 
undergo any kind of specialist explosives training. Furthermore, none of the six men 
convicted in relation to a further plot to bomb an EDL rally in the summer of 2012 
received any training or direction from handlers in Pakistan. In respect of four men 
convicted in March 2012 of preparing for an act of terrorism in relation to a reserve 
army base, all self-trained in the Breacon Beacons and relied heavily on explosives 
instructions downloaded from the Internet.127  
Finance 
Over the last ten years, there has been a discernible shift in how British Muslim 
terrorists have financed their operations. Previously, credit card fraud provided the 
means by which to fund training, purchase bomb-making equipment and cover the 
cost of other operational expenses such as travel. Between February and March 2004, 
the leader of Crevice, Omar Khyam and the leader of Theseus, Mohammed Sidique 
Khan met on four separate occasions. 128 According to UK Counter-terrorist Police, 
the only subjects discussed were how to defraud banks and building societies. 
Evidence from court transcripts suggests they did this for three reasons: initially to 
supply insurgents in Afghanistan, then to finance military training in Pakistan and 
later on to fund terrorism in the UK.129 This connection and information sharing 
between terrorist cells in order to raise finance was only possible because of 
introductions made through the fundamentalist movement. Since 2006, conspirators 
appear to have relied more on the misuse of charitable donations in the hope of 
evading increased financial surveillance. In December 2006, the US treasury froze the 
accounts of facilitator Mohammed Al-Ghabra, accusing him of financing the training 
of British jihadists with Kashmiri insurgent groups. Two years later, the UK Charity 
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Commission banned Al-Ghabra from running any charitable organisation.130 Recent 
evidence of the growing misused of charitable donations occurred in 2011, three men 
involved in the Birmingham Ruck Sack plot stole over £10,000 raised for various 
relief agencies to fund their terrorist ambitions. 
Oversees support and direction 
As outlined above in domestic networking, between 2003 and 2007, four major UK 
terrorist plots constituted a well co-ordinated Al-Qaeda linked cluster. That is to say, 
during training for jihad, UK facilitators introduced men leading each conspiracy to 
Al-Qaeda operatives who subsequently recruited them for suicide terrorism back in 
London. Upon returning to the UK, each group received variable levels of further 
support and direction as they moved forward with their operation. Established 
operatives Abdul Hadi Al-Iraqi, Rashid Rauf and Abu Ubaida Al-Masri served as the 
main interface between Pakistan and the UK ringleaders of Crevice, Theseus, Vivace 
and Overt. Overwhelming evidence gathered from court transcripts, media reports and 
expert witnesses indicate Al-Qaeda were actively directing British Muslims terrorists 
in the UK up until at least 2006.  
Since 2007, there has been a shift towards what has been termed, “homegrown 
terrorism”. The post 2007 case studies outlined in the first section of this chapter were 
carried out with little if any, support or direction from overseas. Former head of SO15 
Counter Terrorism Stuart Osborne adds an illuminating insight in terms of how 
operatives in Pakistan provided significant support to British fundamentalist Muslims 
pursuing terrorism in the UK:  
The major plots that we have had, and….the vivace and the airline plot and the 
other ones you’ve talked about, were mainly controlled by overseas so these 
are people that have had some sort of training, and there was some command 
and control that was coming, the plots were being hatched in bigger plots that 
were then coming back and there was this sort of overseas sort of inspirational 
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side of life and almost on some of the occasions an…. authority from overseas 
to actually commit these acts.131 
In a remarkable shift away from the more established top down Al-Qaeda driven 
approach, since 2007, conspirators have adopted a more bottom up, grass roots 
operation. This has meant recruiting more from the national Islamic fundamentalist 
movement if not acting alone. Terrorists have also radicalised internally, limited 
connections to other cells nationally and in the most part avoided any activity that 
might draw attention from the intelligence and security services. This strategy of 
British Muslim terrorists doing ‘what they can, when they can’ builds upon a message 
first espoused by Al-Qaeda leader, Ayman Mohammed Al-Zawahiri back in 2004. 
Pantucci and others have dubbed the self-starters “Nike terrorists”. Forget the great 
plans, forget trying to seek authorisation, direction or support, ‘just go out there and 
do it’.132 In May 2013, this new approach reached its apogee when a British born 
fundamentalist with no training or experience of jihad, carried out the brutal murder 
of Soldier Lee Rigby on the streets of South East London. 
The post 2007 wave of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism appears less effective. 
Two of the four plots between 2003 and 2006 remained un-detected before their 
execution. In contrast, Police successfully disrupted all of the major terrorists plots 
since 2007 before the terrorists were in a position to carry out their operation. The loss 
of key personal in Pakistan may account for the recent failures. Individuals that were 
pivotal in helping to direct terrorism in the UK have succumbed to targeting 
assassination as part of the growing US led drone war fought in both Afghanistan and 
the tribal regions of Pakistan. Bassey supports this proposition, noting how a drone 
strike eliminated key Al-Qaeda operative Rashid Rauf in 2009.  Bassey underlines the 
importance of Rauf to domestic Islamic terrorism in the UK when he suggests: 
I think through that period 2002 when he arrived in Pakistan until about his 
death, I think he was the driver behind the British plots. Rauf was the go 
between man. If you look at the transcripts of Operation Overt and some of the 
other cases, if nothing else just the text speak, the lingo they used, the fact that 
he could communicate with them on their own level, therefore he had been 
there, he knew what to say and how to say it, what buttons to press. Without 
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somebody like him, he is irreplaceable in that respect. It is quite funny how it 
shows the loss of one man, has had such a massive influence on the European 
networks.133  
During his time as home secretary, MP David Blunkett enjoyed complete access to all 
of the available intelligence regarding terrorism in the UK. Commenting on the 
emergence of terrorist plots carried out by British Muslims since 9/11, Blunkett 
suggests that although the conspirators were home grown, they gained significant 
influence and support from overseas, ‘The question you really asked was it home 
grown. There is a half answer which is that some of the things that happened post 11th 
September were by home grown but they were radicalised, incentivised and provided 
with the where with all, from outside’.134 What this account suggests is synergy 
between the UK and Pakistan whereby men born in the UK would connect with more 
experienced terrorists overseas. The two parties would then co-ordinate together in 
order to achieve a common objective. 
The 2003 to 2006 plots show clear operational direction from Al-Qaeda in 
Pakistan. In 2003, when members of Crevice asked for combative jihad in 
Afghanistan, Abdul Hadi Al-Iraqi refused permission. He told them if they really 
wanted to do something, they should do it back in the UK. Activities consistent with 
preparing for an act of terrorism began immediately after the men arrived home. It 
appears that Mohammed Quyyam Khan (the facilitator who financed the cell’s 
training in Pakistan and is alleged to have been an Al-Qaeda operative) took over 
directing the conspirators after they returned from Pakistan. We know that MI5 
discovered the conspiracy relatively quickly in early 2004 and most likely did so 
because they had Quyyam-Khan under extensive surveillance. Consequently, Crevice 
constituted an authorised Al-Qaeda cell receiving operational direction right up until 
Police intercepted the operation and arrested all those involved.  
 Constituting part of the same four-cell cluster as the Crevice, the leaders of 
Theseus, Vivace and Overt also received direction though a separate Al-Qaeda 
associate. Overwhelming evidence suggests operatives Rashid Rauf and Abu Ubaida 
Al-Masri directed the three conspiracies from Pakistan via phone and email. Between 
2003 and 2006, Al-Masri recruited cell leaders Mohammed Sidique Khan, Muktar 
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Ibrahim and Ahmed Ali Khan to carry out suicide terrorism in the UK. Upon 
returning to the UK, the cells quickly shifted into the operational cycle. Meanwhile, 
pursued by the CIA and the ISI, Al-Masri died from natural causes in December 2007. 
US drones assassinated Rauf on a compound in North Waziristan in November 
2008.135 Thereafter, kinetic operations using both drones and Special Forces have 
continued to erode the hard core of Al-Qaeda as an organisation.   
 In the years following the end of the four-cell cluster in 2006, the role of Al-
Qaeda handlers in Pakistan significantly declined. Despite receiving passive 
assistance from Kashmiri insurgents to obtain basic military training, the evidence 
suggests the Pitsford conspirators acted alone in their pursuit of terrorism. The new 
era of independent activity arguably began in 2007 with the attempt to kidnap a 
British soldier and a suicide attack on Glasgow Airport in which the perpetrators 
received no assistance from Al-Qaeda. The same pattern can be observed in respect of 
the six men convicted of plotting to blow up an EDL rally in 2012, the four men 
found guilty in March 2013 of planning an act of terrorism against a reserve Army 
barracks, and more recently the two men responsible for killing soldier Lee Rigby in 
May 2013. In all five cases since 2006, there is no substantive evidence of 
authorization or operational direction from Al-Qaeda handlers in either the UK or 
Pakistan.  
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Chapter Six - Conclusions & Policy 
Recommendations 
Drawing upon a wide range of detailed empirical materials, this doctoral study has 
argued that an environment socially constructed by the mobilisation of Islamic 
fundamentalists, was a necessary condition for the emergence of domestic terrorism 
carried out by British Muslims since 2003. Absent of this environment, British 
Muslims would not have developed the mindset necessary to cross the line and pursue 
terrorism. By engaging in extremist politics, and carrying out activities designed to re-
establish an Islamic Caliphate, British Muslims encountered like-minded individuals 
in the UK and Pakistan who provided both ideological and logistical support. By 
deploying elite interviews, court transcripts and an archive of fundamentalist 
literature, an alternative analysis has been presented that has sought to explain the 
relatively recent phenomenon in which seemingly ordinary British Muslims have 
pursed acts of extreme terrorist violence against fellow citizens. Challenging the 
prevailing theories of trauma, occupation and strategic outbidding, the explanatory 
emphasis has instead been placed on the importance of religion and how Islam has 
been used as the basis for an extremist political ideology, one that has motivated 
British Muslims to pursue fundamentalist activities and, for a minority, to cross the 
line and volunteer for terrorism.  
Characterised as the “Islamic Fundamentalist Movement”, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
examined the rise, politics and activities of this milieu of British Muslims. Critically, 
Chapter 5 presented comprehensive evidence-linking individuals guilty of terrorism, 
directly to fundamentalist groups such as Al-Muhajiroun and Al-Ghuraba. 
Furthermore, by drawing upon ten unique cases representing major terrorist 
conspiracies, Chapter 5 offered up a developed profile of British fundamentalists who 
cross the line to become terrorists and examined in detail, the motivation for them to 
do so. In concluding the previous chapter, the thesis presented analysis of the 
operational cycle of terrorism plots carried out by British Muslims, highlighting 
various shifting trends over the last ten years in terms of recruitment, finance, training 
and operational cycle. From a period of highly organised Al-Qaeda directed terrorism 
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2003 to 2006, post 2007, the British Security Services have faced a growing number 
of lone wolf operatives acting with little if any external support.1  
The final chapter of this dissertation is divided into two substantive parts. 
Firstly, examination is made of how the British government has recognised and 
responded to the Islamic fundamentalism movement. Initially pursuing a policy of 
“appeasement” from the mid-1990s, in the years following the 2005 London 
bombings, politicians began introducing increasingly draconian measures designed to 
challenge and indeed disrupt the organisation and activities pursued by 
fundamentalists. Anti-terrorism legislation, counter radicalisation programmes and 
later anti-social behaviour orders have all featured within the overall strategy 
targeting the environment from which domestic terrorism carried out by British 
Muslims has emerged. Secondly, reflecting on the evidence discovered and presented 
throughout the dissertation, the author concludes with a series of policy 
recommendations. Building on the existing counter terrorism framework, suggestions 
focus on the re-implementation and broadening of “control orders” designed to 
challenge the fundamentalist movement, with the overall objective being to help 
prevent the next generation of British Muslims following a path that may ultimately 
lead them to commit acts of domestic terrorism. 
The Islamic fundamentalist movement presents both a direct and indirect 
threat to UK national security. When the 2010 civil war broke out in Syria, British 
fundamentalist Muslims travelled to the region in order to help overthrow the Assad 
regime. During the first few years the British government, while not condoning the 
activity, showed little interest in pursuing “Jihadists”. This despite the fact volunteers 
were technically guilty of committing terrorist offences by fighting on behalf of non-
state actors. Significantly, at the time, regime change in Syria featured high on the list 
of UK foreign policy objectives and therefore “foreign fighters” were effectively 
serving the governments best interests. However, from 2013 onwards, Islamic 
fundamentalist groups, initially the Al-Nusra Front but later and more brutally the 
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Islamic State (IS), began executing western hostages causing a shift in government 
policy from tacit approval, towards active proscription and prevention.2  
Proving increasingly popular to western jihadists, IS has attracted foreign 
fighters from all around the world. Widespread Internet propaganda featuring acts of 
extreme violence including the execution of enemy combatants and forced conversion 
to Islam for non-Muslim civilians has proved to be a powerful mobiliser. Shortly after 
the beheading of American journalist James Foley in August 2014, it emerged that the 
main suspect had previously been a part of the insular UK Islamic fundamentalist 
movement. Media reports suggested that Abdel-Majed Bary had been gradually 
“radicalised” after coming into contact with outspoken preacher Anjem Choudary.3 
Writing in the Daily Mail concerning the acts of violence carried out by British 
Muslims in Syria, Senior Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation and Political Violence (ISCR) at King’s College, London, Shiraz 
Maher wrote:  
The murder of American journalist James Foley has further exposed the 
terrifying role played by British-born radicals in the barbaric jihadist 
movement. What is so disturbing is not just the scale of their involvement — 
with more than 500 British Muslims now estimated to be fighting for the 
extremists in Syria and Iraq — but also the depths of their violence. It is no 
exaggeration to say that the British militants are among the most vicious and 
vociferous of the recruits to the Islamic State terror network, which aims to 
establish a medieval-style caliphate in the region.4  
By late 2014, it became clear that British Muslims in the UK were now engaged in the 
most atrocious acts of terrorist violence in Syria, most notably the execution of 
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western journalists. The potential for these jihadists with British passports to gain 
explosives training and return to the UK in pursuit of terrorism rang alarm bells 
throughout Whitehall. Consequently, while the immediate need became the 
prevention of British Muslims joining IS, it was clear that more needed to be done to 
prevent the long term radicalisation of young British Muslims, in other words, tougher 
measures were required to challenge the Islamic fundamentalist movement in the UK. 
In August 2014, London Mayor Boris Johnson called for tougher powers to deal with 
British Muslims who volunteered to fight in Syria. Writing for the Daily Telegraph, 
Johnson raised the stakes claiming ‘control orders should be reinstated for the most 
serious cases with some of those stripped of their citizenship’.5  
In November 2014, two men who had returned to the UK after volunteering 
for Jihad in Syria were jailed for 12 years respectively.6 Defying the potential for 
rehabilitation, de-radicalisation or re-integration, these exceptionally harsh sentences 
demonstrate the concern amongst ministers over the threat posed by foreign fighters. 
In contrast to those who joined Islamic militia groups in Bosnia during the 1990s and 
were welcomed back with open arms, the message now sent out to all British Jihadists 
appears clear, ‘do not come home, if you do then you will go to jail for a very long 
time’. While such an approach may indeed help mitigate the potential threat from 
trained jihadists returning to the UK, the long-term implication is reduced co-
operation from the Muslim community. As the mother of one of the two men 
convicted has explained, ‘family members are now far less likely to inform the police 
of any suspicious activity due to fears over how suspects (brothers, cousins, fathers) 
may subsequently be treated’. 7 Accordingly, this chapter proceeds by examining how 
the British government has responded to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism within the 
UK. In particular, measures taken to challenge an ideology that has radicalised a 
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Online, 26th November 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30213771, (accessed 
14th January 2015) 
7 M. Hall, ‘Mother who alerted police to British jihadist son feels 'betrayed' over his 
12-year sentence ‘, Telegraph Online, 7th December 2014, 
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minority of British Muslims in support of Jihad and, to a limited extent, acts of 
extremist terrorism. 
Government Response 
Constituting the core thesis of this dissertation, the previous chapter examined in 
detail British Muslims who have pursued domestic terrorism since 2003. Clearly 
demonstrating the incubatory link between fundamentalism and terrorism, it has been 
shown that the organization of Islamic fundamentalists served to nurture a mindset 
necessary for terrorism, specifically, through the socialization and encouragement of 
members to pursue activities designed to help re-establish the Islamic Caliphate. 
Years spent internalizing and promoting the movement’s political ideology, made 
terrorism an inescapable consequence of high profile western invasions into Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Events that brought into question US commitment to human rights (for 
example the torture of Muslim detainees at Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo Bay 
along with alleged massacres during the battle of Fallujah), served to motivate a 
minority of British fundamentalist Muslims to cross the line in order to exact public 
revenge on politicians and the society who elected them.  
Notwithstanding the 2004 fertilizer plot, which led to the conviction of four 
British Muslims for terrorism offences, there was little recognition of the importance 
of the fundamentalist movement until at least 2005. This was arguably a significant 
failure of analysis on the part of the UK central intelligence machinery and allowed an 
extreme political ideology to mobilize an entire network of Muslims throughout the 
UK without an adequate government response. Today, this milieu of fundamentalist 
Muslims can be found fighting in Syria, Yemen and Somalia, a minority of whom 
present a clear and present danger to British national security. Going forward, this 
section examines in detail how the British government has firstly, recognized the role 
of Islamic fundamentalism in the UK and secondly, how it has challenged actors and 
their political ideology in order to stem the next generation of extremist terrorists. 
Recognising the problem 
Following the abrupt end to the Cold War, Britain focused much of her security effort 
on finding peace in Northern Ireland. This was understandable given that the attacks 
mounted by the IRA during the 1990s constituted a significant threat, not least to the 
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financial sector, which had replaced manufacturing as the key British economic 
activity. Throughout the 1990’s and until as late as 2005, terrorism carried out 
overseas by British Muslims attracted little interest from either Special Branch or 
national security agencies.8 During this period, London became a safe haven to 
fundamentalists engaged with countless insurgent groups around the world. A so-
called “covenant of security” between Islamic fundamentalists and the British 
government allowed terrorists free reign to operate on the strict understanding they 
never interfered with British interests. By invading Afghanistan and shortly 
afterwards Iraq, the covenant collapsed and the attention of Islamic fundamentalist 
Muslims quickly turned to the UK. Moreover, there was a degree of psychological 
dissonance regarding British Muslims and this ensured that, even as the security 
service became anxious about the presence of fundamentalist Muslims in nearby 
France during early 2000, they remained notably relaxed about the UK’s own 
domestic capacity to generate violent extremists.9   Despite the creation of a Joint 
Terrorism Analysis Centre in June 2003, the key linkages were still not identified or 
established. 
It was only in the immediate aftermath of the July 2005 London Bombings 
that Prime Minister, Tony Blair, ordered a full enquiry. A comprehensive examination 
of the perpetrators identified their long-term involvement in the Islamic 
fundamentalist movement. Towards the end of the century, long before the events of 
9/11, the ringleader of the July 7th London bombers, Mohammed Sidique Khan, had 
attended training camps in Afghanistan and raised finance for the Taliban. Similar 
engagement by other British Muslims in activities promoted by the fundamentalist 
movement led to the introduction of a raft of initiatives, policies, programmes and 
legislation, all designed to disrupt and as far as possible dismantle the Islamic 
fundamentalist movement in the UK. This section examines that response, looking 
specifically at the focus on challenging the fundamentalist movement rather than on 
protecting against terrorism more generally. 
                                                
8 Author interview with David Blunkett, London, 9th October 2013 
9 Diary Entry, Monday, 24 January 2000, Piers Morgan, The Insider: The Private 
Diaries of a Scandalous Decade (London: Ebury Press, 2005), pp.250-1 
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In 2004, five British Muslim men plotted a bombing campaign against high 
profile targets in the UK.10 The following year on July 7th 2005, four successfully 
carried out a suicide attack on the London underground killing 52 innocent civilians.  
Speaking at the time, former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, rejected any 
suggestion that Islamic fundamentalism in the UK had nurtured the bombers, pointing 
the finger instead at international terrorist groups.11 Blame centred on Al-Qaeda 
whom Blair accused of targeting vulnerable British Muslims, brainwashing them into 
carrying out murderous acts of violence. Shortly after details of the July 7th cell 
became public, UK based Islamic fundamentalist group Al-Muhajaroon (ALM) 
quietly disbanded. While Blair may not have publically admonished the 
fundamentalist movement, preacher Omar Bakri Mohammed recognised the role of 
his organisation and seeking to avoid deportation, quickly sought to downplay 
growing accusations he had helped radicalise the four conspirators. 
After leaving office in 2010, Blair demonstrated a paradigm shift in his 
thinking, becoming progressively more assertive in his condemnation of Islamic 
fundamentalism. Writing in 2013, he appeared more critical of Islam when he argued, 
‘there is a problem within Islam – from the adherents of an ideology that is a strain 
within Islam. And we have to put it on the table and be honest about it’.12 The 
following year, Blair warned the West not to be side tracked by events in Ukraine but 
rather to unite against the threat posed by the rise of Sunni fundamentalist groups in 
Libya, Yemen and more recently Syria.13 Blair suggested that tackling ‘a radicalised 
and politicised view of Islam’ should be at the top of the global political agenda. The 
shift from apologist to accuser, suggests those in government, privately at least, fully 
recognised that while terrorists may be in the minority, the political ideology guiding 
them is much more mainstream than previously acknowledged. In order to defeat 
terrorism, the objective must be to disrupt the underlying fundamentalist ideology 
                                                
10 Referred to by Police as Operation Crevice but known in the media as the Fertilizer 
bomb plot as the conspirators were arrested in possession of 600 kg of fertilizer 
intended to used by the men to construct an improvised explosive device 
11Staff Reporter, 'Full text: Blair speech on terror', BBC News Online, 16th July 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4689363.stm, (accessed 14th January 2015) 
12 Staff Reporter, ‘Blair says extremism within Islam can’t be ignored’, Times of 
Israel, 3rd June 2013, http://www.timesofisrael.com/blair-says-extremism-within-
islam-cant-be-ingored/, (accessed 12th November 2013) 
13 Ibid. 
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promoted globally, even by those who would not themselves engage in violence 
against non-combatants.  
Reflecting on the events of 9/11, former MI5 Director Baroness Eliza 
Manningham-Buller appears to acknowledge the notion of a global Islamic 
fundamentalist movement incubating terrorism worldwide. In a speech given at 
Queen Mary’s College in 2006, she suggests that one of the primary aims of the attack 
was to unite fundamentalist Muslims around the world.14 Analysing the long-term 
ambitions of Al-Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden, Manningham-Buller suggests ‘he 
must have expected that these murderous attacks would force a reaction that would 
make it easier for him to persuade others of his argument that Islam was under attack 
from the west’. 15  Despite concerns within the security services, the British 
government was slow to react. Even in light of 9/11, recognition that fundamentalist 
Muslims in the UK presented a threat to national security did not occur in earnest 
until 2005. This is surprising given the involvement of British citizens in the 2001 
shoe bombing plot, the 2003 suicide bombing in Tel Aviv and most significantly the 
2003 fertilizer plot discussed above.  
Reflecting on the failure to recognise an emerging threat from “home grown 
terrorists” until 2005, former Home Secretary David Blunkett has said: 
Most of the intelligence and security effort was going into Northern Ireland 
despite the Good Friday agreement, the fringe groups like the real IRA etc. So 
there was very little activity in terms of any potential threat from those with a 
Muslim, later to be known as Al-Qaeda background, despite the fact there had 
been an attack in east Africa on American embassies in 1998... It was not until 
the attack on July 7th 2005 that people realized there had been a genuine shift, 
it wasn’t just a shift in perception. There had been a definite shift in the 
radicalisation of those born and brought up here.16 
                                                
14 E. Manningham-Butler, ‘The International Terrorist Threat to the UK.’ Speech 
given at Queen Mary's College, November 9, 2006, 
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/who-we-are/staff-and-management/director-
general/speeches-by-the-director-general/the-international-terrorist-threat-to-the-
uk.html, (accessed 12th November 2014) 
15 Ibid. 
16 Blunkett Author Interview 
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Asked directly whether the 2003 fertilizer plot (which involved British Muslims with 
a long term participation in the fundamentalist movement) was seen as a wake-up call, 
David Blunkett replied somewhat candidly, ‘Well it wasn’t, is the honest truth.’17 
Despite evidence showing a clear conspiracy in which Islamic fundamentalists in the 
UK had actively sought to carry out a bombing campaign targeting British citizens, 
ministers continued to focus externally, in particular, the alleged threat posed by 
President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein. The absence in Whitehall of any serious 
recognition concerning the threat posed by the fundamentalist movement before 2005, 
contrasts with comments made by the former head of counter terrorism, Peter Clarke. 
Strikingly, in a 2007 documentary investigating the London bombers, he remarks: 
‘amongst his colleagues in the years leading up to the event, it was a question of when 
London would be attacked by home-grown terrorists rather than if’.18 The implication 
is that before 7/7, there existed a disconnect, specifically between the government and 
some elements of the security services, in terms of the threat posed by the UK Islamic 
fundamentalist movement.  
It would be incorrect to say the British government did not at least partially 
recognise the role of extremist preachers prior 2005. However, the widely publicised 
detention of Abu Qatada and Abu Hamza Al-Masri were largely symbolic rather than 
a sincere attempt to disrupt the organisation of fundamentalist Muslims in the UK. 
Ministers considered overt verbal support for Al-Qaeda by preachers to be a public 
relations disaster. Arresting certain high profile individuals therefore, was more about 
building public confidence than actually challenging fundamentalism. Blunkett 
acknowledges this when he comments: 
I think there are at times just let me emphasise this, there are times when you 
have to be seen to take action. Not because it is a meaningless gesture, but if 
you don’t the public lose faith in the fact, you are not addressing what appear 
to be in your face issues, provocation. And if you don’t do that then the media 
start writing that its all out of control, that you don’t give a damn, that you are 
                                                
17 Ibid. 
18 P. Taylor, ‘Generation Jihad’, [online audio], BBC World Service, 5th April 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/documentaries/2010/03/100302_generation_jihad
_part_one.shtml, (accessed 11th November 2011) 
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easy on them, that you are so liberal that they can get away with anything. 
And therefore, you have to act in order to build secure confidence.19 
Therefore, until 2005, government action against the fundamentalist movement 
focused predominantly on outspoken preachers. Policy makers were yet to appreciate 
the various elements and inner workings of the movement and how men like Abu 
Qatada and Abu Hamza Al-Masri constituted only part of the overall problem. 
Accordingly, following the London Bombings, government perception of the 
fundamentalist movement underwent a paradigm shift. The failed 21/7 bombers 
provided the British government with remarkable new details about the generation of 
these plots. Clear evidence of how the organisation of fundamentalist Muslims helped 
incubate the conspirators forced the government to act in order to disrupt the 
environment from which they had emerged. Preachers who openly glorified terrorism 
stood accused of directly influencing British born Islamic terrorists. Six days after the 
attacks, Tony Blair declared that new anti-terror laws would aim to ‘pull up this evil 
ideology by its roots’.20 After ten years of acting with impunity, the fundamentalist 
movement were now at the forefront of counter terrorism strategy. Objectives set out 
in the 2006 Labour Government PREVENT programme included the need to 
challenge violent extremist ideology, disrupt those who promote violent extremism 
and address the grievances, which ideologues are exploiting 21 Roughly translated, 
this meant a greater focus on challenging the political ideology of the fundamentalist 
movement and curtailing activities associated with extremist preachers. 
Elected in 2010, the Conservative & Liberal coalition accorded far more 
importance to the role of Islamic fundamentalism as an incubator of extremist 
terrorism. Speaking in Munich at the start of 2011, newly appointed Prime Minister, 
David Cameron, fully acknowledged the failure thus far to disrupt the environment 
from which terrorism and the foreign fighter problem have emerged, pledging reform 
                                                
19 Blunkett Author Interview 
20 S. Geffrey, ‘The glorification of terrorism’, The Guardian Online, 15th February 
2006, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/15/qanda.terrorism, (accessed 12th 
November 2014) 
21 Prevent is one of the four elements of CONTEST, the government’s counter-
terrorism strategy. See https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/protecting-the-uk-
against-terrorism/supporting-pages/prevent, (accessed 13th January 2015) 
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and a new approach.22 In contrast to the recent position taken by Blair however, 
Cameron continued to emphasize a narrative that shielded Islam as a whole, through 
the disassociation and the framing of terrorists as effectively ‘warped, entirely 
misguided Muslims’.23 The new Prime Minister did, however, hint at the political 
ideology of fundamentalist movement being at the heart of UK domestic terrorism, 
telling the audience of journalists, academics and policy makers: 
Nevertheless, we should acknowledge that this threat comes overwhelmingly 
from young men who follow a completely perverse and warped interpretation 
of Islam and who are prepared to blow themselves up and kill their fellow 
citizens. We have to get to the root of the problem. We need to be absolutely 
clear on where the origins of these terrorist attacks lie – and that is the 
existence of an ideology, 'Islamist extremism'.24 
Referred to by Cameron as “Islamist extremism”, what he is actually discussing is the 
political ideology of the Islamic fundamentalist movement. It is the various 
constituent narratives ranging from the adoption of Shariah to the legitimacy of jihad, 
which are at odds with western democracy and are responsible for radicalizing 
potential terrorists. Later in the speech, Cameron appears more aligned with Blair in 
securitizing those who “accept” parts of the political ideology associated with 
fundamentalism even if they themselves do not engage in it. Far more appreciative of 
the problem, he notes that “sympathizers” exist on the same spectrum as terrorists 
even if they reject violence: 
Islamist extremism is a political ideology, supported by a minority. At the 
furthest end are those who back terrorism to promote their ultimate goal: an 
entire Islamist realm, governed by an interpretation of sharia. Move along the 
spectrum, and you find people who may reject violence, but who accept 
various parts of the extremist worldview including real hostility towards 
western democracy and liberal values. 25 
                                                
22 D. Cameron, ‘Speech on radicalisation and Islamic extremism’, 5th February 2011, 
http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/02/terrorism-islam-ideology, 
(accessed 21st November 2014) 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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In proposing the concept of an “extremist spectrum”, Cameron clearly recognizes the 
universe of fundamentalism and how a small minority support terrorist violence even 
if they themselves would not directly undertake it. Although Islamic fundamentalists 
who commit terrorism may well be in the minority, all committed members of the 
fundamentalist movement possess the necessary mindset that might one day lead them 
to cross the line and volunteer as suicide bombers. Concluding his speech, Cameron 
highlights how non-violent “extremists” have overwhelming influenced terrorists and 
thus the challenge lies in disrupting the environment from which they emerge:  
As evidence emerges about the backgrounds of those convicted of terrorist 
offences, it is clear that many of them were initially influenced by what some 
have called 'nonviolent extremists' and then took those radical beliefs to the 
next level by embracing violence…if we are to defeat this threat, I believe it's 
time to turn the page on the failed policies of the past. So first, instead of 
ignoring this extremist ideology, we as governments and societies have got to 
confront it, in all its forms. 26 
The overall thesis presented in this dissertation argues the term “non-violent 
extremists” represent the majority of fundamentalist Muslims in the UK. Without the 
nurturing environment they provide, there is good reason to argue the flow of 
potential terrorists would eventually dissipate. Cameron fully concedes this 
proposition, going forward he believes both government and society at large have a 
role to play in disrupting the fundamentalist movement: 
First, confronting and undermining the fundamentalist ideology. Whether they 
are violent in their means or not, we must make it impossible for the 
extremists to succeed. For governments, there are obvious ways we can do 
that. We must ban preachers of hate from coming to our countries. We must 
also proscribe organizations that incite terrorism – against people at home and 
abroad. Governments must also be shrewder in dealing with those that, while 
not violent, are certainly, in some cases, part of the problem. 27 
Challenging the extremist ideology is now at the heart of British counter terrorism 
policy. However, although Cameron talks about banning preachers of hate, he offers 
                                                
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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little indication of what constitutes hate and what should therefore be challenged. 
Within Islamic fundamentalism, hate is not necessarily what is being promoted. The 
radicalization process is not designed to turn Muslims against the west per se, rather it 
is there to help them recognize the role of Islam as a supreme way of life and 
therefore something to actively promote universally. According to fundamentalists, 
when the world is governed entirely by Sharia, there will be no more war, famine or 
injustice. Consequently, acts of terrorism are borne out of the belief held by 
fundamentalists that Islam is being constrained due to western fears that a Caliphate 
might rival capitalist hegemony.  
In order to prevent further acts of terrorism in the UK, Cameron suggests a 
less tolerant, less inclusive approach. Giving little weight to the suggestion that a 
change in foreign policy might be the most rational solution, the government is no 
longer focused on appeasement, but rather on defeating fundamentalist political 
ideology by challenging its core political narratives at home. Calling on society to join 
the government in ridding the UK of Islamic fundamentalism, Cameron has said of 
the political ideology that has helped motivate British Muslims to volunteer for jihad 
in Syria: 
We need to confront it with confidence. Confront the ideology that drives it by 
defeating the ideas that warp so many minds at their root. And confront the 
issues of identity that sustain it by standing for a much broader and generous 
vision of citizenship in our countries. None of this will be easy. We need 
stamina, patience and endurance. And it won't happen at all if we act alone. 28 
The solution presented by Cameron appears to be a resolute end to the passive 
tolerance of the fundamentalist movement concomitant with actively promoting 
western values. But neither Blair, nor Brown nor Cameron have been clear about what 
this means in practice. Having demonstrated the gradual recognition by successive 
British government of the significance of the Islamic fundamentalist movement as an 
incubator of terrorism, we look now at how this has translated into practical action 
with respect to policy initiatives, legislation and lastly front line services. Having 
thoroughly examined the progressive recognition of the threat posed by Islamic 
fundamentalism, the next section considers policy initiatives introduced by successive 
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governments designed to challenge, disrupt and dismantle the networks responsible 
for encouraging British Muslims to pursue terrorism. 
Policy Initiatives 
Until the London bombings in 2005, there were no specific policy initiatives designed 
to disrupt the organisation or activities of Islamic fundamentalist Muslims in the UK. 
Following the 2001 terrorist attack in New York, the government developed and 
shortly afterwards in 2003, introduced a comprehensive counter terrorism strategy 
known formally as CONTEST.29 This was organised around four key strands:  
• Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks 
• Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism 
• Protect: to strengthen our protection against terrorist attacks 
• Prepare: where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact 
Considered a “soft measure”, the least developed element (upon its initial release) was 
“Prevent”. Notwithstanding the failed 2004 “fertilizer bomb plot”, ministers were 
seemingly ignorant of how Islamic fundamentalism served as an incubator for “home 
grown terrorism”. 30  However, when four British Muslims carried out the first 
contemporary domestic suicide bombing in 2005, the need to understand and target 
factors driving radicalisation became immediately apparent. Seven home office 
working groups, operating under the banner “preventing extremism together”, 
developed a series of practical recommendations designed to challenge the core 
                                                
29 Home Office, ‘Project CONTEST: The Government’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy’, 
UK Parliament, September 2009, http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/cm77/7703/7703.pdf, (accessed 13th January 2015) 
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fundamentalist movement. 31 In 2007, the government issued a revised version of 
“Prevent”, backing new measures with funding of around £140m per year. 32  
In this new counter-radicalisation era, various community-based projects 
received financial assistance to challenge the core political narratives promoted by 
extremist preachers 33  Despite its ambitious and well-meaning intentions, the 
“Prevent” programme has been consistently plagued by criticism and accusations that 
it lacks credibility and a sincere appreciation of what motivates British Muslims to 
pursue terrorism. Giving little credence to the impact of foreign policy, prevent has 
sought to convince would be jihadists and potential terrorists that they are simply 
“misguided” and that true Muslims reject violence even in defence of co-religionists.  
In 2010, a committee of cross party politicians warned that “Prevent” had stigmatised 
and alienated the very individuals it sought to engage.34 More damming in their 
critique, the committee suggested the entire project had backfired and it was difficult 
to know what good it was doing - if any. 35  
By contrast, one of the most controversial policy initiatives heavily pursued in 
2014, has involved the confiscation of British passports. Troubled by the terrorist 
threat posed by returning jihadists, ministers have sought to deny anyone suspected of 
engaging in terrorism either at home or abroad, the ability to travel freely. For Islamic 
fundamentalists resident in the UK, it has made it difficult for them to pursue jihad in 
Syria. Of greater concern to civil liberties groups however, are the cases in which 
individuals already fighting abroad have been prevented from returning to the UK.  
Between 2005 and 2012, the British government confiscated the passports of 
                                                
31 Home Office, ‘Preventing Extremism Together: Report and Government 
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approximately twenty individuals accused of engaging in terrorism. At present, this 
pre-emptive policy designed to prevent potential suicide bombers returning to the UK 
is restricted to those with dual nationality. However, in 2013, Home Secretary Teresa 
May announced her intention to find a way around international rules in order to 
revoke British citizenship, even if it meant leaving terrorist suspects effectively 
stateless.36 In the 17th report of the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee on 
Counter-terrorism, government identifies the withdrawal of passports as a vital tool in 
preventing UK citizens from travelling to foreign conflicts.37 MPs expressed surprise 
that although the number of foreign fighters leaving the UK for Syria is estimated to 
be in the low hundreds, this measure has been used only 14 times since April 2013. 
The initiative of removing passports from potential foreign fighters resident in 
the UK has been controversial. It follows the embarrassing disappearance of two 
individuals subject to control orders (TPIM’s) restricting their movement and 
interaction.38 Opposition MP Diane Abbott rejects the entire government policy on the 
confiscation of passports, noting how the debate around “citizenship-stripping” 
operates contrary to the common law presumption of innocence. Speaking publically 
on the issue, Abbot has said, ‘we are talking about terror suspects. Nowadays in 
Parliament, saying suspected someone of terrorist activity is enough for the political 
class to assume that that person does not deserve due processes.’39 On reflection, it is 
important to recognise that individuals engaged in the Islamic fundamentalist 
movement often gain the terrorist label despite having no intention to commit 
violence against non-combatants. Persons subjected to control orders have in the 
majority of cases engaged in nothing more than the dissemination of fundamentalist 
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literature. Even the strongest cases are often based on nothing more than the mere 
association of individuals with a spectre of an alleged link to a terrorist organisation 
e.g. Al-Qaeda.  
Preventing British Muslims from pursuing Jihad may on the surface appear an 
effective element of any overall counter terrorism strategy. However, proscribing an 
individual’s perceived religious duty creates the potential for “home grown” 
terrorism. Frustrated by the inability to participate in Jihad and inspired by extremist 
literature encouraging them to ‘do what they can where they can’, British 
fundamentalist Muslims may decide to act unilaterally, resulting in acts of terrorism 
including lone wolf style attacks involving nothing more than weapons found in the 
home e.g. knifes and axes. In extreme cases, society may be threatened by the 
deployment of improvised explosive devices targeting public spaces. Consequently, if 
a UK resident is deemed so great a risk as to have their passport confiscated, then 
additional measures discussed below in the final section of this chapter must also be 
considered. 
In May 2013, a prominent member of the Islamic fundamentalist movement 
murdered an off-duty soldier outside his barracks in South East London. For several 
years, Michael Adebalajo appears to have been active in the fundamentalist 
movement. He attended demonstrations, recruited new members and like many of his 
peers, sought to pursue Jihad overseas. Responding to this textbook example of how 
the fundamentalist movement incubates terrorism, the British government announced 
a specific new policy in which they would use civil powers to disrupt the Islamic 
fundamentalist movement. Prime Minister David Cameron suggested new special 
“Anti-Social Behaviour Orders” (ASBO’s) provided the solution necessary to disrupt 
the organisation of fundamentalists and curtail their activities.40 Referred to in the 
media as “extremism disruption orders”, the proposed new sanction would be issued 
to individuals by a high court judge based on a balance of probabilities rather than the 
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stronger, historic legal test of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. Subsequently, civil servants 
identified twenty-five preachers who they planned to effectively silence. 41  
BBC News journalist, Dominic Casciani notes that for many years, ministers 
and policymakers argued over the response to fundamentalism because neither have 
ever been entirely sure of how to define the term.42 According to the Home Office, in 
the domain of religiously motivated terrorism, Islamism presents the most threatening 
to Western values, interests and society.43 Consequently, the new “extremism asbo” 
based on a revised definition of “extremism” is due to include opposition to western 
values of democracy and human rights: specifically it will target anyone seeking to 
direct British Muslims towards fundamentalism. Former Attorney General, Dominic 
Grieve, QC has expressed concerns about the proposed new powers to challenge 
extremism, suggesting that it could result in the prosecution of individuals simply for 
expressing a point of view. 44 At this stage it is unclear how the orders might work in 
practice and whether they would be used against persons who legitimately claim to be 
doing nothing more than citing Islamic scripture. Perhaps the most flawed assumption 
of this new policy is the continued emphasis on top down radicalisation. There is little 
to suggest that self-radicalisation through the Internet and within closed networks 
would be in any way impacted by this new measure. 
Legislation 
Even before the major terrorist attacks on 9/11 and 7/7, legislation designed to prevent 
the funding of Irish paramilitaries ultimately impacted on members of the 
fundamentalist movement. The Terrorism Act 2000 was perhaps the most significant 
legislative change for decades and made it a criminal offence to raise funds for any 
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group proscribed by the British government.45 Theoretically, this put an end to the 
flow of vital money from Pakistani Muslims in Birmingham to Kashmiri insurgents, 
an activity that was overt and commonplace in Mosques during the 1990s. However, 
several convictions in respect of “terrorist fundraising” demonstrate how the practice 
continued unabated. After 2001, the primary destination of financial support shifted 
towards Afghanistan; members of the fundamentalist movement regularly sent 
finance and later equipment including night vision goggles to mujahedeen fighters.  
In 2014, fundamentalist movement preacher Abu Hamza Al-Masri stood trial 
in the US in relation to the kidnap of tourists in Yemen in 1998. Despite his many 
years of promoting jihad thus helping to maintain an environment conducive to 
terrorism, in the UK his sole charge (in 2004) under the Terrorism Act was for the 
possession of an “illegal” document. Found at his home, the Encyclopaedia of the 
Afghani Jihad contained information ‘of a kind likely to be useful to a person 
committing or preparing an act of terrorism’. At the time of his initial arrest, there was 
no law against encouraging individuals to pursue violence abroad. MI5 officers 
approached Al-Masri in 1997 informing him that his speeches did not currently break 
the law. 46 Following the introduction of the Terrorism Act 2000, MI5 and Police 
Special Branch shifted their position slightly advising Masri he was walking on a 
tightrope, albeit there was no specific instruction to stop.47 Subsequently, preachers 
like Masri would continue for many more years promoting fundamentalist ideology 
before witnessing any kind of government clampdown.  
In 2005, lawyers suggested that under existing legislation, it would be difficult 
to prosecute fundamentalist preachers thought to be inspiring future terrorists. 
Leading human rights solicitor, Geoffrey Bindman, argued at the time that apparent 
support for suicide bombing and calls for Muslims to install terror into the hearts of 
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nonbelievers might not be specific enough to warrant criminal proceedings. 48 
Implying the possibility of prosecution under laws prohibiting the solicitation of 
murder, however, Bindham suggested that if preachers told followers to go out and 
blow themselves up on crowded tube stations, this might constitute an offence and 
they could be prosecuted accordingly. 49 Commenting on the subject in 2005, Duncan 
Lamont, senior partner at a leading UK law firm has observed that preachers are 
intelligent people who are very careful about what they say and do.50  
By introducing the Terrorism Act 2005, lawmakers sought to address the 
complicated issue of what ministers now judged to be the glorification of terrorism. 51 
Responding to the new law, Lamont suggested that Omar Bakri’s description of the 
7/7 Bombers as the “fantastic four” and comments made by Abu Izzadeen about the 
destruction of tall buildings would most likely fall foul of this new legislation.52 
Specifically, Lamont argues that ‘if you could satisfy a jury that he [Izzadeen] meant 
9/11, then under what is proposed you have him bang to rights’. 53 Yet government 
were not entirely powerless before the new laws were introduced.. For example, in 
2003, prosecutors successfully convicted Abdullah el-Faisal (though to have 
radicalised the London bombers) under the 1861 Offences against the Person Act. 54 
Evidence in court showed that he had solicited the murder of Jews, Hindus and 
Americans within sermons delivered at various fundamentalist movement events 
across the country.  
In addition to restricting the glorification of terrorism, the Terrorism Act 2005 
also introduced a new measure designed to significantly curtail the liberty of persons 
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suspected of being involved in terrorism.55 Known as “control orders”, anyone 
subjected, faced restrictions including where they lived, whom they associated with as 
well as access to communication devices etc. In April 2006, the Administrative Court 
ruled the review procedure for control orders incompatible with article 6 of the 
European convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Home Secretary at the time Charles 
Clarke rejected the finding, claiming the legislation to be fully compliant with the 
ECHR as it contained rigorous safeguards to protect the rights of individuals.56 
Following a change in government in 2010, the Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures Act 2011 eventually replaced control orders. The updated 
legislation provides new powers to allow the Home Secretary to impose sanctions on 
the behaviour of a specified individual via means of a TPIM notice. The main 
difference between a TPIM and a control order is that the former has a maximum 
length of two years while the latter could be rolled over year on year without limit. 
While control orders could be imposed on reasonable suspicion of involvement in 
terrorism; TPIMs required reasonable belief. Persons subject to a TPIM notice are 
entitled to use a phone and a computer albeit with both activities closely monitored by 
the Security Services.  
The most controversial issue in respect to TPIMs compared with control 
orders has been the removal of a power allowing terrorist suspects to be relocated. 
Both MI5 and counter terrorism police argued that relocation has served as an 
effective means of disrupting networks concentrated in a particular area. By relocating 
facilitators and preventing them from communicating with other fundamentalists, it 
made absconding and support for the pursuit of overseas jihad far more difficult. 
David Anderson, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, makes the 
importance of relocation clear in his 2014 report. Having examined use of the 
measure within the previous control orders, he notes, ‘a power to relocate subjects 
away from their home areas would be of real practical assistance to the police and 
MI5 in distancing subjects from their associates and reducing the risk of abscond. It 
would also facilitate monitoring, save money and could help restore faith in a TPIM 
regime that has withered on the vine’.57 Anderson concludes by commenting that after 
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having read his report, the government had decided to re-introduce the power of 
relocation within the counter-terrorism and security bill currently awaiting Royal 
Assent as of January 2015.58 Suggesting there has been a significant game change due 
to the number of British fundamentalist Muslims fighting in Syria, London 
Metropolitan Police chief Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe told the BBC in August 2014 
that: ‘measures similar to control orders should be re-introduced to tackle the threat 
from Britons who fight with militants in Syria and Iraq’.59 The problem with TPIMs 
he argues is that they cannot force a terrorist suspect to live in a specific location, ‘and 
that puts quite a lot of responsibility on all the security services’. 60 
Front Line Services 
Until 2006, the remit of Police Counter Terrorism investigations fell to the Anti-
Terrorist Branch (SO13) and Special Branch (SO12). Prompted by the devastating 
events of July 7th 2005, these two organisations merged to form a new counter 
terrorism unit. Today, Counter Terrorism Command (CTC) also known as SO15 
employs over 1,500 Police Officers and staff as well as a number of investigators 
based overseas, in particular Pakistan. Discussing operational priorities in terms of 
Islamic fundamentalist terrorism before 7/7, former SO15 commander Richard 
Walton comments: 
Investigations of any London based Islamists only occurred at the behest of 
Foreign Governments - Operation Challenge is an example of this. The most 
common investigations involved the GIA. Locations associated with calls to 
pursue terrorism, for example, The Four Feathers social club and Finsbury 
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Park Mosque were not a priority at the time and there was little attempt to 
monitor activities going on behind their closed doors.61 
The events of 9/11 also led to a greater level of information sharing between Security 
Services both domestically and internationally. Due to a fear this attack would lead to 
the start of a long-term Irish style bombing campaign, the number of British police 
officers dedicated to investigating Islamic fundamentalist terrorism increased 
tenfold.62 Almost immediately, Counter terrorism officers at Scotland Yard developed 
a greater understanding of Islamism and began to recognize that fundamentalist 
preachers and facilitators were helping to construct an environment that would 
eventually lead to Islamic terrorism plots within the UK.63  
Walton has explained that after London bombings in 2005, it became possible to 
disrupt more attempts to pursue terrorism because of an overwhelming increase in 
resources available to his unit, SO15.64  Although British Muslims continued to travel 
to the tribal areas of Pakistan for training, facilitated by experienced handlers in the 
UK, SO15 now held a far greater insight and more intelligence on these visits due to 
an increase in the number of Police informants within the Muslim community. 
Controversially, after 7/7, the intelligence and security services began profiling 
individuals suspected of involvement in the fundamentalist movement. Stop and 
Search, undercover investigations, and border agency questioning were all now 
focused on those with the potential to cross the line and pursue terrorism. The three 
UK intelligence and security service gave Islamic extremism a higher priority and 
their budgets broadly doubled between 2002 and 2006.65 Blunkett acknowledges this 
broad approach to profiling terrorist suspects and communities took place and 
suspects that under the surface and despite opposition from liberty groups, it 
continues to this day. 66 Reflecting on the difficult balance between security and 
justice faced policy makers, Blunkett adds, ‘if a particular community is host to a 
particular form of terrorism, then you are bound to profile that particular diaspora, and 
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when you do, you are accused of discriminating in a way that is almost 
unavoidable’.67  
Seven months after the London bombings, in January 2006, MI5 announced plans to 
recruit an additional 200 officers, the majority of whom would be devoted entirely to 
countering the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalists based in the UK. Commenting 
in 2009, Patrick Mercer MP, the chair of the Home Affairs sub-committee on 
terrorism told The Daily Telegraph that the September 11 attack in New York should 
have been a catalyst for drastic expansion of the security services. Yet ‘it took an 
attack on this country for such measures to be started.68 Mr Mercer was responding to 
allegations that in the wake of the London bombings, MI5 inadvertently recruited up 
to six al-Qaeda sympathisers as part its rapid expansion plans.   
Following the comprehensive examination above of how progressive 
governments have sought to challenge the fundamentalist movement, the final section 
of this chapter presents a series of policy recommendations. Suggestions put forth by 
the author seek to build upon the existing counter terrorism framework discussed 
above which has been continuously developed and reworked over the last ten years. 
Shutting down the Facilitation Networks 
The terrorism Act 2006 made it a criminal offence for a British citizen to attend any 
kind of training camp operated by a proscribed organisation. Merely stepping foot 
inside such a camp is enough to warrant a prison sentence of up to ten years. In 
practice it is very difficult to prove any offence has taken place due to the often-
lawless nature of areas where training and fighting take place. With a significant 
number of British Muslims travelling to Pakistan every year to visit family, marry and 
attend religious schools (Madrassas), detecting and disrupting those intent on 
pursuing jihad has generally proved difficult. However, due to an increase in the 
number of informants and greater co-operation with Pakistani security forces since 
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2005, the security services now possess far more intelligence on the activity.69 
Consequently, today, the police and border agency will either stop recruits on their 
way out (due to a tip off) or if this fails, prevent trained jihadists from returning to the 
UK by cancelling their citizenship wherever possible.70 
Former Home Secretary David Blunkett has said that during his time in office, 
attempts to shut down the pipelines between the UK and Pakistan proved largely 
unsuccessful. He acknowledges that in retrospect, his administration could have done 
much more - both in terms of disrupting the networks but also in finding out who was 
behind them. Reflecting more generally on the situation in light of the 2013 Edward 
Snowdon fiasco, Blunkett comments: 
The presumption would have been that you identified where the problem was 
and you took them out. Now we live in a much more transparent and 
concerned world actually at the moment. People worry about what GCHQ or 
you know the equivalent across the, the NSA are up to. Actually, we have 
never been in a more transparent situation than we are today.71 
Blunkett suggests that due to increased oversight, the British government can no 
longer adopt controversial methods to disrupt the facilitation and training process. 
Unsurprisingly and despite the aggressive war on terror, British Muslims continue to 
gain the military training needed to pursue jihad. While camps operated by Al-Qaeda 
have certainly declined, Kashmiri insurgent groups in Pakistan continue to welcome 
new recruits from the UK. The seemingly never-ending dispute between Pakistan and 
India over the future of Kashmir ensures that Islamic insurgents continue to operate 
with impunity. As fundamentalist Muslims, they are religiously obliged to facilitate 
individuals travelling from the UK who express a desire to fight for the cause.  
Since 2010, the Syrian civil war has become the number one destination for 
those seeking to pursue jihad. In contrast with Kashmir and Pakistan that have largely 
lost favour amongst fundamentalists, British Muslims now find it much easier to 
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simply travel to Turkey where they are easily able to cross the border into Syria. Due 
to the extensive nature of social media, there is a growing amount of primary data 
showing how British Muslims have trained with various insurgent groups such as Al 
Nusra and the Islamic State and are now fighting on the front line. So concerned are 
the British government over their ability to shut down the facilitation network 
between the UK and Syria that in 2014, prosecutors warned Britons who joined the 
civil war, they would face prosecution and potential life sentences on their return.72  
Policy Recommendations 
Reflecting on the implications of the main arguments in the thesis, this final section 
concludes with a set of balanced policy recommendations. The emphasis must be on 
how to challenge the Islamic fundamentalist environment from which UK domestic 
terrorism carried out by British Muslims has emerged. While the threat of terrorism, 
in particular that posed by returning British jihadists from Syria is indeed severe, it is 
important that the foundations upon which western society are based i.e. freedom, 
democracy and liberty, are not compromised in the relentless pursuit of national 
security. To do so would invite the question of what exactly it is that the intelligence 
and security community are seeking to protect in the first place. Dostoevsky once 
wrote, 'you can judge a society by how well it treats its prisoners’.73 
Counter-terrorism measures can be counter-productive. In December 2014, a 
senior official within the Islamic State (IS) explained to the Guardian newspaper, ‘if 
there was no American prison in Iraq, there would be no IS now. Bucca was a factory. 
It made us all. It built our ideology.’74 Discussing the treatment of Muslims detainees 
in Iraq at locations such as the Bucca prison, special aide to all US ambassadors, Ali 
Khedery, has commented that even top American officers came to believe the prisons 
had ‘actually become radicalising elements and were being used to plan and organise, 
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to appoint leaders and launch operations.’ 75 In preventing the next generation of 
British fundamentalist extremist terrorists, policy makers must not compromise on the 
values that distinguish good citizens from those who would harm innocent civilians. 
In response to the death of soldier Lee Rigby in May 2013, the British 
Government launched a new counter-extremism taskforce.76 Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, charged the group with examining the range of powers currently available 
for “dealing” with individuals responsible for promoting an ideology alleged to 
inspire terrorism. Established thinking on the subject of “top down radicalisation”, 
suggests that to avoid prosecution, preachers will act merely as signposts and 
interpreters of the Holy Quran and the Hadiths.77 In defending their claims to freedom 
of speech, preachers argue that God commands Muslims to defend themselves and co-
religionists and as such, they are merely instruments of his will. Therefore, to silence 
them, is to silence the word of God. Consequently, the taskforce sought to identify 
areas where the current approach had failed and to agree practical steps in order to 
fight against all forms of extremism without encroaching on freedom of speech and 
freedom of religion.  
One of the key findings established in the UK counter extremism task force 
report published in December 2013, underlines the central thesis outlined in this 
dissertation. In particular that, ‘it is often too easy for preachers and groups to spread 
extremist views which can lead people into terrorism, while at the same time being 
careful not to contravene existing laws on incitement to violence or glorifying 
terrorism.’ 78 In recognition of this, policy makers confront the problem of how to 
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disrupt the fundamentalist environment without limiting individual liberty, or how to 
find a balance between challenging narratives that promote terrorism while protecting 
the heart of liberal democracy. Before answering this important question, it is 
necessary to firstly recap on what this author has previously discussed in terms of the 
radicalisation process. Two distinct pathways may lead an individual towards 
pursuing terrorism. Firstly, radicalisation can be thought of as a process of personal 
development whereby an individual adopts ever more extreme political or politic-
religious ideas and goals, becoming convinced that the attainment of these goals 
justifies extreme methods.79 Secondly, there exists a top down approach in which 
second-generation British Muslims and new converts are seduced by the fiery 
speeches of radical preachers such as Omar Bakri Mohammed’.80  
The latter pathway has been responsible for the majority of British Muslims 
who have progressed from moderate to fundamentalist to extremist terrorist. Within 
fundamentalist discourse, ideologues present a real life scenario designed to evoke 
strong, painful emotions amongst their audience. Common examples include the 
occupation of Palestine and the “Shock and Awe” bombing campaign that began the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. The writer or speaker will then quote either a particular verse 
in the Quran where Allah has issued a command or a narration in the Hadith 
describing what the Prophet Mohammed said or did. Connecting the two together, the 
aim of the fundamentalist preacher is to encourage Muslims to recognise and accept a 
specific Islamic response to the situation they first outlined. For example, if western 
soldiers occupy Muslim land, then God has commanded they be removed. Preachers 
may not themselves encourage violence in order to achieve this, but will instead urge 
the audience to ask, ‘what would the Prophet Mohammed have done in such a 
situation?’ When accused of inciting terrorism, the defence will argue the defendant 
has simply acted as a signpost to material already in the public domain. 
Freedom of Speech 
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In light of the events in Paris in early 2015, Islamic fundamentalists asked why they 
are not afforded the same rights as those who insult their religion.  Freedom of speech 
protection in Europe and North America is extremely strong. Rightly or wrongly, the 
“show and tell” style of laying the foundations for radicalisation appears safeguarded 
and is beyond reproach. Directing followers to verses in the Quran or the Hadith is not 
and should not be a criminal offence. However, what happens next, the actual 
radicalisation process, has rightly become the target of government intervention. 
Fundamentalist preachers will supplement religious text and or personally interpret 
elements out of context or selectively in a manner largely rejected by the majority of 
non-fundamentalist Muslims. For example, Jordanian cleric Abu Qatada and the late 
Osama Bin Laden both raised the highly charged issue of American troops stationed 
in the Arab Peninsula.  
When the first Gulf War concluded in 1991, a significant number of foreign 
troops remained. Determined to build up opposition to this perceived blasphemy, the 
two staunch fundamentalists invited fellow Muslims to consider what the Prophet 
thought about foreign troops on Muslim lands. According to the Hadith, Mohammed 
instructed that no two religions might exist in the Arab Peninsula. Therefore, the 
implication given by this Hadith is that Christians and Jews must be banished. 
Contrasted with non-fundamentalists who might advocate diplomacy and negotiation 
as a way forward, Bin Laden and Qatada urged followers to pursue a more direct, 
more violent response through insurgency and terrorism. Fundamentalists were told to 
adhere to the will of Mohammed and undertake combative Jihad in order to cleanse 
the Arab region of all unbelievers. Diplomacy and non-violent protest are 
inappropriate western concepts ill-suited to the fundamentalist ideology. In support of 
their fatwa’s (Islamic rulings) Bin Laden and Qatada will again take out of context, 
supplement or deliberately misinterpret elements of Islamic doctrine in order to gain 
legitimacy for acts of terrorism.  
In light of the above discussion, how can the radicalisation process be 
disrupted without outlawing the primary sources upon which extremist material is so 
often based? Certainly, there is no suggestion the government treat the Quran or the 
Hadiths as “extremist literature” and thus proscribe them as articles considered useful 
in the preparation of terrorism. What then is the solution? This author recommends 
the introduction of legislation that makes “reckless interpretation” of religious 
doctrine a criminal offence. For a successful conviction, prosecutors must establish 
Page 335 of 370 
that a defendant knowingly cited text such in a way that any reasonable person would 
be encouraged to commit an offence outlawed by the terrorism acts 2000 and 2006. In 
short, what is being suggested is a kind of ‘pre-cursor’ criminal offence, one that 
tackles the political ideology responsible for inspiring British Muslims to engage in 
terrorism. For example, in respect of American soldiers stationed in the Arab 
Peninsula, if fundamentalist preacher Qatada taught his followers that the Prophet 
Mohammed forbids two religions in the region and therefore it is their duty to speak 
out verbally and by way of demonstration, this would be acceptable. However, for 
him to discuss the situation within the same narrative in which America is accused of 
murdering women and children and to conclude by stating that God has commanded 
every able Muslim to retaliate through the pursuit of jihad: this could surely be argued 
in court as having the sole purpose of inciting a person to commit terrorism. 
Internet  
Published in Nov 2014, the Intelligence Select Committee (ISC) report into the killing 
of Soldier Lee Rigby, noted how MI5 pays little attention to threats made online.81 In 
oral evidence given by the Director General to the ISC concerning online threats of 
terrorism, he made it clear that ‘… those sorts of things said, and worse, on these sorts 
of [sites] are very common…the vast majority of it translates into no action at all.’82 
Consequently, the idea that radicalisation can be disrupted through simply increasing 
the amount of resources charged with ‘policing’ the Internet is misplaced and 
untenable. As soon as police investigate extremist material and remove it, new threats 
and new material quickly appears elsewhere. The Internet is too vast and anarchically 
structured to monitor or control; it should not therefore be the focus of counter 
terrorism strategy. Valuable resources must not be wasted on fire fighting the 
distribution of extremist material; one cannot disrupt the dissemination of ideas, 
especially given the increasing availability and anonymity of Internet access. 
Providing alternative narratives to extremist material online is important, but this 
strategy can only hope to achieve success if pushed directly to individuals before they 
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have become radicalised. It is unlikely that someone reading for example Inspire 
magazine, would suddenly decide to navigate to a website where Islamic scholars 
contradict testimony given in the publication. If the government is to maintain a 
website that challenges fundamentalist ideology, then initiatives must also be put in 
place to encourage members of the Muslim community at risk of radicalisation to 
explore such material, before they look for answers elsewhere on forums populated by 
Islamic fundamentalists. Whether this should be incorporated into the school 
curriculum remains a controversial question and few teachers in primary or secondary 
schools have been comfortable with the “Prevent” agenda.   
Disrupting the organisation of Fundamentalist Muslims 
Without the environment socially constructed by the organisation of British 
fundamentalist Muslims, the political ideology that encourages the pursuit of jihad 
would be disrupted. To be radicalised, it is insufficient for a person simply to read 
“extremist literature” on the Internet. Respected academic Peter Neumann at Kings 
College London explains that: ‘Self-radicalisation and self-recruitment via the 
Internet with little or no relation to the outside world rarely happens, and there is no 
reason to suppose that this situation will change in the near future’.83 Fundamentalists 
must congregate freely amongst others who share the same ideas, each seeking to 
outbid the other in demonstrating commitment to the cause. Social bonds are a critical 
element of religious motivation and evidence suggests that British fundamentalist 
terrorists socialise within like-minded groups. 84 In particular, Silke has argued that 
‘recruits for jihad and terrorism always belong to the section of society that supports 
or shares the aims, grievances and ambitions of the terrorist group’. 85 Consequently, 
British counter terrorism strategy must focus on disrupting the organisation of 
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fundamentalist Muslims. Evidence presented in this dissertation clearly demonstrates 
that the UK Islamic fundamentalist environment incubates volunteers for jihad as well 
as a minority of extremist terrorists. Therefore, in order to prevent the next generation, 
the government must act decisively by isolating those individuals who call for the 
universal adoption of sharia and promote jihad as a legitimate means of self-defence. 
Where relocation is not possible, the government should enforce civil orders 
preventing the wide association with known fundamentalists.  
De-Radicalisation 
Terrorist suspects who are known to the security services for carrying out 
fundamentalist activities, must be forced to attend de-radicalisation programmes with 
non-compliance leading to strict control orders. While some observers have suggested 
that so called ‘de-radicalisation’ or ‘risk-reduction’ programmes have little impact, 
the Saudi Ministry of Interior has determined that out of 120 former Guantanamo Bay 
detainees who graduated from their de-radicalisation program, only 25 later returned 
to terrorist activities. In return for agreeing to participate in a government approved 
counter radicalisation programme, control orders would be relaxed or rescinded. In 
support of this, it should be noted that it is often the case (we know this from reading 
letters sent by convicted terrorists to the NGO Cage Prisoners) that British Muslims 
who volunteer for terrorism have only a very basic grasp of their faith. It is common 
for convicted terrorists to learn far more about their religion during their time 
incarcerated than they knew beforehand.  
Islamic fundamentalists cross the line and become terrorists not because of 
what they themselves read in the Quran, but more often, what others tell them it says. 
De-radicalisation should therefore be framed as Religious Education, compulsory for 
those who pass the threshold necessary to implement a control order. Having pursued 
jihad in Somalia, Michael Adebolajo had without question reached a stage whereby 
such intervention was both necessary and legitimate. Although not convicted of a 
criminal offence, he posed a clear and present danger to UK national security.  
Subjecting him to a control order would therefore have been a fair and reasonable 
balance between civil liberties and the need to protect society. Specifically, Adebolajo 
should have been forced to attend a de-radicalisation programme in order to challenge 
his extremist beliefs. Failure to comply would have led to increased restrictions 
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concerning his association with other fundamentalists, in particular his co-accused 
Michael Adebowale. 
In the particular case of Adebolajo, the ISC report notes how he appeared on 
the periphery of five unique investigations and yet there was no ‘cumulative effect’ 
causing an increase in his threat level. 86  This failure in the process has been 
recognised by the security services, with changes now agreed to ensure persistent 
suspects do now attract greater attention and resources. The report also notes that the 
intelligence community did not attempt to divert either of the individuals away from 
the fundamentalist pathway that led them to kill soldier Lee Rigby. In cases of 
individuals already incarcerated for terrorism offences, British counter terrorism 
policy must include the opportunity for them to engage in an approved de-
radicalisation programme. Fundamentalists, who turn their back on extremist political 
ideology, may be offered a reduction in their prison sentences. Put simply, if the 
opportunity afforded to the government from incarceration is not used to rehabilitate 
and challenge extremist ideas, then upon release, terrorists will almost certainly 
continue to engage in fundamentalist activities including most critically, the 
mobilisation of fellow Muslims. 
The Road Ahead 
The future landscape of UK domestic terrorism carried out by extreme British Islamic 
fundamentalists appears alarming. With an Islamic Caliphate now established in 
northern parts of Syria and Iraq, fundamentalists are revitalised by the seemingly 
genuine possibility of a world governed according to Sharia. Following the December 
2014 US senate report into “enhanced interrogation” that amongst other contentious 
highlights, documented the torture of Muslims at black sites around the world; it is 
more likely that reprisals both in the UK and around the world will follow.87 As of 
2015, the Islamic fundamentalist movement in the UK continues to thrive, evidenced 
by the continued number of British Muslims joining the ranks of the Islamic State in 
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87 J. Slack, ‘Shaming of the West and the Covert up of the British Role’, Daily Mail 
Online, 9th December 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
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their fight to overthrow President Assad and expand the Caliphate to encompass the 
whole of Iraq and Syria. Although harsh sentences given to British Muslims who have 
fought with ISIS might deter combatants from returning to the UK, they will do little 
to stop the radicalisation of a next generation sold on the idea of dying in order to 
protect the Islamic State. While the British government has proposed tougher anti-
terrorism laws, there is little reason to believe that the current wave of new measures 
will have any impact on disrupting the fundamentalist movement. As recently as 
December 2014, police charged six Islamic fundamentalists in London with carrying 
out the task of facilitation concerning a plot to smuggle British would be Jihadists to 
Syria. 88   
Britain will probably have to confront the difficult truth that it is not only fighting 
terrorism, it is fighting a wider ideology. Only by taking steps that significantly 
restrict the liberty of those involved in Islamic fundamentalism, can the British 
government hope to dismantle the environment from which domestic terrorism carried 
out by British Muslims has emerged. The monopoly of power – and indeed violence - 
must remain solely in the hands of the sovereign state, governments must not allow 
the organisation of non-state actors who promote a visceral political ideology and 
carry out activities designed to further the Manichean vision of a world dominated by 
a perverse interpretation of the Islamic faith.  
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